Land seizure in the bolivarian revolution

A rather long essay on the Venezuelan land distribution

The "land problem" has acquired a new urgency over the holidays. To believe the official story one would be lead to think that hordes of starved peasants, landless, desperate, are roaming the country is search of land so they can plant a little bit of yucca and plantain so their children will not starve.

Passing fast on the obvious comment that how come that after 6 years in office Chavez has peasants starving, the truth of the matter is far distant from the chavista version of the situation. It would require a book to describe all what is going on in the Venezuela country side. Thus, to simplify matters I will split this in three parts. First I will refer the reader to a recent post by Miguel who describes quite well some of the judicial aspect of the problem. Then I have translated the editorial of El Nacional from yesterday (with the original Spanish there ). This is accompanied with rather lengthy notes to explain in more detail some aspects of the problem, as they are brought forth by the text. Finally I set up a table on the land distribution as far as we can know right now in Venezuela. This way the reader will be able by itself to decide what to think. With my very own opinionated opinion at the very end.

Since it is a rather long assay I have added internal links to facilitate circulation between the different sections.

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El Nacional, Thursday January 6 editorial, 2005

(Foot notes sources mostly from Diccionario de Historia de Venezuela, Fundación Polar, 1997, ISBN 980-6397-37-1)

The Charcote and its problems

The manner in which the bolivarian regime has been dealing with the land tenure problem has allowed for many ambiguities from the very beginning of the revolution. It has been more than five years since the government has promised a study of the essential lands to know where they are and which ones are of state or private ownership. It is a matter of order, of legitimacy for a state to talk with authority and trustworthiness. This was not done. The regularization of land holding is an old and dramatic Venezuelan problem (1). It does happen to all governments, they promise a survey, and later on they abandon it, never concluding anything. We are not, thus, in front of an exception, but in from of a predicted failure (2).

According to official sources, the bolivarian regime has distributed millions of hectares among peasants. Can anyone inform how they are being administered, which are the results and the projections? Meanwhile, and what has been learnt, it has been a major failure in Guarico, publicized and shown on TV, where peasants accuse public institutions for cheating them by selling them corn seed contaminated with fungi. Harvests were lost, and so were lost the loans and, of course, the hopes that they had put in their labor.

One does not need to be a rocket scientist to understand that few matters are as complex and depend on so many unpredictable factors as the agrarian production; that a special preparation is required to direct institutes such as the National Institute of Land [INTI]; that is not enough to have eaten arepa to know the complexities involved in growing corn (3). The problem of the State is that the President thinks that all his captains know everything and can do it all.

From this to hit like a blind man with a stick is just a step away (4).

Suddenly appeared fitful acts with the initiatives of the Cojedes governor "intervening", that was the word in the initial decree, a considerable number of haciendas, the famous hato Piñero among them, and also the fundo Charcote, property of a British company which is in full production, according to itsspokespeople (5). Governor Yanez Rangel called for a governor reunion, segregating the INTI, to ask not only for support, but also for imitation, that is, to act as he did.

After these episodes some more got involved, vice president Rangel, the minister of Agriculture and Land, the president of INTI, who announced as one voice a reactivation of the "commando against latifundia" as if it were a major battle. Maybe so much heroism was unnecessary. What are needed is moderation, good sense and knowledge.

Nobody wants them to remain with their arms crossed, but neither that they act as epileptics. May they know what they are doing because to govern is not to mock everyone and even less to deny people's rights. The governor of Cojedes has announced the creation of a commission that would have determined in a few days the situation of the intervened hatos. They did not wait. For example, the immediate intervention of El Charcote, an agricultural complex, better known as "the British company" was ordered.

According to a communiqué from the Agropecuaria Flora, the legal name of El Charcote, the propriety rights can be traced to 1830, that is, to the foundation of the Republic of Venezuela. The spokesperson stated that they have given copies of this to the INTI of Cojedes as well as the Caracas office. In other words, they demonstrate the ownership "without any interruption and very clearly"(6). With the phlegmatic tone which is their trademark, a spokesperson from the UK embassy expressed that "what is important is that the law is respected in an impartial manner". This is what we all wish for.

El Charcote will be the subject of a final intervention by the governor of Cojedes. The news was divulgated like a war report. "Saturday 8, at 10 AM, all the machinery of the sate, all the armed forces stationed within the state of Cojedes and its police force will be present at the installations of hato El Charcote to implement the first beachhead of mision free Land and Men". Not even Zamora had such words (7).

Governor Yanez Rangel promised that the productive process in El Charcote
will not be stopped. He said: "All that is necessary to guarantee the judicial security and preserve the right of property and the due process to the ones subject to justice will be established, just as mandated by the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela". Yanez or Cantinflas? (8)

(jump to next section to avoid the extensive notes on this editorial)

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NOTES:

(1) Writing an history of the Venezuelan Land problem is a near encyclopedic behavior. Here is a short run, completed in other notes.

It started of course with the Spanish grabbing the land from the natives, through in part the system of encomienda. However this system did have an advantage: those who spoiled other folks from their land were rather keen in registering all their proprietary rights. By independence time all useful land close from inhabited centers was assigned in a wide variety of ownership schemes, from church lands to native lands in some areas. Including of course the gigantic estates such as those belonging to Bolivar himself.

But the independence wars, often closer to a civil war than a freedom war had the result of massacring most of the colonial elite. Those who were not killed fled the country or abandoned their ancestral lands, few remaining on the job. The epigones of Bolivar came back to Venezuela and as a compensation often occupied the ancient ingenios and haciendas which often were abandoned or with a minimum of activity by the remaining slaves and peons. With the mess of 2 decades of civil disruption, property rights were often not clear and the new land owners were not too worried about legalizing the invader situation. Not mentioning that many of them, not particularly educated in what had become a semi barbaric rural habitat were only too happy to limit themselves to cattle raising. There was thus no particular need to settle propriety rights since the new owners had the force with them and land property was pretty much as far as their cowboys could reach to herd cows.

The federal civil wars f the 1850-1870 period did not help. And the long lived an powerful dictators who followed (Guzman Blanco or Gomez) were not adverse to seizing a few haciendas for their own use, not necessarily under their name.

Thus by the middle of the XX century one could safely assume that much more than half of the land of Venezuela had dubious property rights, and there was no will to solve that situation as too many people were bound to lose. According to the census of 1937 82.5% of land holdings had changed hands in the preceding two decades, demonstrating quite a significant mobility within the land ownership structure. [return]

(2) Many a government used agrarian issues to justify their access to power, since independence times even. Bolivar emitted a decree on that subject in 1817. But the first real concerted effort was the agrarian reform of 1945, greatly expanded in 1947 and finally applied in the 60ies with the Agrarian Reform law of 1960.

The agrarian census of 1954 reflected only around 100 000 "owners" of what was about barely 25% of all of the agrarian lands. The rest of the land was owned as latifundia and worked by hired hands. The Agrarian Reform increased the number of land "owners" to 313 000 by 1985, though perhaps as many as 100 000 peasants were still claiming for land.

For all of its deficiency the Agrarian Reform is considered has having had a
considerable impact in the land owning and producing structure in Venezuela, and to have helped in maintaining social peace for 40 years. [return or go back again to next section]

(3)"arepa" is the national corn bread. It is based on a unique preparation of corn flour which allows for the making of the arepa, which cannot be made with the varieties of corn flours made, say, in the US. To make an arepa you need to buy your corn flour from Venezuela (pre-cocida,
"pre-cooked" as it is a two step preparation) [return]

(4)Translation of "dar palos de ciego". Means to try to hit with a stick when you are blind (also used for fun referring of the piñata hits where party goers must have their eyes shut by a bandana while trying to hit the piñata). [return]

(5)There is a number of terms to describe Venezuelan agricultural exploitations, not necessarily referring to the real size of the property. They start from "hato" which usually is considered large enough that some run into the acreage of a small European country. Then we have "fundo", "hacienda" to the smaller "finca" and "granja". Usually the names have a relation with the initial activity of the farm, in addition to its size. For example most chicken farms are referred to as "granjas". A "finca" is perhaps the closest to the term farm in its European sense, a few acres including a few fields and some cattle. "hacienda" has an old tenure connotation, a certain prestige even if the "hacienda" lost most of its glamour (and lands!)over the years. "hato" is mostly used for immense lands in the Llanos for cattle raising. One Spanish term not used is "rancho", widely used in Mexico. In Venezuela "rancho" is used for slums.

There is a rather good memoir in English about life in an "hacienda" in Venezuela written by a British woman. Her life strange turns had her marry a Venezuelan and live in his hacienda, running it herself alone for a few years until she got tired to see the relatives only come to get their share at harvest time. "The Hacienda", Lisa St. Aubin de Terán, Little Brown and Co., 1997, ISBN 0-316-81634-5. I can vouch for its life like feel: even if all did not happened to them, she did not make up anything. [return]

(6)In the Byzantine land tenure situation in Venezuela, one must demonstrate the successive tenureship of the land from as long as possible. The many political disruptions in our history make it quite possible that you buy land from Mr. X who bought it from Mrs. Y 10 years ago and who can show something that looks like an official document. Yet, once you build a house or plant a crop, just at harvest time you can have a neighbor come and claim part of your land (and crop) or even a long lost heir from 30 years ago with a document that actually can void your property title. In such cases, after a lengthy and costly trial you will be lucky to recover part of your initial investment. This is actually not a rare scam, heirs staying quiet for years until somebody revalues a land that they refuse to work on.

It is thus a good strategy if you buy land in Venezuela to trace property titles back for at least a couple of generations to avoid surprises. And it is always advised that you pay for a good survey and dated delimitations markers once, or before, you buy it to avoid problems with your new neighbors. That investment in lawyers and surveyors is steep at first but will be handsomely recovered when you decide to sell your property. It is my opinion that the British group holding El Charcote has probably a reasonable survey and title of the land, which makes it quite surprising that they have been chosen for the first "intervention". Politics are surely the main reason for such a choice. [return]

(7)Ezequiel Zamora (1817-1860) is one of the mythic heroes of Chavez. And he has distorted the story around him as much as he has distorted the story of Bolivar to suit his interests.

Zamora was a successful shopkeeper that got dragged into politics when the post independence order established by Paez was challenged by the "Liberal" movement, which was very loosely more open to greater popular participation, although controlled by the same social class as the one in office. As a young man Zamora had been exposed to progressive European ideas and he became an advocate of landless peasants and a noted local agitator. But when the Liberals made it to office he was associated with its new benefits and left behind any notion of social revolution that he might have harbored.

His first uprising was in 1846, and he forges his military skills until the final victory of his side in 1849. From then on he occupies diverse administrative posts and gets married in 1856 to a rich widow for whom he leaves public office to administer her estates in the Coro region. But in 1858 the Monagas regime falls and after a brief exile Zamora comes back to lead an insurrection in 1859. His military skills and leadership make him quite a successful leader with his high feat the battle of Santa Ines in December 1859. In his march to Caracas he is killed at a minor battle in San Carlos, making a rather ineffectual Falcon the new leader and postponing for several years the issue of the conflict making it as bloodied a conflict as the independence wars were. During that campaign he retook some of the popular and agrarian themes that had made him strong a decade earlier. These helped him greatly in recruiting peasants to man his army. His sudden death of course will leave for ever the mystery as to whether he would have done something about the landless peasants that time around, a doubtful proposition at best.

Nevertheless Chavez has chosen to focus only in Zamora populist and popular aspects even if Zamora was quite clearly interested in money and power, at least as much as in freeing peasants. In this respect Zamora was like many a South American strong man, rich in reformist promises, surrounded by lieutenants issued from the humblest social classes, but poor in actual results. However his legend has given Chavez a few of the terms he uses in his revolutionary jargon: "free land and men" (a mision named for that), "general del pueblo soberano" (general of the sovereign people) and of course Santa Ines, the battle cry for the chavista recall election effort.

As a side detail, it was Zamora who gave form for the first time to Yaracuy as a separate identity, in 1858. During his 1858-1860 campaign he lead the Federalist movement and founded states around the main cities that he was taking, starting the transformation from the original 7 provinces to the 22 states that now form Venezuela. [return]

(8) Cantinflas was a popular Mexican comic movie actor. One of his specialties was to ridicule incompetent bureaucrats and policies. Another was the mumbling and fumbling character that had no idea what he was doing but pretended to know [return]

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The reality of the land distribution in Venezuela

El Nacional also published a graph obtained from the latest national census on agrarian lands. One way to look at it, a way that would favor the government intentions, is to observe that 10 972 families own 60% of the land set for agriculture in Venezuela. That of course would be unacceptable. But is it that number as offensive as some would want us to believe?

The first observation that one must make is that the situation is much less grave than it was in 1960. The Agrarian Reform then redistributed a very large amount of estates and did create a new peasant class. Unfortunately this one did not succeed for various reason. One was the very poor support to get started as they often lacked the equipment and seeds and technology that should have accompanied the redistribution. The other, much more important, was the fast urbanization of Venezuela. Today barely more than 10% of the Venezuelan population can be classified as rural population. in 1961 the rural population was already down to 37.5% from a 1926 number of 85% living in the country side! After 10 year of oil exploitation Venezuela was still a very rural country in 1926. If in 1926 Venezuela could show some semi feudal aspects, in 2004 this is not a social issue anymore.

But let's look a little bit closer at this table from El Nacional. I have simplified it by putting all the numbers in percentages. I have also taken the criteria that to make a living from the land one should own more at least 5 hectares (2.47 acres, so you can just multiply by 2 for a gross approximation if you live in the US). This is very subjective since it depends on the value of the land as an arable estate or a strictly cattle area, on water availability, on the crop, etc, etc... But one must simplify somewhere.

Thus the table has been divided into three groups, those that might not have enough land (purple), those that should have enough for a decent living (blue) and those that obviously have a lot, perhaps too much (red).

Property size in hectares	% owners in census		% lands in census
less than 1	8,5%	48,4%	0,07%	1,59%
1 to 2	14,1%		0,28%
2 to 5	25,7%		1,24%
5 to 10	15,0%	50,7%	1,60%	51,97%
10 to 20	11,9%		2,49%
20 to 50	10,3%		5,04%
50 to 100	5,4%		6,02%
100 to 200	3,7%		8,12%
200 to 500	3,1%		15,42%
500 to 1000	1,2%		13,27%
1000 to 2500	0,7%	1,0%	16,78%	46,45%
2500 to 5000	0,2%		10,37%
more than 5000	0,1%		19,30%

Thus, for example, 25.7% of the rural families own 1.24% of the land which is comprised of properties between 2 and 5 hectares (5 and 12 acres). This particular number is rather bad. However if you regroup the population living in farms whose size should allow them to eek out a decent income (say, to buy a color TV and send kids to school) you will see that 50.7% of rural families own 51.97% of the agricultural land in Venezuela. This, with only 10% of rural population is far from being the searing problem that Chavez would like the world to believe. And certainly not the problem found in Northwest Brazil or other areas of South America.

I have also included two areas of overlap. That is, from 2 to 5 through 5 to 10 hectares where the type of crop or breed raised makes the difference between productive or unproductive. The other overlap area, from 500 to 1000 through 1000 to 5000, could represent some lands whose size is a must, in particular in extensive cattle grazing areas in the Llanos were a ranch less than 2500 hectares in certain areas might just not be productive enough. Some Llanos sectors get their only water from rain, for 6 month of the year. In other words, that 50.7% of families who own properties allowing an acceptable income might reach more than 75% of Venezuelan rural population, for almost 70% of the productive land.

Of course, this is a speculation as real numbers and rural conditions are not available. Not to mention that there is a profound inequality in Venezuelan land quality. I would much rather own 5 hectares of Yaracuy land than 50 or even 500 hectares of Apure land. In fact, some Yaracuy lands are owned by people from Llanos states who send their cattle to their Yaracuy property for a final fattening before the slaughter house!

So, why is Chavez so intent in breaking the land structure?

It is important to notice that what would be more useful to ensure the productivity of the Venezuelan country side, what is really needed, would be a large technical program, including education, financing, technology, determination of suitable crops and a real complete census of lands and exact determination of real property titles. But that is too slow a way for people who want flashy results and think that they know it all. Instead,expropriation and setting up cooperatives that would favor a very few percentile points of the population is a preferred method of political promotion. Not forgetting that experience dictates that very few folks in Caracas slums, as in most countries, will willingly go back to the country side.

No, the reasons are to be sought elsewhere.

One is the need to promote the bolivarian adventure in other countries by creating a fake problem, a code word to rally support elswhere.

Another is to destroy a source of wealth for the opposition to Chavez, even if he risks to create food problems in Venezuela (see the Zimbabwe fiasco for a possible Venezuelan future).

A more likely explanation is to force the present landholders to sell their land cheaply to the new oligarchic class that Chavismo is creating fast with the state monies so liberally spread around to unconditional followers.

And the one that is the most likely objective, is to create a smoke curtain while civil liberties are curtailed. As the "interventions of hatos" is programmed, the gag law gets into effect, a new penal code is voted making it a crime for this blogger to write "Chavez is a jerk", decentralization is becoming a dream of the past, militarization of society advances speedily and new repressive laws are in the books while opposition leaders are facing jail for their ideas.

Why there are food shortages in Venezuela

This blog has reported often on the erratic supplies that one can find at any Venezuelan grocery store for now two years. The reasons are of course bad agricultural policies that result in a dearth of investments in the country side. The situation IS NOT created by an increase of purchasing power of the population through the Misiones handouts. These exacerbate the problem, they do not create it, I repeat.

Today there are a few recent articles worth noting in El Universal. The first one tells us that the very own government numbers speak of a 0.2% growth in the agricultural PIB for 2005-2006. This at a time where the economy was growing by a 10%, courtesy of the import boom due to high oil prices. That is, as it has been pointed out often enough in this page, the economy grew because imports grew and had to be distributed around the country, NOT because production grew. Currently most industries are working at full capacity but very few new industries are being built. While the population keeps growing.... That article also cites the following number: in 2003 Venezuela imported 1.5 billion USD in food; the number for 2007 is 5.5 billion... That is, all the increase in food consumption has been done on food import, not food production. We are eating the oil we produce and export instead of investing it for our future. You do not need to be a rocket scientist to imagine the long term consequences of these numbers.

Amazingly, in 2005-2006, the loans for agricultural production from banks have increased and yet production has gone down! In 2006 Bs 2.54 billions were loaned by the banks (by law Venezuelan banks are obliged to loan a certain percentage of their loans to agricultural activities). The 2005 number was Bs. 1,53 billions. Yet that 66% increase in financing translated into a 6.1% reduction in agricultural production volume.

Why is the production failing to grow? Some of the causes are seen in the other recent articles.

Producers are harassed and threatened all the time. Why should they invest and risk their own money when the state after any stupid utterance from Chavez could seize your business? This week, Polar the main giant feeding Venezuela was once again threatened as it was accused of hoarding. Polar quickly pointed out that it is not in the business of producing sugar, nor milk, meat or poultry, not even coffee or eggs which are all the most notorious missing products whereas the supply of Polar made products is more regular. But see, chavismo needs a scapegoat for its incompetence and even if Polar does not produce a single gallon of milk, let's accuse them anyway. I let you imagine the morale of the Polar personnel after such attacks, and the plans of expansion that will be duly shelved.

That governmental inefficiency is, by the way, aggravated by corruption. Mercal, the government distributing system reports 397 cases of corruption under study. Obviously when you must import so much food in such a hurry, you create a prime field for corruption to bloom. Besides, when it is so easy to import why should Mercal directors visit hot sunny production facilities to promote local goods production where they will sweat profusely when they can order a container of beans from the comfort of their AC office?

I could find many more articles and many more ways to explain the government failure in promoting production, but El Universal this Sunday nailed the coffin reporting on El Charcote abandon. Long time readers of this blog might remember a long study I made in 2005 where I discussed the policies of land seizure in Venezuela, including the famous productive cattle ranch of El Charcote (many other articles on this subject appear if you use Charcote as a search word for this blog). I could say again that I was sort of prophetic as all the land seizures of 2004 and 2005 only resulted in a drop of agricultural production. El Charcote stands now mostly idle, the farmers brought to cultivate the seized land having left or limited themselves to put up a shack where to live and hold their assigned land in case they can sell it someday.

I can assure you of one thing because it is my line of work: some agricultural sectors have prospered under chavismo, and they are all the ones linked to some agribusiness ventures in the hands of private investors. Such is Polar working full time or other sectors such as the poultry industry, in spite of price controls or such as corn growing associated with these agribusiness and that the government has not dared to touch yet. The global meager result is due to those policies of land seizure who have destroyed cattle ranching, meat and milk production, and sugar cane fields (among others). But do not hold your breath expecting Chavez to recognize his grievous mistakes, a true betrayal to the country of even worse consequences than the one he is perpetrating with PDVSA: soon we will not have enough oil to but all the food that we will need to import.


-The end-

The 2010 election predictions: Llanos

This is deep Venezuela, the large central plains, a chavista area and in some states perhaps even a bastion.  The reason is quite simple and goes beyond the Llanero origin of Chavez: the wave of land grabs, the expropriation of a considerable amount of large farms have created a generalized impoverishment of the area and thus an increased dependency of the people from state alms.  More than anywhere else we can see the contrast between the few urban areas of the Llanos which still can on occasion show an opposition presence, and the rural districts which have become a terre de mission for opposition candidates (missionary lands, french political vocabulary).

Cojedes

Land seizure and the deliquescence of the Venezuelan state

These past days have been rich in demonstrations that the Venezuelan state is sinking fast into some type of tribal units ruled by weapons. Sunday's papers reflected the marvelous contradictions in which we live, making Gabriel Garcia Marquez an illuminated amateur.

I wanted to start with the latest on the seizure of El Charcote, that X-thousand acres ranch in Cojedes part of a group of ranches owned by British interests. I use the X as a number since the true extent of the land owned, and by whom, has become the mystery du jour. And the source of quite a fight even before the Brits are expelled in what is the new Cojedes parody of independence war, with flown in chubby governor and all.

Apparently the governor of Cojedes, Yanez Rangel, had to come by helicopter as the roads were blocked by chavistas. Blocked by chavistas? Well, it turns out that there are two groups of people that want to lay their hands on the Charcote estate. Those that already grabbed a few acres 4 years ago, pretty much ruining the production scheme of the property. And those that the governor wants to give the land to, some cooperatives whose origin and function (and control) is not quite clear. However, those that have been sitting in on the land apparently will have none of it and accuse Yanez of trying to plug in his friends.

Where have I read such stuff? Oh! I remember! I wrote a few days ago about that possibility myself! It seems that I am not the only one that suspects that the cooperatives are only a front for some chavistas to make good with land. You set the cooperative. The cooperative conveniently goes bankrupt a few years later and some governmental official buys its land for a fraction of its real price. Incidentally that standard operating procedure has not been invented in Venezuela but seems to have a promising future here.

Miguel has already posted a few pictures to illustrate this high in color moment. But there is one that I want to repost in this page. (And by the way his translation of an interview of Carlos Machado Allison musing on the technical nonsense of it all is a must read)



These were the soldiers sent. To control what? The docile management which has claimed that it wanted justice, which has already had to fire 60% of its personnel as the invasions have maimed production by 2/3? What gun power could possibly have 50 rural workers against even the body guards of the Cojedes governor? No, these "tonton macoutes" were sent because the factions between Chavismo forced the governor to come by helicopter. I find this picture quite symbolic of the degradation of the public power in Venezuela when a small state governor needs the Army to protect himself from "his" followers.

But if you want more degradation of public institutions you can read the editorial of Teodoro Petkoff coming back from vacation today. And what a come back! This lengthy editorial (posted here in Spanish) explains how Danilo Anderson has come from the revolution first martyr from a putative victim of a war between extortion groups. The only thing that remains to be settled, or so it seems when one reads the editorial, is whether Anderson was part of one of those rings, whether he was just a conduit for information and notoriety, whether the General Prosecutor knew anything (and, this blogger adds, whether Isaias Rodriguez was crying on Danilo's remains at his funeral or crying on something altogether different). All of this while Isaias Rodriguez acolytes are investigating who gave inside information to the noted investigative journalist Patricia Poleo instead of verifying whether what she denounces is true or not.

To close this post two articles quite telling on what lays ahead of us. Michael Rowan, in English, muses on the unstoppable wave of corruption due to the nature of the regime.

Corruption is reduced by institutionalizing independent checks and balances in the ministries, monopolies and enterprises of government, reducing the discretion of individual actors with great power, and eliminating secrecy altogether. Corruption is a function of the system, not the people who use it.

And yet another delicious article by Manuel Caballero yesterday in El Universal. There he muses on the declaration of totally discredited Pedro Carreño (of Montesinos and Direct TV fame) where he said that Chavez was the only "indispensable" within the MRV.

This is not only a confession, it a whole philosophy of power. Chavez is not only the coat which tails allowed to reach parliament and other offices people who not even in their most delirious dreams ever thought of reaching places of influence for which they were not prepared nor ever bothered to get prepared for; but if it were not for Chavez that political group would not exist.

I trust the reader to be able to tie it all up together.

Demagoguery in Aragua: another day of economy wrecking for Chavez

Chavez needs to show that he is cured, that he is in charge.  What better than to go to next door state Aragua (short ride in copter) to expropriate a few farms and make job promises that cannot possibly held, not here, not in Brussels, not in D.C.

14.000 hectares (35.000 acres) of farmland expropriated, and Agroflora

Chavez seizing his "homeland"?

Last week the Venezuelan army in a feat of high military prowess and courage invaded the property called La Marqueseña (and 4 others not as not worthy though one belongs to the Vestey group, thus adding a second important loss to that group). The invasion revealed that inside there were a few workers busily producing abundant agricultural products and apparently not particularly upset by the way the (ex-) owners were treating them. It was soon obvious for the public opinion that the assault had nothing to do with the new agrarian law which allows the state to force unproductive lands to be surrendered to peasant that want to work them. As far as I can tell I have not seen throngs of people trying to get the lands of La Marqueseña, and certainly not to the extent of the crowds that were wanting a take on, say, the Charcote farm, the first Vestey loss.

Thus from the very beginning that La Marqueseña, bought by the Azpurua family in 1949 (as seen on TV by one of the present owners showing all the titles that she held from her father) seemed like a very suspicious move, only understandable if one is willing to believe that the Chavez administration has decided to exacerbate political tension in an electoral move for December 2005.

Today a very interesting notice has come to the forefront and it is better for me to just translate the ironic editorial of Tal Cual from Simon Boccanegra.

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La Marqueseña

Regarding the intervention in hato La Marqueseña something started buzzing in my head. Somewhere, it seemed to me, I had read something on that farm and Chavez. Eventually the light bulb lighted up in my head. I went back to the famous book of Agustín Blanco Muñoz, "Habla el Comandante", (The Comandante speaks) (1). There I found the thing. Says the president (page 49): "Because it turns out that the lands of La Marqueseña belonged, at the beginning of the century, to my great grandfather, Pedro Pérez Delgado (I must note, before I continue to quote, that it is the official name of the ineffable Maisanta), who being a Gomez general rebelled and died in jail. That farm belonged to the Pérez Delgado (2).

Alter the year 1914, when my great grandfather left us, for the guerrilla against Gomez, those lands fell into the hands of the government. […] Today I believe they belong to the Azpúrua. These went from hand to hand. But my grandfather, the son of Maisanta, died fighting for those lands.

When he died, quite old, he got tired of going with lawyers and papers to try to rescue those lands. Those documents must be with the family". Well, I would not want to believe that La Marqueseña would fall into the hands of these peasants without land that the brothers Chávez Frías are (3).

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To make the reader understand this better a few comments:

(1)This book is dated from around the time was released from jail. Some sort of comprehensive interview which is used by chavistas on occasion although the author/interviewer is now solidly in the anti Chavez camp. This blogger has never read that book nor is he planning to.

(2)According to the Polar Dictionary of Venezuelan history, 4 books that I read constantly, indeed Maisanta was the named character. Originary of the Lara lands he somehow ended managing some lands in the Sabaneta area after the civil wars that brought to power Cipriano Castro and Gomez. Hence why the Chavez clan is from Sabaneta de Barinas (the state). But that Maisanta who seemed to have worked for the politician who offered the most, rebelled against Gomez once too many and ended up in jail where he died. Some historians consider Maisanta to be simply a famous highway robber who settled in Barinas state and tried to get some legitimacy for his booty by playing politics. Something which was, by the way, very frequent in Venezuela until Gomez finally brought some order through the country through the longest and bloodiest dictatorship of our history, so far…

(3)Of course Boccanegra cannot stop himself from pointing out that since Barinas state fell into the hands of his father as a governor, and under real management of one of his brothers, the Chavez family has become the happy owner of a considerable amount of lands. One would only need to look at the electoral add of Chavez one year ago, aired for his birthday, shot from a "family" farm with horse paddocks that looked more like manicured English Polo fields than a working farm of the Llanos.

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So? One might say?

It is rather interesting to see so many coincidences, is it not? Can Chavez have become so brazen in trying to recover lands that fell into the hands of the Azpurua family at least 20 years after Gomez took them away from his ancestor? Is he becoming a highway robber like said ancestor?

No matter what, it looks like this new land seizure episode is tainted with all sorts of irregularities, not to say violations of the law approved by chavismo itself.

Interestingly also, this week Chavez is hoping to visit New York and be celebrated by the intelligentsia of the Liberal/Left of New York who put their dislike of Bush against any ethical scrutiny of those who confront Bush. I recommend folks to read the excellent piece by Alexandra Beech on that subject.

My own piece of advice to the New York establishment from a Liberal blogger who opposes Chavez (and who lived in the New York area for 5 years): if you follow Chavez without questioning him, you risk to step on a lot of cow turds along the way.

Mendelssohn and Hato Piñero

I have been arranging my extensive CD collection which lead me to play some of those long forgotten CD. This afternoon it was Mendelssohn "Reformation" Symphony. This might not be the best symphony of this rather underrated composer. The 5th popularity has suffered from being a "heftier" work, more intellectual, less crafted and vital than the "Italian". As if trying to encompass the reformation movement in music were possible. Still, the last movement opening is one of the most stirring moments of the repertoire, and a powerful musical image of the liberation of the spirit, no matter what religious connotation is associated with.

I started to have the odd notion that it was rather subversive to play such a symphony in San Felipe. After all it was an ode by a man of Jewish origin to the most important religious reformation movement. For better or for worse, the rivalry between the two Christian creeds was going to be at the root of European technical and political superiority, even if the 30 Years War was a rather heavy price to pay. Not to mention what would happen to Jewry in Europe. But it must have been quite an intellectual effort for Mendelssohn to accept fully his German soul through the celebration of Luther's work. So many contradictions for the sake of civilization.

Because this is all what it is about, what civilization is. I do not know why but as I was listening again to it, I was recalling images of countryside Yaracuy chavistas herded in open air trucks to some political meeting. Some with bottles of booze in hand, most disheveled and not only by the wind. I wondered what was the equivalent scene in the late Weimar Germany. I wondered about Luther rallying first the German peasants only to send later the German petty lords crush them. It is always a good time to think about these clichés associated with civilization changes, and how those who undertake them do not necessarily get the expected result.

I am not sure if the "Reformation" symphony is heard by those intervening the hato El Charcote this week end, or if the host suites of hato Piñero do pipe Mendelssohn on occasion. But certainly watching the scenes of this week end one knows that we are getting further away than closer to civilization and culture.

Hato Piñero might have been a highlight of civilization in the Llanos, something as removed from Doña Barbara as possible, but still keeping some of the natural wonders of the Llanos. I have never been there, the idea of waking up at wee hours to go in the wild find anacondas to pet them not being my idea of a good time. But this has not stopped me to admire the initiative of the Branger family, original owners of the extensive hato to transform with the help of dedicated naturalists the hato Piñero into a biological station visited by scores of tourists from afar, who do not mind the rustic lodgings and the on occasion rough visiting tours.

Probably the hato was not particularly profitable, the literature indicating that up to 80% of it is under water during rainy season. Bad soil probably, mostly fit for extensive ranching. But that only adds to the value of the experiment which was the unique combination of rational and moderate agricultural exploitation with recovery of a large area for its ecological preservation. The final work of civilization when it finally arrives. I wonder if some of the lefties "ecologists" that visited the hato are aware that Piñero is marked for "intervention" by the Cojedes governor, avenger of real or imaginary offenses. Why Piñero? Aren't there other more productive areas that should be of interest first? Why not make it a National Park right now if "revenge" against the Branger family is sought? Who wants Piñero?

I think the fate of hato Piñero under this regime will be one of its litmus test, the symbol by which we will be able to judge its commitment to ecology, preservation, civilization.

Meanwhile I can seek further solace in music to shelter me from the crudity that surrounds our lives.

La Carolina as a chavista summer camp?

One thing is certain: the resistance of Diego Arria at being robbed blind is hurting chavismo.  For the first time really, in a long chain of state sponsored thuggery that started with emblematic farms like Hato Piñero, the government is met with effective criticism exposing bluntly the uselessness of its policies and the robbery component of the whole charade (1).  And thus the INTI guy at La Carolina circulates these pictures posted on the right of the pool at La Carolina.  He even posted a picture on how the horses at La Carolina are now used for rides for "el pueblo".

Juan Carlos Loyo, @jcloyo has opened a Twitter account which has been duly picked up by Chavez at his @chavezcandanga.  Now, let's play the game and accept the premise that indeed Chavez is the one finding enough time to manage his twitter account.  What is wrong with these pictures?

Plenty.

The Venezuelan 2008 election: update 17 - The chavista llanos

Now we move into pro Chavez territory. But we also move into areas where Chavez feels so sure of himself that some of his abuses are the clearest to see. If normally most of these states should remain safely into chavismo hands, surprises are possible and highly interesting.



Chavez is a llanero president. But so was Luis Herrera Campins (1978-1983). From these two presidents out of the Llanos as a people we are justified to remain weary of any future candidate coming from the area: both administrations have been economic disasters.

The Llanos are the great plains of Venezuela, a wide expanse that got its own qualifying name such as the Pampas or the Chaco did. If we share them with Colombia, the Llanos remain mostly a Venezuelan affair. Politics in the Llano are not held like elsewhere: this is the land of the caudillo by excellence even though few reached ultimate power. See, the llanero is interested in controlling his habitat but not much beyond it. However whenever the llanero decided to spread outside of its lands, consequences were to be paid for Venezuela.

Historically the Llanos have only figured heavily in Venezuelan history during the independence wars, first a civil war and second as the decisive factor in the revolutionary armies. The Venezuelan Second Republic was destroyed by a Spaniard, Boves, who somehow managed to rally to him the rough llaneros, most still riding these days without a saddle. His early and fortunate death gave its chance to Paez to gain control of the llaneros and bring them on the side of the revolution. But when Paez and others did not like the life presidency intentions of Bolivar, nor the increasing influence of the Bogota gentry, Paez by then was powerful enough to allow Venezuela to split and become a separate nation in 1830. Then the few surviving llanero went back to their great plains. Since then the Llanos strove to perpetuate its legend of roughness, where democracy did matter little. This culture gave us the “great Venezuelan novel”, Doña Barbara or Romulo Gallegos who narrates how border line civilization barely held until the XX century. Even today as Polar and Direct TV have reached small corners of the Llanos, it still has a feeling of remoteness and legend that contribute in part to the aura of Chavez. Well, at least the barbarous side so much in display during this campaign.

Chavez is a pure product of the Llanos, from his speech cadenzas to his value set. But he is of the Doña Barbara school, not of the Santos Luzardo. That is, his creed is the rough caudillo who imposes his will. Passing through army barracks did not do a thing to tame his autocratic temper. But the llanero responds to that and Chavez has been getting some of his best percentages in the Llanos state, his home state of Barinas, the low land FARC infested Apure, small Cojedes, and the agricultural power houses of Guarico and Portuguesa. Today this still holds and the only trouble Chavez faces is from dissidence, not from a real civilized opposition as in other Venezuelan places: what we see is the local caudillo facing the Caracas one. That two of thee local caudillos are women does not change a thing: we are in Doña Barbara territory.

Apure

This state which is half under water at rainy season is also a state where the FARC roams free with the complicity of the Venezuelan army. Corruption, traffic of influence, violence and blackmail are the rule. The sitting governor, Jesus Aguilarte, running for reelection is a Chavez faithful and seems set to win again. Opposing him there is a woman, Miriam de Montilla, who used to be a Venezuelan senator before Chavez and whose husband was also an ex-governor. But to add to their troubles an ex governor, Lippa, who was barred from running by Clodosvaldo is not happy with the situation and was running his won man. This division also appears at town hall levels. Safe in the Chavez column.

We can note that it is a state were the agrarian vote goes heavily to chavez: the SI took 61.2%. And yet, the only serious town, San Fernando, gave the SI only 53.5%. Thus even in deep chavista states, the following is not as blind as one would think.

Cojedes

Here amazingly an ex governor, beaten twice, is trying to make yet another comeback. Galindez is helped by the fact that the outgoing governor, reaching term limits, is quite a scoundrel. Not only Yanez Rangel is rarely seen in the state since his reelection, but he is involved in many of the scandals surrounding the maletagate of the 800,000 USD. Apparently that does not seem to be a problem for local chavistas who are happy supporting the candidate that Chavez picked up from the primaries as no one managed a clear victory. Teodoro Bolivar is the name. Early in the campaign Galindez seemed to be ready for a comeback but it seems that misiones and paybacks are stronger and lately the race has been close. I suspect that too many people who depend too much from the state after a spat of rural invasions in 2004 (El Charcote was in Cojedes) will vote for Chavez appointee anyway. Not even the collapse of the Olympic villa at San Carlos barely two years after completion seem to upset the local chavistas. Like Apure, Cojedes is a rather spineless state where people might be getting what they deserve after all. Though like Apure we can also observe that the state cpaital and only city of sorts voted ten points less for the SI than the state average.

Although some polls still give Galindez the edge I just do not see it. Chavez does not even bother visiting the state. Maybe the polls reflect more the situation of San Carlos who could well go to the opposition.

Guarico

We now start discussing three interesting states where the main challenge to chavismo does not come from the opposition but from a dissidence. Guarico was held by the PPT governor Manuitt. He certainly was no prize, accused of covering up a violent police who might have killed more than just criminals. A National Assembly was even called to investigate but apparently Chavez himself ordered to stop the proceedings. As such Manuitt escaped what seemed to be a sure expulsion. But that was not enough to garner his gratitude. When Manuitt announced that he wanted Guarico to remain PPT, preferably through a relative of his, Chavez said no and send as PSUV candidate the ineffable William Lara, ex communication minister, a big failure in his own right. This was a mistake as the PPT and MVR almost got the same amount of votes in 2004 (PODEMOS got much less votes in Aragua and Sucre than the MVR in 2004).

See, Lara might have been born in El Sombrero of Guarico, but all his life took place in Caracas. He even run in 2000 for Miranda governor, and was elected Miranda representative! In Guarico the llanero mentality does not forgive easily such transgressions, even if they come from the hand of Chavez. That he was a lousy communication minister has not helped much his credits in the area. Yet, Chavez has spent enough time campaigning in Guarico with Lara in his shadows that polls are now too close to call in the state.

The Manuitt camp was of course unwilling to accept such a poor candidate as Lara who discovered Guarico as he campaigned. So since Manuitt was subject to term limits he decided to run his daughter in the PSUV primaries. She barely lost, called fraud and decided to run on her own. All smiled but the girl did manage a decent campaign and now we do not know who will win the contest (though she was leading for a while). I saw Lenny Manuitt on TV. I must say that I was favorably impressed: her father might be a crook and an uncouth character but he educated his daughter, a young, articulate, appealing candidate. She has raised above the PPT ideology and has managed to present herself as the true local candidate with the required pragmatism, which might have hurt her among the PPT voter who is more attached to Chavez rhetoric of class warfare.

The opposition without anyone to field thought it was pulling a fast one by running Reynaldo Armas, a local folk singer. But his candidature floundered fast and no poll gives him more than 20% of the vote. In fact a case has been made that if he were to withdraw Lenny Manuitt would win without trouble. That Armas candidacy will be in fact a major set back for the opposition who proves that in the Llanos it cannot even find suitable candidates. Guarico will remain chavista or PPT for at least another 8 years before the opposition can mount a viable challenge.

There are two urban centers of interest in Guarico: the state capital San Juan de los Morros who the opposition barely missed in 2004, and Valle de La Pascua one fo the few cities truly deep in the Llanos (San Juan de Los Morros, as the name indicates is on the hilly edge of the Llanos). As it is now a routine observation, these two cities gave less to the SI than the rural areas of the state. Could one be won by the opposition? A must if it wants in 8 years form now mount any challenge. The odds are not clear. The opposition might have managed unity in more than half of the districts which should give it an edge against a deeply divided chavismo. But that same divide might encourage people not to waste their vote and chose Lenny Manuitt allies as a lesser evil. By the same token the opposition might be wept away at the local legislature. Truly, Guarico is one of those text books cases on how not to opposer the chavista machine.

Portuguesa

Portuguesa used to be the breadbasket of Venezuela. But it is not that prominent anymore. Once controlled by the MAS, Portuguesa was an easy pick for chavismo even if it had to rally first Antonia Muñoz who run for the constituent assembly as an independent and got elected. Chavismo decided wisely to recruit her instead of fighting her then and she has served as governor for 8 years. But her succession by a personal appointee of Chavez, Wilmar Castro Soteldo, is far from certain. Not to mention that the second term of la "negra" Muñoz was less than stellar.

The story here is that the PPT is also running a dissident candidature through Bella Petrizzo. Early in the campaign she run quite well and was ahead in the polls. Portuguesa was in fact the state where Chavez started getting personally involved in the campaign and attacked savagely the PPT and the Communist Party who also support Petrizzo. It seems to have made an effect: the imposed candidate of Chavez has overcome Petrizzo in polls, and yet he is not certain of success. The division between pro Chavez rank is deep enough that the opposition candidate, Jobito Villegas, who was not given a chance three months ago could squeak by in what would become a major upset of the campaign since Portuguesa is considered perhaps the most chavista area of Venezuela.

At this time Portuguesa is perhaps the most unpredictable state. Even if the Chavez man is ahead in the polls, he is not comfortably ahead and a sudden shift of voters towards Petrizzo o Jobito could well create a surprise. Interestingly it seems tha tthe divisions are carried at municpal level making the race all over the state very voaltile. Still, in the end I think that Wilamr Castro will prevail, though I am not so sure for Guanare and Acarigua.

Barinas

I saved this one for last because it has the highest drama content: Chavez own brother is in trouble by a dissident chavista who has made his name by denouncing how the Chavez family got rich in Barinas. The struggle has become so deep, the participation of Hugo himself so marked that the opposition candidate who was thought to have a chance at the beginning had been relegated to a distant third.

Chavez decided that his father should be succeeded by his brother Adan, an academic ideologue who is credited with having brought to Hugo Fidel ideas. Maybe, but Adan is a dour bureaucrat totally lacking charisma. Still, compared to his other brothers deeply involved in “business” Adan was somewhat more presentable. Unfortunately in Barinas everybody knows that the Chavez had nothing a decade ago and that now through “prete noms” (testaferros) they have become among the biggest landowners of Barinas. The rest of Venezuela might not care but in Barinas they do.

The dissident Julio Cesar Reyes comes from a group of folks deeply attached to chavismo as a way to change things. But not like the Chavez getting rich, and thus the split. Amazingly through the campaign his name has grown and now he is reported as leading in some polls. This should not be a surprise anyway, he is the outgoing mayor of Barinas, a district that contains more than 30% of the state population and which reflected him in 2004 with 90% of the vote. Needless to say that a defeat of Adan in Barinas would be the major news of the election outside of Venezuela.


Conclusion

Either through chavismo or dissidence the Llanos are no hunting grounds for the opposition except for the occasional town hall (though a couple of important ones could fall). This is not really surprising as Chavez misiones and “business” have favored that region more than any other. However what is interesting to observe is that Chavez has taken this region so much for granted that he imposed three candidates that had no real roots with the area except form being born there: William Lara, Adan Chavez and Wilmar Castro. His act of arrogance could end up costing him much because even if he wins in the three states he would have created a powerful dissident movement that could become the root to a new opposition branch that would be more united and organized than the current crop. To be continued for sure.


-The end-