Monday, October 12, 2009

The 2010 votes: legal cheating in a pro Chavez electoral system

Electoral systems tend to reflect the political culture of a country, though there is always the question of the chicken or the egg. Indeed, sometimes it is difficult to decide whether a political system has been shaped by its electoral system or by the cultural values of the people. If it is not the intention of this long post to be a description of world electoral systems it is still good to visit a few electoral principles to understand better what chavismo is trying to do in Venezuela.

The basic debate in any electoral system through history has been to decide if it was more important to ensure a stable governmental majority or a genuine representation of all the trends of a society. The two extremes are thus the "winner take all" of Anglo-Saxon countries or the absolute proportional representation of which Israel is the prime example today.

Electoral principles

In the anglo-saxon tradition of single circumscription, winner take all, the objective was always to create a clear parliamentarian majority. When the system works well, the representation of minorities is not necessarily a major issue as many mechanisms exist to temper the iron rule of winner take all, in addition to the risk that the winner does not dispose of 50% of the total expressed vote. For example the US has got around this by creating a strict separation of powers where the Supreme Court makes sure minorities get some form of protection from the abuse of the majority, and with the introduction of a wholesale primary system which allow the expression a many political currents within the main parties. As such the Dem and GOP can be seen as mere expression of a political coalition.

Another way to create diversity while still ensuring that a clear parliamentarian majority happens is the two round balloting systems such as the French one. In these systems the first round vote allows for the expression of diverse tendencies which reach an agreement among themselves to create a majority in the second round. In theory, you do not get a proportional representation, you may even get distortions as bad as the anglo-saxon system but due to alliances necessary for the second round vote every political party is guaranteed at least a spokesperson in parliament.

On the other side we have the belief that expression of all political tendencies of a country must appear in the parliament of that country. Today Israel offers an example of such system where people vote for a list and the list gets a certain number of representatives according to a direct correlation with the vote percentage they get. The basic weakness of these systems is that invariably they result in the dispersion of votes and as years pass it becomes increasingly difficult to create a stable governmental majority. Unless such systems evolve toward a presidential form of rule, they quickly risk to become paralyzed. That happened in post war Italy and more spectacularly in Wiemar Germany allowing Hitler to reach power without ever reaching an majority of the vote.

Post war Germany did not want to abandon the principle of proportional representation but did not want to go back to a paralyzed assembly and thus they invented what is in my opinion one of the best electoral system existing today. Half the chamber is elected on a winner take all system and half on a proportional system. Yet, that proportional list is limited at the federal level and in addition requires political parties to reach 5% of the vote. Thus, small but significant parties are ensured of a solid representation, but the winners are ensured of reaching a stable government provided they reach a political agreement to form a coalition. Historically in Germany since the war two parties have been enough to reach a stable majority. The beauty of the system is that it not only allows a significant proportional representation but it also maintains the major advantage of the anglo-saxon tradition, the direct contact between the representative and its circumscription voters, something missing in resolute proportional systems where people vote for lists, not for names.

The Venezuelan original choice

In 1958 Venezuela retained its strong presidential system, for better or for worse, and thus chose a proportional representation for its Congress thought to be more fair and more in tune with the contemporary Zeitgeist. Even the Senate, who by definition is an unfair system (consider that a California Senator has the same worth as a Delaware one), was elected in such ways that some Senators were not elected by state but according to how many votes did they party get. That is, if a party got zero Senator but 10% of the vote it would get at least one Senator. The House was elected on a strict proportional system but somewhat tempered by the fact that the states were the basic circumscriptions. In practice since a majority of states had less than a dozen representatives what happened is that you needed at least a 5% of the vote share to ensure that you would get a seat of two. Yet at the national level the House, like the Senate had some representatives elected according to the nation share of political parties. That way all would get at least a spokesperson.

The system served well a country without democratic tradition where the political class was asked to learn to debate according to rules, and not according to how many guns a given caudillo had. But by the late 70ies the system was already wearing down as it suffered from two factors: 1) increasing presidentialization and 2) lack of contact between the elector and its representative as this one hid behind the party who decided after all who would run. Eventually an important electoral reform was enacted, trying to get something a little bit more representative, along the German system model. As such it was decided that within each state about half would be elected according to districts within a circumscription.

To explain this reform I have imagined the following circumscription, which could represent a medium sized state like Bolivar or Anzoategui.



For clarity I have decided that this state has only 257 electors and that this population has not changed since the mid 90ies until today. The state elects 9 representatives. Thus 5 are elected in in three individual districts and 4 on an "at large" list that is supposed to be proportional. The quotient of previous vote was eliminated and as such it is quite clear that one objective pursued by that reform was to eliminate very small parties. In this imaginary circumscription it is clear that any party that gets less than 20% of the state vote risks highly not to get a single seat, depending on how those votes are spread.

Now the major flaw of this system was actually the district configuration. In a country where streets do not have a name and even less of a sequential numeration, urban areas are very difficult to split in individual districts. Thus district 2 is an urban district in our example and elects three, 3, representatives. Now, if each elector voted only once in district 2 it would not matter: people would just vote for one name in the list. The lists would be allocated their number of seats according to vote and those with the most vote within a list would be the elected folks. But that option was not selected: amazingly people are allowed to vote in a district as many times as there are representatives in that district. In this district 2, when you vote, you vote three times. Since in Venezuela there is a tendency to vote according party lines in overwhelmingly most circumstances the winning party carries ALL. That is, with 40% of the vote of district 2 you can carry 100% of the seats.

Supposedly this was solved when taking into account the list vote, that is, the representatives at large. The representative distribution in that "list vote" would depend on how many votes would elect on average a representative. That is, if you carry the 3 seats of district 2 you are much less likely to gain representatives from the at large district since your average vote per representative would drop to the benefit of those who did not get a single district vote. Below an example to understand this complexity (right hand click on image to enlarge in a different window).


Trying to simplify I have decided that there are only 6 political parties in this state, three pro Chavez and 3 NON- Chavez (not ANTI, just NON). Equally that the there are three parties for Chavez does not mean that they all engage easily in coalitions, as it was the case in this imaginary 2000 vote of the above figure.

District 1 and 3 are easily decided, the main pro Chavez party carries both seats. Note that district 3 is the most pro Chavez district, you will see the importance of this later.

District 2 got a majority for the non Chavez party 1. It gets the three seats. Note that this urban district is non Chavez majority anyway.

Now when we look at the list vote, that is representative at large, even if pro Chavez party should get 2 seats it only gets one because its average drop (note, there are different ways to calculate that "average" and that can affect the final repartition but I am trying to keep it simple here). As for non Chavez 1, it gets zero seats becasue it already got 3 seats in district 2. Its representative average is just not high enough. This system allows for 3 minor parties to get the seats they were not allowed to get on the "winner take all" of the district vote.

Now, look the columns on the right and you will see that the system is still reasonably fair. If as expected the vote list is slighly different than the district vote (personal character there affects the outcome), the overall percentage of the vote is generally reflected in the seat percentage (last column on the right).

We can thus say that the 1998 and 2000 voting system was still considering minority representation though it squeezed out the very minor parties, parties that until the early 90ies were guaranteed at least one spokesperson in Congress (for those old enough, remember Borregales?).

The first electoral cheating

In the 2000 vote the governor of Yaracuy found the first flaw of this system and used it to obtain 100% of Yaracuy representation even though he got only slightly more than 50% of the vote. This was very simple, run the districts with one party name and the vote list with another party name, the famous "morochas" (twins). That way the list vote is not punished by the success of the district vote since apparently we are dealing with two "different" parties.

In the example below I use the same numbers as above except that I assume that chavismo used the morochas system. Pro Chavez 2 and 3 form a coalition, 2 running only in the district and 3 on the list alone. I assume for effect that pro Chavez 1 does not participate in that coalition.


The non Chavez parties obtain the same number of votes as above but there is some difference in the pro Chavez vote becasue we can assume that some disgruntled voters did not follow the electoral consigns and voted for pro Chavez 1 in protest. Yet the result leaves no doubt: with the exact overall number of votes the pro Chavez folks get 7 representatives, 78% of them while their list share was ONLY 44%. The injustice is quite clear! A party that got 30% of the vote only gets now 10% of the representatives. In fact, depending on how you calculate the "average" non chavez 3 seat could end up with pro Chavez 3!

This morochas system as applied fully by chavismo in 2005 though the withdrawal of the opposition made the point moot. However, had the opposition run anyway, in 2005 it would have gotten at least 40% of the vote but probably no more than 20% of the seats, even with its own morochas.

The new ways to cheat


The new electoral law that was voted a few months ago was designed to create a built in advantage for chavismo. This one has realized that once the "morochas" system is applied by all parties in Venezuela it becomes in all practical aspect an anglo saxon system, a winner takes all system. The threat here is that the opposition could win an overwhelming legislative victory with say barely 55% of the popular vote. That is also true for chavismo but we already saw what happened when they got 100% of the Nazional Assembly.

Thus the new system made legal the "morocha" system but in addition allowed the gerrymandering of the districts by the electoral board, CNE, as it pleases. Until now, districts had to follow historical lines around the political divisions of counties and parishes. In the new system the CNE is allowed to break down parishes and counties to create electoral districts at will, and AS LARGE as it wants to create them instead of the tendency to evolve to single representative district. In other words Chavez wants large districts because as it was the case before the elected representatives depend more on the party (PSUV/Chavez) rather than any direct contact with the inhabitants of the district. Not to mention of course that the multiple voting favors the winning side, something that chavismo hopes to be no matter what.

In the example below I speculate on the following changes, based on the new electoral law:
1) less voting at large thus less possibility of minority representation: only 3 list representatives instead of 4
2) district 1, weakly chavista loses some voting centers that are anti Chavez to be added to a new district 2 that includes the most anti Chavez areas.
3) district 2 includes thus the areas most likely to vote against Chavez and becomes the district with the most electoral votes per representative.
4) district 3 has now three representatives with a weak but solid pro Chavez tendency.


In this new system, even though the two political groups get about the same vote share as above, chavismo still retains 6 out of 9 seats, thus annulling the possible advantage of the opposition now using the "morochas" system. All courtesy of old fashioned gerrymandering now legal in Venezuela.

For my last graph I use the same table as above but this time I change the total votes to favor the non Chavez option. That is I assume a slow decrease in popular for chavista parties support due to ten years in office and unfulfilled promises.


Now the opposition wins clearly but yet in spite of its unity, in spite of beating chavismo by 4 points, chavismo STILL gets 5 out of 9 seats!!!!!

Note: the morochas "coalition" allows for a repartition of seats to all groups which is why for example non Chavez 2 and 3 get each one seat even if Chavez 3 does not figure on the ballot. On the other hand, because chavismo lost the overall vote, pro Chavez 1 loses the seat it was getting when chavismo still was winning the vote.

By tweaking the vote totals a little bit more one could reach a 55 to 45 in favor of the opposition and yet still a chavista victory 5 to 4! All depending on how effective gerrymandering was, and how the political pressure targeted to some districts worked. For example in Zulia chavismo could give up altogether the Maracaibo districts and focus strictly on the oil areas, blackmail and all and carry them barely obtaining thus more seats than what it deserved in Zulia.

Comments

First, do not be surprised of such Manichean electoral system of multiple seats districts: in the US South such systems were routinely used to avoid African American to elect representatives, that is, districts were carved where more than one representative was elected, just as in Venezuela. Thus 60% of whites got 100% of seats.

Second, for all of its imperfections, the original system which I described at first allowed for Chavez to be elected and to gain a 2/3 majority in 2000 in the National Assembly with not even 60% of the vote. Now, it is not clear whether with 55% of the vote a united opposition would get a simple majority in the assembly.

Third, let's not forget the other electoral fraud already in use by chavismo, such as the shameless use of state property for the PSUV campaign. The system is pretty much sealed for chavismo, the more so as freedom of expression and information are under serious threat.

In other words, from what I have described here it should be crystal clear that the only way the opposition can win is:
- unique candidatures in EVERY district
- coordinated and focused campaigns
- civil society massive participation to compensate the abject state abuse
- presence at EVERY polling stations as gerrymandering makes a few dozens votes "added" critical enough to decide a single seat

not forgetting the notion that we need probably 55% of the vote to get a bare majority in the new parliament.

Now let's wait for the next posts to discuss ways we could reach at least an united front and how we can try to get more citizen involvement.

Conclusion

If electoral systems are a representation of the democratic nature of the people of a country we can say that in Venezuela the new electoral system does not reflect anymore the democratic and representative ideals of 1958 where diversity was sought and as much consensus as possible a goal. In the parliaments of the preceding decades even if two political parties on occasion represented up to 85% of the seats there was always room for small parties to have their voices heard without having to subject themselves to undesirable alliances. The system albeit not a perfect one allowed outsiders to be a voting surprise (see CCN in 1963, MEP in 1968, Causa R in 1993 or Chavez in 1998).

The main flaw of the old system, namely the lack of direct contact between the voter and its representative, a contact that was established only though political parties, was beginning to be addressed as specific constituencies began to be drawn.

But today the modified electoral law allows for the pernicious return of the political party rule since only through the strength of a strong party, or its leader as is the case of the PSUV, will someone be allowed to run for office and be elected eventually. As such the current electoral law is not even a return to the past as it is a less democratic system than the 1958 original election rules. Minority parties cannot elect representative on their own anymore, and to be elected you need to be anointed by a large group.

We are now into a plebiscite regime where the only thing that matters is the link between the leader and the masses and where it is becoming increasingly difficult for small groups to emerge as viable alternatives: they must lose some of their originality, a loss that even the use of primaries as a nomination system will not be enough to maintain.

From now on elections will be between two groups, in much harsher terms than the Anglo-Saxon systems since the link between the voter and its representative has all but been erased. "winner take all" with a vengeance!

The new system forces all parties to align themselves into two camps with two single messages, two camps where internal dissent must be muted and reserved for a post electoral moment. The winner of such an unfair and undemocratic system will in addition get an unfair share of the seats. Venezuelans still "vote" but their votes are becoming increasingly meaningless.

How can the Venezuelan opposition in its diversity can manage to create a single front?

-The end-

Sunday, October 11, 2009

Young Zelaya

My mail box brings me strange things. I have no idea whether the picture of a young Zelaya below is real or not, but based on his career these past few months, as Italians say, "si non e vero, e ben trovato", or the US, "too good to be true". In other words if this picture is true (and that should not be too difficult to establish), and does not correspond to a tawdry Halloween scene, then the case is close and Zelaya should be swept away to the trash bin of history, now.

You may click to enlarge if you can stomach it.

-The end-

Friday, October 09, 2009

Barack Obama versus Piedad Cordoba

I think the Norwegian parliament has made one of its worst political grant ever by giving president Barack Obama the Peace Prize this year. In fact, it is so bad that they might wreck his chances at bringing peace in his multiple endeavors as bitter rivals and envious nuts will go out of their way to sabotage Obama for the next three years. If I were Obama I would seriously consider refusing the prize.

Why, oh why?

The only "sensible" explanation that immediately came to my mind upon reading the news is that the Norwegian committee (it is not the Swedes who give the Peace Prize) hated so much Bush and his policies that they exacted revenge by awarding the prize to Obama. Thus giving a new meaning to pettiness.

There is a precedent, two sitting US presidents have already won the prize, Wilson and Teddy Roosevelt. But both of them had significant achievements with them, Obama none. I truly do not want to disparage president Obama, he simply has had no time to get an "achievement" yet, the world does not work that way. And in all the initiatives that he has undertaken if a third of them work out he will be richly deserving of the Peace Prize, say, in his second term. By giving him the prize right now the Oslo folks are in fact probably sabotaging Obama potential success, ruining the very "hope" that they use as an excuse to give him the prize. Or does anyone think for a second that the Noble Peace Prize will help Obama in front of Chavez? Iran? North Korea? Pleaseeeee.... Far from it! The reverse is true! How can Oslo be so clueless, stupid!?

I am actually sorry for President Obama, not to mention that he cannot cash his prize and will be forced to give it away to some charity or foundation as he cannot even wait 3 or 7 years to enjoy it. Heck, the IRS might even tax him on that anyway!!!! I suspect that he is smart enough that he realizes that overall this prize is not going to help him, is not going to repair US image in the world except in the mind of some European people that will love Obama, prize or not.

But I suppose I should be happy that Obama got it because according to chavista sycophancy the leading candidate was Piedad Cordoba of Colombia, you know, the woman with the eternal turban who cavorts in the jungles of Colombia with the FARC and who is a regular visitor to Chavez in Caracas. A woman so controversial, so sectarian that she is even accused of treason in Colombia. Giving her the prize would have been terrible for us in the area, though I doubt it would have been enough to make her win the Colombia next presidential election.

So you see, the Peace Committee could have done worse than Obama. We should never underestimate the screw up potential of the best intentioned people.

-The end-

The 2010 Venezuelan votes: the messages

Before starting an electoral contest usually political parties try to put together a message to attract voters. With at least two general elections coming next year, this should not be the exception in Venezuela. In fact, chavismo has already started campaigning hard even though there is not a single candidate named yet. But it does not matter, they all ride on Chavez's coat tails anyway and since it has sort of worked for the last ten years, why not not repeat the formula? If people have been willing to vote for zillions of promises and very few achievements chavismo has all the right to think that it will work once again. They know very well the cattle they herd ("conocen su ganado" as we say in Venezuela).

Tonight we had yet another cadena illustrating this point, following already the Sunday cadena of nearly 6 hours. Brace yourself, we are in for a cadena almost every day for the next few months. Both forced nation wide broadcast had only one objective: put up a show to try to cover up what has become an obvious failure: the famous Mision Barrio Adentro which has proven to be unsustainable. What Chavez is doing is simply promise that it will all be fixed, by 2019 there will not be any poor left in Venezuela (I kid you not) and watch out, we are bringing back the Cubans; without of course bothering to explain how come the Cubans left and why were they not replaced with Venezuelan medics. But when you run inconceivable populist campaigns you do not pay attention to the details.

Opposition delays

If chavismo is right and ready, not bothering with subtleties whatsoever, the opposition is yet to emit a peep-squeek of an electoral offer. And yet, paradoxically obtaining an electoral message for the opposition should be the simplest of matters and yet it seems that it is slowing down everything. Why?

First the opposition has placed itself in front of an unnecessary dilemma. Apparently the clearly expressed wishes of unity from the electorate are interpreted by politicians as the need to create an united government plank, thus missing totally the whole point of the coming elections.

Second, the wishes to nitpick everything and the belief that the election is all but won make a few leaders among the opposition already think about the next presidential election.

As far as I am concerned, the elections are already lost unless by late December the political opposition has come up with a sensible plan and at least a strategy to nominate unity candidates. And yet, Chavez will have already been campaigning for three months and the opposition nothing yet, making it a much harder uphill battle than what it should have been. I let you imagine the polls by January first...

A simple platform

There is no reason why we should be at such dire point so early in the campaign. So I am going to help the opposition out, knowing full well that no one in the leadership will read it and that even if they were to read it their arrogance will blind them anyway. But I have to do my duty. Heck! I might even translate this and start my own Spanish language blog....

Let's start by the basics: what are we electing. Let's forget about the municipal council elections, the message is mostly local and the real problem there is a way to generate unity candidates that will run on local issues platform. So, we just need to focus on the message for the Nazional Assembly election.

The constitution of Venezuela is quite clear, the national Assembly is not the one that runs the country. It proposes laws that will hep the executive run the country, it will receive law proposals from the executive to examine and it will exert control functions on how the executive spends tax money. There are other items but for an election purpose those are the ones that count, there is no need to even bother about the other ones except perhaps hinting at some constitutional reform to guarantee for example a better decentralization of the country.

In other words the message should be quite clear:
We are going to let Chavez run the country as you wished for in 2006,
but we are going to control the government,
making sure that the monies reach the social services
and not the pocket of the corrupt governmental agents.

This is enough of a message, all the rest risks to be fanciful distraction that could even be dangerous to maintain opposition unity. For example, how can you bridge the divergence between left PODEMOS and more right wing groups that oppose, say, barrio adentro if you try to include in your platform new rules for barrio adentro? It is impossible! How can you bridge the judicial differences between AD and PJ if you want to include ways to nominate judges in the platform?

How to design the platform

In short the opposition needs to bother only about an electoral plank of things that can be done of common agreement among ALL parties to control the regime, restore democracy and decentralize the country, forcing chavista local officials to work on their own without the protection of Chavez. All the rest not only is superfluous but I would go as far as proposing that it should be left at the free conscience of each political party. For example if PODEMOS wishes to negotiate different social programs with chavismo because together they represent a majority of seats, then so be it, PODEMOS should be allowed to do so as long as they respect the basic agreement. If PODEMOS and AD decide to join PSUV to reorganize the high court, so be it, PJ should just seat on the side realizing that it can only be an improvement from he present TSJ.

In other words the less conditions the platform has, the better the message can pass, the more solid the unity will be. Starting to discuss rebuilding the country and other such nincompooperies is not only counterproductive but stupid: as long as Chavez is in Miraflores the only thing you can hope is to control him better, force him to waste less and wait for 2012 and beat him at elections. Let's not forget that Chavez will have important weapons such as new constitutional amendments, and even the power to dissolve the new Assembly if necessary by creating a crisis.

Now, how difficult can it be for the opposition to come up with a simple, short, clear, limited proposal? This is what I would propose in no particular order:

- exert the financial control of the National Assembly to limit corruption.

- stop credits for foreign countries unless duly consulted with the National Assembly. This include the ALBA. Venezuelan money should be spent first on Venezuela.

- reestablish the constitutional quota of oil money that go directly to the local governments.

- vote laws to return responsibilities to local officials along with more funds, creating a system that allows for all states to be treated as equal.

- modify laws that have diminished the freedom of the people, in particular those that bring censorship, that bring unjust judicial proceedings, etc....

- force the government to spend more on jails, on police, etc., returning part of the security apparatus to the governors who wish to exert their responsibility there.

- increase democracy and popular participation:

$$ reformulate the heath system plan and pension system to force the government to fulfill its promises yet to be accomplished (even if Chavez votes in a hurry some law to that effect you can claim that as a success). Offer for example that local referenda will decide whether the people want their governor to manage the local hospitals instead of the central government.

$$ offer local referenda as to whether people want their mayors/governors to manage their public schools instead of the central government.

$ guarantee constitutional provisions to name judges

$ organize consejos comunales to fight corruption

- defend small and medium property, giving property rights to everyone in "ranchos". Include those who got only "permits" from Chavez land seizures (there will always be time to compensate folks later).

- guarantee freedom of association and work by voting laws that limit governmental abuse in trade union elections.

- give freedom to individual opposition parties to negotiate with the government items that are not included in the platform, as long as they respect that electoral platform

And what SHOULD not be included:

- mention of controlling the army (way to early and too difficult to do considering how corrupt the army has become).

- reversing any social program: they are all accepted, we are just going to make sure they work the way they should work, you approved them in 2006.

- constitutional amendments: people are sick of voting. Besides the constitution is so sick that it is way past amending. Simply state that you are willing to work with Chavez from the National Assembly but if it does not work out you reserve your options, such as constituent assembly.

In other words, an eventual victory of the opposition WILL generate conflict with Chavez. Announcing how the opposition would deal with such conflict is only a sign of weakness.

Conclusion

There! Was that so difficult? Serious people can put up together a simple program as the one described above in a matter of weeks, not even a month. It should fit in at most a dozen pages so it can be printed cheaply and distributed around. The language should be simple and directed to to sectors E and D (the chavista electoral bulk) since the other sectors already vote in their majority against Chavez. It could even take the gamble to add point blank as an introduction "that since we do not know how much money is left in the public coffers we abstain to offer material promises that we could not fulfill, and besides, that is the role of the government, not of the Assembly: we just make sure that Chavez fulfill his promises"

-The end-

Wednesday, October 07, 2009

The 2010 Venezuelan votes: Introduction

Apparently Chavez has already launched his campaign for next year legislative elections. Mind you, they are due in MORE than one year but Chavez is already going gung-ho on the campaign trail starting with a totally unjustifiable cadena of nearly 6 hours this Sunday to inaugurate a long built heath center in Caucagua and to rant against students that mooned him at their last rally. Boy, do they know how to get on Chavez case! He is so predictable, so vain that he cannot take upon himself to ignore that event and ends up giving it maximum coverage by being a cry baby about it.

This is not a good way to start a campaign, not the way he has got people used to, the invincible leader. But I suspect that negative polls been what they are, money to buy votes not being as plentiful as in the past, the sooner he starts the better for him, he must think.

Not that things look much brighter for the opposition as usual. More than ever it is ABSOLUTELY clear that without a single list of candidates they are not going to win. As I will explain in subsequent posts, I think that it is not enough for the opposition to get 50% + 1 of the ballots. It probably will need at least 55% not only to ensure that it does get 50% + 1 at the Nazional Assembly to make it National again, but also that high a vote to force Chavez to acknowledge the victory. That is, anything less than a 10% margin of victory will allow chavismo to do all sorts of maneuvers to erase it. Today they are desperate enough that outright frontal cheating is a clear possibility and only by making that one too big to hide properly can we force them to relinquish control of the Nazional Assembly and perhaps start the road to the end of the regime in a peaceful way.

For this the opposition needs a clear message, a way to select its candidates in a unitary way that not only keeps sympathizers motivated but also avoid devastating internal struggles which will make an eventual "unity" a work of fiction, and of course more than ever a TOTAL presence at the polling stations to record the fraud that this time is all but a sure thing. Unfortunately so far it does not look like it is happening for reasons that I fail to comprehend except if I look inside the vanity of some of the opposition leaders, in particular blank shooting of Borges, bitter Rosales, sillily ambitious Leopoldo and mummy like Allup. It is not too late yet but if by December 31 the opposition has not put together a basic message and a mechanism of candidate selection, we can all go home and forget about it.

There are two national elections next year, the Nazional Assembly by December and normally at least 3 months earlier the town councils elections. Plus some local essential ones of which Maracaibo mayor is at the top. I bet you Maracaibo mayor is first and that Chavez will gamble it all on that one. The candidate is irrelevant for chavismo, Chavez will be there every week end.

Depending on the Maracaibo result then Chavez will decide whether separate the other two elections and by how many weeks. If he wins Maracaibo he will try to put both council and Assembly together as early as October on any excuse. If he loses it, he will probably go through the council ones ASAP to take his losses there (August? when the opposition is on vacation) and put all of his money and time in a blitzkrieg two months campaign in October-November to at least ensure a thin majority at the Assembly in a December vote: it might not be a rubber stamp anymore but it will be unable to control anything. Chavez will just have to weather it until 2012 when he can do something about it again after he gets reelected, maybe.

In a way chavismo does not have it so easy either. If it counts on Chavez, a formidable campaigner even if showing some wear, the PSUV is still not a very good electoral machine on its own without Chavez direct fuel input. In addition next February Chavez will reach 11 years in office and well, 11 years is a lot even for successful government. Ask Thatcher about it... To this you can add that crime, ineptitude, corruption and inflation are not going to go down in any noticeable way, more likely getting worse. Still, the power of the purse and a tireless campaigner who still command irrational affection are still two powerful weapons. Unless the opposition puts its act together.

Thus in the next couple of weeks I will need to write about:

- what kind of political message the opposition can cobble up (it is amazingly simpler than what you think which baffles me that they still are discussing it!)

- how the electoral system is stacked against the opposition thus requiring extreme vigilance, dedication and organization to counter it (the final answer it to have witnesses and support at EVERY polling station, no excuses)

- how the opposition should select its candidates (note: I am not for an all out primary, it would be a disaster though it is a must that at least half of the candidates are selected through some form of primary, but this can only be understood once you understand the fine print of the modified electoral system).

- but no predictions, at least not a single one until June 2010 regardless of what polls might say.

-The end-

Monday, October 05, 2009

Forero on Venezuelan political dissenting

At the Washington Post they do not mince words as to how Chavez deals with his political and democratic opposition. Maybe we should include this article and the one from Maria Anastasia O'Grady in the WSJ, see preceding post, for mail to Senator's Kerry office, apparently in dire need of an enlightenment he seems to have lost since his failed run 5 years ago.
-The end-

Oh dear, antisemitism in Honduras too?

Do we detect a pattern?

-The end-

Followers