Measures of Voter Intention are Nonsense

I have written two recent posts, one on the polling situation in Venezuela and one about an electoral map as I see it, based on historical patter and perception as to the individual states political situation. I think that the Keller interview in Noticiero Digital was a great interview and it has actually been translated. Thus below the full text in English, as a nice complement to these two posts (note: I received it by e-mail so I do not know whether there is a link to acknowledge as a source).

Alfredo Keller faced with the Public Opinion Poll Wars
“Measures of Voter Intention are Nonsense”

Interview by Roger Santodomingo | Noticiero Digital

8 November 2006 | This well-known public opinion guru, the first to speak of a technical tie between Rosales and Chávez, shuns the use of opinion polls for publicity purposes, because, as he states, this eventually discredits the profession, especially at this juncture, when there is talk of the opportunity to build an alternative to power.

The public media speak of a war among public opinion polls and of a distortion, even in findings from the more prestigious firms, resulting from interviewees’ fears of revealing their true political stance.

The inopportune publication of opinion poll results that show, for example, an alleged advantage held by Chávez, or conflicting statements by analysts who defend their own interpretations of seemingly objective data, turns the opinion poll wars into a more or less self evident phenomenon.

Unknown analyst firms compete for time and space in the mass media in order to get attention aimed at defending their own prestige as well as imposing their own opinions.

Who are we to believe? The discrete analyst who only reports what he is thinking as he sits in his client’s office? Or the extrovert who publicly debates his own opinions against opinions suggested by the data?

Alfredo Keller is of the ilk of the extroverted.

RS: There is a perception among the opposition that the man in the street dismisses polls that consider Chávez to be the winner. Does that perception have any basis in reality, or is there difficulty in accepting what the numbers depict at a given moment?

AK: Explaining it is a complex matter because it depends upon the voters’ degree of motivation. With his street rallies, Rosales is showing that the theory that Chávez is with the poor and the poor are with him is not true. Part of Rosales’ strategy has been to nullify President Chávez’s competitive advantages, which has been very shrewd on his part. On the other hand, we have decided to seek out other elements of analysis rather than voter intention and such nonsense.

RS: Nonsense, you say?

AK: Yes, because it is precisely voter intention that is supposed to be modified in any campaign. We have chosen to analyze political segments among voters in order to determine the motivations that distinguish them, what captivates them, and what they reject in order to determine and identify the campaign strategies of the factions in the struggle.

RS: Your study analyses the strategies and the possible results that the candidates would obtain under optimum conditions.

AK: Right. For what reason? Because, essentially, since the time of the recall referendum, in the way of public opinion, this is a society divided into two equal parts. More or less, this is a case of 50 and 50, for and against the government. Being against the government has been a laborious matter because it has had to be managed by several contenders, while within the officialdom there is a sole leader and it has been relatively easy for them to demonstrate their position.

RS: What is said by this particular analysis that is not said by the voter intention analysis?

AK: This segmentation analysis tells us that the highly motivated and mobilized groups today are stronger on the side of the opposition than on the side of the officialdom. Since the beginning of the year, we have been observing that this segment on President Chávez’s side has been weakening.

RS: But the numbers indicate that he is still ahead.

AK: Yes, this does not mean that he has lost any support, quantitatively speaking, but in fact his influence has diminished within the more motivated, active and trusting sector. This is what makes it possible out on the street for the opposition to disclaim its own alleged weakness and fragmentation, given that it is emphatically capable of mobilizing many more people to marches and rallies. That is to say that the ones who participate in marches are only the hardcore segments from the opposition, the same as what occurs with the government’s mobilizations.

RS: Those who have witnessed the weakening of their own unconditional stance…how are they measured? Is it perhaps because they have become more amenable to the messages of the opposition? Why are they able to doubt their own allegiance at a given moment in reaction to a well stated message?

AK: There are four more or less equal quadrants for voters. On the hardcore side there is a distribution that tends to favor the opposition a bit. But on the softcore side, those not sufficiently motivated, there is a proportion mostly inclined toward President Chávez. One then arrives at a division into two parts more or less resembling each other…similar. The whole secret to a campaign consists of being able to incorporate the softcore supporters into the campaign because the hardcore supporters are not enough.

RS: Political communicators know that in order for that to happen the fundamental thing to do is to inject doubt into the minds of softcore sympathizers from the other side and offer them an alternative proposal. What would then be the strategy to be followed by the struggling factions, according to your analysis?

AK: For the government, the strategy is to intimidate the softcore opposition; for the opposition, the goal is to show softcore Chavistas that the Mi Negra proposal, for example, can be better than the missions and that Chávez is not the only one who shows concern for the poor.

RS: It appears that the candidate of the officialdom has been more efficient. Let us say that fear of voting prevails among the Neither-Nor’s who lean in favor of Rosales. On the other hand, Oscar Schemel, from Hinterlaces, finds that the proposed Mi Negra draws a high level of rejection and is considered to be a populist proposal.

AK: Mi Negra has caught on. Now it is better known. It is recognized by 96% of Venezuelans. Everyone is aware of Rosales’ proposal. But should it be the case that one were to be on the side of President Chávez and this were an offer being made by an opponent, automatically, one would reject it on the basis of its language. But the reality shown by the opinion polls is that these people would like to be offered something along those lines.

RS: Then Mi Negra is not rejected in and of itself, but rather because it came from Rosales. Aren’t we back to where we started from? Polarization prevails and thus people are not thinking objectively about what is being offered, but rather: “If it’s coming from the other faction, I’m not interested.”

AK: The Mi Negra card, or its offer, have not been rejected, but rather the offer has been politicized, and therefore people get involved or assume their own pro opposition or pro government role as their way of evaluating the offer. Among hardcore supporters this occurs more markedly. A hardcore opposition supporter is unwilling to swallow anything said by President Chávez; likewise, a hardcore supporter of President Chávez is unwilling to swallow anything coming from Manuel Rosales.

RS: That is how it works, but no candidate in his right mind can limit himself to hardcore supporters.

AK: Of course not, because we know that is the way hardcore supporters are…it is practically impossible to move them. Therefore the campaign game focuses on softcore supporters, on how can one manage to mobilize them: to take them away from the adversary or nullify their electoral effect, in terms of abstention, for example. All these chess pieces are moving around on this board, this scenario, that is what is happening, for example, when candidate Rosales offers the Mi Negra card, he is offering it to segments of the populace who have been very happy with President Chávez’s missions, but are not married to the president.

RS: They’re not married, but they want…

AK: As for President Chávez: What has he done? He says, “I am the only one who loves you, the only one who is concerned for you, the only one who prepares social policies, the only one who has policies aimed at assisting all of you.” Manuel Rosales has been showing him that this is not true, that he also has a proposal and that, furthermore, he has government experience where it can be shown that he has also shown concern for the poor, whereas that original competitive advantage held by President Chávez during the recall referendum has fallen short. Rosales has nullified Chávez´s effect, that is to say, the unique feature President Chávez has held in this matter.

RS: Do you believe that the Rosales campaign has succeeded, for example, in getting hardcore anti Chavistas to be inclined to vote 100%, and that the softcore opposition supporters, the Lite opposition, if one may call them that, are willing to overcome their fear and vote?

AK: That’s right. Furthermore, the Rosales campaign has been very efficient in weakening people’s loyalty toward Chávez. That is noticeable in the indicator pointing to a drop in hardcore voters for President Chávez, because at the beginning of this year, hardcore support was as at 39 and now it is at 22; he has lost 17 points in hardcore voters. Rosales has succeeded in doing this by showing softcore voters that they are there simply because of a transitional relationship, because Chávez is the one with the missions, the one who distributes the money. I have seen him weakening Chavista loyalties as a result of pointing out the contradictions that exist in President Chávez’s support segments. This segment, the softcore Chavistas, is very contradictory, because they lend their support to Chávez but are basically against the government’s agenda. For example, they are adamantly against any attacks against private property, they are totally against having the country led in the direction of a socialist model, they are against the increase in armaments and against the threats of war presented by the President, and so on and so forth. These voters are voters who find themselves in a permanent dilemma of deciding how to resolve their contradictions, likings and reasons.

RS: Not only is it voters who sound contradictory or seem to be trapped in a permanent dilemma concerning likings. There is also the perception among those who participate in the Noticiero Digital forum that among the opinion pollsters, even with reliable firms, there are contradictions and that the seeds of doubt have been sown concerning an alleged opinion poll war…and now you say that the idea of measuring voter intention is nonsense.

AK: There is a war among public opinion pollsters; that is an inevitable stage in all campaigns and, regretfully, we the pollsters are the ones who have forged our own credibility through our work; we are the first victims. I say it is irrelevant nonsense to measure voter intention because the objective in a campaign is precisely to have the one who is ahead maintain the lead, while the one who is behind is supposed to modify his position in order to win.

RS: But people are interested in knowing how the race is coming along, who is ahead. In this sense you are able to affirm that your numbers are similar to those of, for example, Datanálisis, Datos or Consultores 21. Right? Luis Vicente de León and Oscar Schemel say that there are no big differences among all of you, but that there are only different dates when the measures were taken.

AK: That’s right. The results that are known have very much to do with the date, since the campaigns have been very dynamic. Extraordinarily dynamic. Few times have I seen a campaign capable of modifying figures the way we have seen it done from one month to the next, for example, in the month of July the opposition had 20%; in the month of September they had 32%; in the month of October they had 38%. One then sees they have been growing in such a brutal manner that predicting what is going to happen is extremely difficult when what you have is basically a scenario divided in two.

RS: Then it’s difficult, but not nonsense.

AK: In my opinion it makes no sense to focus on the topic of voter intention in such an extraordinarily dynamic scenario, on the one hand, and with a strategy so clear as to be observed in terms of deficiency. Finally on December 3rd the winner will be the one who has managed, with greater certainty, to convince his own softcore voters to join in on the electoral process; because, for now, I don’t dare predict the results.

RS: Field studies by certain public opinion pollsters have predicted that it would be difficult for a candidate, unless something extraordinary should happen, to gain 15 points in advantage in so short a time. Is this the situation faced by Rosales? Do you share that opinion?

AK: Seen that way, of course it seems difficult. That is what I would say, if that were the difference. But that figure speaks of a situation reflected by the opinion polls 15 days ago. But, even though it’s difficult, it’s not impossible. I set before you the example of candidate Fujimori in Peru. Fujimori, one month before the first voting round, when he was in second place behind Vargas Llosa, barely showed 1% in the opinion polls. Well, in the first round he managed to get 25% and on the second round he obtained a majority. That is to say that in two months Fujimori turned the 1% into a 50%. That is an outrage that defies opinion polls based on voter intention.

RS: Then, what is important in the public opinion polls is what they tell you about the strategy you are following, whether it is mistaken or not.

AK: Exactly. After all, also hovering over us is the methodological doubt concerning credibility in the reader’s reliability.

RS: You mean to say that the fear that someone else will know how a person votes at the polling place is also observable at the time that person expresses his voter intention.

AK: That’s right.

RS: Today the abstention matrix seems to be reemerging. Again people are saying that conditions are not right, that the government is going to steal the votes, and, according to strict extremists, that Rosales is playing along with Chávez.

AK: In fact, that is not new. For the recall referendum process—and I am not referring to August 15th of 2004 itself but rather the entire process—which had so many obstacles and so many difficulties and so many signs of manipulation and the exercise of undue power by the government, an opinion matrix became established, a well rooted idea concerning the manipulative capacity of the CNE (National Electoral Council). Today, we have our opinion polls, practically in round numbers, the figure: 70% of the population distrusts the CNE in different degrees. Thus circumstances are such as to constitute a basis for suspicion. When Minister Ramírez stated that PDVSA is red, truly red, and then the President backs him up and says that, in reality, all public institutions are red, truly red, he may well be including the CNE, that is what is left for him to say, that it too is red, truly red. The fact remains that people believe it, independently of whether it is true or not.

RS: In that sense, it is a very effective message for the officialdom’s strategy, which is to create a disincentive to vote among the softcore opposition.

AK: Of course. Talk of abstention, in reality, only manages to be detrimental to the opposition. Talk of abstention only leads to a lost opportunity for the opposition because they make up half of the population and have a real chance to win. If the voters do not go to vote they will have nothing to replicate later.

RS: Because it is one thing to have your vote stolen, if it is true about the fraud, and another thing to lose it by not competing…Now there is talk of “the spiral of silence,” that is to say, that many members of the opposition prefer not to reveal their true intentions for fear of reprisals.

AK: Yes, truth is there is reason to be distrustful. That suspicion that in fact there is a fear among voters faced with an opinion poll that feeds on the same contradictory data that the surveys themselves spit out. For example, when you obtain results that say that 48% think that “Chávez’s is the best government we have” from among a population, 48% of whom also say “we are able to have a better government than that of Chávez’s,” does that have anything to do with the issue of the vote? Well, plenty. In other words, if I believe that we can have a better government than that of Chávez’s, indirectly I am saying that I am not going to vote for him.

RS: Or they are saying that it is the best because there is no other alternative that looks better…

AK: Clearly so. Or it is simply an opinion that does not translate later into the shape of the vote…It is very difficult to know this, since I can take this response to be a syllogism of what voter behavior will be like. When you discover that practically 70% of softcore Chavistas do not agree with anything the government does, you then ask: How is that possible? Could it be that these people are not going to vote? What are they going to do? Why does he tell me that? Why does he tell me that he is Chavista, if it turns out that he does not agree with anything Chávez does?

RS: This makes the opinion polls be more of a reference that an oracle.

AK: Because the surveys are full of contradictions, which is what allows us to have an electoral debate…Which, by the way, is one of the reasons why Chávez evidently will not accept the debate and as these doubts and contradictions become more clear, he passes on to becoming part of the minority. Thus, an open discussion of his agenda or his conduct of office is not to his advantage.

RS: And, in that sense, can the insistence by the Rosales campaign apparatus upon having the debate, knowing that they are not going to get a positive reply, obtain favorable results?

AK: The negative response to the debate is already a debate in itself. Because a debate is created within people’s minds who explain to themselves, who ask themselves, who give themselves answers as simple as, how is it that Chávez does not want his conduct of office discussed or his proposal discussed? That annoys the voters and pits them against the president.

Translation by W.K.