Just before folding in for the day I run across a Union Radio note on a recent Kerry declaration (which I could not find on Kerry blog, but not surprising since they surely cannot put all that appears in the press).
In that declaration Kerry defends the NED actions, in no meek terms. No meek terms for other stuff either. The NED part is already blurbed in English by El Universal.
I wonder if after attacking Bush so violently during his recall election campaign now Chavez is considering rooting for Bush... As for poor Eva Golinger, I guess she will have to make her threat to vote for Nader good.
Friday, October 29, 2004
An opposition reaction?
Well, things must be worse than I thought.
I just heard the latest message (or was it an add?) from Enrique Mendoza. But before some background.
The abstention has been the specter of this election and I have already described some of its consequences (1, and 2).
There are real reasons to promote abstention and some important figures/op-ed-folks have done so.
Meanwhile chavismo has made a campaign without pair in our history as far as using public funds for particular interest, negative campaigning, character assassination, and what not.
To the point that the CNE had to make a timid and fake declaration yesterday, barely 24 hours before the campaign closes. In that declaration Rodriguez decided to "investigate" Chavez abuses, and the opposition and media one for good measure. It is stunning how impartial the CNE is in such situations...
But the CNE has been caught red handed in partiality: his on the hour cadenas that have been harassing us for the last few weeks do not take place when Chavez makes a campaign speech on the state TV, VTV. Tonight again Globovision Alo Ciudadano was telling one of his guests to keep talking that there was no cadena coming as Chavez was in some proselytizing act. All illegal acts of course for a sitting president.
Now, Mendoza's message.
After a lackluster campaign, if one could charitably call that a campaign when comapres it to the efforts deployed by Lapi in Yaracuy or Rosales in Zulia, Mendoza started reacting a couple of weeks ago. Today, even Milagros Socorro in El Nacional recognized that Diosdado Cabello campaign in Miranda was more effective and willful than she would have expected.
Thus I am not quite sure to interpret tonight's message by Mendoza. Either it is a last ditch effort as he feels himself lost. Or it is the surprise counter attack from the opposition. What was the message:
It was an indictment of the cheating CNE. It was an acknowledgment of the faults of the CD leadership on August 15. It was a call, a strong call to order, to the abstentionist wanna-be that they would wake up to a chavista administration nightmare, with a dramatic picture of what such an administration would be. The terms used to detail all of these things are basically illegal in a campaign, though obviously less illegal than what Chavez is doing, by far, if there were a real electoral umpire in this godforsaken country...
I was stunned!
Pretty much it suggests that the campaign will not close tonight at midnight and that the opposition is defying the CNE outright! Is this a test strike before a pitched battle on Sunday? Or is it a desperate move to bring abstention back to the ballot boxes? If I could only have access to real opinion polls, but my private ones indicate that there will be abstention, though on both sides...
------------
On other matters. I was not planning to write today, too tired after the extensive posting of this week. It is draining. But I thought that this development was of interest to people reading Venezuelan blogs.
Although I will keep my "election coverage", for the next few days I will keep monitoring the two long posts that I did on the electoral motivations and the possible outcomes (which I might update some as needed), reminding folks the links at each new post so that the discussion can continue if people feel like to. These posts will be as valid Monday morning as they were when I posted them earlier this week.
Thursday, October 28, 2004
The Complexity of Regional Elections in Venezuela (part 2)
HAZARDOUS PREDICTIONS IN THE VENEZUELAN REGIONAL ELECTIONS
From the preceding post the reader should have gained a clearer idea that the Venezuelan regional elections are particularly complex even though the results are rather predictable. I have thus, to the better of my knowledge, tried to give in the table below a prediction of the local results and the why of my prediction for each Venezuelan state. These predictions are of course based on the parameters listed in the previous post. In a way it is rather an optimistic prediction as I hope that the opposition will manage to rally at the very last minute and retain all of its states except for 1 or 2. It might even be able to pick up a couple of chavista states which should be a great help for future plans, in particular if it picks up Tachira. Overall, status quo is the very best we can hope on state houses. But at the municipal level it is a whole different story.
Cities and districts predictions
A prediction that I cannot make in detail is the result on the town halls. That is where the electoral fraud at the level of the Electoral Registry, REP, will be felt the most. The opposition has been unable to have the CNE budge on this. In other words, we are going to elections knowing full well that the deck is stacked against us and hoping that legally at some point we might force new elections on some districts.
What is about to happen at the level of municipal districts is nothing short of a disaster. Up to 100 town halls will go to the Chavez site, which is a shift of about 30% of town halls in Venezuela. That is, on November 1st up to 70% of Venezuelans might wake up with a pro Chavez mayor. This will be particularly dramatic in some states such as Falcon which with 25 districts might go from 4 pro Chavez to 20+!
But there is always a silver lining: AD and Copei will be the main losers there as 3/4 of the town halls about to be lost are in their hands. Whatever bite is left for these parties might be lost and we can only better off for that on the long run. On the short run it will be a disaster as thousand of public employees will become jobless and as the now proverbial inefficiency of chavista mayors will be visited on 3/4 of the national population. It is to be hoped that the lost town halls will at least provoke the needed shake up within AD and that this one will finally decide that Chavez is bad news for them no matter what deals they make in dark rooms (Copei is all but dead). Unfortunately there is no reason to be optimistic on this point.
To end this section, most large cities from either side are not expected to change hands, except for Caracas at large. There the SI vote was stronger and the misiones effect not as convincing.
State projections
I have made an effort on this table, creating links to go back and forth between the sates and the predictions, thus the reader can read only the states s/he might care about. The table is also organized in a way that I hope will allow people to follow the results on November first, if they are not too depressed to do so. Maybe we could make a pool and bet on the resutls :-)
First I have listed all the Chavez states currently run by a chavista governor. They are sorted according to the percentile total of the SI vote on August 15. This way the chavista sates are listed according to maximum vulnerability.
The opposition held states are then listed and sorted according to the NO vote. That way it is easy to see which are the theoretically more vulnerable states first.
The last two columns, Oct-04 and Nov-04, have a color code: in red for chavista states and purple for opposition states. In the last column the expected result are indicated in red or purple and in pink for states with a slight chance to go/stay Chavez, mauve if there is a slight chance to go/stay opposition.
As a side comment, to illustrate the predilection of Chavez for the military over the civilian, in the Oct-04 column I have put a mark when the chavista sitting governor (**) and/or the chavista challenger (*) was in the army. Pretty good illustration on Chavez plans to militarize all institutions, pretty good way to suggest that we are already in a "legal" military autocracy.
Finally I have inserted two column that list which states have major divisions within the opposition candidacies, and which ones are more subject to be a victim of significant opposition abstention.
In the comments that follows the link to each state I have put links from El Universal that have helped me write the blurb I wrote for each state. Sometimes I think that El Universal is rather ill informed about the provinces, but that is why your obliging blogger supplements El Universal comments when he can.
Table of expected results of October 31 (if there is no electoral fraud, otherwise all bets are off)
Comments by geographical areas
The Eastern "oriental" states
Nueva Esparta is a state that lives mostly from tourism, and a tax free (shopping) port. It has been particularly hard hit by the continuous devaluations, currency exchange controls and economic permanent recession. Thus it is not surprising that it is the state where the SI reached its highest percentage, the only one where it actually won! Its controversial, inefficient and subservient pro-Chavez governor should get the boot and Margarita island is the almost certain chavista state to go to the opposition, which distresses greatly Chavez to the point of doing one of the longest "Alo Presidente" on the record, with empty promises galore, with burning buildings as a background. {back}
In Anzoategui a previous division of the opposition has been now settled in favor of AD. Thus the opposition has a chance to retain the state house though with a different governor. In that state there was a PJ/AD fight and it is difficult to predict how this will affect the outcome. Things that complicate the panorama is that Anzoategui has been hurt by the oil strike which has been very divisive. And the chavista candidate, Tarek Saab who has been refused a US visa and in other times was a real human rights defender, has had trouble to establish his leadership, though he is well known nationally. {back}
Monagas is another state duly affected by the oil strike. But one where foreign companies are allowed to operate and thus its effects are mixed. Governor Call is alone and so is the chavista candidate. Chavez has invested a lot trying in part to compensate his failures in Zulia by taking the other two oil states of Anzoategui and Monagas. But Monagas is one of those states that tend to vote either "for the government" or for tradition. Thus, if Chavez has a chance to unseat Call, this low key old fashioned governor has a real chance to retain its seat, even though the NO vote was very high. But Call could be helped by the rather controversial chavista candidate who failed in the past at trying to get the state house. {back}
Sucre, arguably one of the most beautiful areas of Venezuela, is one of the poorest areas in the country. It did not use to be so but its ex-centric position leaves it far from the commercial routes and the oil industry, leaving only tourism and agriculture as its main sources of revenues. In addition it had a very troubled political life, going as far as launching mobs to burn down the state capitol in 1999. The current governor Martinez acts more like a capo di mafia than an actual governor. He was ousted once because of his poor response from the Cariaco earthquake where it was rumored that he pocketed some of the relief money. But he threw his lot with Chavez and made a surprising come back in 2000. He did not hesitate in leaving the MAS when this one broke ranks with chavismo and has remained one of the main adulators of the president. This seems to have paid off: misiones flowed in, Sucre got a hefty NO vote and AD is the shadow of what it used to be there. This unsavory governor, if crafty politician, has the good luck to have a divided opposition in front of him, divided enough that he can even ignore a pro-Chavez dissidence that could still diminish what should have been a comfortable victory. {back}
The central States
Vargas is the ravaged state of the 1999 rain disaster. It has never recovered fully and the present governor does serve as a blank to many a critic. Still, he is one of the most devoted of Chavez followers, a very frequent guest to many a public event where one wonders what the heck he is doing there. His star might have started to fade some. He is not as often behind Chavez as he probably has to catch up with his work in Vargas. The opposition, even though very divided, has managed to put some credible challenges. A certain consolidation in the last few days around a single candidate, Roberto Smith, might be too late and should still allow Rodriguez to retain his seat. {back}
Carabobo has union in both camps except for a dissident against Salas Feo. But the Salas dynasty has worked really hard and Carabobo is reputed as one of the best run states. In the 2000 election extensive cross over voting took place and there is no reason why it should not happen again, thus compensating a surprisingly high NO vote. The ex-military running for Chavez, Acosta Carles, is the famous military of the burp! He raises much instinctive dislike and does not seem to have mobilized the chavista base. Yet his job creation proposals are rather creative, such as using dwarfs to create a theme park on the Snow white story. It will all depend on whether the abstention will affect Carabobo and whether the opposition dissident manages to take away enough of Salas Feo votes, though he might also be siphoning some of the chavista vote. One thing that helps Salas Feo is that the industrial might of Carabobo has been deeply hurt by Chavez policies, and people are aware of that. The misiones might not have been as effective in garnering sympathies for Acosta Carles. Carabobo is really a good test state to check for August fraud and the real implications of Chavez policies, assuming of course that there is no fraud on October 31. {back}
Caracas Mayor at large is the great disaster for the opposition, the best example of self destruction it has shown all along since April 2002. After having hesitated for a long time to support the reelection effort of Alfredo Peña, the sitting mayor elected on Chavez lists and now a bitter enemy, all but AD rallied behind him. AD, breaking ranks, had Claudio Fermin run, a very discredited candidate himself. Chavismo did postulate Juan Barreto, perhaps its worst option for Caracas when one considers that several other more palatable options were available. A few days ago, even though leading at polls, Peña surprised all by withdrawing from the race and leaving Fermin and Barreto fight it out alone, a most distasteful choice for a majority of the population! It seems very unlikely, and barely more desirable, that Fermin takes over Barreto in the very few days of campaign left. Thus Peña probably handed Caracas on a silver platter to chavismo! This can only be considered as an irresponsible act from Peña who did not even offer an alternative protest action to fight the electoral fraud that he used as an excuse for withdrawing. Unless of course Peña is trying to obtain forgiveness from chavismo so as to go back peacefully to journalism... {back}
Miranda is the basket case of the opposition. Once an inexpugnable fortress it has suddenly become very vulnerable. Even though there is only two candidates, the opposition having had no problem to unite behind Enrique Mendoza, the defeat of August 15 has been placed on Mendoza and the opposition threatens major abstention in the Caracas areas that Mendoza needs to fight back from Tuy Valley areas where chavismo fares better. However people have not forgotten his rather good administration and chavismo has not been able to pin on him any misdeed except for being the leader of the opposition. Unfortunately for Mendoza, Diosdado Cabello, the chavista candidate has been campaigning for now a year and although very far in early polls he has been able to climb steadily by identifying closely to the misiones, questioning Mendoza character and sexual preferences, and by being one of the very few chavistas that is not totally under the shadow of Chavez. He even is considered coming from the "manager" wing of chavismo, whatever that might mean. This has played well in the areas outside of Caracas where he leads in some districts! It will all depend on how the abstention operates though recent polls seem to indicate that Mendoza is tightening the race again with a series of political adds that show his old combative self. {back}
Aragua is the only industrial state still held by chavismo. Its NO score was good but the local governor who was reelected in 2000 with the highest percentage in the country (70% +) does not have it as easy this time. The problems of Didalco Bolivar come that he rather reluctantly embraced Chavez when the MAS left the coalition, and all remember this. Chavez was even rumored to consider someone else. Didalco Bolivar followed Chavez for very pragmatical reasons: he wanted the monies to keep coming to Aragua and he was aware that as the main military state in the country, his life would be made miserable by the soldiers that would have to follow orders to hinder his administration. But the harder than expected recession has ravaged the industrial tissue of Aragua and Didalco bears the brunt, unfairly has he is the only chavista governor whose administration has successes recognized by all sides. Even an army officer has mounted a pro Chavez dissidence that is apparently higher in the polls than the sitting governor would like. To complicate matters, the wife of Didalco's predecessor, Margarita Tablante, has managed to mount a credible bid and slowly but surely has rallied most of the opposition groups around her. Still, Didalco Bolivar was so strong in the past that he should have enough reserves to manage to survive easily, but he could lose his majority at the state council and maybe even a townhall or two. {back}
The Andes states
Trujillo is another poor and backward state, and the preserve of AD and Copei, that is, until Chavez came. It is a state where the misiones have made quite an impact. The opposition squabbling has been enough to ensure the re-election of the sitting governor in spite of a few scandals such as a police strike a couple of years ago and a coming teachers' strike. I am not even aware of Chavez planning to visit Trujillo during the campaign, so confident they are of retaining this state. On the radar of Trujillo, the new political forces are not even a blip as all is a sterile battle between AD and Copei. {back}
Merida should have been an easy pick for the opposition. Even though the NO vote was higher than expected, at 54% it was way below the national average. The sitting governor, Porras, is very disliked in spite of the misiones, and carries the albatross of having been elected in 2000 under fraudulent conditions, the most scandalous affair of these elections! He retained the nomination because Chavez said so. But the opposition managed to blow it by running two separate candidacies, both strong ones, from the ex governor with a victim aura and the Merida mayor who seems to have a decent record. Again, AD has been the wedge in the state as the ex-governor was expelled of AD in 2001 for protesting its internal autocracy. One can hope that a last minute arrangement might make the opposition catch up and win but it seems very unlikely. {back}
Tachira is a difficult state for both sides. Its ex governor "El Cura" Calderon was ousted in 2000 under a cloud of electoral fraud favoring the chavista candidate, Blanco La Cruz, a coup monger of 1992 and a Chavez radical. Since then the state has fallen prey to the Colombian guerrilla, the kidnapping industry, the decrease in trade between Venezuela and Colombia and what not. The political struggle has never relented and Calderon is trying this time to come back with a vengeance. Many in Tachira do not like him but still will probably rally behind him as the best option to unseat Blanco La Cruz. Thus an atomized opposition is slowly decanting in favor of Calderon and it remains to be seen if this one rallied the troops or if Blanco La Cruz did manage to benefit from the misiones enough to overcome his poor record as a governor more interested in politics than in efficient administration. Though the fact that Tachira was the second highest state in SI vote percentage indicates that it stands a good chance to go to Calderon. Local polls show a dead heat. Again, the division within the opposition will be the cause of that loss. {back}
The Guayana states
Bolivar is an interesting case. The governor is an ex chavista, with a reasonable if questioned record, associated with the 1992 coups. But now he is running against Chavez in perhaps the only state that actually has benefited from the Chavez administration as it is loaded with state enterprises. Chavez, who has never seen a state enterprise he did not like, has kept them afloat with huge subsidies and thus has created a fake prosperity. The NO vote reflects this and makes the task even more difficult for the sitting governor in a state where cross voting is less likely. The dissidents on both sides are non factors though the chavista candidate does not have a hearty support from the base as he is considered too moderate for a state with militant union tradition. {back}
Delta Amacuro is a shoo in as the governor even benefits of the support of some of one of the opposition parties! In this rather backward and poor state, the opposition manages to split in 4 candidates, increasing even further the reelection chances of one of the two female governor of Venezuela. {back}
Amazonas is an indigenous state, far from everything, with the particularity of having its governor elections in a few months (terms have to be for 4 years, and the 2000 election was annulled). Still, chavismo should win easily there as it is pragmatically a pro-government state, no matter who is in charge in Caracas. If you add to this the pro Native-American rhetoric of Chavez, it is a safe state for him. {back}
The "Llanos" states
In Guarico the opposition has managed to set up a common front. But the local governor, a Chavez allied if not directly in Chavez party, has a reasonable administration record. Though his quite confrontational style has garnered him a lot of enemies. His administration is also considered corrupt. Still, it should remain in the Chavez camp without trouble, in particular when one sees the large NO vote which should compensate any crossover voting. {back}
In Barinas the Chavez clan has taken over. Nepotism and corruption are main complaints, but Chavez has spent lavishly. Chavismo dominates in spite of a poor administration by Chavez daddy, old and ineffective. In addition the opposition is divided so it is not helping its chances. {back}
Apure is an interesting case where an AD governor is now out of AD and supported by Primero Justicia. Both sides have failed in unifying candidacies so all is possible although it seems that the present governor and the ex pro Chavez governor should catch most votes. The opposition could retain that state, if barely, considering the large NO vote! {back}
Cojedes has the curiosity to have 4 chavista candidates and a perfect union within the opposition. But the actual governor seems to have gained most sympathies and all rests on how fractionated the chavista vote will remain. A difficult but not impossible pick for the opposition though its candidate is too linked to the past. Also, like most rural states, the misiones have improved chavismo chances, as seen from the NO vote. {back}
Portuguesa is the granary of Venezuela. It is also a state with a strong tradition of leftist parties who went easily over to Chavez but who also present him with a serious division this time around. "La Negra" Muñoz has not been a very convincing a governor and even with the backing of Chavez and a very high NO vote in August, finds herself on a tight rope as her left flank cannot be relied on. The opposition has managed unity around Colmenares, an ex governor that was pro Chavez in the days when the MAS supported Chavez. But chavismo who first supported Colmenares and then Muñoz is paying the price. Still, it is a state that should remain for Chavez, if barely. {back}
Zulia and the MidWest (Centro Occidente)
In Zulia the situation is clearer. Manuel Rosales has emerged as one of the strong leaders of the opposition as he has managed to sever his ties with the pre-Chavez era, even though he was AD. His strategy was in part to confront Chavez directly during the oil strike of 2002, appealing to strong regional sentiment. And his administration was not too bad either, though not shining. He is greatly helped by the chavista candidate, General Guttierez, whose claim to fame is to have jumped on board of the Pilin Leon tanker during the oil strike to arrest the striking crew. This high feat of revolutionary glory won him the Zulia candidacy though he is not from Zulia, a rather crucial defect in a very "regionalist" and proud state. He is seen as such a carpetbagger that he is rumored not to be able to find his way through Maracaibo streets. In spite of all of Chavez efforts he is still trailing badly at the polls, while the local chavistas fail to give him more than lip service support. The importance of Zulia, politically and ideologically for Chavez cannot be underestimated as he is threatening to put Rosales in jail for signing the Carmona decree while promoting one of the dirtiest campaign in recent memory. But independent minded Zulia is very difficult to manipulate as more than one Caracas politician found out. Zulia might end up becoming for chavismo the disaster that Caracas will be for the opposition, and a strong Rosales victory could make him the new opposition leader, with a 2006 window! {back}
Falcon has been a state very affected by the maelstrom of politics, in particular during the strike. It also has a significant chavista dissidence as an ex companion of Chavez coup in 1992, who after fighting with Chavez failed to return in his good graces. He is now running against the sitting governor, Montilla, also issued from the army barracks. Falcon is a particularly varied state, from desertic Paraguana to the humid cattle rich land of the Tucacas area. Somehow Montilla has managed to establish a strong leadership and is poised to take most of town halls from the hands of the opposition. As a very rural and disperse state the misiones have been very effective there in improving Montilla standing. Not to mention the divisions between the opposition. This is really a state where a united opposition might have made a difference and the chavismo dissidence is probably not enough to helpt it unseat Montilla. {back}
Lara is a state that could have gone to the opposition, surprisingly, in spite of a high NO vote, due to a rather disliked and ineffective chavista governor, Reyes Reyes. But an unsolvable division within the opposition ranks ensures a victory for the sitting governor. His meager success comes from whatever Chavez has brought to Lara and his, forced, association with the more successful mayor of Barquisimeto who represents more than a third of the votes, and who was "convinced" not to run for governor. The opposition division is a pity because ex governor Orlando Fernandez was a much better governor than Reyes Reyes. But the AD candidate, Mariano Navarro, has been intractable and remains in the race even though Orlando Fernandez is higher in the polls. As a result this division might even encourage a higher abstention thus sinking definitively the chances of the opposition even as the other minor candidates withdrew. On November first, it will be one of the harder explanations that AD will have to provide. {back}
Yaracuy, the home state of this blogger, is apparently complex. The governor, Eduardo Lapi, has run afoul from the opposition traditional leadership and is paying the price with a dissident candidacy backed to the outmost by AD and Copei who do not forgive him to have almost singlehandedly made them irrelevant in a rural state that they once controlled totally once. Not to mention that he become a nationally known leader when he became one of the members of the negotiating team late 2002. Caracas old pols do not fogive having to share TV sets with the natives. On the other hand Lapi benefits from the support of all the newer opposition forces, making Yaracuy a classic fight between old style politics and new style politics. However, in spite of the opposition division, Lapi is greatly helped by the chavista candidate who was probably the worst option available for chavismo. Gimenez was the mayor of La Independencia and his administration has been very criticized as too politicized, inefficient, rather corrupt and rife with nepotism and "friends", which bars him from criticizing Lapi for the same provincial sins. Thus, even if Lapi is perceived as an authoritarian, Chavez style, his efficient management of the state should allow him to repeat in spite of a hefty NO vote in August. {back}
PS: As this post has a significant amount of information, some being the "perception" of this blogger who cannot follow closely what goes on in every nook and cranny of this country, mistakes and omissions might have been made. But I am more than willing to correct them and add new info that readers might have. It is thus an "open post" that the reader might want to check back later.
From the preceding post the reader should have gained a clearer idea that the Venezuelan regional elections are particularly complex even though the results are rather predictable. I have thus, to the better of my knowledge, tried to give in the table below a prediction of the local results and the why of my prediction for each Venezuelan state. These predictions are of course based on the parameters listed in the previous post. In a way it is rather an optimistic prediction as I hope that the opposition will manage to rally at the very last minute and retain all of its states except for 1 or 2. It might even be able to pick up a couple of chavista states which should be a great help for future plans, in particular if it picks up Tachira. Overall, status quo is the very best we can hope on state houses. But at the municipal level it is a whole different story.
Cities and districts predictions
A prediction that I cannot make in detail is the result on the town halls. That is where the electoral fraud at the level of the Electoral Registry, REP, will be felt the most. The opposition has been unable to have the CNE budge on this. In other words, we are going to elections knowing full well that the deck is stacked against us and hoping that legally at some point we might force new elections on some districts.
What is about to happen at the level of municipal districts is nothing short of a disaster. Up to 100 town halls will go to the Chavez site, which is a shift of about 30% of town halls in Venezuela. That is, on November 1st up to 70% of Venezuelans might wake up with a pro Chavez mayor. This will be particularly dramatic in some states such as Falcon which with 25 districts might go from 4 pro Chavez to 20+!
But there is always a silver lining: AD and Copei will be the main losers there as 3/4 of the town halls about to be lost are in their hands. Whatever bite is left for these parties might be lost and we can only better off for that on the long run. On the short run it will be a disaster as thousand of public employees will become jobless and as the now proverbial inefficiency of chavista mayors will be visited on 3/4 of the national population. It is to be hoped that the lost town halls will at least provoke the needed shake up within AD and that this one will finally decide that Chavez is bad news for them no matter what deals they make in dark rooms (Copei is all but dead). Unfortunately there is no reason to be optimistic on this point.
To end this section, most large cities from either side are not expected to change hands, except for Caracas at large. There the SI vote was stronger and the misiones effect not as convincing.
State projections
I have made an effort on this table, creating links to go back and forth between the sates and the predictions, thus the reader can read only the states s/he might care about. The table is also organized in a way that I hope will allow people to follow the results on November first, if they are not too depressed to do so. Maybe we could make a pool and bet on the resutls :-)
First I have listed all the Chavez states currently run by a chavista governor. They are sorted according to the percentile total of the SI vote on August 15. This way the chavista sates are listed according to maximum vulnerability.
The opposition held states are then listed and sorted according to the NO vote. That way it is easy to see which are the theoretically more vulnerable states first.
The last two columns, Oct-04 and Nov-04, have a color code: in red for chavista states and purple for opposition states. In the last column the expected result are indicated in red or purple and in pink for states with a slight chance to go/stay Chavez, mauve if there is a slight chance to go/stay opposition.
As a side comment, to illustrate the predilection of Chavez for the military over the civilian, in the Oct-04 column I have put a mark when the chavista sitting governor (**) and/or the chavista challenger (*) was in the army. Pretty good illustration on Chavez plans to militarize all institutions, pretty good way to suggest that we are already in a "legal" military autocracy.
Finally I have inserted two column that list which states have major divisions within the opposition candidacies, and which ones are more subject to be a victim of significant opposition abstention.
In the comments that follows the link to each state I have put links from El Universal that have helped me write the blurb I wrote for each state. Sometimes I think that El Universal is rather ill informed about the provinces, but that is why your obliging blogger supplements El Universal comments when he can.
Table of expected results of October 31 (if there is no electoral fraud, otherwise all bets are off)
| States | Recall Election vote | |||||
| SI | NO | |||||
| Nueva Esparta | 50 | 50 | yes | slight | ||
| Tachira | 49 | 51 | no | some | ** | |
| Merida | 46 | 54 | no | ? | ** | |
| Falcon | 42 | 57 | no | no | ** | |
| Vargas | 36 | 64 | no | some | ** | |
| Lara | 35 | 65 | no | some | ** | |
| Cojedes | 33 | 67 | yes | no | ** | |
| Sucre | 33 | 67 | no | no | ||
| Trujillo | 33 | 66 | no | no | ** | |
| Aragua | 32 | 68 | maybe | yes | ||
| Barinas | 30 | 69 | no | no | ||
| Amazonas | 29 | 70 | no election | no | ||
| Delta Amacuro | 29 | 70 | no | no | ||
| Guarico | 29 | 71 | yes | no | ||
| Portuguesa | 26 | 73 | no | ? | ||
| Apure | 32 | 68 | no | ? | * | |
| Bolivar | 33 | 66 | yes | ? | ** | |
| Monagas | 39 | 61 | yes | ? | ||
| Yaracuy | 39 | 60 | no | slight | ||
| Carabobo | 43 | 57 | no | yes | * | |
| Distrito Capital | 44 | 56 | yes | YES! | ||
| Anzoategui | 45 | 54 | yes | some | ||
| Zulia | 47 | 53 | yes | ? | * | |
| Miranda | 49 | 51 | yes | yes | * | |
Comments by geographical areas
The Eastern "oriental" states
Nueva Esparta is a state that lives mostly from tourism, and a tax free (shopping) port. It has been particularly hard hit by the continuous devaluations, currency exchange controls and economic permanent recession. Thus it is not surprising that it is the state where the SI reached its highest percentage, the only one where it actually won! Its controversial, inefficient and subservient pro-Chavez governor should get the boot and Margarita island is the almost certain chavista state to go to the opposition, which distresses greatly Chavez to the point of doing one of the longest "Alo Presidente" on the record, with empty promises galore, with burning buildings as a background. {back}
In Anzoategui a previous division of the opposition has been now settled in favor of AD. Thus the opposition has a chance to retain the state house though with a different governor. In that state there was a PJ/AD fight and it is difficult to predict how this will affect the outcome. Things that complicate the panorama is that Anzoategui has been hurt by the oil strike which has been very divisive. And the chavista candidate, Tarek Saab who has been refused a US visa and in other times was a real human rights defender, has had trouble to establish his leadership, though he is well known nationally. {back}
Monagas is another state duly affected by the oil strike. But one where foreign companies are allowed to operate and thus its effects are mixed. Governor Call is alone and so is the chavista candidate. Chavez has invested a lot trying in part to compensate his failures in Zulia by taking the other two oil states of Anzoategui and Monagas. But Monagas is one of those states that tend to vote either "for the government" or for tradition. Thus, if Chavez has a chance to unseat Call, this low key old fashioned governor has a real chance to retain its seat, even though the NO vote was very high. But Call could be helped by the rather controversial chavista candidate who failed in the past at trying to get the state house. {back}
Sucre, arguably one of the most beautiful areas of Venezuela, is one of the poorest areas in the country. It did not use to be so but its ex-centric position leaves it far from the commercial routes and the oil industry, leaving only tourism and agriculture as its main sources of revenues. In addition it had a very troubled political life, going as far as launching mobs to burn down the state capitol in 1999. The current governor Martinez acts more like a capo di mafia than an actual governor. He was ousted once because of his poor response from the Cariaco earthquake where it was rumored that he pocketed some of the relief money. But he threw his lot with Chavez and made a surprising come back in 2000. He did not hesitate in leaving the MAS when this one broke ranks with chavismo and has remained one of the main adulators of the president. This seems to have paid off: misiones flowed in, Sucre got a hefty NO vote and AD is the shadow of what it used to be there. This unsavory governor, if crafty politician, has the good luck to have a divided opposition in front of him, divided enough that he can even ignore a pro-Chavez dissidence that could still diminish what should have been a comfortable victory. {back}
The central States
Vargas is the ravaged state of the 1999 rain disaster. It has never recovered fully and the present governor does serve as a blank to many a critic. Still, he is one of the most devoted of Chavez followers, a very frequent guest to many a public event where one wonders what the heck he is doing there. His star might have started to fade some. He is not as often behind Chavez as he probably has to catch up with his work in Vargas. The opposition, even though very divided, has managed to put some credible challenges. A certain consolidation in the last few days around a single candidate, Roberto Smith, might be too late and should still allow Rodriguez to retain his seat. {back}
Carabobo has union in both camps except for a dissident against Salas Feo. But the Salas dynasty has worked really hard and Carabobo is reputed as one of the best run states. In the 2000 election extensive cross over voting took place and there is no reason why it should not happen again, thus compensating a surprisingly high NO vote. The ex-military running for Chavez, Acosta Carles, is the famous military of the burp! He raises much instinctive dislike and does not seem to have mobilized the chavista base. Yet his job creation proposals are rather creative, such as using dwarfs to create a theme park on the Snow white story. It will all depend on whether the abstention will affect Carabobo and whether the opposition dissident manages to take away enough of Salas Feo votes, though he might also be siphoning some of the chavista vote. One thing that helps Salas Feo is that the industrial might of Carabobo has been deeply hurt by Chavez policies, and people are aware of that. The misiones might not have been as effective in garnering sympathies for Acosta Carles. Carabobo is really a good test state to check for August fraud and the real implications of Chavez policies, assuming of course that there is no fraud on October 31. {back}
Caracas Mayor at large is the great disaster for the opposition, the best example of self destruction it has shown all along since April 2002. After having hesitated for a long time to support the reelection effort of Alfredo Peña, the sitting mayor elected on Chavez lists and now a bitter enemy, all but AD rallied behind him. AD, breaking ranks, had Claudio Fermin run, a very discredited candidate himself. Chavismo did postulate Juan Barreto, perhaps its worst option for Caracas when one considers that several other more palatable options were available. A few days ago, even though leading at polls, Peña surprised all by withdrawing from the race and leaving Fermin and Barreto fight it out alone, a most distasteful choice for a majority of the population! It seems very unlikely, and barely more desirable, that Fermin takes over Barreto in the very few days of campaign left. Thus Peña probably handed Caracas on a silver platter to chavismo! This can only be considered as an irresponsible act from Peña who did not even offer an alternative protest action to fight the electoral fraud that he used as an excuse for withdrawing. Unless of course Peña is trying to obtain forgiveness from chavismo so as to go back peacefully to journalism... {back}
Miranda is the basket case of the opposition. Once an inexpugnable fortress it has suddenly become very vulnerable. Even though there is only two candidates, the opposition having had no problem to unite behind Enrique Mendoza, the defeat of August 15 has been placed on Mendoza and the opposition threatens major abstention in the Caracas areas that Mendoza needs to fight back from Tuy Valley areas where chavismo fares better. However people have not forgotten his rather good administration and chavismo has not been able to pin on him any misdeed except for being the leader of the opposition. Unfortunately for Mendoza, Diosdado Cabello, the chavista candidate has been campaigning for now a year and although very far in early polls he has been able to climb steadily by identifying closely to the misiones, questioning Mendoza character and sexual preferences, and by being one of the very few chavistas that is not totally under the shadow of Chavez. He even is considered coming from the "manager" wing of chavismo, whatever that might mean. This has played well in the areas outside of Caracas where he leads in some districts! It will all depend on how the abstention operates though recent polls seem to indicate that Mendoza is tightening the race again with a series of political adds that show his old combative self. {back}
Aragua is the only industrial state still held by chavismo. Its NO score was good but the local governor who was reelected in 2000 with the highest percentage in the country (70% +) does not have it as easy this time. The problems of Didalco Bolivar come that he rather reluctantly embraced Chavez when the MAS left the coalition, and all remember this. Chavez was even rumored to consider someone else. Didalco Bolivar followed Chavez for very pragmatical reasons: he wanted the monies to keep coming to Aragua and he was aware that as the main military state in the country, his life would be made miserable by the soldiers that would have to follow orders to hinder his administration. But the harder than expected recession has ravaged the industrial tissue of Aragua and Didalco bears the brunt, unfairly has he is the only chavista governor whose administration has successes recognized by all sides. Even an army officer has mounted a pro Chavez dissidence that is apparently higher in the polls than the sitting governor would like. To complicate matters, the wife of Didalco's predecessor, Margarita Tablante, has managed to mount a credible bid and slowly but surely has rallied most of the opposition groups around her. Still, Didalco Bolivar was so strong in the past that he should have enough reserves to manage to survive easily, but he could lose his majority at the state council and maybe even a townhall or two. {back}
The Andes states
Trujillo is another poor and backward state, and the preserve of AD and Copei, that is, until Chavez came. It is a state where the misiones have made quite an impact. The opposition squabbling has been enough to ensure the re-election of the sitting governor in spite of a few scandals such as a police strike a couple of years ago and a coming teachers' strike. I am not even aware of Chavez planning to visit Trujillo during the campaign, so confident they are of retaining this state. On the radar of Trujillo, the new political forces are not even a blip as all is a sterile battle between AD and Copei. {back}
Merida should have been an easy pick for the opposition. Even though the NO vote was higher than expected, at 54% it was way below the national average. The sitting governor, Porras, is very disliked in spite of the misiones, and carries the albatross of having been elected in 2000 under fraudulent conditions, the most scandalous affair of these elections! He retained the nomination because Chavez said so. But the opposition managed to blow it by running two separate candidacies, both strong ones, from the ex governor with a victim aura and the Merida mayor who seems to have a decent record. Again, AD has been the wedge in the state as the ex-governor was expelled of AD in 2001 for protesting its internal autocracy. One can hope that a last minute arrangement might make the opposition catch up and win but it seems very unlikely. {back}
Tachira is a difficult state for both sides. Its ex governor "El Cura" Calderon was ousted in 2000 under a cloud of electoral fraud favoring the chavista candidate, Blanco La Cruz, a coup monger of 1992 and a Chavez radical. Since then the state has fallen prey to the Colombian guerrilla, the kidnapping industry, the decrease in trade between Venezuela and Colombia and what not. The political struggle has never relented and Calderon is trying this time to come back with a vengeance. Many in Tachira do not like him but still will probably rally behind him as the best option to unseat Blanco La Cruz. Thus an atomized opposition is slowly decanting in favor of Calderon and it remains to be seen if this one rallied the troops or if Blanco La Cruz did manage to benefit from the misiones enough to overcome his poor record as a governor more interested in politics than in efficient administration. Though the fact that Tachira was the second highest state in SI vote percentage indicates that it stands a good chance to go to Calderon. Local polls show a dead heat. Again, the division within the opposition will be the cause of that loss. {back}
The Guayana states
Bolivar is an interesting case. The governor is an ex chavista, with a reasonable if questioned record, associated with the 1992 coups. But now he is running against Chavez in perhaps the only state that actually has benefited from the Chavez administration as it is loaded with state enterprises. Chavez, who has never seen a state enterprise he did not like, has kept them afloat with huge subsidies and thus has created a fake prosperity. The NO vote reflects this and makes the task even more difficult for the sitting governor in a state where cross voting is less likely. The dissidents on both sides are non factors though the chavista candidate does not have a hearty support from the base as he is considered too moderate for a state with militant union tradition. {back}
Delta Amacuro is a shoo in as the governor even benefits of the support of some of one of the opposition parties! In this rather backward and poor state, the opposition manages to split in 4 candidates, increasing even further the reelection chances of one of the two female governor of Venezuela. {back}
Amazonas is an indigenous state, far from everything, with the particularity of having its governor elections in a few months (terms have to be for 4 years, and the 2000 election was annulled). Still, chavismo should win easily there as it is pragmatically a pro-government state, no matter who is in charge in Caracas. If you add to this the pro Native-American rhetoric of Chavez, it is a safe state for him. {back}
The "Llanos" states
In Guarico the opposition has managed to set up a common front. But the local governor, a Chavez allied if not directly in Chavez party, has a reasonable administration record. Though his quite confrontational style has garnered him a lot of enemies. His administration is also considered corrupt. Still, it should remain in the Chavez camp without trouble, in particular when one sees the large NO vote which should compensate any crossover voting. {back}
In Barinas the Chavez clan has taken over. Nepotism and corruption are main complaints, but Chavez has spent lavishly. Chavismo dominates in spite of a poor administration by Chavez daddy, old and ineffective. In addition the opposition is divided so it is not helping its chances. {back}
Apure is an interesting case where an AD governor is now out of AD and supported by Primero Justicia. Both sides have failed in unifying candidacies so all is possible although it seems that the present governor and the ex pro Chavez governor should catch most votes. The opposition could retain that state, if barely, considering the large NO vote! {back}
Cojedes has the curiosity to have 4 chavista candidates and a perfect union within the opposition. But the actual governor seems to have gained most sympathies and all rests on how fractionated the chavista vote will remain. A difficult but not impossible pick for the opposition though its candidate is too linked to the past. Also, like most rural states, the misiones have improved chavismo chances, as seen from the NO vote. {back}
Portuguesa is the granary of Venezuela. It is also a state with a strong tradition of leftist parties who went easily over to Chavez but who also present him with a serious division this time around. "La Negra" Muñoz has not been a very convincing a governor and even with the backing of Chavez and a very high NO vote in August, finds herself on a tight rope as her left flank cannot be relied on. The opposition has managed unity around Colmenares, an ex governor that was pro Chavez in the days when the MAS supported Chavez. But chavismo who first supported Colmenares and then Muñoz is paying the price. Still, it is a state that should remain for Chavez, if barely. {back}
Zulia and the MidWest (Centro Occidente)
In Zulia the situation is clearer. Manuel Rosales has emerged as one of the strong leaders of the opposition as he has managed to sever his ties with the pre-Chavez era, even though he was AD. His strategy was in part to confront Chavez directly during the oil strike of 2002, appealing to strong regional sentiment. And his administration was not too bad either, though not shining. He is greatly helped by the chavista candidate, General Guttierez, whose claim to fame is to have jumped on board of the Pilin Leon tanker during the oil strike to arrest the striking crew. This high feat of revolutionary glory won him the Zulia candidacy though he is not from Zulia, a rather crucial defect in a very "regionalist" and proud state. He is seen as such a carpetbagger that he is rumored not to be able to find his way through Maracaibo streets. In spite of all of Chavez efforts he is still trailing badly at the polls, while the local chavistas fail to give him more than lip service support. The importance of Zulia, politically and ideologically for Chavez cannot be underestimated as he is threatening to put Rosales in jail for signing the Carmona decree while promoting one of the dirtiest campaign in recent memory. But independent minded Zulia is very difficult to manipulate as more than one Caracas politician found out. Zulia might end up becoming for chavismo the disaster that Caracas will be for the opposition, and a strong Rosales victory could make him the new opposition leader, with a 2006 window! {back}
Falcon has been a state very affected by the maelstrom of politics, in particular during the strike. It also has a significant chavista dissidence as an ex companion of Chavez coup in 1992, who after fighting with Chavez failed to return in his good graces. He is now running against the sitting governor, Montilla, also issued from the army barracks. Falcon is a particularly varied state, from desertic Paraguana to the humid cattle rich land of the Tucacas area. Somehow Montilla has managed to establish a strong leadership and is poised to take most of town halls from the hands of the opposition. As a very rural and disperse state the misiones have been very effective there in improving Montilla standing. Not to mention the divisions between the opposition. This is really a state where a united opposition might have made a difference and the chavismo dissidence is probably not enough to helpt it unseat Montilla. {back}
Lara is a state that could have gone to the opposition, surprisingly, in spite of a high NO vote, due to a rather disliked and ineffective chavista governor, Reyes Reyes. But an unsolvable division within the opposition ranks ensures a victory for the sitting governor. His meager success comes from whatever Chavez has brought to Lara and his, forced, association with the more successful mayor of Barquisimeto who represents more than a third of the votes, and who was "convinced" not to run for governor. The opposition division is a pity because ex governor Orlando Fernandez was a much better governor than Reyes Reyes. But the AD candidate, Mariano Navarro, has been intractable and remains in the race even though Orlando Fernandez is higher in the polls. As a result this division might even encourage a higher abstention thus sinking definitively the chances of the opposition even as the other minor candidates withdrew. On November first, it will be one of the harder explanations that AD will have to provide. {back}
Yaracuy, the home state of this blogger, is apparently complex. The governor, Eduardo Lapi, has run afoul from the opposition traditional leadership and is paying the price with a dissident candidacy backed to the outmost by AD and Copei who do not forgive him to have almost singlehandedly made them irrelevant in a rural state that they once controlled totally once. Not to mention that he become a nationally known leader when he became one of the members of the negotiating team late 2002. Caracas old pols do not fogive having to share TV sets with the natives. On the other hand Lapi benefits from the support of all the newer opposition forces, making Yaracuy a classic fight between old style politics and new style politics. However, in spite of the opposition division, Lapi is greatly helped by the chavista candidate who was probably the worst option available for chavismo. Gimenez was the mayor of La Independencia and his administration has been very criticized as too politicized, inefficient, rather corrupt and rife with nepotism and "friends", which bars him from criticizing Lapi for the same provincial sins. Thus, even if Lapi is perceived as an authoritarian, Chavez style, his efficient management of the state should allow him to repeat in spite of a hefty NO vote in August. {back}
PS: As this post has a significant amount of information, some being the "perception" of this blogger who cannot follow closely what goes on in every nook and cranny of this country, mistakes and omissions might have been made. But I am more than willing to correct them and add new info that readers might have. It is thus an "open post" that the reader might want to check back later.
Chavez to be sanctioned for illegal campaign activities
April's fool! Bwahahahahah!
Wait! We are in October!
Finally after months of campaign abuse someone at the CNE decided to raise a complaint (English). About time that they noticed!!!!! Maybe Sobella Mejias finally realized that after her friend the Zulia governor got such a trashing last Sunday...
But her late reactions must have had a slight effect since the CNE finally decided to open an "investigation".
Bwahahahah! Hahahahaha! (tears and sob due to heavy laughter).
Did Rodriguez listen to Chavez today in Yaracuy? Is he aware that this has been going for ever and that now at four days of the election it really does not matter much if he slaps a fine on Chavez wrist?
Does Rodriguez think that he is fooling ANYONE, from either side in Venezuela?
April's fool indeed!
Bwahahahahaha! Whahahaha! Cough! Cough! (writer passed out just as he hit the "publish" key)
Wait! We are in October!
Finally after months of campaign abuse someone at the CNE decided to raise a complaint (English). About time that they noticed!!!!! Maybe Sobella Mejias finally realized that after her friend the Zulia governor got such a trashing last Sunday...
But her late reactions must have had a slight effect since the CNE finally decided to open an "investigation".
Bwahahahah! Hahahahaha! (tears and sob due to heavy laughter).
Did Rodriguez listen to Chavez today in Yaracuy? Is he aware that this has been going for ever and that now at four days of the election it really does not matter much if he slaps a fine on Chavez wrist?
Does Rodriguez think that he is fooling ANYONE, from either side in Venezuela?
April's fool indeed!
Bwahahahahaha! Whahahaha! Cough! Cough! (writer passed out just as he hit the "publish" key)
Chavez in Yaracuy
And Governor Lapi closes his campaign
Local politics can be quite interesting. Today we got the visit of Chavez trying to improve the sagging chances of his designated governor to Yaracuy. He was supposed to come Tuesday but postponed at the last minute. As a result the scene selected for Photo-Op had to be moved, or so I was told, since Lapi had already scheduled long in advance the Avenida Caracas, the "grandiose" backdrop for all his closing rallies. Avenida Caracas is wide and steep which of course gives great takes for TV cameras…
So Chavez had to settle for Avenida Libertador in La Independencia, which is a decent backdrop too. This blogger who usually gives pics from this type of events must confess that this time, due to work obligations, messed up the different times for the different rallies and missed both of them! Still, he has a tale to tell.
Realizing that I had missed the Lapi meeting at 10 AM (I thought it was at 1 PM) I tried to make it to the Chavez meeting. However I knew that I had missed it when I heard a series of planes and helicopters zooming above my office. Chavez had landed, at tax payer expense.
I waited for a little bit and made it home realizing that I was already too late to get anywhere close of the rally stage. While having a very, very late lunch I watched the state TV which of course gave the whole event live. Well, I have to admit that the turnout was impressive for a 150 000 people town. But before pro Chavez readers cheer and anti Chavez readers weep, let me remind you that this is a provincial capital with only one single movie theater. Thus a visit by Chavez is like a visit by a rock star in Caracas: most go, and if they cannot go, they pay attention anyway. And if you doubt it, keep reading.
On my way home, I checked the radio stations and half of them where broadcasting the speech. That is, even some of the supposedly anti Chavez media were transmitting the speech as they knew all wanted to hear what Chavez had to say on Yaracuy, in Yaracuy. We were in the news and we were not going to miss it!
But not for all. Driving in front of Banco de Venezuela, one of the banks that manage the funds and payments for the misiones, there was a line, I kid you not, of at least 200 people, most wearing some red chavista insignia! Apparently it was more important for them to cash in than to go listen to the beloved leader… And some think that there is a real commitment from the people in populist regimes. Sigh!
After lunch I went to pay my phone bill (1). Chatting with the attendant she told me that this morning there was a stream of people going to the Avenida Caracas, to the Lapi happening. The turnout apparently was very impressive. At noon the tide reversed and the flow went toward the Libertador this time with red shirts. Busses also passed along the narrow street as the main thorough fare was closed by the Chavez stand. She told me that the chavista buses passing were from all around the neighboring states, even one Metro Bus from Caracas that had broken down and was being towed, window graffiti and all!!!! I imagine the Caracas commuters that will find it strange today that there are less metro bus on their line than usual. Some more inquiring with other folks that commute from the neighboring villages revealed that the highway entrances of San Felipe were chockfull of parked buses early this morning. For Lapi and for Chavez, all amiably parked together. The only difference was that the Chavez buses were also from next door states!
In other words, these rallies might bring out a lot of the natives, but when they include Chavez, they also come with groupies.
Eventually I made it home just to see the end of the speech. It was that long. And soon I could hear a lot of honking from buses stuck in what was probably a massive traffic jam… Oh well, I wonder how the Caracas visitors made it back with their bus at the shop.
Ah! I was forgetting! I did not hear the Lapi speech but unfortunately I did hear part of the Chavez speech. Lapi was of course accused of evil incarnate. Chavez listed all the minute successes of the misiones, and even pointed out the Cuban doctors corps that were attending the rally, all dressed up in white coats. Apparently Cuban doctors now are allowed/required to participate in Venezuelan politics. An interesting development. And Chavez promised us that after October 31 victory, the land redistribution will get into high gear. But he would negotiate first with the folks owning 40 000 idle acres to see if they would sell him some for the "poor". If not, he would send the army to "inspect" and find any possible code violations and then fine them to the hilt; and then force them to sell or be dispossessed. And some people wonder why folks are not investing in Venezuela besides the one in the oil industry. Personally I wonder who has 40 000 idle acres in Yaracuy.
To conclude, a little observation. Chavez was accompanied by: the education minister, the environmental minister, the "popular economics" minister, the communications minister, and, I think, one or two more ministers, none of them clergy. This to open a rehabilitated special education center. What the heck were doing all of these guys there? Don't they have work to do? Why must these operetta leaders travel with their permanent court?
But one thing was really good! Two major meetings almost met and as far as I can tell, San Felipe is at peace. And some wonder why I like it here in the provinces....
---------------
(1) In Venezuela the mail system does not work so you must pay all your services at the bank or at the utilities offices. OR have a direct withdrawal system. I cannot do it with my phone because I rent.
Local politics can be quite interesting. Today we got the visit of Chavez trying to improve the sagging chances of his designated governor to Yaracuy. He was supposed to come Tuesday but postponed at the last minute. As a result the scene selected for Photo-Op had to be moved, or so I was told, since Lapi had already scheduled long in advance the Avenida Caracas, the "grandiose" backdrop for all his closing rallies. Avenida Caracas is wide and steep which of course gives great takes for TV cameras…
So Chavez had to settle for Avenida Libertador in La Independencia, which is a decent backdrop too. This blogger who usually gives pics from this type of events must confess that this time, due to work obligations, messed up the different times for the different rallies and missed both of them! Still, he has a tale to tell.
Realizing that I had missed the Lapi meeting at 10 AM (I thought it was at 1 PM) I tried to make it to the Chavez meeting. However I knew that I had missed it when I heard a series of planes and helicopters zooming above my office. Chavez had landed, at tax payer expense.
I waited for a little bit and made it home realizing that I was already too late to get anywhere close of the rally stage. While having a very, very late lunch I watched the state TV which of course gave the whole event live. Well, I have to admit that the turnout was impressive for a 150 000 people town. But before pro Chavez readers cheer and anti Chavez readers weep, let me remind you that this is a provincial capital with only one single movie theater. Thus a visit by Chavez is like a visit by a rock star in Caracas: most go, and if they cannot go, they pay attention anyway. And if you doubt it, keep reading.
On my way home, I checked the radio stations and half of them where broadcasting the speech. That is, even some of the supposedly anti Chavez media were transmitting the speech as they knew all wanted to hear what Chavez had to say on Yaracuy, in Yaracuy. We were in the news and we were not going to miss it!
But not for all. Driving in front of Banco de Venezuela, one of the banks that manage the funds and payments for the misiones, there was a line, I kid you not, of at least 200 people, most wearing some red chavista insignia! Apparently it was more important for them to cash in than to go listen to the beloved leader… And some think that there is a real commitment from the people in populist regimes. Sigh!
After lunch I went to pay my phone bill (1). Chatting with the attendant she told me that this morning there was a stream of people going to the Avenida Caracas, to the Lapi happening. The turnout apparently was very impressive. At noon the tide reversed and the flow went toward the Libertador this time with red shirts. Busses also passed along the narrow street as the main thorough fare was closed by the Chavez stand. She told me that the chavista buses passing were from all around the neighboring states, even one Metro Bus from Caracas that had broken down and was being towed, window graffiti and all!!!! I imagine the Caracas commuters that will find it strange today that there are less metro bus on their line than usual. Some more inquiring with other folks that commute from the neighboring villages revealed that the highway entrances of San Felipe were chockfull of parked buses early this morning. For Lapi and for Chavez, all amiably parked together. The only difference was that the Chavez buses were also from next door states!
In other words, these rallies might bring out a lot of the natives, but when they include Chavez, they also come with groupies.
Eventually I made it home just to see the end of the speech. It was that long. And soon I could hear a lot of honking from buses stuck in what was probably a massive traffic jam… Oh well, I wonder how the Caracas visitors made it back with their bus at the shop.
Ah! I was forgetting! I did not hear the Lapi speech but unfortunately I did hear part of the Chavez speech. Lapi was of course accused of evil incarnate. Chavez listed all the minute successes of the misiones, and even pointed out the Cuban doctors corps that were attending the rally, all dressed up in white coats. Apparently Cuban doctors now are allowed/required to participate in Venezuelan politics. An interesting development. And Chavez promised us that after October 31 victory, the land redistribution will get into high gear. But he would negotiate first with the folks owning 40 000 idle acres to see if they would sell him some for the "poor". If not, he would send the army to "inspect" and find any possible code violations and then fine them to the hilt; and then force them to sell or be dispossessed. And some people wonder why folks are not investing in Venezuela besides the one in the oil industry. Personally I wonder who has 40 000 idle acres in Yaracuy.
To conclude, a little observation. Chavez was accompanied by: the education minister, the environmental minister, the "popular economics" minister, the communications minister, and, I think, one or two more ministers, none of them clergy. This to open a rehabilitated special education center. What the heck were doing all of these guys there? Don't they have work to do? Why must these operetta leaders travel with their permanent court?
But one thing was really good! Two major meetings almost met and as far as I can tell, San Felipe is at peace. And some wonder why I like it here in the provinces....
---------------
(1) In Venezuela the mail system does not work so you must pay all your services at the bank or at the utilities offices. OR have a direct withdrawal system. I cannot do it with my phone because I rent.
Wednesday, October 27, 2004
The Complexity of Regional Elections in Venezuela
This oxymoronic title introduces my attempt at trying to paint as briefly as I can the diverse aspects of the regional elections in Venezuela. I will organize this in two parts:
The elements that shape these regional elections, discussed below
The predictions state by state, discussed in a subsequent post
_________________________
THE DETERMINANTS OF THE VENEZUELAN REGIONAL ELECTIONS
The chavismo set up
In most states Chavez has set up himself the candidates, and sometimes he also seems the one running the campaign. The reason is very simple: he wants governors, and mayors, that will follow strictly his orders. Chavez does not like decentralization as he thinks that being the "leader" of the revolution, "his benevolency" must be the sole provider of the "beloved" people. Governors are the people that mail the checks and take the blame.
Unfortunately for Chavez, the brief history of Venezuelan decentralization process has been long enough to convince a majority of the Venezuelan population that day to day problems are solved much better by local authorities than by some bureaucrat in Caracas. And that is affecting the pro Chavez candidates up to a point, in particular the ones that Chavez has picked out of nowhere to lead his troops. The case of Zulia where a military whose only claim to fame was taking the Pilin Leon tanker in January 2003 is a particularly daunting set back for Chavez as his candidate is still trailing almost 2 to 1!
But the authoritarian way to decide candidates by Chavez has other side effects. Chavismo is a rather heterochromatic alluvial compost of leftist movements, and, early on at least, right wing and democratic factors. Thus, in some locales the decisions of El Supremo have not been well received and "dissident" candidatures, usually to the left of the Chavez nominee, have sprouted. Their effect is hard to evaluate with polls as electors on this side of the spectrum are rather hard to reach, and rather secretive.
The referendum after shock
Winning, fraudulently or not, has been good for Chavez. Indeed, we are a country that loves to be with "the winner", deservedly or not. We root for Brazil at world soccer cup just to be able to shout "We won! We won!" Vicariousness is thy name!
This been said, we are also a country of cross voters. In my very own Yaracuy, a rather backward state some would say, Chavez won handily in 2000, but Lapi won handily his reelection trashing the pro Chavez candidate (who, admittedly, was a rather lousy candidate). The question is of course whether the August 15 afterglow will compensate the cross voting habit. Or even if the August 15 possible fraud might tarnish that Chavez advantage.
The convalescing opposition
The opposition never fully recovered from August 15. Nor would have that been possible in such a short time. Also, what was worse than losing was the lack of alternative strategies which left the opposition completely adrift. Eventually some steps were taken. The Coordinadora Democratica, CD, initiated its slow demise while the decisions were transferred to the local office holders, the ones that had to run their campaigns. A few more months and the local leadership would have been able to distance themselves from the failed CD effort on August. But as it is, it will have to do with October 31.
The electoral fraud debate
There are two debates actually. The first one is the debate on the August 15 fraud. This one unfortunately has not received all the support that it should have gotten, certain organization being more worried in negotiating some quota (or is that shreds?) of power with the thugs in charge. This ambiguity within the opposition has been deadly. No serious politician came out to say that the August 15 result was legitimate. But too many leaders were too comfortable in letting others take the brunt of the blame, or put up a weak defense of their case. The reasons are difficult to understand. Either there was fraud or not. If a political group is convinced that there was fraud but it is not willing to take action, what kind of messages does this send to the voter? An explanation of this contradiction is finally appearing.
The main issue of the present election is a direct consequence of the August 15 likely fraud, namely the fraudulent electoral registry, REP. The CNE has done its outmost to block investigation and revision. The opposition has made it, at least for a while, its sine qua non condition. This has aggravated the campaign problems and distressed the people strengthening a pro-abstention movement. It is easy to understand that with a fraud claim unresolved with an intransigent and arrogant CNE who does not even get its 5th member renewed, there is little trust in fair elections. So, why bother voting?
AD’s game
The reactions to the Tulio Alvarez report and his predictions that the opposition would lose at least half of the cities and districts it controls now just due to the REP irregularities, not mentioning the misiones, has finally brought the necessary clues to understand the games being played within the opposition.
Through August and September, the referendum numbers, whether clean or not, indicated one certain: if the opposition did not manage to unite in the critical districts Chavez candidates would win hands down. That electoral unity has been impossible to achieve and only in October, as the Alvarez report became a political reality, have some efforts been made to that effect. Why was unity, in the face of so much adverse evidence, so difficult to achieve?
The answer is AD who as the grand old party of sorts in Venezuela, the inventor of petro-populism, has been unable to change with the times. Even the Chavez disaster does not seem to have dented its arrogance and stubbornness. After the August debacle, an AD that denounced fraud on the 16, was one week after announcing that it would go to the elections as if nothing. AD has never been bothered by contradictions.
My speculation is that AD decided long ago that the country was perhaps against Chavez but that it would not go and expose itself anymore to unseat him. The momentum was definitely gone on August 16. If there is one thing that has characterized AD through its history is pragmatism and survival skills. They simply decided that Chavez was here for a few more years and that they better got ready for that time. The first thing to do was to become the main opposition party, preferably the only one as during the good old days of AD/Copei. No need for unity pacts, it was now more important to be the sole survivor than to take states away from Chavez. And Primero Justicia, PJ, was the main obstacle before that goal
As a result, PJ who would have done a more principled stand against the CNE and Chavez, realized that it would become the victim of both chavismo and the Adecos who share a profound dislike for the new brand of responsible politics that PJ embraces. PJ was thus forced to hit the campaign trail and try to avoid its early demise at the hands of wily and totally unscrupulous politicians, be them from AD or from chavismo.
The campaign as such
The campaign has become a struggle between AD and PJ, usually indirectly through allies. Everyday it becomes clearer that AD forced the issue on who will lead the opposition after October 31. And this will probably have devastating consequences for the opposition as a whole. In particular for the MAS, Copei and other minor forces from the past who quite often are forced into alliances with AD in the hope to preserve something of their past glories.
Chavismo is actually not being any wiser. The idea of using the opposition divisions to try to get all the states has actually weakened its cause. Political greed promoted internal divisions that are unresolved and that will come back to haunt Chavez after the 31, as the militant left is very upset with the chosen candidates. The specter of hegemony might have actually resulted in a slow re-motivation of the opposition. The talk of fraud is not good for chavismo either as some of its electors might decide not to go and vote since their candidate is certain to win.
The end result is a lackluster campaign. A few postcards.
a wicked and discredited CNE does not even put the pretense of fairness as it leaves Chavez do stuff for his candidates that would impeach him promptly in ANY civilized country a CNE who for three weeks now has been giving us a 2 minutes cadena every hour in a futile attempt to convince the people that the very complex voting system they set up is "easy" to do a CNE who puts his cadenas all the time except when Chavez campaigns live on the state TV a congested and sweaty Chavez visibly upset at having to rescue all his candidates, feeling lonelier than ever, berating his humblest followers in public! Asking them to go away because they come to him with their grievances! (it is long gone the time wen Chavez accepted paper notes from his adoring crowds!) a prostrated opposition who only reacted the second week of October when Chavez had been campaigning fast and furious since August 16 a very single march of a few thousand people when hundred of thousand hit the street on a whim a chavismo that can only fill its rallies if Chavez attends
and so many more images of a politically deadened country... The end of an era, for all the players.
The elements that shape these regional elections, discussed below
The predictions state by state, discussed in a subsequent post
_________________________
THE DETERMINANTS OF THE VENEZUELAN REGIONAL ELECTIONS
The chavismo set up
In most states Chavez has set up himself the candidates, and sometimes he also seems the one running the campaign. The reason is very simple: he wants governors, and mayors, that will follow strictly his orders. Chavez does not like decentralization as he thinks that being the "leader" of the revolution, "his benevolency" must be the sole provider of the "beloved" people. Governors are the people that mail the checks and take the blame.
Unfortunately for Chavez, the brief history of Venezuelan decentralization process has been long enough to convince a majority of the Venezuelan population that day to day problems are solved much better by local authorities than by some bureaucrat in Caracas. And that is affecting the pro Chavez candidates up to a point, in particular the ones that Chavez has picked out of nowhere to lead his troops. The case of Zulia where a military whose only claim to fame was taking the Pilin Leon tanker in January 2003 is a particularly daunting set back for Chavez as his candidate is still trailing almost 2 to 1!
But the authoritarian way to decide candidates by Chavez has other side effects. Chavismo is a rather heterochromatic alluvial compost of leftist movements, and, early on at least, right wing and democratic factors. Thus, in some locales the decisions of El Supremo have not been well received and "dissident" candidatures, usually to the left of the Chavez nominee, have sprouted. Their effect is hard to evaluate with polls as electors on this side of the spectrum are rather hard to reach, and rather secretive.
The referendum after shock
Winning, fraudulently or not, has been good for Chavez. Indeed, we are a country that loves to be with "the winner", deservedly or not. We root for Brazil at world soccer cup just to be able to shout "We won! We won!" Vicariousness is thy name!
This been said, we are also a country of cross voters. In my very own Yaracuy, a rather backward state some would say, Chavez won handily in 2000, but Lapi won handily his reelection trashing the pro Chavez candidate (who, admittedly, was a rather lousy candidate). The question is of course whether the August 15 afterglow will compensate the cross voting habit. Or even if the August 15 possible fraud might tarnish that Chavez advantage.
The convalescing opposition
The opposition never fully recovered from August 15. Nor would have that been possible in such a short time. Also, what was worse than losing was the lack of alternative strategies which left the opposition completely adrift. Eventually some steps were taken. The Coordinadora Democratica, CD, initiated its slow demise while the decisions were transferred to the local office holders, the ones that had to run their campaigns. A few more months and the local leadership would have been able to distance themselves from the failed CD effort on August. But as it is, it will have to do with October 31.
The electoral fraud debate
There are two debates actually. The first one is the debate on the August 15 fraud. This one unfortunately has not received all the support that it should have gotten, certain organization being more worried in negotiating some quota (or is that shreds?) of power with the thugs in charge. This ambiguity within the opposition has been deadly. No serious politician came out to say that the August 15 result was legitimate. But too many leaders were too comfortable in letting others take the brunt of the blame, or put up a weak defense of their case. The reasons are difficult to understand. Either there was fraud or not. If a political group is convinced that there was fraud but it is not willing to take action, what kind of messages does this send to the voter? An explanation of this contradiction is finally appearing.
The main issue of the present election is a direct consequence of the August 15 likely fraud, namely the fraudulent electoral registry, REP. The CNE has done its outmost to block investigation and revision. The opposition has made it, at least for a while, its sine qua non condition. This has aggravated the campaign problems and distressed the people strengthening a pro-abstention movement. It is easy to understand that with a fraud claim unresolved with an intransigent and arrogant CNE who does not even get its 5th member renewed, there is little trust in fair elections. So, why bother voting?
AD’s game
The reactions to the Tulio Alvarez report and his predictions that the opposition would lose at least half of the cities and districts it controls now just due to the REP irregularities, not mentioning the misiones, has finally brought the necessary clues to understand the games being played within the opposition.
Through August and September, the referendum numbers, whether clean or not, indicated one certain: if the opposition did not manage to unite in the critical districts Chavez candidates would win hands down. That electoral unity has been impossible to achieve and only in October, as the Alvarez report became a political reality, have some efforts been made to that effect. Why was unity, in the face of so much adverse evidence, so difficult to achieve?
The answer is AD who as the grand old party of sorts in Venezuela, the inventor of petro-populism, has been unable to change with the times. Even the Chavez disaster does not seem to have dented its arrogance and stubbornness. After the August debacle, an AD that denounced fraud on the 16, was one week after announcing that it would go to the elections as if nothing. AD has never been bothered by contradictions.
My speculation is that AD decided long ago that the country was perhaps against Chavez but that it would not go and expose itself anymore to unseat him. The momentum was definitely gone on August 16. If there is one thing that has characterized AD through its history is pragmatism and survival skills. They simply decided that Chavez was here for a few more years and that they better got ready for that time. The first thing to do was to become the main opposition party, preferably the only one as during the good old days of AD/Copei. No need for unity pacts, it was now more important to be the sole survivor than to take states away from Chavez. And Primero Justicia, PJ, was the main obstacle before that goal
As a result, PJ who would have done a more principled stand against the CNE and Chavez, realized that it would become the victim of both chavismo and the Adecos who share a profound dislike for the new brand of responsible politics that PJ embraces. PJ was thus forced to hit the campaign trail and try to avoid its early demise at the hands of wily and totally unscrupulous politicians, be them from AD or from chavismo.
The campaign as such
The campaign has become a struggle between AD and PJ, usually indirectly through allies. Everyday it becomes clearer that AD forced the issue on who will lead the opposition after October 31. And this will probably have devastating consequences for the opposition as a whole. In particular for the MAS, Copei and other minor forces from the past who quite often are forced into alliances with AD in the hope to preserve something of their past glories.
Chavismo is actually not being any wiser. The idea of using the opposition divisions to try to get all the states has actually weakened its cause. Political greed promoted internal divisions that are unresolved and that will come back to haunt Chavez after the 31, as the militant left is very upset with the chosen candidates. The specter of hegemony might have actually resulted in a slow re-motivation of the opposition. The talk of fraud is not good for chavismo either as some of its electors might decide not to go and vote since their candidate is certain to win.
The end result is a lackluster campaign. A few postcards.
and so many more images of a politically deadened country... The end of an era, for all the players.
Monday, October 25, 2004
To vote or not to vote: an acute question in Venezuela
It has become very fashionable in some opposition sectors to scream loud and clear that there is an electoral fraud going on and the only way to protest is to create a massive abstention movement to de-legitimize the chavista candidate that will win by forfeit.
This sounds really good, particularly on TV.
Unfortunately it is totally unrealistic, and in addition, as Talleyrand would say, "plus qu'un crime, une faute" more than a crime, a blunder) (1). The crime is that it will be serving on a silver platter to chavismo states and cities that normally would never be won by them, succulent dishes such as Caracas and Miranda state. The inhabitants of those areas would suffer the consequences to a degree that they cannot imagine. The blunder is that after such a loss it will be very, very difficult for the opposition to recover, and Chavez will have an even easier time of his re-election in 2006.
Let me track back in time. In April 1999 a lot of people were preaching the abstention for the referendum on calling a new constituent assembly. The reason was that it was illegal to call a referendum which figure was not included in the 1961 constitution and that this 1961 document had to be amended first. That was all very fine and true except that the Supreme Court caved in to Chavez and allowed for the referendum on some unclear principles of "soberania popular" (popular sovereignty). The result was striking, 90% voted Yes, but only 40% voted. As a consequence 36% of the country asked to write a new constitution that now bears heavily on 100% of us...
There is one great saying in French: Les absents ont toujours tort (The absents always carry the blame). This applies to some office question such as "who the f... screwed up the photocopier again?!" which answer is invariably someone out at coffee break or on sick leave. It applies even better to politics: "you could not be bothered to vote, so stop complaining!"
And this is the crux of the matter: you cannot claim that your vote has been stolen by electoral fraud if you did not go an deposit it!!!!!!!
For all of these people that are promoting abstention I have a simple question: what do you offer in exchange? Will you be picketing at the poll stations? Will you block access highways? And if you just stay home on Sunday, what will you do once Barreto has been proclaimed Mayor at Large for Caracas? I really want to know! I am even willing to follow if your plan is sound!
I understand that there is a major electoral fraud going on, that many town halls will be lost because of irregularities in the electoral registry. But they are not going to be saved if people stay home and do not protest actively. If you do not want to vote on October 31 for fraud, then you must take to the streets, NOW! If not, do not dare coming to me and complain on November first.
On September 14 this blogger wrote:
I was only too prescient.
That is our drama, the provinces have moved, the governors are still fighting nails and claws with the CNE, but the Caracas prima donnas are sabotaging us, as well as AD who is more interested in remaining alone with Chavez than ousting Chavez.
I will go and vote. Even though I am perfectly aware of the electoral problems, of the lousy leadership we have in the opposition. Staying home only favors Chavez, vacuous politicians that love to posture, and AD/Copei. And on November first I will be able to claim electoral fraud. Democracy and freedom are earned, they are never granted.
Wake up! Voting is the only way that you will have to punish the opposition leadership: they will have lost their town halls for the fraud that they could not face, for the unity they could not reach. If you stay home, they will blame you! And we will not be able to boot them! We will lose our chances to get real leaders, or at least eliminate the weak ones!
Finally a thought. If you do not go and vote, Chavez will not need to cheat. Heck! He might even order all the ballot boxes to be counted, every single vote by every single vote. He will be able to claim that he won fair and square. And the whole world will accept the result. Thus you will remain "sin el chivo y sin el mecate" (without the goat and the rope, an expression that loses a lot in translation) (2)
Of course, feel free to use the blogger e-mail button below to circulate this post to the folks you know will be at the beach on October 31, that is, if we have elections that day which still remains to be seen.
------------------
(1) Talleyrand was the foreign minister of Napoleon and said those words on the unnecessary execution of the Duke of Enghein. This unjustified political crime by Napoleon actually alienated the royal houses of Europe that were grudgingly starting to accept his Consulate regime. War broke out soon until Europe finally got rid of him 14 years later.
(2) note added in proof: AIO suggested "throwing the baby out with the bathwater" as a translation. I agree. I also messed up the post when I edited it so this version might not be quite the same as the one an hour ago. Sorry!
This sounds really good, particularly on TV.
Unfortunately it is totally unrealistic, and in addition, as Talleyrand would say, "plus qu'un crime, une faute" more than a crime, a blunder) (1). The crime is that it will be serving on a silver platter to chavismo states and cities that normally would never be won by them, succulent dishes such as Caracas and Miranda state. The inhabitants of those areas would suffer the consequences to a degree that they cannot imagine. The blunder is that after such a loss it will be very, very difficult for the opposition to recover, and Chavez will have an even easier time of his re-election in 2006.
Let me track back in time. In April 1999 a lot of people were preaching the abstention for the referendum on calling a new constituent assembly. The reason was that it was illegal to call a referendum which figure was not included in the 1961 constitution and that this 1961 document had to be amended first. That was all very fine and true except that the Supreme Court caved in to Chavez and allowed for the referendum on some unclear principles of "soberania popular" (popular sovereignty). The result was striking, 90% voted Yes, but only 40% voted. As a consequence 36% of the country asked to write a new constitution that now bears heavily on 100% of us...
There is one great saying in French: Les absents ont toujours tort (The absents always carry the blame). This applies to some office question such as "who the f... screwed up the photocopier again?!" which answer is invariably someone out at coffee break or on sick leave. It applies even better to politics: "you could not be bothered to vote, so stop complaining!"
And this is the crux of the matter: you cannot claim that your vote has been stolen by electoral fraud if you did not go an deposit it!!!!!!!
For all of these people that are promoting abstention I have a simple question: what do you offer in exchange? Will you be picketing at the poll stations? Will you block access highways? And if you just stay home on Sunday, what will you do once Barreto has been proclaimed Mayor at Large for Caracas? I really want to know! I am even willing to follow if your plan is sound!
I understand that there is a major electoral fraud going on, that many town halls will be lost because of irregularities in the electoral registry. But they are not going to be saved if people stay home and do not protest actively. If you do not want to vote on October 31 for fraud, then you must take to the streets, NOW! If not, do not dare coming to me and complain on November first.
On September 14 this blogger wrote:
- But if you [the opposition leadership] are not standing next to me, or ahead of me at the march, I will not be there next or behind you. If you do not fight nails and claws against the CNE, I will stay home and watch cable TV.
If people do not sense a good support for Tulio Alvarez, a dynamic electoral campaign entrusted to the local guys, a hint of new blood in the fossilized Caracas apparatchiks, and I am not talking of Pompeyo, a transfer of more responsibilities to us in the provinces who know better what is going on in the country than a Prados del Este garden party, we will stay home on voting day.
I was only too prescient.
That is our drama, the provinces have moved, the governors are still fighting nails and claws with the CNE, but the Caracas prima donnas are sabotaging us, as well as AD who is more interested in remaining alone with Chavez than ousting Chavez.
I will go and vote. Even though I am perfectly aware of the electoral problems, of the lousy leadership we have in the opposition. Staying home only favors Chavez, vacuous politicians that love to posture, and AD/Copei. And on November first I will be able to claim electoral fraud. Democracy and freedom are earned, they are never granted.
Wake up! Voting is the only way that you will have to punish the opposition leadership: they will have lost their town halls for the fraud that they could not face, for the unity they could not reach. If you stay home, they will blame you! And we will not be able to boot them! We will lose our chances to get real leaders, or at least eliminate the weak ones!
Finally a thought. If you do not go and vote, Chavez will not need to cheat. Heck! He might even order all the ballot boxes to be counted, every single vote by every single vote. He will be able to claim that he won fair and square. And the whole world will accept the result. Thus you will remain "sin el chivo y sin el mecate" (without the goat and the rope, an expression that loses a lot in translation) (2)
Of course, feel free to use the blogger e-mail button below to circulate this post to the folks you know will be at the beach on October 31, that is, if we have elections that day which still remains to be seen.
------------------
(1) Talleyrand was the foreign minister of Napoleon and said those words on the unnecessary execution of the Duke of Enghein. This unjustified political crime by Napoleon actually alienated the royal houses of Europe that were grudgingly starting to accept his Consulate regime. War broke out soon until Europe finally got rid of him 14 years later.
(2) note added in proof: AIO suggested "throwing the baby out with the bathwater" as a translation. I agree. I also messed up the post when I edited it so this version might not be quite the same as the one an hour ago. Sorry!
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)