And now, after a series of 6 posts we come to the most difficult issue to address: how to design the unity candidates to the nominal districts for the National Assembly election of 2010, over 100 of them.
In a series of posts we have discussed the problems with the new electoral law of Venezuela, how the government has modified the electoral system to try to obtain again a crushing majority at the Assembly, how gerrymandering is now a reality. We also tried to guess what is the message that the opposition should hold to counter the massive electoral machinery of chavismo, and we observed how necessary was the unity of the opposition in an electoral alliance if it wanted to have a chance at winning a bare majority.
Thus we came to the posts on how to elaborate that electoral alliance. First I discussed the system to establish the electoral alliance in what I called the "list seats", the seats who were supposed to allow for minority representation in parliament but who, with the new electoral mechanic, have now become a bonus point to enlarge the winner's majority. I proposed that these seats, not even a third of all the contested seats, should be decided through a political party negotiation with the input of some sector of civil society. The objective was to use these seats as safe seats and offer them to important political personalities that ARE ABLE AND WILLING TO CAMPAIGN STATE WIDE AND NATION WIDE. In other words, something as a supra campaign team marshaling its multiparty composition everywhere to demonstrate the purpose of unity of the opposition.
There are about two dozen of "safe seats" and thus no political party should get more than 3 of these seats, to make sure that their motivation to campaign for the less safe district remains. The nominees should include about half a dozen of local or national figures not linked directly to any political party. They should all be nominated as soon as possible so they can start campaigning while the names of the other 100 or so seats are decided. And this is the subject of this post.
How to chose a candidate?
I will list the different methods briefly with their advantages and disadvantages. The objective is for the reader to understand that there is no good method with the current political situation of Venezuela and that as such all methods should be considered and applied according to the different states. One thing is certain: a healthy dose of primaries must be implemented as it is the only way that the general nomination process will be validated in public opinion. For that it would be desirable that no less than 50 seats, half of the total nominations remaining, should go through a primary system.
The smoked room negotiations
Advantages: the cheapest method, and up to a point the fastest. If well managed, with generosity and transparency, it could even be the fairest.
Disadvantages: the parties that do not get the nod could accuse the "winners" of all sort of manipulations. This could damage unity enough that it might push some parties to launch their candidates anyway, the more so if "secret" chavista money comes to finance them.
Applications: yet, in some cases can we really afford a primary or even an opinion poll to decide the nominees? Think about some nearly hopeless states like Trujillo or Cojedes, why bother spending time and money in financing some sort of popular nomination process in states that will most likely go to Chavez? Not the favorite method by any means but one that applied with enough transparency could serve in some small red states, 4 to 6 of them.
The opinion poll selection
Advantages: it is a method that served well in 2008 to select some governors and mayors candidates, for example Ledezma who went on to win Caracas. It is cheaper than organizing a primary. It also allows to ignore the problem that comes when you decide what voter base should be allowed to vote in a primary.
Disadvantages: it still costs some money since at least 2 different pollsters must be commissioned in every district. And experience shows that when polls results are close then a third pollster is called to the rescue. When polls are close the "losing" side is very, very reluctant to concede. In addition individual districts represent at best 10% of the voter share (we will discuss that later), so minority parties risk not to be high enough to get a candidate and thus lose any motivation to campaign. Remember, we need everyone's effort and any political organization that has a blip on the radar should be offered at least one "spokes person" seat in the next assembly (luckily we are talking here of at most half a dozen of such seats, for Bandera Roja, ABP, MAS, and 2 or 3 more ). There is a complication with that method: do we put the names or political parties in the polls to be made? Using several candidate names could risk muddling the results and not give clear winners.
Applications: this method applies best to the top half states in population, where polling methods are well established and where there are many seats to provide thus allowing for a reasonable fair participation of all, leaving room for some negotiation so every side is reasonably happy. Also, if gerrymandering indeed takes place and is announced too late for effective primaries to be organized, it will be the only way to sort out the names in the new districts. Furthermore, if primaries are held but suddenly the CNE changes the districts, polls are the way to go to "reorganize" the primary results.
A primary system
Advantages: there is clear popular expression and the losers will have a hard time not recognizing the results. If they try to sabotage the final result by running anyway, public opinion will sanction them, at least the way public opinion stands today. It is also the most democratic way to do a nomination process, an excellent propaganda tool against the PSUV primaries that will be murky at best. And SUMATE is willing and ready to organize primaries if enough funds are provided.
Disadvantages: unfortunately this system has many problems. Who runs the primary (not all like SUMATE)? Where do we find the funds for a rather expensive process? When do we hold the primary since the CNE will reveal the new districts as late as possible? How do we ensure that even the losers get at least some representation if they got a significant number of votes overall? But most importantly WHO WILL VOTE? Political party militants? everyone?
The major problem with a primary system is really to decide who can vote. Opening the vote to all might sound good but by allowing militant chavista to participate in a truly polarized society could result in all PODEMOS and chavista dissident to lose as chavista will be directed to vote for the candidates chavismo think it can defeat best. Only in opposition strongholds (Miranda, Zulia, Nueva Esparta, Tachira and maybe Merida, Carabobo and Caracas) can we consider an open roll based on the CNE electoral registry. But in a state like Aragua, Bolivar, Monagas or Lara, expect chavismo to try to influence the result.
The primary electoral roll
From the above you can deduct that the the two main problems of all of these selection methods reside in the primary system: which states will hold primaries and who can vote in these contests. I will leave the first problem for the next post and will discuss only the electoral base to close this text.
The proposals next are reflecting my personal opinion more than what the reality should be. I, for one, do not agree that primaries should be open to all. After all the PSUV will not open its eventual primaries to all so we have no lessons to get from that quarter. But then again, who can vote?
SUMATE has in its database the folks who signed for the recall election of Chavez in 2004. This is roughly 3 million potential voters who can already be told that they have the right to vote. In addition, political parties have data base of their militants that can be crossed easily with the 2004 list to supplement this one. Finally, SUMATE and political parties could open registration drives for a week or two, and add easily up to half a million more voters coming mostly from PODEMOS and disaffected chavista and NiNi. In other words, in a couple of weeks SUMATE can provide the opposition with a voter base of maybe 4 million voters.
The objection is of course that "many people are afraid to put their names on any opposition list". Well, too bad. It is time that folks take a stand, that NiNi stop being the profiteers they really are. We all know that the state is organizing a political apartheid since 2003 and sticking your head in the sand once more will not protect you from becoming a second class citizen.
However there is a counter argument that can be made to open voting to all. After all, if you vote in a primary you will need to vote at least in your home state and there will be a record of that. The new list generated will not differentiate whether you voted because you support the opposition, you are a disaffected chavista or you were told to vote for a given candidate to make sure s/he does not win the primary. That is, the fear of people to appear in an anti Chavez list works both ways, for the chavista and non chavista Venezuelan. In other words, it is possible to scare away the chavista vote so that its effect will be small on the final outcome.
In the end it is a political decision that must be made by the political parties, SUMATE and significant representatives of the civil society, without minimizing the potential consequences. One thing is certain, even if opposition primaries are held in only a few states but that a large participation is observed, this would be a very bad omen for chavismo and motivation for the opposition.
Further notes on Primary vote
There is an additional problem with primaries, the need to decide who wins. A two round ballot? Too expensive and time consuming for the present strength of the opposition. Should we just allow for the winner to be nominated outright if s/he gets at least 35%? OR should we allow the political parties to decide the winner from the top two vote getters? See, primaries are not the sure solution.
Could we just assume multi seat districts and candidates distributed on a proportional way? I would go for the open list per party that is, every party names a list and you mark your vote for a single name, the seats being allocated first on party vote strength and second on votes obtained. This would make useless a second round balloting except in single seat districts. In addition in case the CNE redraws late the districts the results could still be more or less used in most districts.
My final proposal?
I think primary could be held in the states that are held by the opposition since some logistical support could be found there (chavismo supposedly could not complain too much since their abuses is ALREADY well documented). In particular for Tachira, Carabobo and Miranda (Zulia could be done with a poll since we all know that UNT would be first and PJ second). If anything the state police and some state facilities could offer the safety required for holding the contests. Of the states held by chavismo the only ones where primaries would be justified would be Bolivar, Merida, Anzoategui and perhaps Lara. Of the small states Yaracuy and Barinas are the only ones where I see a primary being of any use, if anything because a primary would be a first step for the opposition to start rebuilding there.
Polls should be used for Caracas, Aragua, Lara, and Anzoategui and maybe Falcon and Monagas.
The following states would be better served by a negotiated arrangement: Trujillo, Portuguesa, Guarico, Cojedes, Amazonas, Delta Amacuro, Sucre and Vargas (though Vargas can be included in the Caracas poll).
If no more than a 8 states go to primaries we can risk a open to all vote. But if we decide to make primaries in half the states or more we might consider using SUMATE data to which we add the political parties data.
Primaries should be held on a regional basis by necessity, to marshal the opposition scarce resources effectively. 3 or 4 primary regional dates should be fixed over a maximum of two months, to be completed no later than May of next year.
The vote should be open list by parties, people marking one cross in front of one name of one list only. In districts with 3 or more seats, no party can run a complete slot. That is, 4 seats, only 3 names, 3 seats, only 2 names. That is perhaps the less painful way to ensure that minority parties reach a seat somewhere. Candidatures would be distributed by party result, the top getter name of the list receiving the nomination. The substitute name of a nominated guy from a different party (Venezuela elects the main guy and its substitute, which I totally disagree with). That way all will get something, if anything the substitute seat for when the main representative travels or something.
In next post I will start posting some tables to illustrate the complexity of the primary process in some states.
-The end-
Monday, October 19, 2009
Sunday, October 18, 2009
The 2010 Venezuelan votes: the "list" voting
I need to start this post with an erratum of sorts. I must confess that when I wrote the preceding posts I had not read in full the new electoral law. The reason is that I had read enough tidbits about it to have a fairly good idea of what was its purpose, and also because as far as I know the law is not officially approved yet. That is, it only appears in the SUMATE page and it does not appear in either the CNE page or the Nazional Assembly one. Curious no? Perhaps they will heed the advice of people like Ojo Electoral, who have been accused on occasion to be too lax with the CNE or chavismo, and who still go out of their way to explain how chavismo could, with that law, get 84% of the seats with only 45% of the votes, thus violating the basic principle of the constitution that demands a proportional representation.
But now I have read the whole thing and allow me to say that my calculations of preceding posts was actually bland: the realty is worse than what I assumed it to be. In particular is the realization that the famous "list vote", which is the one supposed to guarantee proportional representation has been tampered. Now, in every state there will be ONLY 2 or 3 list seats, according to the population. This mean, no way around it, that a "minority party" will need at the very least 25% of the vote to have a chance at a seat!!! And some find the 5% German rule too tough.....
Thus in this post we are going to start looking at the "list vote" as it stands currently on the new law, hoping against all hope that the CNE will not dare to go as far as it was proposed. But I am not holding my breath because as you can see from the first graph, chavismo benefits too much of this advantage to give it up.
The "list vote cheating"
In this first table I have compared the list vote seats of 2005 with the putative ones for 2010 (as usual, right click to enlarge in a different window). I have divided the states according to the traditional regional divisions I have used in the past, for the long time readers. The left side of the table is a simple summary of how the seats were allocated in 2005 (and 2000 and 1998 for that matter). The right side of the table would be the 2010 configuration.
I have also put in light blue the states where the opposition did its best scores in the 2008 regional elections, NOT where it won, but where it did its best score.
In 2010 all states will have 2 or 3 list vote seats. Thus on the "loss from 2005" column I indicate the numbers of seat lists lost in each state (curiously with that system Amazonas actually gains one list vote, which might be a chance for the opposition to grab a seat in what is considered a 100% chavista bastion). Finally in the last columns you will see the supposedly new increased numbers of district seats per state, a topic that I will reserve for a coming post.
What is the first observation we can see? Most of the states affected are the states where the opposition stands a good chance to make a good score next year. In fact, Lara and Anzoategui can even be added to that list (yellow highlight) because in Lara governor's Falcon success is due to the opposition crossing over to vote for him and Anzoategui chavismo success was a fluke due to a lousy opposition campaign and the barring for election of the natural candidates, almost shoo-in for the state house.
The cheating here is two fold:
- All the states that get at least one more district seat will suffer extensive redrawing of districts, in particular opposition strongholds of Zulia and Miranda.
- And as indicated earlier on, the reduction of list seat is a sure way to penalize a divided opposition and to force minor pro Chavez party (PPT and PCV) to accept the PSUV terms. With a divided opposition the list seats would go mostly to chavismo.
You do not need to be a rocket scientist to figure out the intention of the regime in changing the electoral law....
The opposition and the list vote
So, what can the opposition do?
The good news is that "list seats" are the only "safe" seats for the opposition if it decides to unify its electoral lists. The next table indicates which are those that I consider to be "safe seats" based on past results, on trends, etc... That is those states where the opposition is certain to win or to get close to 40% which will make difficult for chavismo to get the all of the seats according to the calculation method in the new electoral law. Still the column of safe seats is only 21 our of 52 (though I do not give chavismo more than 25 safe seats which leaves really 6 contested seats at best).
My proposal is simple: name the "list seats" candidates according to personalities, a little bit like the "top" of the ticket, using these folks to campaign all across the state helping the other guys that will have it harder to win in the district seats as I have explained in previous post of this series.
The people named at the top should be charismatic politicians, the ones that will carry the national message of the opposition leaving the local messages to the district seats candidates. These folks, I argue, should not be selected according to a primary system because the scarcity of seats available to run makes sure that in a primary contest almost all seats would be gained by PJ, UNT and AD, shunting out the minor ones. I think thus it is better to leave those seats to the "bigger guys" from the start, but including some "personalities" and local folks to leaven it up some. A compensation mechanism can be designed when district seats are subjected to primaries; for example all the political parties beneficiaries of the safe seats choices would accept not to run in the primaries of a certain number of districts to make sure the small fry, such as ABP, get a chance to prove themselves and earn a couple of nominations.
There is also another advantage: once the big ones place their top 2-3 names on safe seats, they will be more willing to allow primaries everywhere else.
The table below reflects, based on previous results, how should the "safe seats" nominations be allocated, keeping in mind that "safe" is an adjective that can be used ONLY if there is a good electoral alliance.
I will discuss it by region.
Central states
In the central region Podemos should get the safe seat from Aragua. It is quite possible that with the competition between Proyecto Venezuela and Primero Justica there (PV and PJ) PODEMOS could lose! And I explained before we need Ismael Garcia in the next parliament. We also know that Ismael, if given a safe seat, will kill himself campaigning in other districts and states.
Carabobo of course has one for PV. I did not put Carabobo as two safe seats as I did for Miranda and Zulia because the arrogance of PV in 2008 has allowed for chavismo to gain in strength and take Valencia mayor's office. However a unified ticket could allow for an extra seat. That one should be given to a local personality and not to any party in particular. Maybe a journalist or a campus dean, but to a personality, something that the voter of Carabobo could be sensitive too compared to he imposed names sure to come from Caracas for the PSUV candidates.
Caracas is the same problem as Carabobo because of the extreme polarization and because the obvious strategy of the government to favor the popular districts of Caracas and punish those of Miranda who voted against Chavez. However there is a possibility of a second seat to be gained there and it should be either given to ABP, Ledezma's group, or to a personality like the rector of the UCV (if she lives in Caracas). The top of the ticket is given to UNT to satisfy their need to expand outside of Zulia and because they do have feisty candidates there such a William Ojeda.
Miranda is an easy case: PJ and Copei. AD should be talked out of Caracas metro area and compensated with seats elsewhere. Though maybe Copei and AD should be left to sort their allocation between themselves alone. We also get here a top seat for Julio Borges who needs a safe seat to campaign elsewhere in Venezuela.
Finally Vargas, where the opposition has little chance. Maybe a local personality could be found to try to wrestle the second position of the list.
Zulia
No problem here. The UNT stronghold has a good chance to carry 2 seats. Here UNT should understand that it must allow PJ to enter Zulia, one of the reasons I give UNT the Caracas safe seat. A UNT PJ ticket is a sure winner in Zulia, in particular if 2 or 3 districts are given to other folks besides UNT or PJ. It would be a test of UNT commitment to plurality.
The South
Amazonas has an off chance to give a seat to AD. Delta Amacuro could give one to the opposition if the candidate is enough on the left of the coalition; thus it would be a good place to give the MAS its small token seat. Bolivar is the problem as Causa R will demand a seat. But it should be punished along PJ and PODEMOS for their division in 2008 which cost the governor's office. All should run in primaries there for the district seats.
On the other hand there is that chavista who is increasingly opposition, Pastora Medina, ex-PPT, who could be given that safe seat and thus drag along a not insignificant section of the chavista vote and create a bad surprise for chavismo in Bolivar. Or Juan Jose Molina of PODEMOS, though I think on his own he should be able to win his primary for a district. Either one should be the safe seat because either one can be used to campaign elsewhere in the country to appeal to the wavering chavista.
The west central region
Pickings are slimmer for the opposition there although in Falcon they are starting to get tired of the Montilla dynasty and Lara is really an anything goes now that Falcon is more and more a free agent. Thus I suggest a Lara personality, preferably a journalists to run there. In Falcon the proximity of Zulia makes the UNT the natural choice and in Yaracuy Convergencia should be given the safe seat for one single reason: the opposition has so destroyed itself in 2008 in my home state that the only cold embers to be found are in Convergencia. They are the only ones that have an idea on how a campaign should be run in the state. But if there is a state where a primary vote could revive the opposition it is Yaracuy!
The Andes
Tachira is easy enough: Copei has the governor. The Merida safe seat should not be given to any political party because all of them made their utmost to sabotage the 2008 result in a state that was almost a shoo in for the opposition. I propose that a representative from the student movement gets the safe seat there. Or a primary, perhaps the only case where a primary for a list seat would be justified.
Trujillo is almost a sure loss. I can only see some untainted local personality having a shot at the second finish in the list vote.
Oriente
This region is a little bit more complex because over time each state has pulled considerably apart from the historical regional trend. Because there is a need to compensate AD from giving up seats in Caracas and Zulia, it should be given a chance to recover its old stomping grounds where it still has a few semi interesting politicians left. Thus Monagas and Anzoategui seats should go to AD.
Podemos controlled Sucre for many years and we need them to beat Chavez. Sucre should be given to the ex mayor of Carupano or to whomever Podemos decides.
Finally Margarita. There is a chance there that all the seats go to the opposition but there is also a governor that is quite stubborn. Lets convince him to allow primaries for the districts by giving him the list safe seat, and even the second position if he wants.
The llanos
We finish with the region where chavismo has the most chance to pick up everything except a couple of list seats. Thus the obvious choice in Barinas is to give the nod to the dissident chavista who has a personal feud with the Chavez famiglia. He might be a mafiosi himself but it takes one to beat one.....
In Apure AD has a chance, though I am skeptic. In Guarico the judicial pursuits against the Manuitt famiglia leaves the opposition, very weak there, with little choice but to name some local personality.
In Cojedes and Portuguesa chavismo should get the 4 seats and only an AD in Cojedes or a MAS celebrity in Portuguesa have a weak chance to get the second list seat.
Conclusion
The cheating is absolutely clear and thus it is absolutely clear that the opposition needs unity and internal generosity to get seats. In the list seats it really cannot expect more than 26 seats even with more than 50% nationwide vote. This is due to the fact that in some small states chavismo can pick up all the list seats without too much trouble (Portuguesa, Cojedes, Guarico, Apure, Amazonas, Trujillo, Monagas and Delta Amacuro).
In other words the eventual victory of the opposition will come from the district vote of the Urban States: Caracas, Miranda, Aragua, Carabobo, Zulia and the Andes as Oriente might be a toss up tending toward chavismo. Thus there is no point in wasting much "nominating energy" on the list seats nomination. They should be used to place the leader of the campaign, to get safe seats for them and spend time campaigning across all of their states to help the district candidates.
In addition, considering that we do not know when the final gerrymandering of districts will come, the sooner the list seats are nominated the sooner they can start the campaign. The longer the field is left open to chavismo, the more difficult it will be to gain back the wasted time, no matter how badly the economy might tank, electricity outages get worse, etc, etc...
-The end-
But now I have read the whole thing and allow me to say that my calculations of preceding posts was actually bland: the realty is worse than what I assumed it to be. In particular is the realization that the famous "list vote", which is the one supposed to guarantee proportional representation has been tampered. Now, in every state there will be ONLY 2 or 3 list seats, according to the population. This mean, no way around it, that a "minority party" will need at the very least 25% of the vote to have a chance at a seat!!! And some find the 5% German rule too tough.....
Thus in this post we are going to start looking at the "list vote" as it stands currently on the new law, hoping against all hope that the CNE will not dare to go as far as it was proposed. But I am not holding my breath because as you can see from the first graph, chavismo benefits too much of this advantage to give it up.
The "list vote cheating"
In this first table I have compared the list vote seats of 2005 with the putative ones for 2010 (as usual, right click to enlarge in a different window). I have divided the states according to the traditional regional divisions I have used in the past, for the long time readers. The left side of the table is a simple summary of how the seats were allocated in 2005 (and 2000 and 1998 for that matter). The right side of the table would be the 2010 configuration.
I have also put in light blue the states where the opposition did its best scores in the 2008 regional elections, NOT where it won, but where it did its best score.
In 2010 all states will have 2 or 3 list vote seats. Thus on the "loss from 2005" column I indicate the numbers of seat lists lost in each state (curiously with that system Amazonas actually gains one list vote, which might be a chance for the opposition to grab a seat in what is considered a 100% chavista bastion). Finally in the last columns you will see the supposedly new increased numbers of district seats per state, a topic that I will reserve for a coming post.
What is the first observation we can see? Most of the states affected are the states where the opposition stands a good chance to make a good score next year. In fact, Lara and Anzoategui can even be added to that list (yellow highlight) because in Lara governor's Falcon success is due to the opposition crossing over to vote for him and Anzoategui chavismo success was a fluke due to a lousy opposition campaign and the barring for election of the natural candidates, almost shoo-in for the state house.
The cheating here is two fold:
- All the states that get at least one more district seat will suffer extensive redrawing of districts, in particular opposition strongholds of Zulia and Miranda.
- And as indicated earlier on, the reduction of list seat is a sure way to penalize a divided opposition and to force minor pro Chavez party (PPT and PCV) to accept the PSUV terms. With a divided opposition the list seats would go mostly to chavismo.
You do not need to be a rocket scientist to figure out the intention of the regime in changing the electoral law....
The opposition and the list vote
So, what can the opposition do?
The good news is that "list seats" are the only "safe" seats for the opposition if it decides to unify its electoral lists. The next table indicates which are those that I consider to be "safe seats" based on past results, on trends, etc... That is those states where the opposition is certain to win or to get close to 40% which will make difficult for chavismo to get the all of the seats according to the calculation method in the new electoral law. Still the column of safe seats is only 21 our of 52 (though I do not give chavismo more than 25 safe seats which leaves really 6 contested seats at best).
My proposal is simple: name the "list seats" candidates according to personalities, a little bit like the "top" of the ticket, using these folks to campaign all across the state helping the other guys that will have it harder to win in the district seats as I have explained in previous post of this series.
The people named at the top should be charismatic politicians, the ones that will carry the national message of the opposition leaving the local messages to the district seats candidates. These folks, I argue, should not be selected according to a primary system because the scarcity of seats available to run makes sure that in a primary contest almost all seats would be gained by PJ, UNT and AD, shunting out the minor ones. I think thus it is better to leave those seats to the "bigger guys" from the start, but including some "personalities" and local folks to leaven it up some. A compensation mechanism can be designed when district seats are subjected to primaries; for example all the political parties beneficiaries of the safe seats choices would accept not to run in the primaries of a certain number of districts to make sure the small fry, such as ABP, get a chance to prove themselves and earn a couple of nominations.
There is also another advantage: once the big ones place their top 2-3 names on safe seats, they will be more willing to allow primaries everywhere else.
The table below reflects, based on previous results, how should the "safe seats" nominations be allocated, keeping in mind that "safe" is an adjective that can be used ONLY if there is a good electoral alliance.
I will discuss it by region.
Central states
In the central region Podemos should get the safe seat from Aragua. It is quite possible that with the competition between Proyecto Venezuela and Primero Justica there (PV and PJ) PODEMOS could lose! And I explained before we need Ismael Garcia in the next parliament. We also know that Ismael, if given a safe seat, will kill himself campaigning in other districts and states.
Carabobo of course has one for PV. I did not put Carabobo as two safe seats as I did for Miranda and Zulia because the arrogance of PV in 2008 has allowed for chavismo to gain in strength and take Valencia mayor's office. However a unified ticket could allow for an extra seat. That one should be given to a local personality and not to any party in particular. Maybe a journalist or a campus dean, but to a personality, something that the voter of Carabobo could be sensitive too compared to he imposed names sure to come from Caracas for the PSUV candidates.
Caracas is the same problem as Carabobo because of the extreme polarization and because the obvious strategy of the government to favor the popular districts of Caracas and punish those of Miranda who voted against Chavez. However there is a possibility of a second seat to be gained there and it should be either given to ABP, Ledezma's group, or to a personality like the rector of the UCV (if she lives in Caracas). The top of the ticket is given to UNT to satisfy their need to expand outside of Zulia and because they do have feisty candidates there such a William Ojeda.
Miranda is an easy case: PJ and Copei. AD should be talked out of Caracas metro area and compensated with seats elsewhere. Though maybe Copei and AD should be left to sort their allocation between themselves alone. We also get here a top seat for Julio Borges who needs a safe seat to campaign elsewhere in Venezuela.
Finally Vargas, where the opposition has little chance. Maybe a local personality could be found to try to wrestle the second position of the list.
Zulia
No problem here. The UNT stronghold has a good chance to carry 2 seats. Here UNT should understand that it must allow PJ to enter Zulia, one of the reasons I give UNT the Caracas safe seat. A UNT PJ ticket is a sure winner in Zulia, in particular if 2 or 3 districts are given to other folks besides UNT or PJ. It would be a test of UNT commitment to plurality.
The South
Amazonas has an off chance to give a seat to AD. Delta Amacuro could give one to the opposition if the candidate is enough on the left of the coalition; thus it would be a good place to give the MAS its small token seat. Bolivar is the problem as Causa R will demand a seat. But it should be punished along PJ and PODEMOS for their division in 2008 which cost the governor's office. All should run in primaries there for the district seats.
On the other hand there is that chavista who is increasingly opposition, Pastora Medina, ex-PPT, who could be given that safe seat and thus drag along a not insignificant section of the chavista vote and create a bad surprise for chavismo in Bolivar. Or Juan Jose Molina of PODEMOS, though I think on his own he should be able to win his primary for a district. Either one should be the safe seat because either one can be used to campaign elsewhere in the country to appeal to the wavering chavista.
The west central region
Pickings are slimmer for the opposition there although in Falcon they are starting to get tired of the Montilla dynasty and Lara is really an anything goes now that Falcon is more and more a free agent. Thus I suggest a Lara personality, preferably a journalists to run there. In Falcon the proximity of Zulia makes the UNT the natural choice and in Yaracuy Convergencia should be given the safe seat for one single reason: the opposition has so destroyed itself in 2008 in my home state that the only cold embers to be found are in Convergencia. They are the only ones that have an idea on how a campaign should be run in the state. But if there is a state where a primary vote could revive the opposition it is Yaracuy!
The Andes
Tachira is easy enough: Copei has the governor. The Merida safe seat should not be given to any political party because all of them made their utmost to sabotage the 2008 result in a state that was almost a shoo in for the opposition. I propose that a representative from the student movement gets the safe seat there. Or a primary, perhaps the only case where a primary for a list seat would be justified.
Trujillo is almost a sure loss. I can only see some untainted local personality having a shot at the second finish in the list vote.
Oriente
This region is a little bit more complex because over time each state has pulled considerably apart from the historical regional trend. Because there is a need to compensate AD from giving up seats in Caracas and Zulia, it should be given a chance to recover its old stomping grounds where it still has a few semi interesting politicians left. Thus Monagas and Anzoategui seats should go to AD.
Podemos controlled Sucre for many years and we need them to beat Chavez. Sucre should be given to the ex mayor of Carupano or to whomever Podemos decides.
Finally Margarita. There is a chance there that all the seats go to the opposition but there is also a governor that is quite stubborn. Lets convince him to allow primaries for the districts by giving him the list safe seat, and even the second position if he wants.
The llanos
We finish with the region where chavismo has the most chance to pick up everything except a couple of list seats. Thus the obvious choice in Barinas is to give the nod to the dissident chavista who has a personal feud with the Chavez famiglia. He might be a mafiosi himself but it takes one to beat one.....
In Apure AD has a chance, though I am skeptic. In Guarico the judicial pursuits against the Manuitt famiglia leaves the opposition, very weak there, with little choice but to name some local personality.
In Cojedes and Portuguesa chavismo should get the 4 seats and only an AD in Cojedes or a MAS celebrity in Portuguesa have a weak chance to get the second list seat.
Conclusion
The cheating is absolutely clear and thus it is absolutely clear that the opposition needs unity and internal generosity to get seats. In the list seats it really cannot expect more than 26 seats even with more than 50% nationwide vote. This is due to the fact that in some small states chavismo can pick up all the list seats without too much trouble (Portuguesa, Cojedes, Guarico, Apure, Amazonas, Trujillo, Monagas and Delta Amacuro).
In other words the eventual victory of the opposition will come from the district vote of the Urban States: Caracas, Miranda, Aragua, Carabobo, Zulia and the Andes as Oriente might be a toss up tending toward chavismo. Thus there is no point in wasting much "nominating energy" on the list seats nomination. They should be used to place the leader of the campaign, to get safe seats for them and spend time campaigning across all of their states to help the district candidates.
In addition, considering that we do not know when the final gerrymandering of districts will come, the sooner the list seats are nominated the sooner they can start the campaign. The longer the field is left open to chavismo, the more difficult it will be to gain back the wasted time, no matter how badly the economy might tank, electricity outages get worse, etc, etc...
-The end-
Friday, October 16, 2009
The 2010 votes: the unavoidable opposition unity
In previous installments of this series we have discussed the following electoral problems the Venezuelan political opposition faces and in which are ways they can be dealt with:
The message: simple and short, no outrageous promises, the main point being to exert control over Chavez projects so those become more efficient; control somewhat rampant corruption and reverse some unpopular measures such as the radio closures, something that can be done with a law to reform CONATEL, just to give an example.
The electoral system: it is stacked in favor of Chavez but we must still run the gauntlet. After all the other option is uprising and as long as that uprising does not start from Catia and23 de Enero neighborhoods it will not succeed. True, it might just be a question of time but do we really want that bloodbath in addition to the weekly crime toll passing the Iraq numbers? The only thing we can do is to present good candidates and fill up the polling stations, ALL of them, with as many eyewitnesses we can get away with it.
And thus the third part of this series, how to file good candidates, and unique ones at that!
The obligation for unity
Although it is becoming tiring to repeat this, it must be done: the lack of unity among the opposition cost it the following last November (directly or indirectly, it does not matter)
- Bolivar state governor, one of the major states and a crucial one considering all the trade union battles taking place today there
- The mayors of at least three major cities: Valencia, Maracay, and Cumana
- Several other cities including the state capital of San Felipe
- The legislative assembly of the states of Carabobo and to a lesser extent Tachira and Bolivar
- The passing of some states to near or absolute chavista control, in particular Yaracuy where not a single town-hall could be saved.
The question I submit to you is: would have Chavez cruised so easily through his February referendum and all the totalitarian laws passed this year if all of these entities were today in the hands of the opposition?
We are ONLY starting to pay the price today for this lack of unity due to personal ambition and local vendettas, with two main culprits in my book, Primero Justicia and Proyecto Venezuela, though AD and UNT deserve quite a few stones too.
But it is not the time to allocate blame, not even to ask for apologies: all, from PODEMOS to minor groups on the right must pull together and find a way to avoid these internal battles. UNITY IS THE ONLY WAY WE CAN HAVE A CHANCE AT TAKING BACK THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND START REVERSING SOME OF THE DAMAGE TO THE COUNTRY MADE BY CHAVISMO. If anyone within the opposition does not understand that then s/he is stupid or sold out to Chavez. No way around.
How to manage the unity of the opposition?
I have already written extensively around that but as Rafael Poleo if found of quoting Gide, everything has already been said but since no one pays attention it needs to be repeated over and over.
The obstacles
They are many, ideological ones, past dalliances that come to haunt the different political actors, personal ambitions and what not. In normal times these are impossible to solve, but these are not normal time and for once it is fair to ask the prima donne to lower their ego at least for one single election.
The reality at ground zero
Political parties are a necessary evil. They are the only ones that can really organize the witness at the voting stations and who can sort of manage to campaign in chavista strongholds. If you are not member or sympathizer of a political party please share with us the last time you were campaigning in La Baldosera of Yaracuy or when you stayed until 3 AM waiting for the last vote to be counted in some polling center at Gramoven?
True, civil society can bring a substantial help but in all fairness we cannot expect the Student Movement and Sumate to solve all of our electoral problems. They working together with political parties and assorted ONG and civic group are the answer and all should drop their ego for a few months. There will always be plenty of time to settle accounts after the election.
Thus any system that does not ensure that all will be heard and that all will be granted at least a side chair will fail. That is why I think a wholesale primary is a sure way to sink the project: the sore losers will lose any motivation to help the winners. We are not in the US where the primary loser of yesterday has an excellent chance to become the primary winner of tomorrow. See McCain as the most recent example..... That is why primaries work in the US but why they are in-existent most places where the best we can hope is fair internal election for those who run the smoke filled room. Even in Venezuela where primaries have been tried on different guises we can observe a very mixed result at best. And the recent case of Aragua last year show us clearly that a primary, no matter how well Sumate organized it, is far from guaranteeing the necessary popular enthusiasm required to win the final vote.
But on the other hand we certainly cannot go back to a secret nomination horse trading process: the civil society is not willing anymore to accept it. Heck, even the PSUV where we know that no one gets the nod unless Chavez approves it still manages to make a farce of primary elections with the occasional surprise as the victory of Falcon in Lara in 2008. The "primary feeling" is strong among too many Venezuelans, even chavistas. We are going that way but we are not there yet, wishful thinking is just not going to cut it.
How can we thus tie these loose ends of reality and make it work?
PODEMOS as an example of the problem
I think we can illustrate the general problem examining the case of PODEMOS, stern ally of Chavez until RCTV was taken over. Then slowly but surely PODEMOS started leaving chavismo until finding themselves as a new opposition in December 2007.
Many people, including this blogger, have had a very hard time to accept PODEMOS, to stomach Ismael Garcia, one of the most repulsive Chavez supporters. And yet we must all recognize that singlehandedly he has done a lot to counter Chavez (with a couple of his colleagues and other tranfuges of chavismo). His atonement and his willingness to put up with abuse at the Nazional Assembly will be told some day a political epic. Can we do without Ismael in the next National Assembly? Can we do without his intimate knowledge of the adversary weaknesses that can be well exploited the day Chavez loses the majority?
It is not that Ismael is essential, but together with Molina and Pastora they are among the few people able to campaign in the barrios where they have a chance to be heard. Any nomination process that does not ensure that these three do not return for the National Assembly will increase the opposition handicap.
A solution?
There are 167 representatives, at least 3 per state. Thus the majority the opposition needs to get to be able to do anything is technically 84 seats. Let's take the 86 number to feel more comfortable about any potential of the new assembly. Thus we have 86 seats to spread around, seats that can be won with a normal turnout, a good campaign and the continuous degradation of the regime unable to solve any problem for quite a while (if ever, but that is another story). Any seat won above 86 is an added bonus, a lucky gain. We cannot worry about the nomination of these seats. The way candidates for these seats are nominated is of little importance. Let's put them on a primary system.
My proposal is that of these 86, a number between 23 to 30 should be "assigned" by a general agreement between political parties and the civil society main players (students? university deans? civil rights groups?). Those who receive the nod for those safe seats would be a mix of major political tenors and a few noted figures of the civil society, figures whose expertise and stamina is required in the next assembly. Why that 23 number? There are 23 states plus Caracas, thus 24 "electoral lists" with at least one safe seat on it except in some chavista stronghold like Amazonas or Cojedes.
What are the advantages of this list? First, they do not have to waste time, resources and energy to run for a primary. Second, they can be nominated as early as December. Third they can start running while the opposition keeps hammering the nomination process for the second list of seats, raising funds, working on a plank, whatever. The thing is that there would be two dozen official voices of the opposition replying to Chavez regularly as he is already campaigning hard and needs some one in front A.S.A.P.
There is an additional problem with organizing a long primary system: the CNE is yet to be confirmed as two of its 5 members board are currently being replaced. Any gerrymandering announcement will have to wait for whenever the CNE decides it. The opposition is paralyzed while Chavez campaign since all of his candidates will depend on him anyway, no matter how late the CNE redraws the political districts.
Thus the more benefit to nominate quickly a list of chosen folks while making clear that all the other candidates (about 130) will be named through some form of primary of poll. This way the opposition discussion table could focus and what needs to be decided by December, no matter what:
1) a methodology to establish primaries, a method easily adaptable to any gerrymandering the CNE does.
2) register as soon as possible eventual primary candidates so a preliminary campaign might allow to wean some the field
3) work with Sumate and ESDATA and such folks to decide which are the states where primaries are realistic and where primaries are an unnecessary luxury
You get the drift, it is really not that difficult.
In a next post I will provide examples on how these problems can be solved.
-The end-
The message: simple and short, no outrageous promises, the main point being to exert control over Chavez projects so those become more efficient; control somewhat rampant corruption and reverse some unpopular measures such as the radio closures, something that can be done with a law to reform CONATEL, just to give an example.
The electoral system: it is stacked in favor of Chavez but we must still run the gauntlet. After all the other option is uprising and as long as that uprising does not start from Catia and23 de Enero neighborhoods it will not succeed. True, it might just be a question of time but do we really want that bloodbath in addition to the weekly crime toll passing the Iraq numbers? The only thing we can do is to present good candidates and fill up the polling stations, ALL of them, with as many eyewitnesses we can get away with it.
And thus the third part of this series, how to file good candidates, and unique ones at that!
The obligation for unity
Although it is becoming tiring to repeat this, it must be done: the lack of unity among the opposition cost it the following last November (directly or indirectly, it does not matter)
- Bolivar state governor, one of the major states and a crucial one considering all the trade union battles taking place today there
- The mayors of at least three major cities: Valencia, Maracay, and Cumana
- Several other cities including the state capital of San Felipe
- The legislative assembly of the states of Carabobo and to a lesser extent Tachira and Bolivar
- The passing of some states to near or absolute chavista control, in particular Yaracuy where not a single town-hall could be saved.
The question I submit to you is: would have Chavez cruised so easily through his February referendum and all the totalitarian laws passed this year if all of these entities were today in the hands of the opposition?
We are ONLY starting to pay the price today for this lack of unity due to personal ambition and local vendettas, with two main culprits in my book, Primero Justicia and Proyecto Venezuela, though AD and UNT deserve quite a few stones too.
But it is not the time to allocate blame, not even to ask for apologies: all, from PODEMOS to minor groups on the right must pull together and find a way to avoid these internal battles. UNITY IS THE ONLY WAY WE CAN HAVE A CHANCE AT TAKING BACK THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND START REVERSING SOME OF THE DAMAGE TO THE COUNTRY MADE BY CHAVISMO. If anyone within the opposition does not understand that then s/he is stupid or sold out to Chavez. No way around.
How to manage the unity of the opposition?
I have already written extensively around that but as Rafael Poleo if found of quoting Gide, everything has already been said but since no one pays attention it needs to be repeated over and over.
The obstacles
They are many, ideological ones, past dalliances that come to haunt the different political actors, personal ambitions and what not. In normal times these are impossible to solve, but these are not normal time and for once it is fair to ask the prima donne to lower their ego at least for one single election.
The reality at ground zero
Political parties are a necessary evil. They are the only ones that can really organize the witness at the voting stations and who can sort of manage to campaign in chavista strongholds. If you are not member or sympathizer of a political party please share with us the last time you were campaigning in La Baldosera of Yaracuy or when you stayed until 3 AM waiting for the last vote to be counted in some polling center at Gramoven?
True, civil society can bring a substantial help but in all fairness we cannot expect the Student Movement and Sumate to solve all of our electoral problems. They working together with political parties and assorted ONG and civic group are the answer and all should drop their ego for a few months. There will always be plenty of time to settle accounts after the election.
Thus any system that does not ensure that all will be heard and that all will be granted at least a side chair will fail. That is why I think a wholesale primary is a sure way to sink the project: the sore losers will lose any motivation to help the winners. We are not in the US where the primary loser of yesterday has an excellent chance to become the primary winner of tomorrow. See McCain as the most recent example..... That is why primaries work in the US but why they are in-existent most places where the best we can hope is fair internal election for those who run the smoke filled room. Even in Venezuela where primaries have been tried on different guises we can observe a very mixed result at best. And the recent case of Aragua last year show us clearly that a primary, no matter how well Sumate organized it, is far from guaranteeing the necessary popular enthusiasm required to win the final vote.
But on the other hand we certainly cannot go back to a secret nomination horse trading process: the civil society is not willing anymore to accept it. Heck, even the PSUV where we know that no one gets the nod unless Chavez approves it still manages to make a farce of primary elections with the occasional surprise as the victory of Falcon in Lara in 2008. The "primary feeling" is strong among too many Venezuelans, even chavistas. We are going that way but we are not there yet, wishful thinking is just not going to cut it.
How can we thus tie these loose ends of reality and make it work?
PODEMOS as an example of the problem
I think we can illustrate the general problem examining the case of PODEMOS, stern ally of Chavez until RCTV was taken over. Then slowly but surely PODEMOS started leaving chavismo until finding themselves as a new opposition in December 2007.
Many people, including this blogger, have had a very hard time to accept PODEMOS, to stomach Ismael Garcia, one of the most repulsive Chavez supporters. And yet we must all recognize that singlehandedly he has done a lot to counter Chavez (with a couple of his colleagues and other tranfuges of chavismo). His atonement and his willingness to put up with abuse at the Nazional Assembly will be told some day a political epic. Can we do without Ismael in the next National Assembly? Can we do without his intimate knowledge of the adversary weaknesses that can be well exploited the day Chavez loses the majority?
It is not that Ismael is essential, but together with Molina and Pastora they are among the few people able to campaign in the barrios where they have a chance to be heard. Any nomination process that does not ensure that these three do not return for the National Assembly will increase the opposition handicap.
A solution?
There are 167 representatives, at least 3 per state. Thus the majority the opposition needs to get to be able to do anything is technically 84 seats. Let's take the 86 number to feel more comfortable about any potential of the new assembly. Thus we have 86 seats to spread around, seats that can be won with a normal turnout, a good campaign and the continuous degradation of the regime unable to solve any problem for quite a while (if ever, but that is another story). Any seat won above 86 is an added bonus, a lucky gain. We cannot worry about the nomination of these seats. The way candidates for these seats are nominated is of little importance. Let's put them on a primary system.
My proposal is that of these 86, a number between 23 to 30 should be "assigned" by a general agreement between political parties and the civil society main players (students? university deans? civil rights groups?). Those who receive the nod for those safe seats would be a mix of major political tenors and a few noted figures of the civil society, figures whose expertise and stamina is required in the next assembly. Why that 23 number? There are 23 states plus Caracas, thus 24 "electoral lists" with at least one safe seat on it except in some chavista stronghold like Amazonas or Cojedes.
What are the advantages of this list? First, they do not have to waste time, resources and energy to run for a primary. Second, they can be nominated as early as December. Third they can start running while the opposition keeps hammering the nomination process for the second list of seats, raising funds, working on a plank, whatever. The thing is that there would be two dozen official voices of the opposition replying to Chavez regularly as he is already campaigning hard and needs some one in front A.S.A.P.
There is an additional problem with organizing a long primary system: the CNE is yet to be confirmed as two of its 5 members board are currently being replaced. Any gerrymandering announcement will have to wait for whenever the CNE decides it. The opposition is paralyzed while Chavez campaign since all of his candidates will depend on him anyway, no matter how late the CNE redraws the political districts.
Thus the more benefit to nominate quickly a list of chosen folks while making clear that all the other candidates (about 130) will be named through some form of primary of poll. This way the opposition discussion table could focus and what needs to be decided by December, no matter what:
1) a methodology to establish primaries, a method easily adaptable to any gerrymandering the CNE does.
2) register as soon as possible eventual primary candidates so a preliminary campaign might allow to wean some the field
3) work with Sumate and ESDATA and such folks to decide which are the states where primaries are realistic and where primaries are an unnecessary luxury
You get the drift, it is really not that difficult.
In a next post I will provide examples on how these problems can be solved.
-The end-
Monday, October 12, 2009
The 2010 votes: legal cheating in a pro Chavez electoral system
Electoral systems tend to reflect the political culture of a country, though there is always the question of the chicken or the egg. Indeed, sometimes it is difficult to decide whether a political system has been shaped by its electoral system or by the cultural values of the people. If it is not the intention of this long post to be a description of world electoral systems it is still good to visit a few electoral principles to understand better what chavismo is trying to do in Venezuela.
The basic debate in any electoral system through history has been to decide if it was more important to ensure a stable governmental majority or a genuine representation of all the trends of a society. The two extremes are thus the "winner take all" of Anglo-Saxon countries or the absolute proportional representation of which Israel is the prime example today.
Electoral principles
In the anglo-saxon tradition of single circumscription, winner take all, the objective was always to create a clear parliamentarian majority. When the system works well, the representation of minorities is not necessarily a major issue as many mechanisms exist to temper the iron rule of winner take all, in addition to the risk that the winner does not dispose of 50% of the total expressed vote. For example the US has got around this by creating a strict separation of powers where the Supreme Court makes sure minorities get some form of protection from the abuse of the majority, and with the introduction of a wholesale primary system which allow the expression a many political currents within the main parties. As such the Dem and GOP can be seen as mere expression of a political coalition.
Another way to create diversity while still ensuring that a clear parliamentarian majority happens is the two round balloting systems such as the French one. In these systems the first round vote allows for the expression of diverse tendencies which reach an agreement among themselves to create a majority in the second round. In theory, you do not get a proportional representation, you may even get distortions as bad as the anglo-saxon system but due to alliances necessary for the second round vote every political party is guaranteed at least a spokesperson in parliament.
On the other side we have the belief that expression of all political tendencies of a country must appear in the parliament of that country. Today Israel offers an example of such system where people vote for a list and the list gets a certain number of representatives according to a direct correlation with the vote percentage they get. The basic weakness of these systems is that invariably they result in the dispersion of votes and as years pass it becomes increasingly difficult to create a stable governmental majority. Unless such systems evolve toward a presidential form of rule, they quickly risk to become paralyzed. That happened in post war Italy and more spectacularly in Wiemar Germany allowing Hitler to reach power without ever reaching an majority of the vote.
Post war Germany did not want to abandon the principle of proportional representation but did not want to go back to a paralyzed assembly and thus they invented what is in my opinion one of the best electoral system existing today. Half the chamber is elected on a winner take all system and half on a proportional system. Yet, that proportional list is limited at the federal level and in addition requires political parties to reach 5% of the vote. Thus, small but significant parties are ensured of a solid representation, but the winners are ensured of reaching a stable government provided they reach a political agreement to form a coalition. Historically in Germany since the war two parties have been enough to reach a stable majority. The beauty of the system is that it not only allows a significant proportional representation but it also maintains the major advantage of the anglo-saxon tradition, the direct contact between the representative and its circumscription voters, something missing in resolute proportional systems where people vote for lists, not for names.
The Venezuelan original choice
In 1958 Venezuela retained its strong presidential system, for better or for worse, and thus chose a proportional representation for its Congress thought to be more fair and more in tune with the contemporary Zeitgeist. Even the Senate, who by definition is an unfair system (consider that a California Senator has the same worth as a Delaware one), was elected in such ways that some Senators were not elected by state but according to how many votes did they party get. That is, if a party got zero Senator but 10% of the vote it would get at least one Senator. The House was elected on a strict proportional system but somewhat tempered by the fact that the states were the basic circumscriptions. In practice since a majority of states had less than a dozen representatives what happened is that you needed at least a 5% of the vote share to ensure that you would get a seat of two. Yet at the national level the House, like the Senate had some representatives elected according to the nation share of political parties. That way all would get at least a spokesperson.
The system served well a country without democratic tradition where the political class was asked to learn to debate according to rules, and not according to how many guns a given caudillo had. But by the late 70ies the system was already wearing down as it suffered from two factors: 1) increasing presidentialization and 2) lack of contact between the elector and its representative as this one hid behind the party who decided after all who would run. Eventually an important electoral reform was enacted, trying to get something a little bit more representative, along the German system model. As such it was decided that within each state about half would be elected according to districts within a circumscription.
To explain this reform I have imagined the following circumscription, which could represent a medium sized state like Bolivar or Anzoategui.
For clarity I have decided that this state has only 257 electors and that this population has not changed since the mid 90ies until today. The state elects 9 representatives. Thus 5 are elected in in three individual districts and 4 on an "at large" list that is supposed to be proportional. The quotient of previous vote was eliminated and as such it is quite clear that one objective pursued by that reform was to eliminate very small parties. In this imaginary circumscription it is clear that any party that gets less than 20% of the state vote risks highly not to get a single seat, depending on how those votes are spread.
Now the major flaw of this system was actually the district configuration. In a country where streets do not have a name and even less of a sequential numeration, urban areas are very difficult to split in individual districts. Thus district 2 is an urban district in our example and elects three, 3, representatives. Now, if each elector voted only once in district 2 it would not matter: people would just vote for one name in the list. The lists would be allocated their number of seats according to vote and those with the most vote within a list would be the elected folks. But that option was not selected: amazingly people are allowed to vote in a district as many times as there are representatives in that district. In this district 2, when you vote, you vote three times. Since in Venezuela there is a tendency to vote according party lines in overwhelmingly most circumstances the winning party carries ALL. That is, with 40% of the vote of district 2 you can carry 100% of the seats.
Supposedly this was solved when taking into account the list vote, that is, the representatives at large. The representative distribution in that "list vote" would depend on how many votes would elect on average a representative. That is, if you carry the 3 seats of district 2 you are much less likely to gain representatives from the at large district since your average vote per representative would drop to the benefit of those who did not get a single district vote. Below an example to understand this complexity (right hand click on image to enlarge in a different window).
Trying to simplify I have decided that there are only 6 political parties in this state, three pro Chavez and 3 NON- Chavez (not ANTI, just NON). Equally that the there are three parties for Chavez does not mean that they all engage easily in coalitions, as it was the case in this imaginary 2000 vote of the above figure.
District 1 and 3 are easily decided, the main pro Chavez party carries both seats. Note that district 3 is the most pro Chavez district, you will see the importance of this later.
District 2 got a majority for the non Chavez party 1. It gets the three seats. Note that this urban district is non Chavez majority anyway.
Now when we look at the list vote, that is representative at large, even if pro Chavez party should get 2 seats it only gets one because its average drop (note, there are different ways to calculate that "average" and that can affect the final repartition but I am trying to keep it simple here). As for non Chavez 1, it gets zero seats becasue it already got 3 seats in district 2. Its representative average is just not high enough. This system allows for 3 minor parties to get the seats they were not allowed to get on the "winner take all" of the district vote.
Now, look the columns on the right and you will see that the system is still reasonably fair. If as expected the vote list is slighly different than the district vote (personal character there affects the outcome), the overall percentage of the vote is generally reflected in the seat percentage (last column on the right).
We can thus say that the 1998 and 2000 voting system was still considering minority representation though it squeezed out the very minor parties, parties that until the early 90ies were guaranteed at least one spokesperson in Congress (for those old enough, remember Borregales?).
The first electoral cheating
In the 2000 vote the governor of Yaracuy found the first flaw of this system and used it to obtain 100% of Yaracuy representation even though he got only slightly more than 50% of the vote. This was very simple, run the districts with one party name and the vote list with another party name, the famous "morochas" (twins). That way the list vote is not punished by the success of the district vote since apparently we are dealing with two "different" parties.
In the example below I use the same numbers as above except that I assume that chavismo used the morochas system. Pro Chavez 2 and 3 form a coalition, 2 running only in the district and 3 on the list alone. I assume for effect that pro Chavez 1 does not participate in that coalition.
The non Chavez parties obtain the same number of votes as above but there is some difference in the pro Chavez vote becasue we can assume that some disgruntled voters did not follow the electoral consigns and voted for pro Chavez 1 in protest. Yet the result leaves no doubt: with the exact overall number of votes the pro Chavez folks get 7 representatives, 78% of them while their list share was ONLY 44%. The injustice is quite clear! A party that got 30% of the vote only gets now 10% of the representatives. In fact, depending on how you calculate the "average" non chavez 3 seat could end up with pro Chavez 3!
This morochas system as applied fully by chavismo in 2005 though the withdrawal of the opposition made the point moot. However, had the opposition run anyway, in 2005 it would have gotten at least 40% of the vote but probably no more than 20% of the seats, even with its own morochas.
The new ways to cheat
The new electoral law that was voted a few months ago was designed to create a built in advantage for chavismo. This one has realized that once the "morochas" system is applied by all parties in Venezuela it becomes in all practical aspect an anglo saxon system, a winner takes all system. The threat here is that the opposition could win an overwhelming legislative victory with say barely 55% of the popular vote. That is also true for chavismo but we already saw what happened when they got 100% of the Nazional Assembly.
Thus the new system made legal the "morocha" system but in addition allowed the gerrymandering of the districts by the electoral board, CNE, as it pleases. Until now, districts had to follow historical lines around the political divisions of counties and parishes. In the new system the CNE is allowed to break down parishes and counties to create electoral districts at will, and AS LARGE as it wants to create them instead of the tendency to evolve to single representative district. In other words Chavez wants large districts because as it was the case before the elected representatives depend more on the party (PSUV/Chavez) rather than any direct contact with the inhabitants of the district. Not to mention of course that the multiple voting favors the winning side, something that chavismo hopes to be no matter what.
In the example below I speculate on the following changes, based on the new electoral law:
1) less voting at large thus less possibility of minority representation: only 3 list representatives instead of 4
2) district 1, weakly chavista loses some voting centers that are anti Chavez to be added to a new district 2 that includes the most anti Chavez areas.
3) district 2 includes thus the areas most likely to vote against Chavez and becomes the district with the most electoral votes per representative.
4) district 3 has now three representatives with a weak but solid pro Chavez tendency.
In this new system, even though the two political groups get about the same vote share as above, chavismo still retains 6 out of 9 seats, thus annulling the possible advantage of the opposition now using the "morochas" system. All courtesy of old fashioned gerrymandering now legal in Venezuela.
For my last graph I use the same table as above but this time I change the total votes to favor the non Chavez option. That is I assume a slow decrease in popular for chavista parties support due to ten years in office and unfulfilled promises.
Now the opposition wins clearly but yet in spite of its unity, in spite of beating chavismo by 4 points, chavismo STILL gets 5 out of 9 seats!!!!!
Note: the morochas "coalition" allows for a repartition of seats to all groups which is why for example non Chavez 2 and 3 get each one seat even if Chavez 3 does not figure on the ballot. On the other hand, because chavismo lost the overall vote, pro Chavez 1 loses the seat it was getting when chavismo still was winning the vote.
By tweaking the vote totals a little bit more one could reach a 55 to 45 in favor of the opposition and yet still a chavista victory 5 to 4! All depending on how effective gerrymandering was, and how the political pressure targeted to some districts worked. For example in Zulia chavismo could give up altogether the Maracaibo districts and focus strictly on the oil areas, blackmail and all and carry them barely obtaining thus more seats than what it deserved in Zulia.
Comments
First, do not be surprised of such Manichean electoral system of multiple seats districts: in the US South such systems were routinely used to avoid African American to elect representatives, that is, districts were carved where more than one representative was elected, just as in Venezuela. Thus 60% of whites got 100% of seats.
Second, for all of its imperfections, the original system which I described at first allowed for Chavez to be elected and to gain a 2/3 majority in 2000 in the National Assembly with not even 60% of the vote. Now, it is not clear whether with 55% of the vote a united opposition would get a simple majority in the assembly.
Third, let's not forget the other electoral fraud already in use by chavismo, such as the shameless use of state property for the PSUV campaign. The system is pretty much sealed for chavismo, the more so as freedom of expression and information are under serious threat.
In other words, from what I have described here it should be crystal clear that the only way the opposition can win is:
- unique candidatures in EVERY district
- coordinated and focused campaigns
- civil society massive participation to compensate the abject state abuse
- presence at EVERY polling stations as gerrymandering makes a few dozens votes "added" critical enough to decide a single seat
not forgetting the notion that we need probably 55% of the vote to get a bare majority in the new parliament.
Now let's wait for the next posts to discuss ways we could reach at least an united front and how we can try to get more citizen involvement.
Conclusion
If electoral systems are a representation of the democratic nature of the people of a country we can say that in Venezuela the new electoral system does not reflect anymore the democratic and representative ideals of 1958 where diversity was sought and as much consensus as possible a goal. In the parliaments of the preceding decades even if two political parties on occasion represented up to 85% of the seats there was always room for small parties to have their voices heard without having to subject themselves to undesirable alliances. The system albeit not a perfect one allowed outsiders to be a voting surprise (see CCN in 1963, MEP in 1968, Causa R in 1993 or Chavez in 1998).
The main flaw of the old system, namely the lack of direct contact between the voter and its representative, a contact that was established only though political parties, was beginning to be addressed as specific constituencies began to be drawn.
But today the modified electoral law allows for the pernicious return of the political party rule since only through the strength of a strong party, or its leader as is the case of the PSUV, will someone be allowed to run for office and be elected eventually. As such the current electoral law is not even a return to the past as it is a less democratic system than the 1958 original election rules. Minority parties cannot elect representative on their own anymore, and to be elected you need to be anointed by a large group.
We are now into a plebiscite regime where the only thing that matters is the link between the leader and the masses and where it is becoming increasingly difficult for small groups to emerge as viable alternatives: they must lose some of their originality, a loss that even the use of primaries as a nomination system will not be enough to maintain.
From now on elections will be between two groups, in much harsher terms than the Anglo-Saxon systems since the link between the voter and its representative has all but been erased. "winner take all" with a vengeance!
The new system forces all parties to align themselves into two camps with two single messages, two camps where internal dissent must be muted and reserved for a post electoral moment. The winner of such an unfair and undemocratic system will in addition get an unfair share of the seats. Venezuelans still "vote" but their votes are becoming increasingly meaningless.
How can the Venezuelan opposition in its diversity can manage to create a single front?
-The end-
The basic debate in any electoral system through history has been to decide if it was more important to ensure a stable governmental majority or a genuine representation of all the trends of a society. The two extremes are thus the "winner take all" of Anglo-Saxon countries or the absolute proportional representation of which Israel is the prime example today.
Electoral principles
In the anglo-saxon tradition of single circumscription, winner take all, the objective was always to create a clear parliamentarian majority. When the system works well, the representation of minorities is not necessarily a major issue as many mechanisms exist to temper the iron rule of winner take all, in addition to the risk that the winner does not dispose of 50% of the total expressed vote. For example the US has got around this by creating a strict separation of powers where the Supreme Court makes sure minorities get some form of protection from the abuse of the majority, and with the introduction of a wholesale primary system which allow the expression a many political currents within the main parties. As such the Dem and GOP can be seen as mere expression of a political coalition.
Another way to create diversity while still ensuring that a clear parliamentarian majority happens is the two round balloting systems such as the French one. In these systems the first round vote allows for the expression of diverse tendencies which reach an agreement among themselves to create a majority in the second round. In theory, you do not get a proportional representation, you may even get distortions as bad as the anglo-saxon system but due to alliances necessary for the second round vote every political party is guaranteed at least a spokesperson in parliament.
On the other side we have the belief that expression of all political tendencies of a country must appear in the parliament of that country. Today Israel offers an example of such system where people vote for a list and the list gets a certain number of representatives according to a direct correlation with the vote percentage they get. The basic weakness of these systems is that invariably they result in the dispersion of votes and as years pass it becomes increasingly difficult to create a stable governmental majority. Unless such systems evolve toward a presidential form of rule, they quickly risk to become paralyzed. That happened in post war Italy and more spectacularly in Wiemar Germany allowing Hitler to reach power without ever reaching an majority of the vote.
Post war Germany did not want to abandon the principle of proportional representation but did not want to go back to a paralyzed assembly and thus they invented what is in my opinion one of the best electoral system existing today. Half the chamber is elected on a winner take all system and half on a proportional system. Yet, that proportional list is limited at the federal level and in addition requires political parties to reach 5% of the vote. Thus, small but significant parties are ensured of a solid representation, but the winners are ensured of reaching a stable government provided they reach a political agreement to form a coalition. Historically in Germany since the war two parties have been enough to reach a stable majority. The beauty of the system is that it not only allows a significant proportional representation but it also maintains the major advantage of the anglo-saxon tradition, the direct contact between the representative and its circumscription voters, something missing in resolute proportional systems where people vote for lists, not for names.
The Venezuelan original choice
In 1958 Venezuela retained its strong presidential system, for better or for worse, and thus chose a proportional representation for its Congress thought to be more fair and more in tune with the contemporary Zeitgeist. Even the Senate, who by definition is an unfair system (consider that a California Senator has the same worth as a Delaware one), was elected in such ways that some Senators were not elected by state but according to how many votes did they party get. That is, if a party got zero Senator but 10% of the vote it would get at least one Senator. The House was elected on a strict proportional system but somewhat tempered by the fact that the states were the basic circumscriptions. In practice since a majority of states had less than a dozen representatives what happened is that you needed at least a 5% of the vote share to ensure that you would get a seat of two. Yet at the national level the House, like the Senate had some representatives elected according to the nation share of political parties. That way all would get at least a spokesperson.
The system served well a country without democratic tradition where the political class was asked to learn to debate according to rules, and not according to how many guns a given caudillo had. But by the late 70ies the system was already wearing down as it suffered from two factors: 1) increasing presidentialization and 2) lack of contact between the elector and its representative as this one hid behind the party who decided after all who would run. Eventually an important electoral reform was enacted, trying to get something a little bit more representative, along the German system model. As such it was decided that within each state about half would be elected according to districts within a circumscription.
To explain this reform I have imagined the following circumscription, which could represent a medium sized state like Bolivar or Anzoategui.
For clarity I have decided that this state has only 257 electors and that this population has not changed since the mid 90ies until today. The state elects 9 representatives. Thus 5 are elected in in three individual districts and 4 on an "at large" list that is supposed to be proportional. The quotient of previous vote was eliminated and as such it is quite clear that one objective pursued by that reform was to eliminate very small parties. In this imaginary circumscription it is clear that any party that gets less than 20% of the state vote risks highly not to get a single seat, depending on how those votes are spread.
Now the major flaw of this system was actually the district configuration. In a country where streets do not have a name and even less of a sequential numeration, urban areas are very difficult to split in individual districts. Thus district 2 is an urban district in our example and elects three, 3, representatives. Now, if each elector voted only once in district 2 it would not matter: people would just vote for one name in the list. The lists would be allocated their number of seats according to vote and those with the most vote within a list would be the elected folks. But that option was not selected: amazingly people are allowed to vote in a district as many times as there are representatives in that district. In this district 2, when you vote, you vote three times. Since in Venezuela there is a tendency to vote according party lines in overwhelmingly most circumstances the winning party carries ALL. That is, with 40% of the vote of district 2 you can carry 100% of the seats.
Supposedly this was solved when taking into account the list vote, that is, the representatives at large. The representative distribution in that "list vote" would depend on how many votes would elect on average a representative. That is, if you carry the 3 seats of district 2 you are much less likely to gain representatives from the at large district since your average vote per representative would drop to the benefit of those who did not get a single district vote. Below an example to understand this complexity (right hand click on image to enlarge in a different window).
Trying to simplify I have decided that there are only 6 political parties in this state, three pro Chavez and 3 NON- Chavez (not ANTI, just NON). Equally that the there are three parties for Chavez does not mean that they all engage easily in coalitions, as it was the case in this imaginary 2000 vote of the above figure.District 1 and 3 are easily decided, the main pro Chavez party carries both seats. Note that district 3 is the most pro Chavez district, you will see the importance of this later.
District 2 got a majority for the non Chavez party 1. It gets the three seats. Note that this urban district is non Chavez majority anyway.
Now when we look at the list vote, that is representative at large, even if pro Chavez party should get 2 seats it only gets one because its average drop (note, there are different ways to calculate that "average" and that can affect the final repartition but I am trying to keep it simple here). As for non Chavez 1, it gets zero seats becasue it already got 3 seats in district 2. Its representative average is just not high enough. This system allows for 3 minor parties to get the seats they were not allowed to get on the "winner take all" of the district vote.
Now, look the columns on the right and you will see that the system is still reasonably fair. If as expected the vote list is slighly different than the district vote (personal character there affects the outcome), the overall percentage of the vote is generally reflected in the seat percentage (last column on the right).
We can thus say that the 1998 and 2000 voting system was still considering minority representation though it squeezed out the very minor parties, parties that until the early 90ies were guaranteed at least one spokesperson in Congress (for those old enough, remember Borregales?).
The first electoral cheating
In the 2000 vote the governor of Yaracuy found the first flaw of this system and used it to obtain 100% of Yaracuy representation even though he got only slightly more than 50% of the vote. This was very simple, run the districts with one party name and the vote list with another party name, the famous "morochas" (twins). That way the list vote is not punished by the success of the district vote since apparently we are dealing with two "different" parties.
In the example below I use the same numbers as above except that I assume that chavismo used the morochas system. Pro Chavez 2 and 3 form a coalition, 2 running only in the district and 3 on the list alone. I assume for effect that pro Chavez 1 does not participate in that coalition.
The non Chavez parties obtain the same number of votes as above but there is some difference in the pro Chavez vote becasue we can assume that some disgruntled voters did not follow the electoral consigns and voted for pro Chavez 1 in protest. Yet the result leaves no doubt: with the exact overall number of votes the pro Chavez folks get 7 representatives, 78% of them while their list share was ONLY 44%. The injustice is quite clear! A party that got 30% of the vote only gets now 10% of the representatives. In fact, depending on how you calculate the "average" non chavez 3 seat could end up with pro Chavez 3!This morochas system as applied fully by chavismo in 2005 though the withdrawal of the opposition made the point moot. However, had the opposition run anyway, in 2005 it would have gotten at least 40% of the vote but probably no more than 20% of the seats, even with its own morochas.
The new ways to cheat
The new electoral law that was voted a few months ago was designed to create a built in advantage for chavismo. This one has realized that once the "morochas" system is applied by all parties in Venezuela it becomes in all practical aspect an anglo saxon system, a winner takes all system. The threat here is that the opposition could win an overwhelming legislative victory with say barely 55% of the popular vote. That is also true for chavismo but we already saw what happened when they got 100% of the Nazional Assembly.
Thus the new system made legal the "morocha" system but in addition allowed the gerrymandering of the districts by the electoral board, CNE, as it pleases. Until now, districts had to follow historical lines around the political divisions of counties and parishes. In the new system the CNE is allowed to break down parishes and counties to create electoral districts at will, and AS LARGE as it wants to create them instead of the tendency to evolve to single representative district. In other words Chavez wants large districts because as it was the case before the elected representatives depend more on the party (PSUV/Chavez) rather than any direct contact with the inhabitants of the district. Not to mention of course that the multiple voting favors the winning side, something that chavismo hopes to be no matter what.
In the example below I speculate on the following changes, based on the new electoral law:
1) less voting at large thus less possibility of minority representation: only 3 list representatives instead of 4
2) district 1, weakly chavista loses some voting centers that are anti Chavez to be added to a new district 2 that includes the most anti Chavez areas.
3) district 2 includes thus the areas most likely to vote against Chavez and becomes the district with the most electoral votes per representative.
4) district 3 has now three representatives with a weak but solid pro Chavez tendency.
In this new system, even though the two political groups get about the same vote share as above, chavismo still retains 6 out of 9 seats, thus annulling the possible advantage of the opposition now using the "morochas" system. All courtesy of old fashioned gerrymandering now legal in Venezuela.For my last graph I use the same table as above but this time I change the total votes to favor the non Chavez option. That is I assume a slow decrease in popular for chavista parties support due to ten years in office and unfulfilled promises.
Now the opposition wins clearly but yet in spite of its unity, in spite of beating chavismo by 4 points, chavismo STILL gets 5 out of 9 seats!!!!!Note: the morochas "coalition" allows for a repartition of seats to all groups which is why for example non Chavez 2 and 3 get each one seat even if Chavez 3 does not figure on the ballot. On the other hand, because chavismo lost the overall vote, pro Chavez 1 loses the seat it was getting when chavismo still was winning the vote.
By tweaking the vote totals a little bit more one could reach a 55 to 45 in favor of the opposition and yet still a chavista victory 5 to 4! All depending on how effective gerrymandering was, and how the political pressure targeted to some districts worked. For example in Zulia chavismo could give up altogether the Maracaibo districts and focus strictly on the oil areas, blackmail and all and carry them barely obtaining thus more seats than what it deserved in Zulia.
Comments
First, do not be surprised of such Manichean electoral system of multiple seats districts: in the US South such systems were routinely used to avoid African American to elect representatives, that is, districts were carved where more than one representative was elected, just as in Venezuela. Thus 60% of whites got 100% of seats.
Second, for all of its imperfections, the original system which I described at first allowed for Chavez to be elected and to gain a 2/3 majority in 2000 in the National Assembly with not even 60% of the vote. Now, it is not clear whether with 55% of the vote a united opposition would get a simple majority in the assembly.
Third, let's not forget the other electoral fraud already in use by chavismo, such as the shameless use of state property for the PSUV campaign. The system is pretty much sealed for chavismo, the more so as freedom of expression and information are under serious threat.
In other words, from what I have described here it should be crystal clear that the only way the opposition can win is:
- unique candidatures in EVERY district
- coordinated and focused campaigns
- civil society massive participation to compensate the abject state abuse
- presence at EVERY polling stations as gerrymandering makes a few dozens votes "added" critical enough to decide a single seat
not forgetting the notion that we need probably 55% of the vote to get a bare majority in the new parliament.
Now let's wait for the next posts to discuss ways we could reach at least an united front and how we can try to get more citizen involvement.
Conclusion
If electoral systems are a representation of the democratic nature of the people of a country we can say that in Venezuela the new electoral system does not reflect anymore the democratic and representative ideals of 1958 where diversity was sought and as much consensus as possible a goal. In the parliaments of the preceding decades even if two political parties on occasion represented up to 85% of the seats there was always room for small parties to have their voices heard without having to subject themselves to undesirable alliances. The system albeit not a perfect one allowed outsiders to be a voting surprise (see CCN in 1963, MEP in 1968, Causa R in 1993 or Chavez in 1998).
The main flaw of the old system, namely the lack of direct contact between the voter and its representative, a contact that was established only though political parties, was beginning to be addressed as specific constituencies began to be drawn.
But today the modified electoral law allows for the pernicious return of the political party rule since only through the strength of a strong party, or its leader as is the case of the PSUV, will someone be allowed to run for office and be elected eventually. As such the current electoral law is not even a return to the past as it is a less democratic system than the 1958 original election rules. Minority parties cannot elect representative on their own anymore, and to be elected you need to be anointed by a large group.
We are now into a plebiscite regime where the only thing that matters is the link between the leader and the masses and where it is becoming increasingly difficult for small groups to emerge as viable alternatives: they must lose some of their originality, a loss that even the use of primaries as a nomination system will not be enough to maintain.
From now on elections will be between two groups, in much harsher terms than the Anglo-Saxon systems since the link between the voter and its representative has all but been erased. "winner take all" with a vengeance!
The new system forces all parties to align themselves into two camps with two single messages, two camps where internal dissent must be muted and reserved for a post electoral moment. The winner of such an unfair and undemocratic system will in addition get an unfair share of the seats. Venezuelans still "vote" but their votes are becoming increasingly meaningless.
How can the Venezuelan opposition in its diversity can manage to create a single front?
-The end-
Sunday, October 11, 2009
Young Zelaya
My mail box brings me strange things. I have no idea whether the picture of a young Zelaya below is real or not, but based on his career these past few months, as Italians say, "si non e vero, e ben trovato", or the US, "too good to be true". In other words if this picture is true (and that should not be too difficult to establish), and does not correspond to a tawdry Halloween scene, then the case is close and Zelaya should be swept away to the trash bin of history, now.
You may click to enlarge if you can stomach it.
-The end-
You may click to enlarge if you can stomach it.-The end-
Friday, October 09, 2009
Barack Obama versus Piedad Cordoba
I think the Norwegian parliament has made one of its worst political grant ever by giving president Barack Obama the Peace Prize this year. In fact, it is so bad that they might wreck his chances at bringing peace in his multiple endeavors as bitter rivals and envious nuts will go out of their way to sabotage Obama for the next three years. If I were Obama I would seriously consider refusing the prize.
Why, oh why?
The only "sensible" explanation that immediately came to my mind upon reading the news is that the Norwegian committee (it is not the Swedes who give the Peace Prize) hated so much Bush and his policies that they exacted revenge by awarding the prize to Obama. Thus giving a new meaning to pettiness.
There is a precedent, two sitting US presidents have already won the prize, Wilson and Teddy Roosevelt. But both of them had significant achievements with them, Obama none. I truly do not want to disparage president Obama, he simply has had no time to get an "achievement" yet, the world does not work that way. And in all the initiatives that he has undertaken if a third of them work out he will be richly deserving of the Peace Prize, say, in his second term. By giving him the prize right now the Oslo folks are in fact probably sabotaging Obama potential success, ruining the very "hope" that they use as an excuse to give him the prize. Or does anyone think for a second that the Noble Peace Prize will help Obama in front of Chavez? Iran? North Korea? Pleaseeeee.... Far from it! The reverse is true! How can Oslo be so clueless, stupid!?
I am actually sorry for President Obama, not to mention that he cannot cash his prize and will be forced to give it away to some charity or foundation as he cannot even wait 3 or 7 years to enjoy it. Heck, the IRS might even tax him on that anyway!!!! I suspect that he is smart enough that he realizes that overall this prize is not going to help him, is not going to repair US image in the world except in the mind of some European people that will love Obama, prize or not.
But I suppose I should be happy that Obama got it because according to chavista sycophancy the leading candidate was Piedad Cordoba of Colombia, you know, the woman with the eternal turban who cavorts in the jungles of Colombia with the FARC and who is a regular visitor to Chavez in Caracas. A woman so controversial, so sectarian that she is even accused of treason in Colombia. Giving her the prize would have been terrible for us in the area, though I doubt it would have been enough to make her win the Colombia next presidential election.
So you see, the Peace Committee could have done worse than Obama. We should never underestimate the screw up potential of the best intentioned people.
-The end-
Why, oh why?
The only "sensible" explanation that immediately came to my mind upon reading the news is that the Norwegian committee (it is not the Swedes who give the Peace Prize) hated so much Bush and his policies that they exacted revenge by awarding the prize to Obama. Thus giving a new meaning to pettiness.
There is a precedent, two sitting US presidents have already won the prize, Wilson and Teddy Roosevelt. But both of them had significant achievements with them, Obama none. I truly do not want to disparage president Obama, he simply has had no time to get an "achievement" yet, the world does not work that way. And in all the initiatives that he has undertaken if a third of them work out he will be richly deserving of the Peace Prize, say, in his second term. By giving him the prize right now the Oslo folks are in fact probably sabotaging Obama potential success, ruining the very "hope" that they use as an excuse to give him the prize. Or does anyone think for a second that the Noble Peace Prize will help Obama in front of Chavez? Iran? North Korea? Pleaseeeee.... Far from it! The reverse is true! How can Oslo be so clueless, stupid!?
I am actually sorry for President Obama, not to mention that he cannot cash his prize and will be forced to give it away to some charity or foundation as he cannot even wait 3 or 7 years to enjoy it. Heck, the IRS might even tax him on that anyway!!!! I suspect that he is smart enough that he realizes that overall this prize is not going to help him, is not going to repair US image in the world except in the mind of some European people that will love Obama, prize or not.
But I suppose I should be happy that Obama got it because according to chavista sycophancy the leading candidate was Piedad Cordoba of Colombia, you know, the woman with the eternal turban who cavorts in the jungles of Colombia with the FARC and who is a regular visitor to Chavez in Caracas. A woman so controversial, so sectarian that she is even accused of treason in Colombia. Giving her the prize would have been terrible for us in the area, though I doubt it would have been enough to make her win the Colombia next presidential election.
So you see, the Peace Committee could have done worse than Obama. We should never underestimate the screw up potential of the best intentioned people.
-The end-
The 2010 Venezuelan votes: the messages
Before starting an electoral contest usually political parties try to put together a message to attract voters. With at least two general elections coming next year, this should not be the exception in Venezuela. In fact, chavismo has already started campaigning hard even though there is not a single candidate named yet. But it does not matter, they all ride on Chavez's coat tails anyway and since it has sort of worked for the last ten years, why not not repeat the formula? If people have been willing to vote for zillions of promises and very few achievements chavismo has all the right to think that it will work once again. They know very well the cattle they herd ("conocen su ganado" as we say in Venezuela).
Tonight we had yet another cadena illustrating this point, following already the Sunday cadena of nearly 6 hours. Brace yourself, we are in for a cadena almost every day for the next few months. Both forced nation wide broadcast had only one objective: put up a show to try to cover up what has become an obvious failure: the famous Mision Barrio Adentro which has proven to be unsustainable. What Chavez is doing is simply promise that it will all be fixed, by 2019 there will not be any poor left in Venezuela (I kid you not) and watch out, we are bringing back the Cubans; without of course bothering to explain how come the Cubans left and why were they not replaced with Venezuelan medics. But when you run inconceivable populist campaigns you do not pay attention to the details.
Opposition delays
If chavismo is right and ready, not bothering with subtleties whatsoever, the opposition is yet to emit a peep-squeek of an electoral offer. And yet, paradoxically obtaining an electoral message for the opposition should be the simplest of matters and yet it seems that it is slowing down everything. Why?
First the opposition has placed itself in front of an unnecessary dilemma. Apparently the clearly expressed wishes of unity from the electorate are interpreted by politicians as the need to create an united government plank, thus missing totally the whole point of the coming elections.
Second, the wishes to nitpick everything and the belief that the election is all but won make a few leaders among the opposition already think about the next presidential election.
As far as I am concerned, the elections are already lost unless by late December the political opposition has come up with a sensible plan and at least a strategy to nominate unity candidates. And yet, Chavez will have already been campaigning for three months and the opposition nothing yet, making it a much harder uphill battle than what it should have been. I let you imagine the polls by January first...
A simple platform
There is no reason why we should be at such dire point so early in the campaign. So I am going to help the opposition out, knowing full well that no one in the leadership will read it and that even if they were to read it their arrogance will blind them anyway. But I have to do my duty. Heck! I might even translate this and start my own Spanish language blog....
Let's start by the basics: what are we electing. Let's forget about the municipal council elections, the message is mostly local and the real problem there is a way to generate unity candidates that will run on local issues platform. So, we just need to focus on the message for the Nazional Assembly election.
The constitution of Venezuela is quite clear, the national Assembly is not the one that runs the country. It proposes laws that will hep the executive run the country, it will receive law proposals from the executive to examine and it will exert control functions on how the executive spends tax money. There are other items but for an election purpose those are the ones that count, there is no need to even bother about the other ones except perhaps hinting at some constitutional reform to guarantee for example a better decentralization of the country.
In other words the message should be quite clear:
How to design the platform
In short the opposition needs to bother only about an electoral plank of things that can be done of common agreement among ALL parties to control the regime, restore democracy and decentralize the country, forcing chavista local officials to work on their own without the protection of Chavez. All the rest not only is superfluous but I would go as far as proposing that it should be left at the free conscience of each political party. For example if PODEMOS wishes to negotiate different social programs with chavismo because together they represent a majority of seats, then so be it, PODEMOS should be allowed to do so as long as they respect the basic agreement. If PODEMOS and AD decide to join PSUV to reorganize the high court, so be it, PJ should just seat on the side realizing that it can only be an improvement from he present TSJ.
In other words the less conditions the platform has, the better the message can pass, the more solid the unity will be. Starting to discuss rebuilding the country and other such nincompooperies is not only counterproductive but stupid: as long as Chavez is in Miraflores the only thing you can hope is to control him better, force him to waste less and wait for 2012 and beat him at elections. Let's not forget that Chavez will have important weapons such as new constitutional amendments, and even the power to dissolve the new Assembly if necessary by creating a crisis.
Now, how difficult can it be for the opposition to come up with a simple, short, clear, limited proposal? This is what I would propose in no particular order:
- exert the financial control of the National Assembly to limit corruption.
- stop credits for foreign countries unless duly consulted with the National Assembly. This include the ALBA. Venezuelan money should be spent first on Venezuela.
- reestablish the constitutional quota of oil money that go directly to the local governments.
- vote laws to return responsibilities to local officials along with more funds, creating a system that allows for all states to be treated as equal.
- modify laws that have diminished the freedom of the people, in particular those that bring censorship, that bring unjust judicial proceedings, etc....
- force the government to spend more on jails, on police, etc., returning part of the security apparatus to the governors who wish to exert their responsibility there.
- increase democracy and popular participation:
$$ reformulate the heath system plan and pension system to force the government to fulfill its promises yet to be accomplished (even if Chavez votes in a hurry some law to that effect you can claim that as a success). Offer for example that local referenda will decide whether the people want their governor to manage the local hospitals instead of the central government.
$$ offer local referenda as to whether people want their mayors/governors to manage their public schools instead of the central government.
$ guarantee constitutional provisions to name judges
$ organize consejos comunales to fight corruption
- defend small and medium property, giving property rights to everyone in "ranchos". Include those who got only "permits" from Chavez land seizures (there will always be time to compensate folks later).
- guarantee freedom of association and work by voting laws that limit governmental abuse in trade union elections.
- give freedom to individual opposition parties to negotiate with the government items that are not included in the platform, as long as they respect that electoral platform
And what SHOULD not be included:
- mention of controlling the army (way to early and too difficult to do considering how corrupt the army has become).
- reversing any social program: they are all accepted, we are just going to make sure they work the way they should work, you approved them in 2006.
- constitutional amendments: people are sick of voting. Besides the constitution is so sick that it is way past amending. Simply state that you are willing to work with Chavez from the National Assembly but if it does not work out you reserve your options, such as constituent assembly.
In other words, an eventual victory of the opposition WILL generate conflict with Chavez. Announcing how the opposition would deal with such conflict is only a sign of weakness.
Conclusion
There! Was that so difficult? Serious people can put up together a simple program as the one described above in a matter of weeks, not even a month. It should fit in at most a dozen pages so it can be printed cheaply and distributed around. The language should be simple and directed to to sectors E and D (the chavista electoral bulk) since the other sectors already vote in their majority against Chavez. It could even take the gamble to add point blank as an introduction "that since we do not know how much money is left in the public coffers we abstain to offer material promises that we could not fulfill, and besides, that is the role of the government, not of the Assembly: we just make sure that Chavez fulfill his promises"
-The end-
Tonight we had yet another cadena illustrating this point, following already the Sunday cadena of nearly 6 hours. Brace yourself, we are in for a cadena almost every day for the next few months. Both forced nation wide broadcast had only one objective: put up a show to try to cover up what has become an obvious failure: the famous Mision Barrio Adentro which has proven to be unsustainable. What Chavez is doing is simply promise that it will all be fixed, by 2019 there will not be any poor left in Venezuela (I kid you not) and watch out, we are bringing back the Cubans; without of course bothering to explain how come the Cubans left and why were they not replaced with Venezuelan medics. But when you run inconceivable populist campaigns you do not pay attention to the details.
Opposition delays
If chavismo is right and ready, not bothering with subtleties whatsoever, the opposition is yet to emit a peep-squeek of an electoral offer. And yet, paradoxically obtaining an electoral message for the opposition should be the simplest of matters and yet it seems that it is slowing down everything. Why?
First the opposition has placed itself in front of an unnecessary dilemma. Apparently the clearly expressed wishes of unity from the electorate are interpreted by politicians as the need to create an united government plank, thus missing totally the whole point of the coming elections.
Second, the wishes to nitpick everything and the belief that the election is all but won make a few leaders among the opposition already think about the next presidential election.
As far as I am concerned, the elections are already lost unless by late December the political opposition has come up with a sensible plan and at least a strategy to nominate unity candidates. And yet, Chavez will have already been campaigning for three months and the opposition nothing yet, making it a much harder uphill battle than what it should have been. I let you imagine the polls by January first...
A simple platform
There is no reason why we should be at such dire point so early in the campaign. So I am going to help the opposition out, knowing full well that no one in the leadership will read it and that even if they were to read it their arrogance will blind them anyway. But I have to do my duty. Heck! I might even translate this and start my own Spanish language blog....
Let's start by the basics: what are we electing. Let's forget about the municipal council elections, the message is mostly local and the real problem there is a way to generate unity candidates that will run on local issues platform. So, we just need to focus on the message for the Nazional Assembly election.
The constitution of Venezuela is quite clear, the national Assembly is not the one that runs the country. It proposes laws that will hep the executive run the country, it will receive law proposals from the executive to examine and it will exert control functions on how the executive spends tax money. There are other items but for an election purpose those are the ones that count, there is no need to even bother about the other ones except perhaps hinting at some constitutional reform to guarantee for example a better decentralization of the country.
In other words the message should be quite clear:
We are going to let Chavez run the country as you wished for in 2006,
but we are going to control the government,
making sure that the monies reach the social services
and not the pocket of the corrupt governmental agents.
This is enough of a message, all the rest risks to be fanciful distraction that could even be dangerous to maintain opposition unity. For example, how can you bridge the divergence between left PODEMOS and more right wing groups that oppose, say, barrio adentro if you try to include in your platform new rules for barrio adentro? It is impossible! How can you bridge the judicial differences between AD and PJ if you want to include ways to nominate judges in the platform?but we are going to control the government,
making sure that the monies reach the social services
and not the pocket of the corrupt governmental agents.
How to design the platform
In short the opposition needs to bother only about an electoral plank of things that can be done of common agreement among ALL parties to control the regime, restore democracy and decentralize the country, forcing chavista local officials to work on their own without the protection of Chavez. All the rest not only is superfluous but I would go as far as proposing that it should be left at the free conscience of each political party. For example if PODEMOS wishes to negotiate different social programs with chavismo because together they represent a majority of seats, then so be it, PODEMOS should be allowed to do so as long as they respect the basic agreement. If PODEMOS and AD decide to join PSUV to reorganize the high court, so be it, PJ should just seat on the side realizing that it can only be an improvement from he present TSJ.
In other words the less conditions the platform has, the better the message can pass, the more solid the unity will be. Starting to discuss rebuilding the country and other such nincompooperies is not only counterproductive but stupid: as long as Chavez is in Miraflores the only thing you can hope is to control him better, force him to waste less and wait for 2012 and beat him at elections. Let's not forget that Chavez will have important weapons such as new constitutional amendments, and even the power to dissolve the new Assembly if necessary by creating a crisis.
Now, how difficult can it be for the opposition to come up with a simple, short, clear, limited proposal? This is what I would propose in no particular order:
- exert the financial control of the National Assembly to limit corruption.
- stop credits for foreign countries unless duly consulted with the National Assembly. This include the ALBA. Venezuelan money should be spent first on Venezuela.
- reestablish the constitutional quota of oil money that go directly to the local governments.
- vote laws to return responsibilities to local officials along with more funds, creating a system that allows for all states to be treated as equal.
- modify laws that have diminished the freedom of the people, in particular those that bring censorship, that bring unjust judicial proceedings, etc....
- force the government to spend more on jails, on police, etc., returning part of the security apparatus to the governors who wish to exert their responsibility there.
- increase democracy and popular participation:
$$ reformulate the heath system plan and pension system to force the government to fulfill its promises yet to be accomplished (even if Chavez votes in a hurry some law to that effect you can claim that as a success). Offer for example that local referenda will decide whether the people want their governor to manage the local hospitals instead of the central government.
$$ offer local referenda as to whether people want their mayors/governors to manage their public schools instead of the central government.
$ guarantee constitutional provisions to name judges
$ organize consejos comunales to fight corruption
- defend small and medium property, giving property rights to everyone in "ranchos". Include those who got only "permits" from Chavez land seizures (there will always be time to compensate folks later).
- guarantee freedom of association and work by voting laws that limit governmental abuse in trade union elections.
- give freedom to individual opposition parties to negotiate with the government items that are not included in the platform, as long as they respect that electoral platform
And what SHOULD not be included:
- mention of controlling the army (way to early and too difficult to do considering how corrupt the army has become).
- reversing any social program: they are all accepted, we are just going to make sure they work the way they should work, you approved them in 2006.
- constitutional amendments: people are sick of voting. Besides the constitution is so sick that it is way past amending. Simply state that you are willing to work with Chavez from the National Assembly but if it does not work out you reserve your options, such as constituent assembly.
In other words, an eventual victory of the opposition WILL generate conflict with Chavez. Announcing how the opposition would deal with such conflict is only a sign of weakness.
Conclusion
There! Was that so difficult? Serious people can put up together a simple program as the one described above in a matter of weeks, not even a month. It should fit in at most a dozen pages so it can be printed cheaply and distributed around. The language should be simple and directed to to sectors E and D (the chavista electoral bulk) since the other sectors already vote in their majority against Chavez. It could even take the gamble to add point blank as an introduction "that since we do not know how much money is left in the public coffers we abstain to offer material promises that we could not fulfill, and besides, that is the role of the government, not of the Assembly: we just make sure that Chavez fulfill his promises"
-The end-
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