THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE VENEZUELAN RECALL ELECTION (VIII): AN EPILOGUE IN TWO PARTS
Preliminary conclusions of this blogger: what did happen in August 2004?

A few weeks have passed since August 15. Two months almost and in barely three weeks we are, supposedly, going back to the polls for local elections.

It has all been rather hard for many people and this blogger is no exception. We really did think that the Venezuelan people would react to 5 years of mediocrity, not to call it outright banditry, but it did not happen. Either people approve of such actions, or opponents of outright populism are just too weak to take a stand, preferring their creature comforts, no matter how threatened these ones might be. It is time for this blogger to share with his audience and for once write a more personal post as to what it meant for him, what effect this result has had on his daily life and future plans.

But before writing these things, to come in the second part of this "epilogue", I will write in this first part what I think happened, to the best of my knowledge to date.

Was there electoral fraud on August 15?

In a way it is irrelevant. I do think that some form of fraud did take place on August 15, and the statistics shown so far are not only quite telling but are starting to perturb the overconfidence of some of the actors who were quite cocky during the first hours and days that followed the 3 AM Carrasquero solitary announcement on that Monday 16.

It is irrelevant because the main fraud had already started to take place in the TWO years that preceded August 15 2004.

After April 2002 Chavez saw the opposition growing again faster than expected and by the third quarter of 2002 it was clear that some form of electoral contest would have to take place in Venezuela. Having being politicking on the cheap for the previous 3 years Chavez was faced with the prospect to have to show something to justify his tenure (1). Probably helped by Cuban advice he embarked in a confrontational course that led to the general strike of 2002/2003 which gave him what he needed most: free access to all sorts of cash to launch all sorts of social pseudo social programs that could be financed without accounting. Not to mention that they would be managed by unaccountable people that cashed in at the register and thus became the fearsomest of Chavez supporters. Nothing new under the totalitarian sun, or our traditional politics. This mode of action was always the case in Venezuela, the difference this time was an order of magnitude or more.

This financial fraud to the coffers of the state was accompanied by a legal fraud on many fronts. A compliant Constitutional Hall in the high Court did manage to block an early referendum action late 2002. Soon the strike changed everything and through international mediation Chavez was able to earn enough precious time (2). By August 2003 he had launched his "misiones" and obtained a favorable electoral commission, CNE. This one through all sorts of tricks, which supposedly were frowned upon by Carter in January 2003 (3), managed to delay for ever and ever the signature collection process though its ultimate success forced Chavez to accept in June 2004 a Recall Election. But by then chavismo had chosen a voting system, had occupied the critical points of the voting system, had revamped the electoral registry in a way that was still not clear to see, had gained an uncontestable majority in all Halls of the High Court, had rendered servile the Venezuelan army and a few other things that made the road to a recall election much less worrisome than it would have been in August 2003.

When polls opened on Sunday 15 in the morning the fraud had already been for all to see, from the outrageous use of public monies for the campaign of Chavez, without any control from the CNE, to the pro Chavez staffed polling stations, the dismal disorganization of the voting procedure which made an ordeal for people to go and vote, and so on.

Just on all of these criteria the referendum of August 15 2004 would have been challenged in any civilized country in the world. Instead we had the OAS and the Carter Center bail out as quickly as possible by recognizing the result indecently fast, and along the way probably burying any chance to determine for sure if fraud took place on August 15 itself (4).

Why has the opposition collapsed so precipitously?

The opposition collapsed for a very simple reason: it had no plan B. No plan B in case fraud were to be detected. No plan B in case Chavez actually were to win fairly the election. This is historically why any political coalition collapses: no plan B. It is quite simple. Anything else is just additional dirt on top of the coffin.

Though the "precipitously" needs to be modulated some. The internal rivalries within the opposition had no reason to stay put once Chavez had got his way. The duplicitous role of Accion Democratica became clear quickly and last week we had the first "official" hard words between AD leader and Primero Justicia Borges not even 48 hours after this blogger predicted it! This exchange, in turn, probably buried any possible success on October 31. More rivalries are sure to flare up soon unless AD smells the coffee and realizes that AD is the party who has the most to lose.

The orphaned opposition electorate

The faithful marchers and electors of the opposition, who conquered the streets of Caracas through 2002 and 2003 are in a quandary. Their leadership is duly criticized (many undeservingly one must add fast!). They wonder what is the point to go and vote if the fraud talk is not cleared up. They are bereft of the central idea: remove Chavez from office. As a direct consequence the opposition leadership has lost the streets, no more marches to support opposition candidates. The "time of marches" is over (5).

Certainly this blogger can relate with electoral apathy. There are a few things that he must think of before he decides what to do, from continuing blogging to even deciding whether he should go to his polling station in San Felipe on October 31. Not to mention personal decisions. But this will have to wait for part 2 of this epilogue.

For better or for worse on August 15 a new Venezuela has appeared, one that nobody really expected from either side. A strangely unresolved country in spite of a 60/40 pseudo decision.

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(1) This is richly narrated by the recent book of Armando Duran "Venezuela en Llamas" editorial Random House Mondadori, Colleccion Actualidad, ISBN 980-293-278-7. A must read for those who want to discuss seriously the Venezuelan recent two years, if you can read Spanish of course.

(2) Armando Duran actually comes out quite strongly against Gaviria making the results of his early rounds of "mediation" almost willfully oriented to favor Chavez. The most severe and critical and serious criticism of Gaviria that I have seen to date, and in retrospective perhaps quite to the point.

(3) Then Carter called for Chavez to allow people try to obtain and organize a Recall Election in August 2003 with "No Tricks!" History would prove him wrong by showing all sorts of tricks and a deficient election in August 2004.

(4) Chavez has not even dared to call an Avenida Bolivar meeting after an election where he supposedly won by 60%! Quite telling if you asked me!

(5) Even chavista candidates with access to all kinds of money have a hard time to fill up their meetings, at least in Yaracuy. The few I see show a few buses and trucks carrying people around, always the same people in the different meetings. Professionalization of political support I presume.