Tuesday, January 11, 2005

Land seizure and the deliquescence of the Venezuelan state

These past days have been rich in demonstrations that the Venezuelan state is sinking fast into some type of tribal units ruled by weapons. Sunday's papers reflected the marvelous contradictions in which we live, making Gabriel Garcia Marquez an illuminated amateur.

I wanted to start with the latest on the seizure of El Charcote, that X-thousand acres ranch in Cojedes part of a group of ranches owned by British interests. I use the X as a number since the true extent of the land owned, and by whom, has become the mystery du jour. And the source of quite a fight even before the Brits are expelled in what is the new Cojedes parody of independence war, with flown in chubby governor and all.

Apparently the governor of Cojedes, Yanez Rangel, had to come by helicopter as the roads were blocked by chavistas. Blocked by chavistas? Well, it turns out that there are two groups of people that want to lay their hands on the Charcote estate. Those that already grabbed a few acres 4 years ago, pretty much ruining the production scheme of the property. And those that the governor wants to give the land to, some cooperatives whose origin and function (and control) is not quite clear. However, those that have been sitting in on the land apparently will have none of it and accuse Yanez of trying to plug in his friends.

Where have I read such stuff? Oh! I remember! I wrote a few days ago about that possibility myself! It seems that I am not the only one that suspects that the cooperatives are only a front for some chavistas to make good with land. You set the cooperative. The cooperative conveniently goes bankrupt a few years later and some governmental official buys its land for a fraction of its real price. Incidentally that standard operating procedure has not been invented in Venezuela but seems to have a promising future here.

Miguel has already posted a few pictures to illustrate this high in color moment. But there is one that I want to repost in this page. (And by the way his translation of an interview of Carlos Machado Allison musing on the technical nonsense of it all is a must read)



These were the soldiers sent. To control what? The docile management which has claimed that it wanted justice, which has already had to fire 60% of its personnel as the invasions have maimed production by 2/3? What gun power could possibly have 50 rural workers against even the body guards of the Cojedes governor? No, these "tonton macoutes" were sent because the factions between Chavismo forced the governor to come by helicopter. I find this picture quite symbolic of the degradation of the public power in Venezuela when a small state governor needs the Army to protect himself from "his" followers.

But if you want more degradation of public institutions you can read the editorial of Teodoro Petkoff coming back from vacation today. And what a come back! This lengthy editorial (posted here in Spanish) explains how Danilo Anderson has come from the revolution first martyr from a putative victim of a war between extortion groups. The only thing that remains to be settled, or so it seems when one reads the editorial, is whether Anderson was part of one of those rings, whether he was just a conduit for information and notoriety, whether the General Prosecutor knew anything (and, this blogger adds, whether Isaias Rodriguez was crying on Danilo's remains at his funeral or crying on something altogether different). All of this while Isaias Rodriguez acolytes are investigating who gave inside information to the noted investigative journalist Patricia Poleo instead of verifying whether what she denounces is true or not.

To close this post two articles quite telling on what lays ahead of us. Michael Rowan, in English, muses on the unstoppable wave of corruption due to the nature of the regime.
Corruption is reduced by institutionalizing independent checks and balances in the ministries, monopolies and enterprises of government, reducing the discretion of individual actors with great power, and eliminating secrecy altogether. Corruption is a function of the system, not the people who use it.

And yet another delicious article by Manuel Caballero yesterday in El Universal. There he muses on the declaration of totally discredited Pedro Carreño (of Montesinos and Direct TV fame) where he said that Chavez was the only "indispensable" within the MRV.
This is not only a confession, it a whole philosophy of power. Chavez is not only the coat which tails allowed to reach parliament and other offices people who not even in their most delirious dreams ever thought of reaching places of influence for which they were not prepared nor ever bothered to get prepared for; but if it were not for Chavez that political group would not exist.


I trust the reader to be able to tie it all up together.

Sunday, January 09, 2005

Alo Presidente is back

The Sunday talk show of president Chavez is back in the air after an interruption of a couple of months "for redesign". The show used to be an itinerant affair that lasted from 3 to 6 hours where Chavez occupied the front scene, only relieved on occasion by some video or some "guest" making some form of expose. Alo Presidente was of course a must see of the political class as most of the maneuvers of the regime were announced previously from its set.

The new format?

Well, the step to a formal TV show with Chavez as the host has been crossed (a dream come true?)





In that picture you can see the central desk (altar?), a huge globe where I can imagine Chavez will describe the numerous excursions that the intends to make to preach his anti Bush gospel, a fancy flat screen TV for videos on the right, and a large Alo Presidente inked on the floor with plenty of red.

The accompanying article in El Nacional let us know that the show will now be always broadcast from Miraflores palace (no more visit to the provinces?). There is a set to show entertainment such a musical performances, a set for interviews, a toll free number and a web page (with plenty of pictures with children). And of course all these changes in format come after "consultation" with the audience, err, I mean the people.

After I recover from that one, I will try to cover the real important news of the week end...

PS: added later. I checked the Venpres web page for more pics of today's show. I was not disappointed by the photo gallery. I have picked, in utter disbelief, two.

The first one is the bench where the ministers must sit through the show. Chavez likes very much to have a few ministers with him wherever he goes. But on Sunday most of then tend to be there (or else, we are told). What a perfect way to illustrate the autocratic style!!!!




The second one speaks for itself. Maybe it is made for television, but really....




PS2: Much later. Truth is stranger than fiction. I have added this one because of the comment by Thomas. The interactive blog where the audience drives the input!!!!!





And I found tonight this poster of the famous Chaplin icon movie, ever so actual, "The Great Dictator". Sorry, I could only find the complete Chaplin with the French title for the movie, in English it was only part Chaplin and part Paulette Goddard :-)




Disclaimer: any coincidence with real life is purely accidental and never intended by the writer of this blog. It is well known that truth is stranger than fiction. Besides it was the idea of one of the readers (see comment section), the writer not being smart enough to come up with anything that hilarious.


Saturday, January 08, 2005

Land seizure in the bolivarian revolution

A rather long essay on the Venezuelan land distribution

The "land problem" has acquired a new urgency over the holidays. To believe the official story one would be lead to think that hordes of starved peasants, landless, desperate, are roaming the country is search of land so they can plant a little bit of yucca and plantain so their children will not starve.


Passing fast on the obvious comment that how come that after 6 years in office Chavez has peasants starving, the truth of the matter is far distant from the chavista version of the situation. It would require a book to describe all what is going on in the Venezuela country side. Thus, to simplify matters I will split this in three parts. First I will refer the reader to a recent post by Miguel who describes quite well some of the judicial aspect of the problem. Then I have translated the editorial of El Nacional from yesterday (with the original Spanish there ). This is accompanied with rather lengthy notes to explain in more detail some aspects of the problem, as they are brought forth by the text. Finally I set up a table on the land distribution as far as we can know right now in Venezuela. This way the reader will be able by itself to decide what to think. With my very own opinionated opinion at the very end.


Since it is a rather long assay I have added internal links to facilitate circulation between the different sections.


= = = = = = =


El Nacional, Thursday January 6 editorial, 2005


(Foot notes sources mostly from Diccionario de Historia de Venezuela, Fundación Polar, 1997, ISBN 980-6397-37-1)


The Charcote and its problems


The manner in which the bolivarian regime has been dealing with the land tenure problem has allowed for many ambiguities from the very beginning of the revolution. It has been more than five years since the government has promised a study of the essential lands to know where they are and which ones are of state or private ownership. It is a matter of order, of legitimacy for a state to talk with authority and trustworthiness. This was not done. The regularization of land holding is an old and dramatic Venezuelan problem (1). It does happen to all governments, they promise a survey, and later on they abandon it, never concluding anything. We are not, thus, in front of an exception, but in from of a predicted failure (2).

According to official sources, the bolivarian regime has distributed millions of hectares among peasants. Can anyone inform how they are being administered, which are the results and the projections? Meanwhile, and what has been learnt, it has been a major failure in Guarico, publicized and shown on TV, where peasants accuse public institutions for cheating them by selling them corn seed contaminated with fungi. Harvests were lost, and so were lost the loans and, of course, the hopes that they had put in their labor.

One does not need to be a rocket scientist to understand that few matters are as complex and depend on so many unpredictable factors as the agrarian production; that a special preparation is required to direct institutes such as the National Institute of Land [INTI]; that is not enough to have eaten arepa to know the complexities involved in growing corn (3). The problem of the State is that the President thinks that all his captains know everything and can do it all.

From this to hit like a blind man with a stick is just a step away (4).

Suddenly appeared fitful acts with the initiatives of the Cojedes governor "intervening", that was the word in the initial decree, a considerable number of haciendas, the famous hato Piñero among them, and also the fundo Charcote, property of a British company which is in full production, according to itsspokespeople (5). Governor Yanez Rangel called for a governor reunion, segregating the INTI, to ask not only for support, but also for imitation, that is, to act as he did.

After these episodes some more got involved, vice president Rangel, the minister of Agriculture and Land, the president of INTI, who announced as one voice a reactivation of the "commando against latifundia" as if it were a major battle. Maybe so much heroism was unnecessary. What are needed is moderation, good sense and knowledge.

Nobody wants them to remain with their arms crossed, but neither that they act as epileptics. May they know what they are doing because to govern is not to mock everyone and even less to deny people's rights. The governor of Cojedes has announced the creation of a commission that would have determined in a few days the situation of the intervened hatos. They did not wait. For example, the immediate intervention of El Charcote, an agricultural complex, better known as "the British company" was ordered.

According to a communiqué from the Agropecuaria Flora, the legal name of El Charcote, the propriety rights can be traced to 1830, that is, to the foundation of the Republic of Venezuela. The spokesperson stated that they have given copies of this to the INTI of Cojedes as well as the Caracas office. In other words, they demonstrate the ownership "without any interruption and very clearly"(6). With the phlegmatic tone which is their trademark, a spokesperson from the UK embassy expressed that "what is important is that the law is respected in an impartial manner". This is what we all wish for.

El Charcote will be the subject of a final intervention by the governor of Cojedes. The news was divulgated like a war report. "Saturday 8, at 10 AM, all the machinery of the sate, all the armed forces stationed within the state of Cojedes and its police force will be present at the installations of hato El Charcote to implement the first beachhead of mision free Land and Men". Not even Zamora had such words (7).

Governor Yanez Rangel promised that the productive process in El Charcote
will not be stopped. He said: "All that is necessary to guarantee the judicial security and preserve the right of property and the due process to the ones subject to justice will be established, just as mandated by the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela". Yanez or Cantinflas? (8)


(jump to next section to avoid the extensive notes on this editorial)


= = = = = = = =


NOTES:


(1) Writing an history of the Venezuelan Land problem is a near encyclopedic behavior. Here is a short run, completed in other notes.


It started of course with the Spanish grabbing the land from the natives, through in part the system of encomienda. However this system did have an advantage: those who spoiled other folks from their land were rather keen in registering all their proprietary rights. By independence time all useful land close from inhabited centers was assigned in a wide variety of ownership schemes, from church lands to native lands in some areas. Including of course the gigantic estates such as those belonging to Bolivar himself.

But the independence wars, often closer to a civil war than a freedom war had the result of massacring most of the colonial elite. Those who were not killed fled the country or abandoned their ancestral lands, few remaining on the job. The epigones of Bolivar came back to Venezuela and as a compensation often occupied the ancient ingenios and haciendas which often were abandoned or with a minimum of activity by the remaining slaves and peons. With the mess of 2 decades of civil disruption, property rights were often not clear and the new land owners were not too worried about legalizing the invader situation. Not mentioning that many of them, not particularly educated in what had become a semi barbaric rural habitat were only too happy to limit themselves to cattle raising. There was thus no particular need to settle propriety rights since the new owners had the force with them and land property was pretty much as far as their cowboys could reach to herd cows.

The federal civil wars f the 1850-1870 period did not help. And the long lived an powerful dictators who followed (Guzman Blanco or Gomez) were not adverse to seizing a few haciendas for their own use, not necessarily under their name.

Thus by the middle of the XX century one could safely assume that much more than half of the land of Venezuela had dubious property rights, and there was no will to solve that situation as too many people were bound to lose. According to the census of 1937 82.5% of land holdings had changed hands in the preceding two decades, demonstrating quite a significant mobility within the land ownership structure. [return]



(2) Many a government used agrarian issues to justify their access to power, since independence times even. Bolivar emitted a decree on that subject in 1817. But the first real concerted effort was the agrarian reform of 1945, greatly expanded in 1947 and finally applied in the 60ies with the Agrarian Reform law of 1960.

The agrarian census of 1954 reflected only around 100 000 "owners" of what was about barely 25% of all of the agrarian lands. The rest of the land was owned as latifundia and worked by hired hands. The Agrarian Reform increased the number of land "owners" to 313 000 by 1985, though perhaps as many as 100 000 peasants were still claiming for land.


For all of its deficiency the Agrarian Reform is considered has having had a
considerable impact in the land owning and producing structure in Venezuela, and to have helped in maintaining social peace for 40 years. [return or go back again to next section]



(3)"arepa" is the national corn bread. It is based on a unique preparation of corn flour which allows for the making of the arepa, which cannot be made with the varieties of corn flours made, say, in the US. To make an arepa you need to buy your corn flour from Venezuela (pre-cocida,
"pre-cooked" as it is a two step preparation) [return]



(4)Translation of "dar palos de ciego". Means to try to hit with a stick when you are blind (also used for fun referring of the piñata hits where party goers must have their eyes shut by a bandana while trying to hit the piñata). [return]



(5)There is a number of terms to describe Venezuelan agricultural exploitations, not necessarily referring to the real size of the property. They start from "hato" which usually is considered large enough that some run into the acreage of a small European country. Then we have "fundo", "hacienda" to the smaller "finca" and "granja". Usually the names have a relation with the initial activity of the farm, in addition to its size. For example most chicken farms are referred to as "granjas". A "finca" is perhaps the closest to the term farm in its European sense, a few acres including a few fields and some cattle. "hacienda" has an old tenure connotation, a certain prestige even if the "hacienda" lost most of its glamour (and lands!)over the years. "hato" is mostly used for immense lands in the Llanos for cattle raising. One Spanish term not used is "rancho", widely used in Mexico. In Venezuela "rancho" is used for slums.



There is a rather good memoir in English about life in an "hacienda" in Venezuela written by a British woman. Her life strange turns had her marry a Venezuelan and live in his hacienda, running it herself alone for a few years until she got tired to see the relatives only come to get their share at harvest time. "The Hacienda", Lisa St. Aubin de Terán, Little Brown and Co., 1997, ISBN 0-316-81634-5. I can vouch for its life like feel: even if all did not happened to them, she did not make up anything. [return]



(6)In the Byzantine land tenure situation in Venezuela, one must demonstrate the successive tenureship of the land from as long as possible. The many political disruptions in our history make it quite possible that you buy land from Mr. X who bought it from Mrs. Y 10 years ago and who can show something that looks like an official document. Yet, once you build a house or plant a crop, just at harvest time you can have a neighbor come and claim part of your land (and crop) or even a long lost heir from 30 years ago with a document that actually can void your property title. In such cases, after a lengthy and costly trial you will be lucky to recover part of your initial investment. This is actually not a rare scam, heirs staying quiet for years until somebody revalues a land that they refuse to work on.


It is thus a good strategy if you buy land in Venezuela to trace property titles back for at least a couple of generations to avoid surprises. And it is always advised that you pay for a good survey and dated delimitations markers once, or before, you buy it to avoid problems with your new neighbors. That investment in lawyers and surveyors is steep at first but will be handsomely recovered when you decide to sell your property. It is my opinion that the British group holding El Charcote has probably a reasonable survey and title of the land, which makes it quite surprising that they have been chosen for the first "intervention". Politics are surely the main reason for such a choice. [return]



(7)Ezequiel Zamora (1817-1860) is one of the mythic heroes of Chavez. And he has distorted the story around him as much as he has distorted the story of Bolivar to suit his interests.


Zamora was a successful shopkeeper that got dragged into politics when the post independence order established by Paez was challenged by the "Liberal" movement, which was very loosely more open to greater popular participation, although controlled by the same social class as the one in office. As a young man Zamora had been exposed to progressive European ideas and he became an advocate of landless peasants and a noted local agitator. But when the Liberals made it to office he was associated with its new benefits and left behind any notion of social revolution that he might have harbored.


His first uprising was in 1846, and he forges his military skills until the final victory of his side in 1849. From then on he occupies diverse administrative posts and gets married in 1856 to a rich widow for whom he leaves public office to administer her estates in the Coro region. But in 1858 the Monagas regime falls and after a brief exile Zamora comes back to lead an insurrection in 1859. His military skills and leadership make him quite a successful leader with his high feat the battle of Santa Ines in December 1859. In his march to Caracas he is killed at a minor battle in San Carlos, making a rather ineffectual Falcon the new leader and postponing for several years the issue of the conflict making it as bloodied a conflict as the independence wars were. During that campaign he retook some of the popular and agrarian themes that had made him strong a decade earlier. These helped him greatly in recruiting peasants to man his army. His sudden death of course will leave for ever the mystery as to whether he would have done something about the landless peasants that time around, a doubtful proposition at best.


Nevertheless Chavez has chosen to focus only in Zamora populist and popular aspects even if Zamora was quite clearly interested in money and power, at least as much as in freeing peasants. In this respect Zamora was like many a South American strong man, rich in reformist promises, surrounded by lieutenants issued from the humblest social classes, but poor in actual results. However his legend has given Chavez a few of the terms he uses in his revolutionary jargon: "free land and men" (a mision named for that), "general del pueblo soberano" (general of the sovereign people) and of course Santa Ines, the battle cry for the chavista recall election effort.


As a side detail, it was Zamora who gave form for the first time to Yaracuy as a separate identity, in 1858. During his 1858-1860 campaign he lead the Federalist movement and founded states around the main cities that he was taking, starting the transformation from the original 7 provinces to the 22 states that now form Venezuela. [return]



(8) Cantinflas was a popular Mexican comic movie actor. One of his specialties was to ridicule incompetent bureaucrats and policies. Another was the mumbling and fumbling character that had no idea what he was doing but pretended to know [return]



= = = = = = = = =



The reality of the land distribution in Venezuela



El Nacional also published a graph obtained from the latest national census on agrarian lands. One way to look at it, a way that would favor the government intentions, is to observe that 10 972 families own 60% of the land set for agriculture in Venezuela. That of course would be unacceptable. But is it that number as offensive as some would want us to believe?


The first observation that one must make is that the situation is much less grave than it was in 1960. The Agrarian Reform then redistributed a very large amount of estates and did create a new peasant class. Unfortunately this one did not succeed for various reason. One was the very poor support to get started as they often lacked the equipment and seeds and technology that should have accompanied the redistribution. The other, much more important, was the fast urbanization of Venezuela. Today barely more than 10% of the Venezuelan population can be classified as rural population. in 1961 the rural population was already down to 37.5% from a 1926 number of 85% living in the country side! After 10 year of oil exploitation Venezuela was still a very rural country in 1926. If in 1926 Venezuela could show some semi feudal aspects, in 2004 this is not a social issue anymore.


But let's look a little bit closer at this table from El Nacional. I have simplified it by putting all the numbers in percentages. I have also taken the criteria that to make a living from the land one should own more at least 5 hectares (2.47 acres, so you can just multiply by 2 for a gross approximation if you live in the US). This is very subjective since it depends on the value of the land as an arable estate or a strictly cattle area, on water availability, on the crop, etc, etc... But one must simplify somewhere.


Thus the table has been divided into three groups, those that might not have enough land (purple), those that should have enough for a decent living (blue) and those that obviously have a lot, perhaps too much (red).



Property size in hectares
% owners in census
% lands in census
less than 18,5%48,4%0,07%1,59%
1 to 214,1%0,28%
2 to 525,7%1,24%

5 to 10

15,0%
50,7%1,60%51,97%
10 to 2011,9%2,49%

20 to 50

10,3%

5,04%
50 to 1005,4%6,02%

100 to 200

3,7%

8,12%
200 to 5003,1%15,42%

500 to 1000
1,2%13,27%

1000 to 2500
0,7%1,0%16,78%46,45%
2500 to 50000,2%10,37%

more than 5000
0,1%19,30%

Thus, for example, 25.7% of the rural families own 1.24% of the land which is comprised of properties between 2 and 5 hectares (5 and 12 acres). This particular number is rather bad. However if you regroup the population living in farms whose size should allow them to eek out a decent income (say, to buy a color TV and send kids to school) you will see that 50.7% of rural families own 51.97% of the agricultural land in Venezuela. This, with only 10% of rural population is far from being the searing problem that Chavez would like the world to believe. And certainly not the problem found in Northwest Brazil or other areas of South America.


I have also included two areas of overlap. That is, from 2 to 5 through 5 to 10 hectares where the type of crop or breed raised makes the difference between productive or unproductive. The other overlap area, from 500 to 1000 through 1000 to 5000, could represent some lands whose size is a must, in particular in extensive cattle grazing areas in the Llanos were a ranch less than 2500 hectares in certain areas might just not be productive enough. Some Llanos sectors get their only water from rain, for 6 month of the year. In other words, that 50.7% of families who own properties allowing an acceptable income might reach more than 75% of Venezuelan rural population, for almost 70% of the productive land.


Of course, this is a speculation as real numbers and rural conditions are not available. Not to mention that there is a profound inequality in Venezuelan land quality. I would much rather own 5 hectares of Yaracuy land than 50 or even 500 hectares of Apure land. In fact, some Yaracuy lands are owned by people from Llanos states who send their cattle to their Yaracuy property for a final fattening before the slaughter house!



So, why is Chavez so intent in breaking the land structure?



It is important to notice that what would be more useful to ensure the productivity of the Venezuelan country side, what is really needed, would be a large technical program, including education, financing, technology, determination of suitable crops and a real complete census of lands and exact determination of real property titles. But that is too slow a way for people who want flashy results and think that they know it all. Instead,expropriation and setting up cooperatives that would favor a very few percentile points of the population is a preferred method of political promotion. Not forgetting that experience dictates that very few folks in Caracas slums, as in most countries, will willingly go back to the country side.



No, the reasons are to be sought elsewhere.



One is the need to promote the bolivarian adventure in other countries by creating a fake problem, a code word to rally support elswhere.


Another is to destroy a source of wealth for the opposition to Chavez, even if he risks to create food problems in Venezuela (see the Zimbabwe fiasco for a possible Venezuelan future).


A more likely explanation is to force the present landholders to sell their land cheaply to the new oligarchic class that Chavismo is creating fast with the state monies so liberally spread around to unconditional followers.


And the one that is the most likely objective, is to create a smoke curtain while civil liberties are curtailed. As the "interventions of hatos" is programmed, the gag law gets into effect, a new penal code is voted making it a crime for this blogger to write "Chavez is a jerk", decentralization is becoming a dream of the past, militarization of society advances speedily and new repressive laws are in the books while opposition leaders are facing jail for their ideas.


Thursday, January 06, 2005

The two year anniversary post

Confessions of a blogger

Yesterday was the second anniversary of this blog. Or at least the anniversary when this blog came officially on line. The first posts were written already on December first 2002, just as the general strike of 2002 was looming.

It has been quite an adventure writing for two years, trying to keep up with this blog. Some days I have enjoyed it very much. Other days I felt forced to write and depressed. Some days I felt that it was time to end this blog, in particular last June/July when no matter what the recall election result would be it seemed pointless to keep going.

But in the recent months I have come to realize that this modest, very modest, effort had a value, that indeed some people gave me the honor to consider what I write to be informative, a necessary piece of information for their use. Then I got a radio interview to explain what the blogging phenomenon was. Then the blog was entered in a contest by a reader and won, to my great surprise. Even if the total of votes was not that big compared to the big time bloggers up North, it demonstrated even more the need to talk about what was going South of the Rio Grande (or across the Atlantic). More citations and interviews followed.

Also a most important event came to pass, implying to increased importance of Venezuelan blogs: the new media "gag" law came to pass. This while Iranian bloggers went to jail albeit briefly. While the words blog and blogger entered dictionaries. Bloggers were considered by some US publications as "people of the year". Writing this blog suddenly was not such an egotistical venture. But even more important, if this blogger writes it is because other bloggers do write on Venezuela and people read all of us. Perhaps I flatter myself by thinking that they also keep writing because I write, but at least it keeps me writing. We all motivate each other. It is from all of our different approaches to look at what is becoming fast an opprobrious regime that there is a better chance that people overseas will get a clearer picture of what is really going on inside.

Indeed, sometime late August I found a second wind and I wrote perhaps more than ever, to describe the October election and to visualize what was coming our way. Now I do not think that I will stop, unless forced by events either personal or imposed by "others".

However I cannot keep this blog the way it was. I have said pretty much all that it is to say. Keeping only a critic eye on the Chavez administration would become tiring as I would repeat endlessly the tales of corruption, greed, violence, human rights abuses that I am sure will keep happening over and over again. Such is the nature of autocratic regimes, trying not to use stronger terms to describe what the Chavez adventure has become.

What the changes will be? I am not sure yet, though I have some ideas on what to add to the blog. Perhaps I will write about what should be done in Venezuela. After all if some people give credit to my opinions perhaps they would give credit to my ideas. Perhaps I should discuss other things about Venezuela, its culture, its society, its sights. Inviting people over to write could interesting, making the page more "participative", though these pages will not be open to philochavistas besides the comment section. No, Chavismo is funding enough propaganda sites and this one is my effort only, I set the rules until someone pays me for my words. And that someone has better got a fat wallet.

I do not know how this blog will evolve. But I trust it will evolve, hopefully in a positive and constructive way. After all it started as a personal diary two years ago and slowly became quite a public reference, with all its faults, and faulty English.

This blog started while we were experiencing one of our most glorious democratic moments when millions hit the streets all across Venezuela to demand our democratic rights. We have been defeated because we played fair with thugs. But our ideas have not been defeated. They cannot be defeated as they are that essence of human rights, so well written in a famous text: the pursuit of happiness. We want to create our own happiness and we do not want it imposed from above.

Thus I will keep writing, if anything in the hope that more and more people in Venezuela will write their story and tell the world what is really going on in my beleaguered and beloved country.

Wednesday, January 05, 2005

Letting bygones be bygones?

Certainly not in this blog who endeavors to keep reminding all that is unacceptable from the Chavez administration. No fat chance, as they say!

The new year start is a good time to resume again a few of the issues pending from last year. No idle task, as the resolution of these issues will confirm whether we are in democracy, or in a dictatorship, or just a plain mess "lead" by a lunatic. To simplify things I suppose that a format by themes would be helpful. Then as the year goes by we could refer to it and count the items which were solved one way or the other. The criteria of course will be very lax as the term "officially forgotten" can be accepted as one way to solve an issue. And to simplify even more I am only listing some of the main issues, although not in any particular order.

Basic Human Rights issues

Will the mystery of the soldiers burnt to death in Fort Mara be –really– solved? (I mean, besides accusing the attending MD of malpractice)

Will the folks abused, tortured [too many to list] and/or killed [Zambrano, Carrizo] during the period of February 27 and March 10 find some form of redress? (some of the tormenters have already received medals, by the way)

Will the assassins of Maritza Ron, who made the front pages of the papers while shooting her in Plaza Altamira, be sent for trial? (One was seen at the funeral of Anderson as if nothing).

Political Right to Life Issues (as a separate issue of HR)

Will Silvino Bustillos, disappeared by the Army on October 31, reappear? (at least his body)

Will we find out who ordered the assassination of Danilo Anderson? (in particular if the order came from inside the Chavez administration)

Accounting issues

Will we find out what PDVSA really produces, or at the very least how much oil it really pumps out? (besides what is guessed by international agencies)

Will we find out where the money goes? (there is an important portion that goes outside the normal budgetary procedures)

Corruption issues

Will any of the cases reported by the press ever be fully investigated? (including the misappropriation case of the FIEM by Merentes, who was just sent back to the chair he left because of that case)

Or for that matter, will any of the major corruption cases of the last 20 years be ever investigated and people sent to jail? (the present administration was elected to punish former corrupt officials, but in 6 years we have still to see any result)

Perseverance in administration issues

Which misiones will survive? (that is, which ones will be forgotten to allow El Supremo to create new ones for campaigning purposes)

Will the chavista governors be kept in a tight leash? (that is, will they need to go to Caracas regularly to be told what to do at home)

Electoral issues

Will we have a statement of campaign expenses from the 2004 elections? (or any other for that matter)

Will we have an independent electoral board? (I know the answer of that one already: NO. The only question is whether the 3 to 2 2003 pro Chavez majority will be expanded to a 4 to 1 or even a 5 to 0)

Will we even move towards a more trustworthy electoral system? (quite important as we will be having 3 elections again this year)

Freedom of expression issues

Will the new media law be only a regulatory mechanism or will it start the process toward control of freedom of speech? (including the press and perhaps even the internet by late 2005)

Will the new penal code be used to silence important opposition voices? (I am afraid that I already that answer, and it is YES)

Militarization of society

Will Chavez be satisfied with 50% of his governors, a good third of his ministers and vice ministers and appointed officials coming from the armed forces? (this proportion of "public servants" coming from the army is even higher than the one observed in previous bona fide military regimes)

And while we are in army matters, will we ever know who coordinated the alleged paramilitary invasion of last May? (since their arrest we only know that many were Colombians brought to Venezuela under false pretenses)

Ethics at home

How long, for a bowl of rice, will philochavistas keep supporting such an administration? (I am afraid that the Adecos have got too many used to silence their conscience for any handout; and "bowl of rice" is of course a metaphor that encompass anything from Mercal to the handouts for pro Chavez "capitalists")

Ethics overseas

Will the fellow travelers that accompany Chavez adventure realize that it is becoming a simple military based regime? (But of course militaries from the left seem to be allowed to commit the atrocities frowned upon for militaries from the right, a distinction that remains unfathomable for this blogger, but a distinction that does not seem to distract a few pseudo-intellectuals from their sleep).


Monday, January 03, 2005

Venezuela, a military dictatorship?

Well, readers of this blog certainly know that in Venezuela we are closer to a military regime than to anything else. The logic of the system has pushed Chavez to associate the army to his power as the only way to get some "safety" in his hold to power.

I have been sent this article from Notitarde and I decided to make it my first translation of the year. You can actually go and open the link to see the picture of the writer, a feature of Notitarde, the Valencia newspaper. The provincial commentators sometimes are ahead of Caracas. Indeed, in the provinces we are more aware of the role of the army than for Caracas folks who I must say sometimes miss completely the point.

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Towards the "barracks" country

The coup-monger-president gets clearer and more explicit in the exposé of his "project". From the carefully thought early ambiguities, which fooled and hooked so many- Mayz Vallenilla, Olavarria, Combellas, Escarra and I am not including Miquilena because the veteran communist leader did know of the real reach of the anti nation adventure- he has come progressively and consistently to the enumeration of the exact contours of his oversized ambition for absolute Power.

Each time Chavez differentiates more from that alleged prophet of democracy, from that "savior of the Nation" who invested the streets and areas of the country, from the hand of Miquilena, as soon as president Caldera erased criminal charges on him –originating from a coup d'etat, hundreds of killed military and civilians- for which grounds he was in jail in Yare.

He spoke of the poor, of "true" democracy, of "street kids" for whom he would forfeit his name if he did not redeem them. Today there are thousand of such street kids and the coup-monger-president keeps using the same name, with total contempt to his former promise. He would govern for all, without exclusion, and at the same time he was beating his chest in his devotion of "love" to the peoples he was threatening to fry "the adecos heads".

Bolivar here. Bolivar there. And sacred oaths to respect the constitution and the rule of law. His would be an activist government, a constructive one, diligent. And above all honest! A commitment that today generates national hilarity in the face of immeasurable corruption consciously and continuously fathered by the coup-monger-president to enrich the lackeys and accomplices, in particular of the rotten military cast. As he was securing his Power, with the submission and obedience of the different public powers, and essentially when he managed, with money, the control of the armed forces, his discourse started to change. He became more defiant. He came out on his external alliances, in particular the one with Fidel and the few remaining communist regimes in the world. He accentuates and continues to accentuate the militarization of the country, to the point that today there is not an administrative sphere exempt of the ominous military presence. He reminds zealously of Peron, the founder of the sadly known "sword international", which had its best expression in Pinochet after decades of long military dictatorships in South America. He hugs Qadaffy and again turns his eyes on Mao Tse Tung. It seems that the time to include Stalin and Pol Pot has not come yet.

But here it comes. Or goes. In his end of year speech to the armed forces, from the ceremonial patio of Fuerte Tiuna, he gave the marching orders to generals, admirals, officers and soldiers, as well as to the reserve, to incorporate definitively in the "revolution". That is, once and for all, without masks, afterthoughts or concealing, the armed forces must act –and they already do, though stealthily- as the fundamental instrument of his administration. In the context of the ever repeated affirmation that his is a "pacific but armed revolution".

In synthesis, the armed institution ceases to be the a power at the exclusive and absolute service of the State and the Nation, -defense of the fatherland, territory, constitution and laws, of the legal state- to downgrade to the condition of a praetorian guard of the coup-monger-president, as it is already operating since the perpetration of human rights abuses, and attacks of civilian rights.

The republic ceases to be civilian and the citizens lose their condition of civilian. The militarization advances speedily, towards the final conversion of Venezuela in an army barrack. With the coup-monger-president as the lone chief, absolute, without appeal. And for life!


Getting back on the blog

Well, it is not easy.

Perhaps I was writing too much before the holidays. Perhaps there are too many abuses to be reported. Perhaps there is a sense of inevitability as to our dark fate, so why bother. Whatever it is I am having a hard time to seat down and write. Though posts ideas are as numerous as ever. Maybe I should get a sponsor, somebody giving me money to write. After all, chavistas are getting all sorts of funding to write garbage, so why shouldn't I get something? Heard that opposition financiers? Whoever you are?

At any rate the beginning of the New Year greats us with the local Yaracuy version of the "attack of land redistributors" as our new governor is preparing to sign land seizures right after letting buhoneros back in the street. Garbage in, garbage out.

El Universal has two articles translated in English. They are not that good, and are not that well translated, however they do reflect a little bit l'air du temps.

The first one is from former president Caldera who is one of the 3 people most responsible for the mess we are in. He reminds us that he let Chavez get off rather easily from his 1992 coup. While Chavez is trying to jail forever people that do not have blood on their hand the way he does since 1992, not mentioning what he added since he reached office. But Caldera, at the very least, was a democrat and Chavez is certainly not one.

The second article is some kind of a rant about the inevitability of the failure of the present project. Just a little sentence:
The "revolutionary military officers" know this is another government they can profit from.

Duh! Well, readers of this blog have known this for a long time. One way to finally bring Venezuela to a democratic vision is to suppress the army. The armed forces have been all along the blood suckers of our treasury, and never more as under Chavez who, scared of them as he is, has allowed so much corruption and abuse that it has banalized it. Perhaps his greatest crime!


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