Volver al Cabildo- Let's retun to the Cabildo

The April 19 theme is far from over and not just because Chavez had a ludicrous military parade trying to make it a purely military element. No, there is much more to it as we celebrate our 200 year of our start to Independence. From now until July 5th 2011 we will see more scholarly works about what it means to be a Venezuelan and more brutal vehemence trying to deny what makes us a people.

Ovidio Perez Morales

One of the best articles published on April 19 is an address to President Chavez by one of the most lucid voices of Venezuela, Monsignor Ovidio Perez Morales, reminding us that for all its fault in times of troubles the church has been a powerful factor of change for the best in Latin America.

Since it is in El Nacional by subscription I am putting here the original in Spanish and the interview made by Milagros Socorro which complements it nicely, in Spanish.  Below the translation in English that was sent to me (though I did change a few words).  If you can read Spanish I suggest the original.

A few comments before you read this important positioning of the church in front of the Chavez regime.

Of the ocasional uselessness of new constitutions: The doomed new Bolivian Constitution

Today Bolivia voted on a new constitution which as far as I am concerned is destined to fail as badly as the Venezuelan one of 1999. The reason is very simple: a constitution which is imposed by a majority over a reluctant minority cannot create a democratic state since it starts by denying the rights of the minority. It does not matter how many elections are held, how many referendums are called, as long as the constitution does not genuinely reflect the notion the country has of itself it will not succeed. A constitution is not a law, it is the framework used to make laws. If you cannot agree on the framework, you are less likely to agree with the laws made through it.

The US constitution of 1787 succeeded (for all the crisis it suffered) because it reflected what the “founding fathers” thought of what the US was and should be: a federal state where freedom of expression and of religion should always be guaranteed. It was a social pact, a minimum upon which all agreed, from Maine to Georgia. Its major failing which led to the Civil War came because the rights of the slave minority were ignored. Even though the slaves had little chance on their own to change the bad hand dealt to them, their existence corroded enough the majority cohesion that the crisis came. Now that constitution has allowed Obama to reach power and turn a final symbolic page on this issue.

The French constitution of 1958 succeeded because the country agreed that the executive should be a stronger institution and that the quarrelsome parliamentary system inherited from 1870 was exhausted. Just as the 1870 system succeeded, at least until WW2, because it reflected the consensus that France should never be open again to the rise of a strong man to rule its future. The weak executive was reinforced by the strong parliament as needed during survival crisis such as WW1; but eventually it failed because it was unable to adapt to changing historical conditions when clarity of purpose was needed to terminate the colonial period and modernize France.

One can write similar paeans to successful constitution such as the recent ones in Spain, Germany or older systems such as the English one. But one can also write about constitutions that failed even in democratic countries as the rights of minorities, or even majorities, was eventually denied. It is the story of most constitutions in Latin America, including the failure of Chile’s in the 70ies when Allende refused to understand that he never got 50% of the popular vote and yet pretended to rule as if he had won that vote share. The Venezuelan one of 1961 succeeded at first because it was designed to guarantee the right of the minority to reach power eventually. That is how Chavez won in 1998. But it also failed in the end because it could never quite break with a “tradition” of strong man, even if they were granted only 5 years to rule.

The Venezuelan constitution of 1999 has already failed as proven by Chavez himself. In spite of being the promoter of the new charter he has tried to modify it enormously in 2007 and he now tries to debase it by creating an executive elite that enjoys enough access to power to remain in office forever. It was doomed from the start when the Constituent Assembly of 1999 had 97% of its seats representing only 60% of the population. The 40% that did not make it to that assembly never accepted its result and if today they defend the 1999 charter it is because the modifications proposed by Chavez ensure that the amended document will serve only the 30% or less that serve Chavez by sheer sycophancy or plain material interest.

I do not know the details of the Bolivian new constitution that is approved today. I am sure that it carries very valid redress measures for a Native American majority that has been abused since BEFORE the Spaniards reached Bolivia as the Inca was already an imperial master. The vote in Bolivia is clear: the new constitution which was already drafted by violating the conditions with which it was supposed to be established is receiving a strong approval in half the country and a strong rejection in the other half. Bolivia is not yet at the breaking point but today it is making a step further towards that possibility. True, Morales and the Media Luna leaders have demonstrated that at the brink of disaster they were able to hammer an agreement of sorts, but that is not the way a constitution is drawn. The agreement that allowed for today’s vote was not a consensus, it was a “let’s get over with this and move on to something else”, implicitly acknowledging on both sides that the constitution was just an excuse of a larger power struggle.

As such I predict that today’s voted paper will be just another one of the many that Bolivia got, just as the 1999 in Venezuela is already an exhausted one.

P.D.

Amazingly Bolivia emitted results as early as 7 PM Venezuelan time. On February 15, with the voting set to last until 6 PM I am pretty sure that we will not get a single result until midnight or even later. May I remind readers that WE STILL DO NOT HAVE THE FINAL RESULT OF THE 2007 REFERENDUM?



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If Chavez were a conscious, serious, people loving president, he would apply article 185 of the constitution

It does not matter what Chavez berates for 4 hours or what the New York Times prints today: the opposition progressed, won very important districts, and the most symbolic ones at that. Or does anyone pretend to show that winning in Delta Amacuro was more important than the Sucre district of Caracas? For their locals maybe, but for the rank and file chavista living in, say, Guacara, Sucre result is more telling than Tucupita.

If Chavez really meant to rule for all Venezuelans instead of plotting ways to get reelected in 2012, he could simply finally apply article 185 of the Constitution which offers the perfect mechanism to bring ALL Venezuelans around the same table to approve the general lines of the country development and to study the biggest problems that face us all. Because what is coming our way Chavez CANNOT face it alone, not even with his PSUV. 2009 will be a rough year starting as early as late December when oil income will be halved within a few weeks. Today we are still cashing bills for oil sold above 100 USD a barrel but late December the bills cashed will be for oil sold below 100, and by March the bills cashed will be for oil sold at 50. We ave no other export to compensate for this loss of revenue. Our tourism industry is in shambles, and anyway foreign tourists will have less money to spend. We still will need in March to import more than half of our food with not even half the money we used to have. There is no escaping reality.

And if to this you add other problems that can only be solved through consensus, such as crime and the viability of the remaining private business who will go under if Chavez presses them further with taxes, we can expect some major trouble in the second semester of 2009 when the 17 states who voted red last Sunday start claiming for the promises made to them.

Article 185 calls for a Federal Council of Government, presided by the Vice President (see, Chavez does not even need to be seen sitting down with opposition governors for business). Its main function is to distribute the responsibilities of governing among all the parties that constitute the different form of executive governments in Venezuela. It is thus formed by the full executive Cabinet, all governors and one Mayor per state, plus a few invited organizations as needed such as trade unions, business groups and major civil rights organizations.

This Council actually decides how certain amounts of money are spent to favor more deprived regions. That is, the regions who give the most to the central state have a said in which project their money will be spent to help the less favored regions. As a peace and unifying organization you can hardly have come up with something better than this Council, one of the few things worth rescuing of the 1999 constitution who today is more dead than alive, courtesy of chavismo constant violations.

But of course Chavez cannot accept this because such Council works for the decentralization of the country, for local responsibility, for cooperation within states without necessarily the hand of the central government. In other words, this great article of the constitution works against all what Chavez stands for: single man rule. By the way, by not applying it Chavez violates the constituion, but who cares?

If I am reminding readers about this article it is because some times I think I am one of the few Venezuelans left who still remember some of the good hidden in the 1999 document, even though I opposed it when it came up for vote. Chavismo from its side only remembers those articles that can be used to increase Chavez power. All the other articles that can protect his "enemies" from abuse are routinely ignored when not violated downright. I am under no illusion that this article would ever be applied but it would be nice to see a major newspaper in Venezuela remind Chavez that the said article exists.

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In Spanish the original article:

Artículo 185. El Consejo Federal de Gobierno es el órgano encargado de la planificación y coordinación de políticas y acciones para el desarrollo del proceso de descentralización y transferencia de competencias del Poder Nacional a los Estado y Municipios. Estará presidido por el Vicepresidente Ejecutivo o Vicepresidenta Ejecutiva e integrado por los Ministro y Ministras, los Gobernadores y Gobernadoras, un Alcalde o Alcaldesa por cada Estado y representantes de la sociedad organizada, de acuerdo con la ley.

El Consejo Federal de Gobierno contará con una Secretaría, integrada por el Vicepresidente Ejecutivo o Vicepresidenta Ejecutiva, dos Ministros o Ministras, tres Gobernadores o Gobernadoras y tres Alcaldes o Alcaldesas. Del Consejo Federal de Gobierno dependerá el Fondo de Compensación Interterritorial, destinado al financiamiento de inversiones públicas dirigidas a promover el desarrollo equilibrado de las regiones, la cooperación y complementación de las políticas e iniciativas de desarrollo de las distintas entidades públicas territoriales, y a apoyar especialmente la dotación de obras y servicios esenciales en las regiones y comunidades de menor desarrollo relativo. El Consejo Federal de Gobierno, con base en los desequilibrios regionales, discutirá y aprobará anualmente los recursos que se destinarán al Fondo de Compensación Interterritorial y las áreas de inversión prioritaria a las cuales se aplicarán dichos recursos.


-The end-

High gear again for Chavez

After his electoral "victory” of December 2006 Chavez started speeding up the radicalization of his pseudo revolution. Thus a new constitution format was announced, 5 socialist motors would be running to speed up changes, weapons galore would be bought to arm the revolution and RCTV would be closed so everyone would feel good about the changes.

Unfortunately reality, long repressed by the financial electoral narcotic slumber of 2006, came back with a vengeance. Food started missing from the shelves. People did not like their novelas taken away. The whole world seemed to dislike the idea of closing a major network just because Chavez said so. Thus we saw a strange backpedaling; Chavez even said that the constitutional change was not urgent and could wait for 2008.

And suddenly, zasss, the constitutional changes are back in the front burner, with an extraordinary energy as the National Assembly chair is even talking of a ratification referendum in December. What happened? Two factors: the internal situation evolution implies that the longer Chavez waits for the constitutional change the more difficult it will be to get ratification; and the planned changes will make Chavez a life term dictatorlet. This last one gives the window to pass such changes with complaisant ignorance from foreign players a short term opening.

The troubles at home

The situation at home is fast reaching a critical point.

Devaluation cannot be postponed for long. The street rate is now TWICE the official rate and climbing. Chavez seems very intend to keep the exchange rate as it is, so in January when the new currency hits the streets (1) he will be allowed to claim the hollow victory that the “Bolivar fuerte” is better than the Bolivar of the 70ies when it was at 4,30 per USD. Any devaluation before that time will unleash an inflationary wave, above the current 20%, and that will not be popular at all.

Food shortages are not going to improve much. If certain rather high tech sectors such as chicken or pig farming will be able to keep growth as long as the government allows for grain import (those becoming more expensive everyday), other sectors will not recover for a foreseeable future, such as cattle and dairy. There is no indication that current agricultural policies will allow for the required increase in sugar and corn production. And corn production is crucial for “arepa”, chicken and pork production.

After the recession of 2003, the industrial park is somewhat recovered but it is not expanding. Let’s remember that the Venezuela important growth rate of the last three years is the reflection of a commercial expansion enabled by high oil prices, not a production expansion. There is no significant investment, at least not the type of private investment required, and thus when you combine that with the industries that went down in 2003 and never reopened, it seems that material goods production will not be able to supply the increasing demand. More pressure on inflation.

Paradoxically many social programs such as Mision Vuelvan Caras are depressing the work market and making hiring of personnel more difficult for the few industries that are working at full capacity. Such Misiones allow too many people to cash a small stipend without providing any significant economical activity. They are in fact a very ill conceived jobless program. If to this you combine the prohibition of economical layoff and new and expensive and time consuming regulations of the work place, there is a definite reluctance in the small and medium sized business to expand the work force, a work force increasingly expensive to maintain, and thus increased costs feeding inflation. Historically it is the small enterprise which are the largest creators of jobs and this is not happening, by far, at the scale the country requires. For all the government talk, the national cooperative system is failing consistently to provide the economical relief sought.

All of these factors will keep increasing the inflationary pressure in Venezuela with all the consequences that such a situation eventually carries for a country: a recession in the near future with an inflation rate well above 20%. If to this you add the prospect of a temporary oil production drop, all but directly admitted last week by some of PDVSA executives, the recession could hit any time in 2008 if some corrective measures are not taken right now. These measures will start by control of public spending, a no-no in an electoral year if Chavez wants to ratify the constitutional changes by December. The vicious electoral circle is thus well established.

The troubles abroad

There has been always the rush to assume the mantle of Castro before this one dies. To this you can add now the badly deteriorated image of Chavez as a consequence of the closing of RCTV.

A mild anti Chavez feeling among Europe ruling class and elite caused by a rather strong anti Castro feeling has not been improved at all when RCTV was closed. However Europe right now is mired again into a treaty renegotiation, is concerned about Iran and what not. But that will last only so long; a deterioration sped up whenever Chavez hugs Ahmadinejerk.

With the US things are pretty much done when all major contenders for the 2008 elections have expressed anti Chavez sentiments. But the US is now mired in the presidential campaign on top of an ever more difficult Iraq situation. Not to mention the worries over Iran.

The constitutional reforms that Chavez wants to introduce are a life long presidency, the end to decentralization, the creation of a strong personal and centralized administration, the end of any investment guarantees, including for those investments that already exist in Venezuela. Even worse, in the new economical system that Chavez proposes, any opposition movement could never establish the democratic bases to challenge Chavez and will be forced into some form of violent response with the irresponsibly magnified repression that usually follows in such systems. In other words, all of this is anathema to established democratic practices where the opposition should have fair access to political tools.

To this we can add the troubles in the neighboring countries. The tension with Colombia is everyday more and ore difficult to hide, even more when at the border the Colombian Peso is now the currency of choice. The Mercosur alliance is now questioned by Chavez himself, and the all but certain arrival of Cristina Kirchner at the Casa Rosada is no guarantee of an unconditional Argentinean support. She will be much less dependent on Chavez generosity than her husband was, and she is a supporter of Jewish communities and definitely not a friend of Iran, now Chavez main ally after Cuba. Lula himself is running into some problems and might soon find that it does not pay off to keep supporting Chavez as he does. An increasingly unstable Ecuador and Bolivia could radicalize the nascent anti Chavez opposition in Peru and Chile and even Uruguay and Paraguay.

Of course, none of these countries is going to send a single soldier to unseat Chavez, but his dreams of international stardom will be curtailed fast if he postpones his constitutional reforms further, as he still benefits of a democratic label as the implications of the RCTV closing are not fully felt outside of Venezuela. Right now the world is very distracted and Chavez antics might not matter much, but a fresh US president, for example, or a new Middle East new crisis could isolate a newly autocratic Chavez.

The timetable

Thus Chavez has redone his math quickly.

Right now, he can still pull out a reasonably acceptable referendum to validate the changes he wants to make to the constitution (2). But the longer he waits, the more difficult this will be. If in December the people approve a non democratic constitution then the world will have to grudgingly accept that Venezuela democracy committed suicide. It is Venezuela’s right after all. But if in 2008 the ratification follows a strong street movement, and a likely rigged vote, then Chavez will be a pariah just as Mugabe is. This is something that Chavez tries desperately to avoid even if in the mind of many foreign leaders he is already such a pariah.

This also applies at home. Many people still think that there was nothing wrong with the Recall Election of 2004, but the RCTV closing has done terrible damage to Chavez image. Not the direct damage, mind you, Chavez is still loved by too many. But among many of his followers the seed of doubt has been planted. The more Chavez let’s the debate on the constitution drag on, the more that small chinck on his Teflon coat will start to expand and become a fault line. Add to this all the other domestic problems brewing and their effect felt more and more by the hoi polloi, and you can guess that suddenly time is running short.

So Chavez has decided, apparently, to gamble on the vacation period of Venezuelans. That is, dissident students supposedly will be off the streets, opposition leaders in vacation in Miami, or in Margarita resorts and the National Assembly will not need to put up the pretense of open debate with the people as no one will show up to any debate they might call. If it works, then the opposition AGAIN, will not have time to organize a reasonable challenge in just the two months of October and November, which late start was also one of the major handicaps of the Rosales campaign in 2006 (3).

Will that work? The country is very different in July 2007 than it was in July 2006. There is a new sense of urgency that could trump all the plans of Chavez, starting by many people inside his base that this time will not follow that adventure. For example, a strong anti constitutional change challenge in Aragua state by Governor Didalco Bolivar could even yield a narrow No vote for the changes! Chavez needs a victory margin for the Yes at least as large as his vote of December 2006. But right now this cannot be achieved without electoral fraud. In fact, a Yes vote is even questionable in December, much more in 2008. Thus for the time being it seems that Chavez is trying a honest victory in December, and you should not be surprised that the initial radical proposal about to be unveiled might be greatly watered down by the December vote. After all, the only thing that Chavez really, really needs, is unlimited reelection. If he gets that, all the other non democratic changes can be postponed and gained in due time. This, in the end might be the real strategy of Chavez, settle for the unlimited reelection but get it in an acceptable vote.

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PS: this post comes with no link at all. There would be so many that it would become almost unreadable if all appropriate details were added. I thought about doing it as a multi part post but time is short these days so I settle for this very long "summary". At any rate, many of today items have already been reported in preceding posts such as this one or this one. And perusing El Universal web page is enough to verify 90% of the information noted here, even from the skimpy English section.

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1) Three zeros will be loped off from the actual VEB. That is, 1,000 VED of today will become 1 “Bolivar fuerte”.

2) The constitutional changes will be the subject of another post. Stay tuned.

3) What the opposition can do will be the topic of yet another post.


-The end-

The Venezuelan autocracy: building it up (final: a constitutional conclusion?)

Amazingly Hugo Chavez has decided that an extensive constitutional reform is just what the doctor prescribed for Venezuela. All the different implications of the 1999 constitution are far from being established yet and some have not even been touched. The complete chapter V, for example, has been totally ignored so far. Then again convocation of a "Consejo Federal de Gobierno" could have only rested power to Chavez, not to mention competing for the public's attention, a no-no for that showman who wants to be alone on stage. But that does not matter, the constitution, we are told, needs a major overhaul.

What we have been seeing in the previous 3 posts will be at the core of what the proposed constitutional changes will be. In fact, the scope of the promised changes is so extensive that we can even use the term new constitution even as Chavez pretends to pass it as “reform”. But when the reforms to a constitution reach perhaps more than half the articles, can we recognize the old constitution? Would it not be more productive, more decent, to just call for a new constitutional assembly and have everyone’s say in the matter? Instead we will have Chavez proposals discussed in “petit comité”. So much for “participatory democracy”.

It is amusing to remember that the 1999 charter was seen by their supporters as the “best constitution ever, an example for all to follow”. Now, these same people who barely 7 years ago swore by that document are now the ones promoting a major revamp, if not an outright rewriting just because the big chief has decided to change the country to a socialist bolivarian popular republic with all the ominous implications that this carries (should I call it from now on the Sobolibanana Republic? With a stress on the “so” obviously). At no point these folks think, ponder, consider, that these required changes must be done because the constitution of 1999 was, to begin with, an ill drafted instrument. It never occurs to them that it is also because Chavez has been so busy bringing down institutions while been careful not to build new ones, that the charter of 1999 has become a hindrance to himself.

We can muse upon this truth that constitutions are only as good as the people who apply them. In the opinion of this blogger the 1999 blue book was unworkable even before it was subjected to vote. In Venezuela not only we got a rather deficient piece of paper, but we have flawed people applying it. No wonder it requires changes even if we all know very well that the same flawed people will pretend to apply whatever is voted sometime later this year. Eventually they will turn it into yet another useless document. Is it idle to remind the reader that the US constitution has barely a couple of dozens amendments, and has been lasting now for over 200 years helping the creation of the most prosperous society in human history? Or that England has no constitution? Or that France who has had truly 5 republics changed its constitution only two times the last century while Chavez did it twice in seven years?

Because this is the core of the problem, these constitutional changes are useless. They are done because, again and again it must be repeated, Chavez needs to demonstrate permanently that he is the boss. He cannot deliver roads, decent housing, real medical care, autosufficiency in food production, stable currency, political stability, real jobs with real wages. So he brings out a new constitution in the hope that for a while people will rather discuss that than the empty shelves at MERCAL.

Along the way he will manage to introduce indefinite reelection, for life reelection, he will get even more control over different state appointments by removing many elected offices, he will reduce any opposition to just what he needs to pretend Venezuela is a democracy, he will enshrine all sorts of regulations to limit the freedom of expression, he will control the economy in a way that not even Gomez managed. In other words we will reach 2008 with Chavez controlling everything, in a way that no dictator ever controlled. Perhaps all legal, but all without any legitimacy as his own supporters will not have been consulted, as 40% of the country will not have been allowed to even present its case.

That new constitution manipulation is a farce, a farce in very bad taste. It will be drawn in an ocean of corruption. The nationalizations that it will justify will result in handing to the chavista mafia profitable companies that will be ransacked, made useless, scavenged for any bit of money that corruption can get out of them. Already the directions of AES and CANTV are packing their desks and workers are wearing red shirts to try to save their jobs. There was a time where the worker of these companies would have gone on strike to defend their works as Tascon is about to sweep in. But these days they do not care, ready to sell their soul to keep their job. And one expect these people to even have an opinion on what would an appropriate constitutional change be? The paradox here, and the measure of Chavez great success in killing the democratic spirit of Venezuela, is that a constitutional debate which should be the great feast of a democracy is nothing more than a monologue from the autocrat with nobody really caring about what is said.

Eventually we will get a totally dysfunctional state where nothing works. Eventually Chavez will be ousted or killed or dead and then globalized transnationals will be called in to buy for cheap whatever is left. They will be associated with the surviving mafia that will claim innocence of the past while inheriting it. We will be a new Russia, because we will not be a new China. These people who today serve Chavez lackadaisically, without an ounce of shame will turn on him when necessary, will save their chips and will once again sell the country to whomever pays them the most. With yet another constitution if necessary.