Tuesday, June 10, 2008

The 2008 election gambles; conclusion and perspective

I did not plan to write a conclusion to the series of posts on the 2008 election I wrote this past two weeks, but a declaration of Mendoza and the events of these recent days require a conclusion which is also sort of an update. Isn't it something how news in Venezuela seem to need an update so fast?

The first post tried to show how focused Chavez would be. More than any one else in Venezuela he knows that any future political career for him past 2012 depends on a convincing victory next November. Failure to confirm once again his populist ascendant, a must for any populist, will mean that at the latest he will leave his job in January 2013.

The second post tried to imagine what would be the Chavez strategy to make sure any losses in November will be limited. Considering the stakes, we can predict that he will pull all the levers he can even if they are illegal or unethical.

It is under the light of these two considerations that we must explain the stunning reversals that Chavez has been doing these recent months. They include the revision of the new education programs, the withdrawal of the security law and yesterday abandonment of the FARC. Clearly Chavez must have seen some polls that prove to him that not only these issues were not going to give him any advantage in gaining votes, but they also will offer the opposition powerful weapons. One thing is sure: Chavez has learned from his self inflicted wound with the RCTV closing which contributed greatly in his loss last December. He will try to avoid such mistakes. In other words Chavez has discovered that this time around he will have a real opposition in front and that he will need to run a real campaign. Thus he cannot afford to be saddled with issues that satisfy his ego but bring him only problems.

The third post looked at the opposition challenge. Considering the mood of the country the political opposition has its work cut out. It must speak to the real needs of the country, that is the general inefficiency of Chavez administration. It must convince Venezuelans that it can run better cities and states than a chavista administration, going as far as proving that even if the central government sabotage local opposition holdings, these will still be able to provide better service. It must understand that the wishes for unity expressed by the opposition voters are not a caprice, that they all want first the local chavista to get out of misrepresenting them and for that they do not care who is the unity candidate as long as s/he speaks to their root concerns. The candidates must realize that if they do not understand the stakes of the country, their voters do so very much. In other words successful opposition candidate will be able to have a local vocabulary with a national grammar.

The fourth post dealt with what possible meaning the results would convey. As we have seen from Chavez actions, he is quite clear about what he needs: popular vote victory and almost all of the state houses, including Caracas and Miranda. The opposition must understand once and for all that the true meaning of the November result is not how many districts it wins, but how damaged Chavez power is, that is, comes November, it is possible that the result in a few chosen key districts might become more important than the whole result. If there is one single reason that should make the political opposition see the light it is to realize that this one did not win the 2007 referendum: it was Chavez who lost it. Chavez does understand that, which explains why he is trying to push many of the constitutional reform provisions through barely legal ways, guessing, so far wrongly, that the opposition might not be able to counter a Chinese water torture proceeding.

The fifth post finally allowed me to post my first prediction, based on recent historical trends more than anything else. I predicted that the opposition should win 7 states, that 1 was leaning seriously in its favor and that up to three more were reasonably accessible. That is , I am giving the opposition a potential of 11 states, which is for me the best result it can hope for at this writing. Well, today Enrique Mendoza sort of confirmed my analysis by declaring that the opposition should make all possible efforts to win 10 states and 190 districts. Thus Mendoza set the bar to reach, as he also stated without ambiguity that the major obstacle to reach such numbers is individuals within the political opposition that think they can run on their own as if this was just a normal election.

I think the opposition can make it provided it follows what I have described in these posts and which I did not invent: you can read similar stuff everywhere in newspapers, I am not original at all. I will just add something: the candidates for every state and every district should be decided by mid July at the latest as chavismo is now running full speed and the opposition cannot leave the field open for too long just because they cannot decide who is the unity candidate. In fact all districts that do not have their main candidate snared by the Russian list should be decided by early July, leaving the rest of July to deal with the dozen or so controversial nominations. Three weeks are left which will be closely watched by public opinion which will be very critical if it takes any longer. The result of this watch will be more decisive to stimulate the opposition voter than any silly local program candidates will be able to present after.

Opposition wanna-be candidates, you did not even read it here first.


-The end-

Monday, June 09, 2008

Chavez calls for an end to the FARC: of the true value of Reyes computers

[Update]

Sundays I also tend to do a news hygiene and only pay attention to them at night, if that much. Thus it was a few minutes ago that I saw the stunning shift in Chavez FARC policies: he asked them to surrender all of the hostages without asking for anything in exchange; he said that today in Latin America guerrillas were not necessary anymore; he finished up the FARC stating that they had become just a mere excuse for the US to keep intervening in South America. The BBC in Spanish carries more complete information.

Wow! The guy definitely knows how to bounce back from the brink of disaster!

But as usual this also hides something: the information inside the Raul Reyes laptop must have been so perturbing, the FARC recent defeats so damaging that before all explodes in Chavez face, he might as well get rid of them both A.S.A.P.

With such a proposal, if it works out which remains to be seen as drug traffickers will not be as amenable to surrender their best shields, the hostages, Chavez could refurbish his image as accusations against him, no matter how true and how sustainable they are, will be seen as keeping Ingrid et al. longer as hostage in the jungles.

The FARC wins, because by accepting the Chavez proposal they get a way to leave the jungles and become a political party before Uribe finishes them off. Right now, as the succession crisis of Marulanda is far from being truly settled, it looks like the only viable option they have left is to negotiate something quick. The other option would require a couple of years of jungle hiding, on the run, until they can finally come across an opportunity to grow again. Very remote possibility. The time is for them to cut their losses, in case they are still anchored to reality.
Besides the French are willing to offer exile to many of them and the less criminal of the lot can recycle as local politicians financed by Chavez. At last they will be able to have showers every night and sleep tight in a bed, without the need of mosquito nets. You know, they are not getting any younger and they cannot even trust their body guards (or Chavez babble mouth).

Chavez wins, at least for the time being. If he convinces the FARC to do so, then he will come out as the grater man. The computer files and the evidence will still exist but as long as hostages are being released and as the FARC is negotiating a political reconversion nobody will dare use them. And after all is settled, Uribe will not be president anymore, Chavez might not be president anymore ans thus nobody might want or need to go and reopen these issues.

Uribe does not win much, but then again he has won so much already... True, if the FARC were to remain fighting, Uribe could manage to change the constitution again to run for a third term (which looks very difficult anyway, more difficult even than for Chavez). But if the FARC "surrender" were to happen, Uribe would have no problem of benefiting from that to make sure his chosen successor is elected. Let's not forget that an integration of the FARC into Colombian politics could bring to light the left divisions as to whether welcome FARC in their ranks. Thus Uribe, his image refurbished in full, could finally land an FTA with the US and become the anti Chavez leader of Latin America once he leaves office.

The US wins, if anything because they will need to give much less money to Colombia. The next US president is facing troubled times and any half backed solution to Colombia's long running war is welcome.

The drug cartels are the ones with the most at stake. They lose their main protectors on the field. Thus the end result might be a division of the FARC, a liberation of a whole bunch or hostages and a small
guerrilla group still bent on warfare as an excuse for drug trafficking. But this time Chavez would not support them preferring to finance the FARC political campaigns.

You have to give it to Chavez, he manages to find a way to get himself out of tight spots! At other people expense of course, even though he is the one that helped put them down, but he escapes. Oh well, that will teach the FARC to have dealt with him: now he will finance their demise. And gladly! as it will be much better than to finance the hordes of lawyers he would need for his defense at The Hague.

Truly, these laptops must contain mighty damning evidence. And now we might never know!

Meanwhile Chavez has had one of his worst weeks: within 48 hours he had to renounce his own Patriot Act and his pet project in Colombia. Someone is going to have to pay for this in Venezuela.........

[Update]: Of course, all of this could be a farce, and as a reader wrote to me, if Chavez were sincere he would be tearing down the FARC hideaways inside Venezuela. But things do not work that way. First chavismo always denied, even in front of the evidence, any FARC activities inside Venezuela, thus he is not going to prove his critics right by dismantling a FARC camp in public. And second, this is a major reversal, one that would make very difficult for Chavez to appear collaborating with the FARC for the time being. True, under the table he will keep financing them but I think that he is in agreement with the FARC and they are cornered enough that they need desperately a breather. So they must at least try to pretend that they are sincere as they know that if Chavez is further weakened by the laptops info, he will be of very little use to them at the time they need him the most. The test will come soon: if they mean it they will free Ingrid within the next month.

-The end-

The 2008 election gambles: part 5, hazardous predictions

And now for what the few patient readers who are still following after the previous 4 posts have been waiting for: the first round of predictions (1).

The predictions, round 1


First, let me state that my predictive stunning success for last December vote cannot possibly be replicated this time: local elections have so many parameters that it is impossible for a simple busy follower like me to master them all. I cannot for the life of me discuss in detail the inner politics of, e.g., Trujillo. Fortunately for me those states I know least of seem to be safely in the Chavez column.

This time I will not hazard an actual vote count as I did last year. For the referendum vote, we could assume general abstention trend, general voter support/defection patterns. But for a local election, no matter what the national issues might be, the local factor, the excitement generated or not by the local candidates will play a bigger role in how many people bother to go and vote in Tacusipon.

Right now we can only talk about a trend. Most candidates have yet to be chosen even within the PSUV. Its primary was shown to be a sham, and it is far from ensuring the support of the disgruntled base and the junior allies of chavismo such as the PPT. It is quite possible that by August someone, like Garcia Carneiro in Vargas, is so low in the polls that he might decide not to run and let another chavista try its luck: candidates can register early August, so that leaves us with 2 full month of sotto voce campaigning and polls until the final pro Chavez candidate is finally anointed (PSUV, PPT or else).

On the opposition side, the length of the "survey poll primaries" might ensure, comes August, a better candidate, or at least a clearly established one . But this has yet to happen. The more opposition delays in its agreements, the more time it gives chavismo to catch up from its very late start in deciding who would run in red. Thus we cannot make any serious prediction until September 30, when all candidates will be decided for good and one month of real campaign will have finally taken place.

But this should not stop us form having fun and we move on for the first round of reckless electoral predictions. This, of course, without forgetting that much more than who will pick the garbage we might be playing out the future of the country next November.

How the chart was designed

You might want to open the chart in a different window to follow better.

The chart lists the different Venezuelan states organized by regions. The names of the states are aligned on the left of the first column. For some states I have included some significant districts that tell us a lot on how things are moving. The names of these districts are aligned right in the same first column. I have included past results (rounded percentile votes cast at the date).

In red we have the states where chavismo won, and in blue the anti chavismo states. Orange are the states which started chavista and ended up independent or anti Chavez as their governors broke with Chavez. Green are the rare districts that could almost pretend to some independent status.

In the sixth column I am putting the prediction. This time no percentile prediction or vote count: a state is won or lost, period. In pink will be the states tending Chavez (sorry, Excel does not allow for a lighter red). Light blue of course means tendency toward the opposition. And in gray I indicate the states which right now can be considered too close to call.

Each column represents an election (I have skipped the 2005 ones which are totally meaningless, and the 2004 recall election which was such a special election that it is of no use to draw trends, though it would look a lot as the 2004 regional elections). In order: the 2000 local result, the 2004 local result, the 2006 presidential result and last December referendum.

The predictions on June 2008

Zulia. Let's start with the richest state of all in voters, and the easiest state to discuss, even if I placed it at the bottom of the chart. Zulia has had an historical tendency to drift away from whoever was in charge in Caracas. When Venezuela was AD, COPEI slowly crept in. When COPEI/AD ruled during Caldera 2, it shifted to Arias Cardenas in a pre-Chavez era mood. It is thus no surprise that the state with perhaps the strongest local character in Venezuela (music, cuisine, heat, all is different there than from the rest of Venezuela) would have felt very unconformable about Chavez using the oil pumped from under its feet to feed its ego trip.

The percentage of the state voting against chavismo clearly tends to go up. Chavez himself is liked enough, he won in 2006, but not impressively as elsewhere. If you look at the three towns I chose, this is confirmed. In 2000 Di Martino won Maracaibo easily in a pro Chavez fervor, though Rosales managed to carry the state, if barely (Venezuelans love to cross over their votes). But in 2004, even as the whole country went red, Di Martino barely made it; since Maracaibo has seen its anti Chavez number rise steadily. Popular San Francisco South of Maracaibo or Cabimas across the bridge also show a similar pattern even if less marked.

Chavismo has decided to run Di Martino anyway, as he cannot run again for Maracaibo again. I cannot see how Di Martino can win Zulia, though paradoxically he might be the best candidate chavismo could field in Zulia (the others such as Cabezas or Ortega never caught there in spite of their long tenure in parliament). I expect Zulia to be carried by the opposition, which in addition should get the top prize of Maracaibo and possibly a very large majority of the state districts. In short, chavismo risks to be shut out of Zulia: they might still get more than 40% of the votes but these will be evenly distributed thus creating a nice advantage for the Rosales led coalition, perhaps nearing a clean sweep.

The Llanos. The other easy to discuss region is the great plains of Venezuela, half way in the chart. They offer us the reverse observations of Zulia: they seem to be pretty proud of their Llanero president (Barinas is the home state) and we can expect a chavista clean sweep even if an occasional small district changes hands. Or can we?

The Llanos have tended to be AD. This one did the only real agrarian reform of Venezuela (the Chavez one is a joke). When AD collapsed, it was natural for its inhabitants to drift to chavismo, which was perceived by them as the left wing that AD had lost. Let's not forget that chavista did not appear as a spontaneous generation, out of nowhere: most of them were all their lives either AD or COPEI or MAS. Chavismo is also a macho party and that resonates well with the local habits of the Llanos which have never quite overcome the Doña Barbara civilization.

No problem here, even if there was a slight fall back in 2007, the trend is clear, the Llanos remain solidly in Chavez camp. But there are clouds on the horizon.

Barinas, which I put in pink as tending to Chavez, might have problems. Adam Chavez, the first brother's candidature ,seems to have been imposed over there. The Chavez brothers have become quite unpopular in Barinas as they have been perceived has reaching easy wealth fast, quite fast, quite suspiciously. In addition Barinas folk expect that being the home state of Chavez they should be much, much better off than what they are (paternalism has a way to come to bite their practionners). Scandals have been occurring enough in Barinas that we could have a surprise and Adam could well bite the dust if his campaign turns bad. He has a very wooden personality, very sectarian and I doubt that he will be campaigning very convincingly. The Llanos state to watch!

Just a warning note on Portuguesa. This one could be the safest bet as its results have been the most consistent. Yet, chavismo is at odds there with the PPT who thinks they have a stronger candidate. Right now it seems that chavismo will run two candidates. Yet the overall pro Chavez feeling there might be enough that chavismo may be able to afford a divided ticket and still win, in particular if the PSUV elected appointee flounders (oxymoron intended). This one, Castro Soteldo, is a rather lackluster military that has been imposed in the area and who barely got half of the votes in the PSUV primary. Thus Chavez might still win but not with the man he wants. Anyway, at this point I do not see the opposition being able to take advantage of that local situation and Portuguesa should remain red.

Guarico also offers a similar situation. Lara, the ineffable professional liar ex Information Minister somehow got dispatched there and only made 43% at the PSUV primary. Eight years ago he was running for Miranda state where he got unbelievably trounced by Mendoza. The current holder of the state house is not amused. Manuitt, barred from running again would like a relative to succeed him and counts discretely on the PPT to put pressure on the PSUV. That Manuitt is a possible criminal and mafia like governor does not stop him to pretend to rule the state after his departure. Could Guarico become an unexpected opportunity for the opposition?

No matter, I think at this point that chavismo is so far ahead in the Llanos that the opposition can expect at best to pick one state. And that if they put their act together because if chavistas settle their issues by September, it will be difficult to pick even Barinas.

The South (Guayana). These three states are today's "frontier" regions of sorts. Delta Amacuro and Amazonas are now ruled by strong chavista sycophants in the name of the native folks who still think that the pro native rights 1999 constitution really were meant for them. It did on paper but not quite on practice (see my Delta Amacuro posts). They have in fact become a group completely dependent of chavismo largesses, without the means to show any independence of will. In fact, the political battles are inside the chavista camp as the opposition groups are basically powerless there and of no interest for the natives.

Bolivar is another matter. The mining state, with huge public sector, and a growing one after the take over of SIDOR, was for a while a secure state for chavismo. But the incredibly bad administration of general Rangel (running again though barely getting the PSUV nod) has created lots of internal battles within chavismo. Trade unions, public servants, mining mafias and military are fighting it out for the control of the state and the opposition could well have better chances there than one would think of. After all, the trend is clearly down for chavismo and the question is how the negative slope will hold.

The Andes. Another easy area to discuss. The Andes went again all chavista in 2004, with better margins. There chavismo truly helped remote areas that had been neglected for a log time. In 2004 the agrarian policies and the FARC problems had not affected the area too much. Yet many people were surprised at the clean sweep of chavismo in 2004. But the fall was as fast as the rise! Trujillo, the poorest of the three, remained chavista in 2006 and 2007, but Tachira offered the best score to Rosales in 2006, and, again, the best NO score in 2007. The almost as dramatic drop in Merida is also influenced in part by the Tachira situation.

What happened? Well, the ambiguous security policies of Chavez have had a clear effect on the border. Letting the FARC hang around with all the crime that comes along, letting contraband of gasoline toward Colombia go through, has greatly perturbed the economic system of the area and its quality of life. Kidnappings, blackmails, "vacunas" are the norm of there and have brought it in a chronic depression now greatly accelerated as the recent Colombo-Venezuelan spat has decreased the border activity by 60%. Tachira and Merida are now two sure picks for the opposition. Besides the chavista candidates sent over there do not seem to carry much popular fervor with them and failed to make convincing shows at the PSUV primaries in Tachira.

Yet the opposition could still manage to blow it as too many candidates want these all but certain jobs. In particular many ghosts from the past have a hard time to understand that their time has gone. Merida is the most vulnerable on thsi respect, and I had to think about putting it blue instead of light blue.

Centro Occidente. Now we start getting into the more complex areas of the country and I will need to look at some town halls to find clues. Let's go by states.

Falcon is the simplest of the lot. It went surprisingly for chavismo in 2000, not even reaching the 50% mark. The governor, a relatively young military, did a good enough job and benefited from the 2003 strike crisis which dramatically polarized Punto Fijo, the main town there. Yet, as any rather uncouth soldier, his reelection brought out the true Montilla out: nepotism and arrogance became felt around and if Chavez was nicely reelected there in 2006, it was a stunning surprise to see that the NO barely missed that state in 2007 (in fact, it was a the only split state where one question was SI and the other NO). Now Falcon is undecided though chavismo should be able to recoup enough to sneak in. It will all depend on the candidate that the opposition manages to field as personality might be the main issue there: Montilla is running his wife!

Lara is a very interesting case. First, there was the stunning NO victory in 2007. That one was due strictly to the large NO votes of the two main districts, Barquisimeto and its suburb Cabudare. Yet Barquisimeto major Henry Falcon was riding rather high in the polls. What has happened there is that the fight between the ineffectual governor Reyes Reyes and Falcon has crated a deep rift within chavismo. In fact chavismo tried to block Falcon nomination but when he announced that he would run with or without Chavez blessing, Chavez had to relent and sure enough once allowed to run, Falcon won easily the PSUV primary last Sunday.

I do put Lara as too close to call because it is difficult to decide how much that chavismo division played: after all it was enough for that stunning NO last year. Reyes Reyes might secretly root for a Falcon defeat. Even Chavez might not cry much if Falcon loses as he is considered a chavista that places good management above unconditional loyalty to anyone, a rarity inside chavismo these days. It will all depend on who does the opposition fields for Barquisimeto district. This one carries about half of the state votes and thus a surprising opposition victory in Barquisimeto coupled with an embittered chavismo sector could give a surprise at state level. Still, at this point the opposition does not seem to be able to field a good candidate for the state house and I expect Falcon to have maybe a short but clear victory no matter what. However he could end up with a state legislature that will not be friendly to him, a possible split state. In fact, his relative good tenure at Barquisimeto might make many opposition electors vote for him for the job but against him at the state legislature, leaving the group hostile in general as hard core chavista would not mind voting agaisnt his proposals and budgets on occasion.

Yaracuy is a real enigma. The current governor, indicted and yet not placed on the Russian list, has been disowned by the PSUV but will apparently run again on his own. He will not win as his administration has been a disgrace: only the rabble rouser of the state might still back him up. In addition a rather discredited chavismo is fielding a local Taliban who scares everyone and who lost any previous electoral attempts he run at. He got the nomination because, in my opinion, no one with a real chance within chavismo wanted to waste it on what seems a sure defeat.

But is it a sure defeat for chavismo? I am not so sure. If there is one thing that Gimenez has succeeded is to get rid of his main rival, governor Lapi, who is now living in exile on trumped up judicial charges. This scandalous situation has not been effectively fought by his supporters and the Lapi movement, based as chavismo on a strong leader, is crumbling. The opposition is divided and no clear candidate is emerging to pick the pieces. If you look at the three main districts of Yaracuy, you can see by yourself that there is no trend. Yaritagua might seem to get closer to chavismo Independencia and San Felipe seem to become slowly more and more anti Chavez. All will be played on the country side vote: if the chavista candidate manages to inspire the peasantry, so to speak, he might win. If he fails to connect, the opposition might be strong enough in the cities to recover Yaracuy. We can also expect in Yaracuy a legislature of a different color than the governor, whichever side gains the much deteriorated mansion. One thing is certain: Giménez will end in jail for sure, probably before the election if necessary to improve Heredia's chances. In short I put right now a "too close to call" because simply we cannot get a sense for anything here yet even though I could probably put it already light blue.

Oriente. The tourist area of Venezuela suffers of spit personality at all levels. While in Monagas chavismo seems to dominate every day more, in the other three states nobody knows for sure what is going on.

In Monagas PDVSA rules. The country side is rather quiet because it is not very settled and thus agrarian problems are not as notorious there. The current governor, who apparently was not too bad, should have no problem to be reelected. Monagas, by the way, is another state which shifted easily from AD to Chavez. Still, the mayor of Maturin is not happy at not having been given the governor nod. Not enough to make Briceño stumble but forcing him to campaign more than he planned.

In Nueva Esparta, in spite of a consistent strong chavista vote, the opposition tends to dominate. Margarita has a much divided population between those who benefit from tourism and those who must clean their bathrooms. Yet, the agonizing free trade zone has made tourism less remunerative for the island as more cheap stakes visit than before. The government has failed to solve the water, electricity, transport, ferry problems and AD amazingly managed to retake the island in 2004. Today the governor should be reelected without any problem as even many chavista supporters realize that the lousy mass tourist schemes of the government are not only failing but are depriving them of those tourists who leave a good tip when they are happy with how clean their hotel room is. In addition the rumors of a terrible new Tourism law would play heavily against chavismo there.

Anzoategui, our next step, is more complex. The current governor, Tarek Saab, former human right defender turned local arrogant potentate has been bad news for he state. The tendency of chavismo to consolidate its hold of the state seems to have reverted even though like in Monagas PDVSA rules there. Anzoategui is a clear case of electoral problems due to incompetence and the only surprise here is that chavismo in lack of a good candidate decided to allow Tarek to run again (he did not even reach 50% on the PSUV primary!). The opposition should win there, even if barely. However as a PDVSA dependent state, a few largesses could go a long way to allow Tarek to retain his chair, even if barely. Still, the opposition should at least conquer the state legislature.

Of the lot, beach splendid Sucre is the most complex to scrutinize. Its governor, Ramon Martinez, cannot run again. And in addition he went all the way against Chavez and helped a lot in the defeat of the referendum. Even though the 74% Chavez vote in 2006 would have us think that the 2007 SI result would be a shoo in, it was a squeak in! Martinez is prepping a successor and will certainly campaign strongly for whoever is the nominee from the opposition side. Even though he is a dubious reputation, Martinez has impeccable left credentials and if the opposition can put its act together, Sucre could well fall. Thus the status of too close to call: very Chavez friendly but now too divided to be a sure bet. Besides the PSUV primaries did not show any rising chavista leader there, the PSUV campaign will need to promote its nominee, even if he is Cumana's mayor, before it can be competitive.

The industrial heartland. Carabobo and Aragua own the bulk of Venezuelan industry. As such they have been hard hit by the 2003 strike but they have failed to recover in spite of the growth boom. All the industries that survived the strike work at full speed but many never reopened and few new stuff was built. As a consequence real jobs in production have not grown much. Politics were rough there too as chavismo tried to promote its trade unions, force the burping general on Carabobo and eventually fought with Didalco Bolivar, the governor reelected with he highest result in 2000, a stunning 85%. Now Aragua gave a meager 53 SI, while Carabobo who for a while seemed to go Chavez went 53 for the NO in spite of a weak opposition organization who collapsed once the Salas lost office (personal movements always fail once their leaders are overthrown).

Prediction is not easy even if we look at the tend of the cities highlighted. In Aragua it is clear that Maracay and la Victoria are getting disenchanted with chavismo even if he still wins. If Didalco manages to tie up a nice coalition led by PODEMOS, Aragua will go away of chavismo which will be a major disaster as 4 years ago it was considered an impregnable bastion. Chavismo just picked Isea for the job. He comes from the finance ministry where he did not shine much. He has a shifty look which might not help him much on the trail. A weak candidate if you ask me. But Chavez needed a faithful in Maracay where too many military interests are at stake. Right now the long leftist tradition of Aragua gives the state to Chavez, but if the opposition accepts to rally solidly behind PODEMOS a surprise could be in the making. No matter what, for the time being I expect a close result for chavismo.

In Carabobo chavismo has made the mistake of dispatching Mario Silva of the most infamous La Hojilla VTV show. A divisive, hateful personality, he will polarize the state and will discourage many chavistas. With a good campaign Carabobo could come back for the opposition with a bang. The trends are clear, even in Puerto Cabello chavismo is weakening. It is amazing that chavismo has sent a candidate with no electoral experience and the most vulgar personality we can think of, a true insult to the Carabobo people. Then again La Hojilla had really high ratings there?

Caracas. All eyes are on Caracas. If it is already normal since Caracas metro area holds maybe more than a quarter of Venezuela's vote, it is also a dramatic battle for the prestige of Chavez. If the opposition manages the sweep of Caracas town halls, it would be considered by itself a major disaster for chavismo.

But let's start by the surrounding two states, heavenly influenced by whatever happens to Caracas.

Vargas is the long suffering state of the 1999 disaster. Amazingly, the more Chavez beats Vargas up, the more it seems to vote for the guy. Yet.... The current governor, the classical fat general, has been a disaster, often berated by Chavez himself. And the one that Chavez wanted to run, Garcia Carneiro has the personality of a rotten fish floating on La Guaira harbor. Clearly the opposition has a chance there. But of course no one knows how deep the codependency of the locals goes... I think that in the end Vargas should go Chavez but it is not a given.

Miranda on the other hand seems a sure pick. It has more than one candidate for the opposition that draws crowds whereas Diosdado Cabello has been a lousy governor, a much questioned one in addition. Yet chavismo decided to have him run again. The evolution of the different districts bode ill for Diosdado: the already bloated opposition margins in Baruta, Hatillo, Chacao, Salias seem to grow further, while bastions like Guaicaipuro and Guatire are far from being a sure thing next November. The Guatire loss in December 2007 was widely noted as Guatire was a district where the chavismo coalition could run in divided ranks and still win without any problem. Tough road for Diosdado: not only he is set to lose but he could lose by as much as 10 points. Then again he has only himself to blame as his tenure was much more concerned in pillaging and politics than actual community problem solving, counting too much on Chavez inaugurating public works to reflect good on Diosdado.

Now Caracas at large, the headache of chavismo. Prestige wise the loss of Caracas would be a major blow for Chavez, thus all the guns have been aligned. Barreto, an awful, truly awful mayor, has been tossed out. Bernal has been sent to political death by running for Vargas where he badly lost. Isturiz, a former Libertador mayor who did serve not too shabbily then had been dragged from a possible retirement to run for Caracas. But it might not be enough. Isturiz is black, that is not a problem as he was already elected once. But his blackness has become an issue as his long tenure at the education ministry has revealed a mean streak in him, a resentment that we did not know from him when he was a trade union activist, speaking for all workers. His best merit is that the could indeed motivate and unite the chavista base, but that might not be enough.

The two districts currently run by chavismo, Libertador and Sucre, are also the ones with the largest population and all the shanty towns. This solid base is not a solid as it used to be. 8 years of truly bad management by Rangel and Bernal have exacted a toll: the barrios now do not vote as massively as before, and not as massively for Chavez. In Sucre Ocariz of Primero Justicia almost won in 2004 in spite of the huge abstention movement. This time Ocariz might even win in Petare and other popular districts. A strong win by Ocariz could play against Isturiz for Caracas. Thus Isturiz chances depend heavily on how large a victory chavismo gets in Libertador.

But in Libertador things are not easy. This most chavista of districts, home of the choice fanatics such as Lina Ron or the president of the National Assembly Cilia Flores, has suffered too much under the painful physical degradation of Caracas. The 52 point loss of 2007 was perhaps in fact surprisingly low. There reaches a point where even the more driven supporter starts wishing that the garbage were to be picked up more regularly.

Chavismo dispatched Jorge Rodriguez to run for Libertador. If he certainly has name recognition and is totally identified with Chavez, he is also a divisive personality, with a mean streak and now perceived as a liar as of his fake impartial pretense when he was at the CNE. Truly the kind of candidate you would not leave your wallet alone with. I suppose that the gamble of chavismo there is the same as sending Silva to Carabobo: send a controversial candidate to motivate the chavista mean base. But chavismo has also a more moderate base that can be put off by people like Rodriguez or Silva while at the the same time these candidates do stimulate the opposition to vote. Rodriguez and Silva are not the kind of candidate that benefit from a long campaign, but they are perfect if you think that negative campaigning is the way to go: you will not find anyone viler than these two.

As a final note on Caracas I think that the truly bad administration of Barreto and Bernal will be the best visiting cards for the opposition and Isturiz for all the good memories he might generate in some quarters of Libertador will have hard time to overcome the negatives. If his campaign is not well run, we could see a clean opposition sweep of the area, the most dreaded result of all for chavismo. That explains why Leopoldo Lopez has been banned: he runs high in any poll of any district in Caracas. Even if chavismo manages to bar Lopez from running, the intention will be so clear that it could hurt chavismo by promoting abstention in its ranks.

Conclusion

Here I post a simplified chart that I will update in future posts. I also added at the bottom the state count election after election. Thus my prediction at this moment is 7 sure for the opposition, 1 very likely and 3 undecided. Thus even if everything goes well, I am not expecting more than a total of 11 states for the opposition, though those include the biggies. And please, if this exercice is fun, it should not distract us from the real aims of chavismo, to have president for life. Their attempts might look foolish recently but with oil at 130, all is possible. That is why the opposition should pick whatever it can with the clear idea that it is just a step on the way to save the country. Politicians might pretend not be aware of this but the opposition voters know it very well and they will punish at the polls if necessary.



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1) Previous posts on this subject:

Chavez motivations
Chavez strategy
Opposition options
What is at stake
Predictions June 2008 (this one).

-The end-

Sunday, June 08, 2008

When "Ooooops" might not be enough.

On Saturday I do news hygiene; that is, once I have read the papers I do not watch any news on TV for the rest of the day. No radio, no Globovision, not even Internet Google News. It is the necessary weekly break. So I missed the biggie in Venezuela which I learned about this morning only via the NYT newsletter. Well, at least I can say that my sanitary Saturday satisfied.

Checking back with El Universal, indeed Chavez announced yesterday that he will withdraw the ley sapo for revision, that article 16 which made it mandatory for any one to collaborate with the intelligence apparatus "was a mistake". I suppose that the words of Cardinal Urosa stating that law the secret of confession was violated through that ley sapo were too much pressure, even in a country were Catholic confession is today a rarity. Symbols do have a weight.

Thus in front of universal condemnation of a totally unnecessary law, unless your intention is to establish a dictatorship Cuban style, Chavez decided to step back. Does this prove anything? Yes, it does, but not necessarily what one would wish.

It proves that the government learned from the closing of RCTV. This ley sapo had the potential to become an even worse issue than the closing of RCTV. The prompt outcry which was magnifying stupendously fast through public opinion would have had worse electoral consequences in November. Numbers being much lower than what they were when the decision to close RCTV was taken, the government decided that it would be best to "review" the law. I am willing to bet that it will be entrusted to a commission that will not say anything about it until AFTER the election.

It proves that the government will do a much less arrogant campaign than what it did last year for the referendum. That might improve its chances and teach it some inside how democracy works.

But it also proves without a doubt where chavismo is headed in the long run and even if Chavez withdrew that law we all know, even chavistas, what are his intentions, to create a subject society Cuban style held together through informers. That he might be able to do so is irrelevant, what matters is that he thinks that way and that colors everything he does. Let's not forget that video confession on VTV where his security employees admit already using routine spying on any politician in Venezuela.

No matter what spin control was launched yesterday, it was probably too late and will remain a simmering campaign issue. I expect Rodriguez Chacin to leave the Interior Ministry any time soon: after this major blunder, and the FARC ties that must appear to be over for the time being, he has overstayed his welcome back.

-The end-

Saturday, June 07, 2008

The 2008 election gambles: part 4, hazardous stakes

In previous posts we looked at Chavez motivations, at what his electoral strategy might be and what the opposition was trying to put together to do more than just contain chavismo. Now we can try to look at what the outcome might be. But first, a summary of the three previous posts, adding what is really at stake.

The stakes

Chavez imposes his needs on this election. Since his ambition to become president for life in legal ways has been cut short last December he is trying to find ways to counter the polls verdict. He does have a more than 4 years left to his term of office and he thus has certainly several options to try again. Unfortunately for him all depend on a strong showing comes November. That is, he must show that he has recovered the people trust and enthusiasm by winning a very large number of state houses and town halls.

It is very important to state that serious electoral observers all predict that chavismo at this point will win a majority of Governor Mansions, but these same observers also point out to the distinct possibility that winning a majority of state houses will not be enough for Chavez as these might not represent at all a majority of the popular vote. Where the opposition seems to be running strong these days is in the most populous states, henceforth the real battle ground is there for chavismo as this one is running somewhat better in smaller states.

Thus it is clear: even though we are facing local elections, the national stakes are clear even if not openly discussed.

The districts

There are 23 state houses at stake, with their legislative assemblies and the Mayor at Large for the five Caracas districts, a sort of supra state district (I will wait for a future post to write on town halls). I will not include the real Caracas district alone, Libertador, which is the remains of the Federal District and that could be counted as a 25 position. The thing is that it is not that important as the result of the Mayor at Large office depends a lot on its result. Besides, the Mayor at large winner (from five districts) is automatically a top runner for the presidency whereas the Libertador mayor when all is said and done is just that, a local mayor... From now one when I refer to Caracas Mayor I mean the Mayor at Large.

Thus we have 24 districts.

The possible results and their meaning

The opposition wins 5 or less. The opposition starts with 2 and thus has an advantage since the two it has will most certainly remain in its hands no matter what cheating chavismo tries. But adding only a couple of states will be considered a major defeat for the opposition, no matter which states it takes. Chavez will be able to dream again of presidency for life and will be able to work on a convenient excuse to try to get it again without the opposition hope for anything better than a second referendum barrage victory. But the new radical wave of chavismo, according to the projected candidates if they win, will make it much more uphill for the opposition to run a referendum campaign as the one it run last year. A resurgent chavismo will be much less amenable to maintain the already meager democratic forms.

The opposition wins 6. This is nearly a stalemate that in the long run will favor Chavez. Not good enough for the opposition to effectively thwart Chavez wishes, but already a significant stumbling block for his ambitions. The opposition will able to claim victory without looking to foolish, but any credibility to this victory will be gained ONLY if it takes at least three out of Zulia, Caracas, Carabobo and Miranda; that is, controlling 3 out of the 4 major electoral districts of Venezuela. Still, at 6 losses chavismo can claim a victory of sorts without looking too ridiculous. For one thing it will help polish its very tarnished image outside by making believe that democracy truly exists in Venezuela. It also will leave it with enough state houses to help Chavez in his plans, even if these will be more difficult as the opposition will have 6 official spokespeople instead of only 1 currently, Zulia's governor Rosales (Nueva Esparta current governor rarely seeks national limelight).

The opposition wins 7 or 8. I make a special distinction here because as we will see later, such a result almost implies that the opposition will control the 4 major electoral districts of Venezuela. This is the first scenario where chavismo still wins a majority of the state house but could manage to lose the popular vote. With this result, the opposition will be perceived by all as the victor. It might not be enough to weaken Chavez to the point of questioning his hold on Miraflores, but clearly a 7-8 states victory will greatly improve the opposition options, from a possible Recall Election on the National Assembly to building an effective public opinion pressure to force the government to change its ways and compromise under the threat of using diverse referendums to annul some of its measures; at least until the next electoral round, the National Assembly election November 2010.

The opposition wins more than 8. The opposition now is the clear winner, no questions, no spin possible. The more so that with more than 8 states it is almost certain to win the popular vote victory. The personal rule of Chavez is now seriously compromised. How long will he last? It all depends on his ability to compromise and accept that he is gone in 2013, thus needing to plan for a successor, trying to get him or her elected to ensure himself with a nice retirement, out of jail. The timetable will be set on how many state houses the opposition wins. If the number is above 10, it will be difficult for Chavez to finish his term; nor will he be very interested in doing so. His best bet might be to call for a new constituent assembly in 2010, as a last gamble that he could actually win if the opposition counts its chickens too fast.

Let's not forget that such a large opposition victory could allow chavismo to deflect some of the blame for its failures on the new governors. By 2010 the constant war between Chavez and the new governors could wear them out faster than Chavez. There is a need even in front of an hypothetical large victory to remain a united front because Chavez will take advantage of any breach. In my opinion of the opposition manages 10 states it should immediately call for a Recall Election on the National Assembly. Any dithering in a strong federal front formation could have unforeseen consequences.

Yet, nothing will be solved no matter what is gained by an eventual large opposition victory. In such a scenario we could fairly speak of downward count for Chavez, perhaps even sped up by a sudden massive defection form chavista rank and file now that their guy is perceived as on his way out. In the end it will again depend on how united the opposition will remain since even with a 12 state house loss chavismo would still be the main single political force in Venezuela. A minority force now but still the largest group of them all.

In the next and last post I will look at the state by state situation.

-The end-

The Zimbabwe-Myanmar campaigning styles

More ideas for Chavez electoral strategy. Mugabe has decided that it was unsafe for Morgan Tsvangirai to attend his political rallies:
The party said it had received a written notice from the police that rallies it had planned in impoverished townships of the capital, Harare, would have to be canceled because the safety of party leaders could not be guaranteed — a seemingly paradoxical rationale, given that the police had confiscated Mr. Tsvangirai’s armored vehicle on Wednesday.
Now, how much more creative can you get to stop an opposition leader to speak against you?

But that is not all: international relief agencies are barred from helping feed the starving for the duration of that campaign. They are accused of promoting anti Mugabe political activities. I suppose he is right: when Mugabe has nothing to offer you and some relief worker comes to you with at least a plate of cold oatmeal, it makes a powerful political statement. That is, assuming that you are not too weak to go to vote afterwards....

What is it with this pseudo leftist dictators that have no qualms in barring international help to reach their people as we just saw dramatically in Myanmar/Burma a few days ago? Believe me, Chavez is perfectly able to follow suit: he has already done it when international aid to Venezuela Vargas disaster in 1999 was either refused, stolen or left to rot in some harbor because some permit was missing or some address error was detected and the Venezuelan authorities could not be bothered to inquire.

-The end-

Eugenio Montejo

He died yesterday of stomach cancer at 69, still full of verses in him.

I leave the eulogy to Guillermo Parra who knows much more about poetry and verses than I do.

Venezuela has lost big time today as Montejo can be argued to be the most important literature persona in Venezuela today.

-The end-

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