The first electoral campaign of Chavez

Yesterday was a holiday in Venezuela. Since it has been gutted of all its meaning as Chavez decided to make it the “day of indigenous resistance”, everyone will give it the meaning it wants, which becomes quickly a free day to go shopping or the beach. In my case I stayed home and rested from some dental work and thought about Chavez electoral problems. Now, they are not that bad, the guy after all has an unlimited supply of money (to campaign or buy votes), controls the media and the electoral system. But he does have some problems recently: money cannot buy happiness even if it can buy the presidency. A few weeks ago it seemed like Chavez would waltz in with 70% of the vote. Now it might even become a squeaker, seriously compromising his road to XXI socialism and his image in LatAm.

I decided that one of the reasons why this time Chavez is not setting the electoral agenda is, well, believe it or not, this is the first real campaign he has to run and he has no one to help him along. But to understand this one needs to make brief historical recap of Venezuelan electoral history.

The 1998 Campaign

Then Chavez arrived as a novelty. He did not even want to run for office but was convinced to do so before starting a civil resistance movement. The implication were quite simple: he run as an anti system candidate, with only a late political set up, the improvised MVR. But he had a campaign to run anyway: after all there is the need for constant press releases, for touring the country, for drafting meetings, rallies, marches, to bring at voting stations witnesses for your own side, etc…

I remember. That was my first year in San Felipe, fresh from many years in the US. When Chavez started climbing in polls he came through San Felipe. Well, guess what? It was the MAS who organized his campaign in Yaracuy. By 1998 there had been a certain regionalization of politics as COPEI and AD had to relinquish the control of some states. Thus the MAS was an important party in Yaracuy, as it was in Portuguesa, Aragua and Sucre. Or the Salas in Carabobo, or Causa R in Bolivar or the PPT elsewhere. Depending on where Chavez went, one of his political allies run the show. And thus Yaracuy was covered with the orange colored flags of the MAS to welcome Chavez.

But this was not all, for the national campaign Chavez counted on wizened guys that if they never managed to win an election had still run many campaigns and new how the job was done. These were folks like Miquilena, Rangel, to name the most important. They only needed a good candidate, a nice loudspeaker, and with Chavez they got it. Thus Chavez, as Woody Allen could have said, had just to show up at meetings to be a success.

The 1999 Campaigns

These had all a common factor: they were single issues event.

The first one was the 1999 constitutional referendum. The opposition, showing how incompetent it would become, decided that the referendum was illegal and thus they would not vote in it. Only 10% brave souls, included yours truly, did go anyway to vote NO to the calling of a new constitutional assembly.

By not voting in the referendum the opposition lost any reason to campaign for the Constitutional Assembly, and screwed by an undemocratic electoral system saw Chavez gain 97% of the seats with barely 60% of the vote (and a rising abstention).

The constitutional ratification was a little bit more fought but the opposition had surrendered initiative in April and by December it was too late to try to get it back. Still, there was “some” campaign but Chavez seemed too strong, was too strong of a leader and on his own he could manage the campaign and get a 70% of the votes, his highest percentage ever, by the way, in a campaign where he invested himself deeply.

That is, in 1999 there was no need for any massive electoral apparatus and the advice of people like Miquilena and the political machinery of 1998 was enough to roll through 1999 with Chavez limiting himself again to be the loud speaker.

The 2000 campaigns

The first one was for the re-legitimization of the elected bodies. Again, using what was left from the 1998-1999 runs, it was easy to propel ahead. With Arias making it a personal run it became an Arias versus Chavez personal battle where issues were never discussed. The result was predictable; Chavez got his first reelection. Yet the National Assembly managed to elect almost a third of opposition candidates. This was due to the fact that the old party machinery still existed and could put a fight at the local level: AD remained the main opposition party.

But there was a problem: the December 2000 referendum became also the first time Chavez lost an election while winning it. In an effort to boost participation for local elections and control townhalls from the opposition by bringing in chavista councilmen, Chavez called for an unnecessary and complex referendum on forcing a new electoral system for Venezuelan trade unions. This time he thought that just by giving the order people would vote for him anyway. That was a mistake. A weak campaign could of course not explain the reasons why to vote whereas the opposition made the referendum a symbol of resistance to the now increasing authoritarian regime. The abstention was massive and the result was gutted of all meaning. Chavez shut up and never brought the issue back. Soon enough the CTV held elections anyway and chavismo candidates were properly routed, not having an adequate machinery to run very complex trade union elections.

For the first time, although one can only see it today, Chavez showed that he was vulnerable if an election required a complex electoral machinery. The curse of messianic leaders.

The 2004 campaigns

By 2004 the political situation had considerably changed. The regime had shown its true colors, and the control of the electoral system had become the new weapon of chavismo. The opposition underestimated considerably the role of the sold out CNE and paid a dear price for it. In addition the opposition did not organize itself well for that election, did not run a proper campaign, falling into the trap that it was uniquely a popular contest on Chavez. Thus the campaign was a popular contest where the opposition was more worried discussing who would be the next president instead of working actively at unseating Chavez. The result is well known: Chavez won with 60%, be it legally or illegally, it does not matter, he won the political battle anyway.

The October 2004 regional elections were of course predictable: the opposition collapse allowed Chavez to take control of all but two states. However the observing eye could have detected a curious phenomenon: in Zulia Chavez would barely make a 53% and in the Metropolitan area of Caracas he would even lose. And in October in spite of a brutal campaign Zulia would remain in the opposition hands with 54% of the vote and a majority in the legislative council. The reason: Rosales, the governor of Zulia did manage a real campaign.

The 2005 campaigns

With the opposition entangled in the abstention inner fight, Chavez did not need to campaign much. The abstention reached historical heights and Chavez cashed up to 100% elected seats.

The 2006 campaign

For the first time Chavez is faced with a real campaign on the other side, and it shows! Rosales has been campaigning all of his life, hard campaigns at that. Let the reader remember that starting political life in Sur del Lago, an area rife with political patrons, caciques and drug overlords where political conflict are often settled with machete fights is the perhaps the toughest electoral school of Venezuela. Starting from there Rosales made it the top position in the biggest Venezuelan state. Nobody gave Rosales that position: he earned it the hard way. On the other hand a case could be made that the historical situation of Venezuela almost resulted in the country giving Chavez the presidential seat.

Thus for the first time ever Chavez has to face a real candidate. And apparently Chavez seems ill equipped for it. One reason is that all the people that were with him are mostly gone, or are all tired. The political wiz of Miquilena and the like have long been booted out of chavismo. Rangel is too busy running the country while his boss campaigns in Venezuela or abroad for a UN silly seat. And the small time political operators have been getting fat with governmental jobs or juicy contracts: they are not in the mood anymore to go and sweat in the streets to round up voters. See, this time it will be harder to rouse enthusiasm for Chavez: after 8 years in office people might still be willing to vote for him but there is really no reason to go and sweat it at political rallies and marches. The hunger for change now is inside the opposition.

Thus we are left with a Chavez that is bereft of an adequate campaign staff (can anyone seriously think that Ameliach is a politically savvy electoral operator?). In fact, more than ever Chavez electoral staff is the board of the CNE who is EXTREMELY lazy and complacent with all the electoral abuses now widely reported in the media. Chavez is alone to run his campaign and it shows: the time when being a good loudspeaker was enough is gone. Today Chavez must also defend his record and defending a rather lousy record without the appropriate staff, well, in any political system it is a hard job.

This is what happens when you create a system where the only way to rise to the top is to show devotional inclinations for the great leader. Few creatives can handle a system where they are not allowed to question the presidential agenda or his decisions. For the first time we see Chavez running in a real election on his own and it is not pretty so far.

We will see how it plays from here to December.