Three years from Chavez downfall

NOTE:

I am travelling this week and I did not think I could write a post. I did ask Jorge and Mora to step in if they could. But today I had an unexpected break and could whip up a quick post to commemorate the April 11 events. To my surprise I found the Jorge interview to Francisco Toro. Quite a document!!! Honored to have such stuff published in my blog.

Still, I decided to go ahead and post my text as it pretty much says the same thing, but with other words. I find the timing interesting and I hope that it will allow for a better understanding of how little we know TRUE from those days.

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This week we remember April 11, or rather the events of a week that started on Sunday April 7 2002, when during an infamous TV broadcast Chavez used a whistle to fire people he did not like in the upper echelons of PDVSA management, as if PDVSA were his to do as he pleases. The events that followed resulted in a general strike, a protest march of a size unknown in Venezuela's history until then, a march that ended up in a blood bath under the walls of Miraflores, a Chavez resignation, a coup against the people who received the Chavez resignation, the stupidest political decree in recent history and the eventual return of Chavez to office.

What really happened in that crazy week is still not known because the Chavez government has made all it could to sabotage the installation of a "truth commission" formed with independent personalities and observers with real access to public officials and state documents. The consequence of course is that all sorts of myths have now been enshrined in the memory of a few people. And new myths are being created as chavismo is trying to rewrite history books, whose first draft of late 2002 today does not have enough of an epic flavor it seems. Of course having new judges in the high court, a controlled electoral system, a divided and ruined opposition, allows Chavez the opportunity to give a new meaning to the old term "history is written by those who won" even if the win lacks on ethical grounds. For example, if we are going by the evolving official version of last Sunday Alo Presidente, we can live with a vision of Carmona Estanga receiving a cell phone from the US embassy so as to wait for the direct phone call from Bush as to when and how dispose of a Chavez in jail. That Chavez waited for three years to reveal us that Carmona and Co. were waiting for the order to eliminate him does not seem to bother the pro Chavez crowd. Then again, they are used to swallow raw stories....

So, as an homage for those days, who did have some moments of glory, I figure that I could write what is the impression of this blogger at this time of what might have really happened during these days. All has been documented through the narrative of this blog.

People were plotting against Chavez since early December when it became clear that his support was not as solid as thought.

Chavez who still did not benefited from sky high oil prices was looking for way to have access to cash in an easier way and thus was looking for ways to bypass financial controls to PDVSA.

The crisis escalated through the first trimester 2002 as the opposition showed more and more muscle.

As admitted by Chavez himself he tried a showdown with PDVSA but was surprised by the popular reaction.

The opposition plotters, surprised by the intense reaction overplayed their hand at the same time as Chavez overplayed his.

The strangely rerouted but glorious march of April 11 2002 met bullets whose origins are still to be determined in full.

Chavez who ordered the Plan Avila that would have ended up in a blood bath was not followed by the army and thus created a grave crisis whose natural conclusion was the announcement by Lucas Rincon, the Army Chief of staff, in the 11-12 night of Chavez resignation.

As a consequence of that announcement, and the unexpected speed at which Chavez apparently had fallen, a small group within the opposition gambled and outrun everyone else, taking over the government: the real coup d'état took place after Chavez resignation, by a coterie, during the early hours of Friday April 12, AFTER the Rincon speech.

The infamous Carmona decree revealed to the whole country at 6 PM on Friday 12 that we were under some form of dictatorship.

A split army showed quickly that it would not accept this new fiat and a faction of the opposition did not follow the new situation: already on Friday afternoon the CTV refused to endorse the decree.

Saturday morning, a still reeling country woke up to TV networks mysteriously refusing to broadcast any news, the excuse being that some looting had started in some areas of Caracas on Saturday and they did not want to advertise it.

By Saturday afternoon,courtesy of CNN, it was clear that Carmona was not in control, that in addition to looting there were also some pro Chavez manifestations in some areas of Western Caracas, and that the Army was abandoning him fast.

During the night of Saturday to Sunday Chavez was returned to office.

Whether the reader agrees with my summary, I do not care much: the true story could have only been written if a "truth commission" would have been installed then and not blocked by chavismo. Meanwhile, this is as simplified and close to the truth as anything else that could be advanced. There is no hard evidence to clearly contradict this version of the story, and even less to sustain parallel versions.

Meanwhile, my most heartfelt homage to all the victims of these 3 days and my sincere regret that real justice will never take place. I am only too afraid that there is more blood in our future.

What happened on April 11, 2002? An interview with Francisco Toro.

Between April 11 and April 14, 2002, Venezuela witnessed some of the most bizarre events in recent Latin American history. They could be dismissed as nothing more than a bit of Venezuelan folklore if they had not been so tragic. Twenty people died that day, and yet, three years later, we still don't know who killed them or what really happened.

I was not in Venezuela at the time and I have heard very differing views about what happened. I started to understand the issues behind the history after I read Francisco Toro’s essay “Venezuela’s 2002 Coup Revisited”. This is a must-read piece of work for those interested in recent Venezuela history.

From 1999 to 2003 Francisco was a freelance journalist writing for foreign media outlets like the New York Times, the Washington Post and the Financial Times. He was in Caracas on April 11 2002 and he has kindly agreed to answer my questions on the events of that day.

1.-How would you describe the situation in Caracas in the days before April the 11, 2002?

It was clear from the first few days of April that something very nasty was about to happen. The mood of national crisis was palpable in the air. The government obviously had a calculated strategy to escalate the crisis as much as possible. But the opposition wasn't the least bit shy about escalating the crisis either. Both sides were itching for a showdown, and a showdown is what they got. Last year, Chávez actually acknowledged, in a speech, that escalation was precisely what he'd been trying to get. "Plan Colina" he said it had been called, together with a "Colina Taskforce" in charge of implementing it. The government served up a steaming plate of "casquillo" - provocation - and the opposition ate it up with relish. Both sides decided to play "chicken" with the country; to my mind both were incredibly irresponsible. In the months and years following the coup, both sides played a fairly sick game of "tira la piedra y esconde la mano" - trying to pretend that they had been entirely blameless in the events of April. Each side has built up a "heroic story" about the crisis - where all of the blame was pegged on the other. Those stories are really seductive to people on one side or the other, but both omit key parts of the story and twist others. More than anything, I would advise readers not to buy the hype (either side's hype) uncritically.

2.- Can you explain to us what were you doing on April 11 , 2002 and what were the circunstances that took you to be a witness of the tragic events of that day?

I was working on an unrelated freelance documentary at the time, so I had access to a camera crew. We went out and got some video, some of it got picked up by the BBC, even. But we didn't get any smoking-gun type material. To this day I kick myself for not having thought to pan the camera accross the rooftops on Avenida Baralt that day - we could've gotten the evidence that the entire country has been looking for ever since. But I didn't think of it in the general mayhem.

3.- Why are you sorry that you did not put the camera across the rooftops on Avenida Baralt? Can you sum up for us what was happening??

At around 3:45 p.m. a shooting spree started on Avenida Baralt – the main North-South avenue in downtown Caracas. Many eye-witnesses claim they saw people shooting from rooftops on Avenida Baralt. No video has surfaced to show that, and to this day nobody knows who the shooters were, or if they really existed. All we know is that at a quarter to four in the afternoon, Chávez started a speech on cadena nacional - a nationwide broadcast on all TV channels and radio stations - and at almost exactly the same time a serious gun fight broke out on Avenida Baralt. Twenty people died around Miraflores that day. People fell on both sides.?Three years on, we still don't know who shot first, from where, or on who's orders. The fact is, the shootout that afternoon was never really investigated properly. It took the Prosecutor General's Office an astounding two weeks to even secure the scene of the crime and start to collect bullet casings and such. Obviously, by that time most of the evidence had been cleared away.

4.- The Chavistas claim that the large march that took place against the goverment was rerouted to Miraflores on purpose to create problems that would lead to the removal of Chavez. Were you there when the rerouting happened? If so, can you describe it?

I wasn't there, so I trust the version of events published by Sandra La Fuente and Alfredo Meza in their excellent book, "El Acertijo de Abril." (The April Riddle,) which is the most trustworthy source on the crisis I know of.

They report that on the evening of April 10th, the main opposition leadership, including CTV (the labor union federation), Fedecamaras (the employers' federation) and several radical NGOs, met in Fedecamaras headquarters in El Bosque. They were concerned that the second day of the General Strike had not been as successful as the first and the movement could peter out if they didn't get results soon. It was at that meeting that the plan to re-route the march was hatched, as well as the decision to present the re-routing as a spur of the moment thing the next day. This was part of the game of "chicken" the two sides were playing. The opposition thought that by precipitating a crisis, they could provoke the armed forces to step in on their side. This meeting has been more or less erased from the opposition's own "heroic version" of events, but when you think about it the manipulation involved is pretty grotesque: these guys planned an insurrectional march, in secret, and bamboozled hundreds of thousands of caraquenos to take incredible risks for the sake of their gamble. The fact is, they used us as cannon fodder.

5.- In your essay about the events of April 11 you write that Chavez' groups had infiltrated the meeting in El Bosque and Chavez was aware that the march was going to be rerouted and yet he chose to do nothing about it. What do you know about this?

La Fuente and Meza report that two separate chavista agencies had infiltrated the meeting at El Bosque where the march re-route was planned: Disip and Aporrea. That means that Chávez had at least twelve hours warning that the march would go to Miraflores - a detail that often escapes people. Now, with 12 hours warning, Chávez had options. The most obvious one would have been to order the National Guard to set up road-blocks on the access routes to Miraflores - a single contingent at the end of Avenida Bolivar would probably have been enough to stop the march. The National Guard is equipped and trained to deal with civilian demonstrations: it's a major part of their mission. It's telling, and very troubling, that Chávez chose, instead, to call out the army together with his armed civilian supporters. The Venezuelan Army has no non-lethal weapons at its disposal, and no training in crowd control. Chávez's plan was to face down several hundred thousand unarmed civilians with light tanks and soldiers carrying automatic assault rifles (FALs). It's a good thing General Rosendo and General Vásquez Velasco, the officers ordered to implement this order, flatly refused. Going along would have set the stage for a much bigger massacre than the one we had. It's also important to remember that the constitution the chavistas had written less than three years earlier specifically bans the use of firearms in civilian demonstrations. Chávez's order was not only incredibly dangerous, it was also unconstitutional.?

6.- The opposition claims that Chavez sent his bolivarian groups to shoot against the crowd. Do you think that that statement is correct? What did you witness?

Well, there's no direct evidence of that. What we can say for sure is that part of the government's plan was to surround Miraflores with hardcore chavista civilians. Some 15,000 turned up following calls on state-run television. This contingency plan had been worked out between chavista civilian leaders and military officers in the days prior to April 11th, as reported by General Rosendo in his testimony to the National Assembly. Rosendo says he argued against the plan, and wrote a letter to Chávez pointing out that it had a high potential to degenerate into a massacre. Chávez brushed off his concerns.?It's also clear that many of those civilians ended up with guns in their hands, and some of them used them. La Fuente and Meza were able to confirm that chavista groups handed out handguns to anyone who wanted them that afternoon, though only after the shooting had already started. "Some took them, some did not," is how they describe the dynamic. Which guns in which hands killed which protesters is one of the things we don't know because no serious investigation was ever held.

7.- Can you tell us more about the famous "cadena" that took place at the moment the shooting started?

It was just bizarre. Chávez gave a generic speech for almost two hours, without directly mentioning the huge mess just outside his door. He was sitting a mere block from a massive bloodbath, but it somehow slipped his mind to say anything about it, or to try to take any measures to stop it. Time and again, a military officer would step into the frame to hand him a slip of paper. La Fuente and Meza confirm that those bits of papers contained a running tally of the cassualties taking place outside. He would read the notes, pause momentarily, then continue his speech. At no point did Chávez stop to do anything to stop the violence. He spent a good few minutes, I remember well, talking up his new program for a Vehículo Utilitario Familiar – a subsidized delivery van - to go on the market later that year. It's hard to overstate how incongruous it all was: you're in the middle of a massacre, you turn on the radio, and you hear the president speaking about subsidizing delivery vans? Surreal, totally surreal. It's not at all clear what the point of that cadena was. It escaped no one's attention that the shooting and the cadena started just about at the same time. What you read into this depends on where you stand, of course, but there was a very definite sense that Chávez was using the cadena to cover up the violence outside. Certainly that impression is bolstered by his announcement, towards the end of the speech, that he had ordered the National Guard to take the private broadcasters off the air. One way or another, it didn't work. During the speech, the private TV stations split their screens down the middle, showing Chávez on the left side of the screen and pictures of the massacre on the right side. It was the only way the private broadcasters had to break the first news blackout of the crisis. Of course, the second news blackout they implemented themselves, on April 13th.

8.- The goverment claims that after the Carmonada millions of people took the streets to claim for the return of president Chavez. Where were you on April 13 and what did you witness?

I was outside Fuerte Tiuna at around mid-day, again with my camera crew. There was a very angry group of hardcore chavistas protesting just outside the fort, looked over by a group of soldiers. There was an uneasy peace between the two. The protesters did not quite cover the highway overpass into Fuerte Tiuna - one or two thousand people at most. I was not outside Miraflores that day, but I've spoken with eye-witnesses who saw about four blocks worth of Avenida Urdaneta full of Chávez supporters. Some tens of thousands of people. The crowd built through the night, and other crowds assembled in other cities. It's hard to get a precise count, but the 8 million figure Chavez is an obvious exageration.

A big part of the chavista "heroic story" about the coup is that the crowds were responsible for Chávez's return. It's just not true - there's plenty of evidence to show that the key decisions that brought Chávez back were made by loyal military officers in Fuerte Tiuna and in Maracay. In fact, the bulk of the crowds came out after it became clear the generals had decided to bring Chávez back, not before.

9.- Can you tell us a little more about what happened in Fuerte Tiuna and on the role of the military in this whole episode?

This is the most confusing parts of the crisis. Leading up to April 11th, a lot of discontent had been brewing in the armed forces about Chávez's demolition derby style of governance. The generals could see Chávez's escalation strategy just as clearly as everyone else, and many were alarmed by it. More than a few cliques of friends within the armed forces were speaking privately about the situation, and at least some were conspiring to launch a coup at some point in the future. But events moved much faster than their planning. When Generals Rosendo and Vasquez Velasco refused Chávez's order to put the army on the streets, the floodgates burst open. All the little cliques that had been operating behind the scenes came into the open all at once. Dozens of generals poured into the fourth and fifth floor of the Army Headquarters inside Fuerte Tiuna to try to decide what to do next. Another part of the chavista "heroic story" is the idea that everything that happened that night flowed from a carefully planned, US backed conspiracy. But eye-witnesses in Fuerte Tiuna that night say the scene was an out-and-out "gallinero" - a chaotic free for all - rather than any single organized conspiracy. The chain of command had gone to all hell. The various groups of generals couldn't agree on anything, even what to do with Chávez (keep him around and try him? send him away to Cuba?) General Vásquez Velasco, who was the nominal head of the army, should have taken control of the situation. But precisely because he had not been part of any conspiracy, it was easy for the conspiratorial clique backing Carmona to outflank him. Neither Rosendo nor Vásquez Velasco woke up that day thinking they would end up overthrowing the government: if they had, they wouldn't have ended up in such a chaotic situation. The big irony is that if the coup had been carefully planned, like the chavistas say it was, it almost certainly wouldn't have unraveled. It's unthinkable, for instance, that in a carefully planned coup the coupsters would "forget" to take control of the military garrison sitting next door to the presidential palace. Yet, amazingly, that's exactly what happened: the chavistas in charge of the Palacio Blanco kept control over their garrison throughout the crisis simply because the coupsters didn't take the trouble to replace them!

10.- What is your conclusion about this whole affair? Who, according to you, is responsible of the deaths of innocent civilians on April 11, 2002?

I have no idea who is responsible for those deaths. Nobody does. One thing I do know is why we don't know: we don't know because, once Chávez returned to power, his prosecutor general/crony Isaías Rodríguez stubbornly resisted a chorus of petitions to launch a serious investigation into what happened. Calls for an independent truth commission were never heeded. The investigation was put in hands of politically pliant prosecutors - including the late Danilo Anderson -who never made a serious attempt to find out what went on. I mean, it took these jokers two weeks - TWO WEEKS - to even send ballistics experts to secure the "crime scene" on Avenida Baralt. That detail alone speaks volumes about the kind of prosecutor general Isaías Rodríguez is. Either this was a cover-up, or Isaías Rodríguez is the world's most incompetent prosecutor. One way or another, the guy should've resigned long ago. The overall lesson, for me, is that it's almost imposible to reach closure on an episode like this when the institutions responsible for finding out what happened are openly politicized. Without access to a single, broadly shared version of what happened, each side just goes ahead and creates its own fantasy-version of events, its own Disney-style story where everything they did was good and righteous and justified and everything the other side did was bad and criminal and indefensible. It's sad, but it's not really possible to move towards reconciliation when there's so much we still don't know.

Venezuela and Pope John Paul II

Today was the funeral of the Great Polish Pope. And what a funeral it was. Even this agnostic blogger feels compelled to recognize his admiration for the man who lighted the fuse for the downfall of the Iron Curtain. Even if I have had quite a few problems with his moral and social positions, I have to admit that at least you got what you saw and that his unquestionable moral fortitude and criticism of materialism, be it capitalist or communist, allowed him to accomplish so much. Never a Pope needed so few military divisions for the immense victories he obtained, to paraphrase Stalin whose "evil work" finally was undone in large part through the Polish Pope. No wonder Poles are lining the streets and streaming to Rome. He is their Simon Bolivar, to bring back in a way this thread to Venezuela.

The objective of this blog is not to write a panegyric to the dead Pope, but still it is a good opportunity to visit the religious issue in Venezuela and the problems that Chavez had with the Catholic church, problems that we can be sure will come back to haunt him.

Religion in Venezuela is a rather complex issue. First, although a nominally Roman Catholic country, many people ignore that "parallel" religions are very strong here. With Brazil Cadomble, Cuba Santeria and Haiti Voodoo, Venezuela holds the distinction to have a very strong pagan cult. It is not very known probably because contrary to the other countries it has not been used for touristy purpose. But the Maria Lionza rituals in Sorte have nothing to envy to what you will find at a Voodoo ceremony or a shadowy Bahian practice. Not to mention that public figures who consult astrologers or visit a witch doctor do not raise an eye brow when it is revealed.

In addition Evangelical missionaries have been working hard and their effect is now felt across Venezuela. Even modest San Felipe has a local Church of the Latter Day's Saint Temple, fairly sized for the city. Speaking of Venezuela as a Catholic country does not make much sense anymore when one observes semi empty churches with women inside during services while most men wait outside. Yet... Religious marriage, baptism of infants, communion are familial rituals that can not be ignored, even if the date might be consulted with the astrologer beforehand. All polls show the Catholic Church as one of the most respected institutions, and when Chavez tried to face the Church, well, he had to back down some.

Facing the Church is nothing new in Venezuela since the times of Guzman Blanco who declared that the only marriage recognized by the Venezuelan state was the civil marriage. In 1873! Divorce was added to the civil code in 1904! Chile barely allowed for some cases of divorce a couple of years ago...

But colluding with the church was also a sport sought. Though it seems that the Venezuelan Church since Guzman Blanco was not as tied up with governments as one could see elsewhere in Latin America. He set the precedent that the president could not be seen as a devout practitioner and none dared to stay publicly too close to church, even Christian Democrats who downplayed some of their Church attendance. As a matter of fact, even Chavez, whose connections to witch doctors is rumored, and who himself declared as belonging to more than one religion, did not dare to push for legalization of abortion in his 1999 constitution and retained some ambiguities, missing a great chance to clear up the air. Even today after years of conflict with the Catholic church, chavismo still subsidizes some Catholic charities though it seems that the final break up is around the corner.

The real problem between Chavez and the Catholic Church is that this one has clearly seen his game from the very start. The crass materialism of the chavista patchwork ideology, to give it a qualifier, and its connection to wanna-be atheist Cuba clearly spoke to a church that had been already lead by John Paul's anticommunist experience for 20 years. By the year 2000 the Catholic Church could be counted as an opponent to Chavez. And the rift shows no sign to mend. That many in the evangelical movement follow Chavez does not help much: the fire and brimstone style of Chavez appeals to that constituency, as well as the perceived anti Catholic stance.

But the Church is not going to be intimidated by Chavez. After all it survived the Inquisition, the XVIII century philosophers, the XIX revolutions, the XX century fascism and communism, and scores of other trials. The Church has eternity as time reference, it never forgets sic transit gloria mundi.

Unfortunately for Chavez, he has had two formidable opponents from within the church.

Rosalio Cardinal Castillo Lara, descending from an illustrious pedigree, became Cardinal due to his services in the Vatican administration, rising to some of the highest positions in the Church. In short, a Cardinal that had perhaps almost daily access to the Pope and his total confidence, a Cardinal that likely was very involved in the two visits of John Paul to Venezuela. In an unusual move Cardinal Castillo decided to retire to his ancestral home, in the remote village of Güiripa where he dedicated himself to social work. He could have stayed in Rome longer, or forever, in the glories of the Vatican, but he chose to retire to comfortable but distant dwellings. Unfortunately for his peace of mind that retirement coincided with the bolivarian riot. And Cardinal Castillo rose to the occasion, becoming a leading critic of chavismo while this one was unable to find a way to tarnish his image. After all, it is understood that a Cardinal deserves a nice retirement and when it is in the Venezuelan boondocks, people are impressed. At 80 plus years, what personal interest could a Cardinal seek?

Cardinal Castillo was the one directing the Venezuelan Church mass for John Paul. The mass, in Don Bosco Church of Altamira drew an immense crowd. And during the mass the Cardinal told us stories that illustrated how close he had been to the Pope, going as far as saying that he does consider him worthy of beatification. There is no doubt that the Pope was well informed on Venezuela descent into madness.

But that was not all. The Papal emissary to Venezuela, Monsignor André Dupuy, revealed himself to be an extraordinarily articulate moral light against Chavez, obtaining more than once unbelievable, not to say vulgar, criticism from Chavez. And Monsignor Dupuy never blanched, never raised his voice while Chavez was showing his true self, his ignorant "resentimiento social" dark side, not noticing that the Church of John Paul 2 was not the Church of the Inquisition anymore. Torquemada was now outside of the Pale of the Church.

Monsignor Dupuy is now leaving Venezuela after 4 years of service. His presence will sorely be missed. Honors are falling on him and his services must have been great as he goes to represent the Vatican to the European Community. He certainly was a great diplomat. And he certainly understood the creeping materialistic fascism that is besieging Venezuela. His parting salutation to Venezuelans was to tell them not to be afraid.

The coherence that existed between his words and his deeds [John Paul II's], what he beleived and waht he lived. Sadly,in our human life there is often a divorce of sorts between words and actions.

Needless to say that these general words had in fact a precise target.

Chavez has nothing to look for in the Vatican. Even with the Pope death Chavez lack of class showed. The delegation sent to the funeral is a joke of ex-guerilla and atheists. Compare this to Bush and Clinton praying together, or Zapatero going hand in hand with the opposition leader Mariano Rajoy. And to dig further his hole, Chavez convoked his own requiem mass in the Caracas Cathedral, a much smaller church that Don Bosco, where the military vicar presided the mass. Chavismo in full was there, alone.

Chavez probably wonders how many oil wells the future Pope will have.

More about chavismo propaganda monies

That Universal Expediente surely has rattled the nerves of chavismo. EL Universal even published a letter from Justin Delacour, one of the supposed "hired pens" who was interestingly more focused on indirectly justifying chavismo propaganda expenses rather than clearing up his name. I could of course point out that Delacour is using his Chavez connection to pursue his academic career, as it is the practice in the US academic world, not quite understood for the average José in Venezuela, a payback of sorts even if his grant pays for the official expenses when he tavels to Venezuela. But that is fair when you know the system as long as one does not pretend to virginal status.

But when private citizens keep unhearthing yet more info, you wonder how far this go, and how hypocrit Izarra really was. Surely to be followed.

PS: note by the way how fast and complete was El Universal publication of Delacour's letter. Something not likley to be seen in, say, VEA, who trashes with total impunity whomever they please in the opposition, from SUMATE down.

Human Rights defenders under attack in Venezuela

I have been absent these past few days: travel and family obligations. But of course the news never stop and there are a few items that need to be caught up with, from the passing of a great leader of peace and its realtion with Venezuela, to the ignominious appeal to hatred and war of a minor crapule within chavismo. But then chavismo has never been known for its tact and sense of timing except when it needs to screw someone.

So tonight I will start the catching up process with the most recent development: the citation for indictment of Carlos Ayala Corao, now "postponed". Some background first. Mr. Ayala is a foremost Human Rights lawyer in Venezuela, with even an international career at his relatively young age. For some reason he has been cited for investigation and possible indictment. AMAZINGLY, tonight, a few minutes ago, I heard him say on the very serious "30 minutos" of Cesar Miguel Rondon that he did not know why he was being cited. Yes, the guy knows that they want to indict him, probably ban him from leaving the country during the "judicial process" and he has no idea why they are after him, what they want to charge him with. He even went as far as to say that perhaps it was not ordered from above and that it was maybe some underling initiative to score brownie points with the powers that be. Really...

But other people seem to know quite well what is behind the whole maneuver.

Teodoro Petkoff at Tal Cual quickly penned a strong editorial (kindly translated by Miguel). Apparently Petkoff offers himself as a witness of the efforts of chavismo to have Ayala Corao preside the "truth committee" for April 11 2002, a committee that eventually never was formed, leaving all the crimes of that day unpunished and open to all sorts of wild interpretations, and injustices, according to the political necessities du jour. So, why today's near arrest warrant?

Human Rights groups are quite vocal in their outrage, from the distinguished COFAVIC and Liliana Ortega, to Pedro Nikken of the CIDH and the speedy Human Rights Watch communique which states:

"This is a clear-cut case of political persecution, targeting someone who has been an effective critic of the Chávez government's human rights record," said José Miguel Vivanco, Americas director at Human Rights Watch. "This outrageous accusation would be rejected out of hand in any independent court of law," he added.

So, what is really going on? Apparently the Human Rights Organizations in Venezuela, or those interested in Venezuela, are finally reaching the stage where they have gathered enough evidence to start pressing charges in international courts on violations in Venezuela, be it the chavista ones (the infamous Tascon list, the April 11-13 deaths, illegal firings, burnt soldiers, etc, etc...) to the security corps who, benefiting of the general lawlessness and inpunity, commit all sorts of abuses such as the ones reported recently in Guarico state where the police corps looks more like a Mafia gang than an orderly police department (without forgetting the Aragua and Portuguesa notorious cases).

Well, of course, chavismo does not want to air its dirty laundry outside, so the next best thing is to shoot the messenger, or at last scare it in the hope that it will run and hide. From what I saw tonight Ayala Corao (and Liliana Ortega and others from other observations) are anywhere closer from dropping their extraordinary work to try to bring decency in Venezuela. They know that they are a hurdle in the script of how fascism is installed and they know that they have to be eliminated. My hat goes to these brave souls.

Audit in PDVSA, the corruption march

Tal Cual had an article on Thursday about how difficult it is to know what really is going on inside PDVSA, the state oil monopoly, now in the hands of Chavez as his own little personal cash box. I just need to translate the sub headline:

In few countries it could be conceived what in Venezuela seems normal: the business that generates 80% of our earned dollars still cannot be audited. The administration of the company does not present balance sheets or audited operations since 2003. This is a new ideal habitat for corruption to grow at ease. The search for new markets looks favorable to switch sales from the traditional buyers of the USA.

I will "translate" further the point, for those that might not get it still.

PDVSA is now the private property of Hugo Chavez and thus there is no serious inquiry possible to figure out a few things that a normal business should do:

What is being sold?
What is being produced?
Where do the monies go?

There is simply no way to run a decent business if those three questions are not answered.

It seems rather incredible that Chavez does as he pleases with what belongs to ALL Venezuelans who have the right to know where their property goes, even if they do not agree with how it is managed and for what purpose.

And all of this at a moment where our local IRS, SENIAT, is stepping up a campaign which looks more like a witch hunt of private business for minor infractions than a real tax policy. Friday I was asked for the first time ever when I was paying for two loaves of bread and bottled water my ID number, my full name and my phone number!!!! A detailed bill now has to be made for everything that is taxable in a store, and has to have on it all that information. I can understand that for big ticket items, but for bread? Of course I gave a false name, a false ID and a false phone number, just for the sake of it. And I know scores of people doing that whereas it was the first time for me, the outrage of having to report my life details if I buy bread was just too much! But a thought occured: could it be possible that Chavez does not want the SENIAT to know how he is spending PDVSA money and is doing exactly what I did yesterday, and will keep doing from now on? Kafka would have had it so easy....

It remains that abscence of a serious audit could be indeed one of the real reasons why Chavez does not want to sell oil in the US where there are such organisms such as the SEC who like to know what people are doing, legally, with large amounts of money. Just as Chavez wants to know what I am doing with my money. Thus Chavez tries to get business partners with corrupt practices of their own, such as China and Cuba. Just as I might start doing when I buy items in cash. After all, he is teaching by example.

A personal view on recent Venezuela history.

When my parents grew up, Venezuela had a set of institutions and infrastructures that allowed them to fulfill their potential. The country was not in the first world but it was far from being a third world country at the time. My parents were not rich, but they studied in good public schools, went to public Universities, graduated and had access to relatively affordable housing. When I grew up, they had one car, so in many cases we had to use public transportation. It was somehow complicated because my mom would sit me in her lap so that I would not pay for the ride, but the system worked. When I got sick, I was treated in Caracas Children’s hospital, a public hospital. There were also huge public vaccination campaigns. We were put in long lines to open our mouth to get a very sweet red liquid called the “polio vaccine”, in other cases it was not so fun when they would come with real injections for all sort of unknown diseases. At the time, I understood the principle that if I had gotten the disease before, the government would not come for me with their big needles. So, whenever I could, I would try to catch some disease like measles or mumps, first to stay home and second to prevent those government nurses to get me the next time. That was Venezuela in the sixties.

I have always thought that Venezuelan problems came with the Arab oil embargo (no wonder Miguel’s blog is called “the Devil’s Excrement”). Oil prices were multiplied by four overnight. All of the sudden, there was so much money that the whole economy was distorted. Venezuela became “Venezuela Saudita”. When Venezuelans traveled abroad, everything seemed so cheap because everything was so expensive at home. Housing prices that had been stable for decades started to increase so much that it was extremely difficult for a young professional or University professor to buy a house on his salary. All of a sudden, things that had been within the reach of everybody became unreachable for those that lived on a salary. For those that lived on a business, it was a flourishing time and soon there was a very active medium class that had an amazing standard of living.

That was the time when many poor people from Colombia and other Latin American Countries came to Venezuela in search of a better future. They installed themselves in the “barrios” of the big cities where lived those that could not afford proper housing. In those slums one could have, however, the latest color TVs and electronic equipments. The energy was stolen from the public posts and Electric Companies such as Electricidad de Caracas just increased everyone else’s bill to compensate for the stolen power. Nobody complained.

It was a time of optimism and huge government programs. Excellent Universities were founded and ambitious scholarship programs to study abroad were put in place. Everybody had access to those programs and the subsidized Universities became a real social melting pot where the rich kid from Altamira and the poor one from the slums studied side by side. It was the time the oil industry was nationalized and the time when the government decided to invest in a new government company to maintain the Venezuelan oil industry. It was the birth of PDVSA. There were also many new heavy industries been founded in the South of Venezuela and the government had huge panels in Caracas that said “Jovenes al Sur” (The young to the South!).

Somehow along the road, oil prices collapsed and the petro-economy did not sustain itself. The social and economic problems that were created by the massive arrival of petro-dollars got wider. Nostalgic of the good old days, Venezuelans re-elected the man that was in place when the bonanza started, Carlos Andres Perez, in a superstitious hope that he could bring back the good old days.

Perez was a man of his time. He understood that he could not use the same strategy this time around. He surrounded himself with young non-political professionals and started the hard job of fixing the economy. It was tough, the disappearance of some subsidies led to price increases. People from the slums got down to Caracas in desperate protest in what was called the “Caracazo”. Perez many political enemies got advantage of the situation and in veiled fashion supported the infamous coup attempt of Hugo Chavez on February 4, 2002. The Pandora box had been opened. The democratic rule had been cut.

Sadly, Venezuelan economic indexes were improving, a sign that the tough measures were making effect. Carlos Andres’ old foes helped by a sympathetic press found a reason to impeach him. The country lived at that time in a French Revolution like environment in which Perez and anybody that would defend him would almost be considered a traitor and be pointed out in public. The climate was so extremist that pictures of the Supreme Court judges that had voted against the impeachment appeared in the local press so that people would recognize them. I remember how I, who had never voted for Perez or AD (Accion Democratica, Perez' party), wrote on an e-mail a moderate view on how I disagreed with the situation. My mailbox was soon full of insults.

So, in the end, Venezuelans got what they wanted: they got rid of Carlos Andres and, in a few years, and after a suspicious pardon obtained from also former president, and Carlos Andres’ foe, Rafael Caldera, elected Hugo Chavez. He was a putchist but charismatic leader that, according to the people that voted for him, would lead Venezuela to change.

This time, they were not wrong. Venezuela has definitely changed.

For the worse.