The Sur del Lago region is resisting the potential narco-guerrilla take over

Dangerous escualidos defending their job

It seems that censorship is working inside Venezuela because I learned late that the 47 farms that were expropriated last week in what we call "Sur del Lago"are resisting the unjust chavista take over.  Not only I learned about this recent development late but I learned it through Colombian TV while Globovision was continuing its "normal " programming.....  Although there are already pictures available on the web the information is meager, just official TV relating that all is going well in the "rescue" of abandoned land and El Universal who is more explicit and which writes that three, 3, battalions of the army have been dispatched to take over these, I assume considering the extensive army deployment.

Hugo Chávez: un bandolero que ademas es idiota y desgraciado

Pues por fin se reveló oficialmente porque Chávez robó los terrenos productivos del Sur del Lago.  Para dárselos a los Rusos.  Así, no mas.

17 BsF.

Chávez robó las fincas productivas del Sur del Lago, las que nos daban leche, plátanos y carne, para dársela a los rusos, para que siembren plátano, para que se coman topochos en Novosibirsk.  Allí va la soberanía alimentaria.  Allí va la variedad de la comida nuestra.  Allí va la soberanía, punto.

“Ya tenemos el terreno al Sur del Lago de Maracaibo" dijo así, como que si con el no fuera, como si se lo hubiese ganado en la lotería, como si hubiese levantado unas piedras.

¿Cual será el próximo robo de Chávez?  ¿La próxima afrenta a la soberanía nacional?  ¿Quitarle las producciones de flores de Yaracuy para dársela a los rusos también?  ¿Es que nadie lo va decir en primera plana?  ¿Habrá quien se lo recuerde al país?

Pero ademas de bandolero y desgraciado el tercio como que es idiota: va a poner a competir el Cocuy con la Vodka, como si se pudiese distilar suficiente Cocuy para la sed de los rusos.  Si no hay ni suficiente Cocuy bueno para Venezuela....

¡Es que ...que...  me dan ganas de llorar cuando veo en manos de que psicópata hemos caído!  Pásame una botella de Cocuy, mientras haiga.....

Welcome to the Bolibanana Republic of Venezuela

The proud flag of the Bolibanana Republic of Venezuela

Long time readers of this blog might remember that on occasion I have qualified the Chavez regime as a reactionary regime.  In Venezuelan standards a reactionary regime means looking back at our military past of caudillos who imposed their will at, well, will.  This vision of a past that was never quite what the reactionaries of today think it was, but it includes a mythical Arcadia of coffee, cocoa and banana plantations that kept everyone happy.  Needless to say that even if that vision had a kernel of reality, it was applied to a country which did not reach the 2 million people and such a vision could not satisfy today's country of 30 million people, while being possibly the most urbanized of Latin America.

Well, I was wrong in stressing that the military caudillo was the motor of the reaction: it has now an agrarian component, when our beloved bloated leader wants us to become a banana plantation for Russia, a reactionary tzarist empire in the making if you ask me.

Chucho Hernandez Melean is negotiating, and some are unhappy

There was a turn of events in Sur del Lago that have left a few people confused, but not your blogger.  Chucho Melean, the hero du jour, has decided that it was not time to immolate himself yet, that he should try to negotiate with the regime first.

"minister" Loyo in Chucho's kitchen!!!!!!!

See, Chucho Hernandez Melean is going to be 94 next February;  he has been around.  When he was 10 Gomez held all power and Venezuela was at peace.  Roads did not reach Sur del Lago.  When he was 20 he saw the madness of oil prospecting while he was digging his trenches in the lands he could take over for free because no one wanted them.  He survived the "revolucion de Octubre" and all of its failed promises while the original Venezuelan social contract started to fray.  During his most productive years Perez Jimenez was ruling.  When he thought he could plan his retirement, roads, electricity, health care arrived Sur del Lago, but also agrarian reform and, later, FARC banditry.  He thus went along quietly completing one of the most successful farm complex in Venezuela while the country slowly sunk.  He treated right everyone, from the military leeches seeking gifts to, we suppose, less wholesome parasites.

Milagros Socorro monitoring Sur del Lago

Chucho Melean, walking cane and all

If you want to know what is going on in the Sur del Lago after the robbery sponsored by Chavez, follow on your twitter Milagros Socorro as she is getting ready to witness hero du jour , Chucho Melean, being taken into custody or something at 93 years of age.  Apparently the army is getting ready to make its move.

It is truly a sad day when a country uses its armed forces to rob citizens of their life's work, because in case you do not know, for the last year the regime has stopped paying any compensation for whatever it takes, letting you know you are lucky to take out your truth brush as you leave.  The cowardice of the regime is reaching new unsuspected lows.

A ridiculous cadena to hide the Sur del Lago protests

Sur del Lago people are resisting.  The legislative assembly of the state moved down there to seat, the representatives elect are stirring the pot, the regime sent a Cuban general!  A Cuban general to direct the repression, how appropriate!!!

So, all of this is playing in Globovision and apparently whoever has access to Globovision is watching.  That is too many people, no matter how many.  So Chavez has prepared a cadena that has just started for the graduation of some of the new National Police that reaches its first year of existence.  As far as we can tell the new National Police has made no dent on the crime rate of Venezuela however it has shown that it has been well trained for repression as we could see from the protest in Caracas subway about three weeks ago.

In other words the cadena is useless but it serves a censorship purpose, the more so if as it is quite possible the regime decides to strike against the people blockading the roads.

That everyday "coup d'état": two this week in Venezuela

François Mitterand was a long time opponent of Charles de Gaulle, to the point of writing a book which title was "Le coup d'état permanent", the continuous coup.  He reproached de Gaulle his strong presidential style to the point of equating it to a a rule issue of a coup.  In France with a long tradition of unstable parliamentary government the accusation did ring, but that did not stop Mitterrand, once elected president in 1981 to rule as much or more as an "imperial presidency", US style.

When all is said and done it was rather amusing and somewhat ridiculous because the separation of powers in France had been achieved long ago and was too anchored to be easily corrupted, even for some one with the stature of de Gaulle.  And this did not stop de Gaulle to resign after he lost a referendum that he sponsored.  In Venezuela on the other hand, a president asks for a major referendum, loses it, and goes on applying the failed referendum anyway, through a system that can be justifiably called a "permanent coup" and military at that.  The constitutional violations of the regime, of a Constitution that it wrote itself 11 years ago, cannot be counted anymore.  Every day new violations, based on previous violations, become the law of the land.  This week we got two more for the list.

La Planta as theater of the absurd: bringing out the inner criminal in the regime

The missing AR-15 of La Planta?

La Planta jail riot and eventual closure keep revealing the inner workings of the regime.  And it is not flattering.  After all, when you accept to "negotiate" with hard criminals, when you allow them to take their goodies with them, when you allow them to pick the seclusion center where they will be transferred, you only acknowledge one thing: you are of the same nature than the criminals you are "negotiating" with.  This was not a negotiation between the judicial system of the republic and inmates that may or may not have justified demands.  This was an agreement between two type of gangsters so as to diminish the public impact, in order to keep doing business.

And today the regime keeps giving evidence of being such a gang.  Not only with La Planta sequels but with the return of Loyo to office!

The 2010 election predictions: Zulia

For the past two days I have been stuck at home with all sorts of contract workers that could only come this week.  So in between bouts of supervision, checking work e-mails and some phone calls I have time to speed up my electoral analysis.  Thus we move on to Zulia, our very own "big enchilada".

Zulia is actually a good bellwether state even if the result there is predictable: the opposition, or rather the UNT, will win.  The only question is whether they will manage a grand slam or just a comfortable majority of the seats allotted.  And that is why it is a bellwether state because the more the opposition manages to progress in a state that already belongs to them, the more it speaks of chavismo degradation in ways that we cannot see in, say, Cojedes where a 10% drop in chavismo does not necessarily mean much.

Rosales is the unity candidate: the campaign starts!

No real surprise there as to the name, though a slight surprise at the opposition finally managing to put its act together. I am rather happy to say that this blog had long ago stated that the strength of the Rosales support was underestimated by the Caracas folks that think they control politics in Venezuela. I mean of course “La Republica del Este” for its Eastern heavily anti Chavez suburbs. But eventually reality imposed itself: you could not just dismiss the governor of Venezuela’s biggest state, and THE one that resisted the chavista onslaught in 2004. His stature had not stopped increasing among Venezuelan outside of Caracas, and became nearly unstoppable after December 2005 when he is the one that managed best the “abstention” crisis of that December when he was widely expected to carry almost all of the Zulia seats against all initial odds.

Even the long term valiant effort of Borges to try to reach out of the central region was not enough. He did indeed made sure that PJ became a “national party” but it is still a party with some strength in only about half a dozen states. Rosales without a formal party already was leading in the Western half of the country. Teodoro Petkoff sort of suspected that when he went early to talk to Rosales before he even launched his own presidential bid. But Teodoro could not finish; though he was smart enough to sense where the wind was coming from and withdrew first, launching the inevitable love fest of sorts when all the other candidates withdrew, where Sumate cancelled the primaries, where Manuel Rosales was proclaimed and made his first official (and decent if populist) campaign speech. The unity picture on the right, with Borges, Rosales and Petkoff.

Chavismo was at the same time surprised but ready. Surprised because it was rather obvious that they did not expect that the opposition would unite, because they were probably really counting on a division. Indeed what better argument for Chavez as he cheats his way back to office to say that “but there were several candidates, did you not see them?”. But chavismo was ready anyway. Already tonight at 7 PM the VTV show “Dando y Dando” was nothing but a vicious attack on Rosales, at tax payer expense. Not even the “moderator” pretended any form of objectivity. We also got a “cadena” at 8 PM where for a good ten minutes we got a travelogue of Chavez last trip in that it was just an assemblage of happy pictures of loving African babies and hugs with all the leaders he visited during 2 weeks. This completed with at least 6 "major achievements of the revolution" in Venezuela. My first advice to the Rosales team is to record VTV 24/7 and all cadenas and do continuous reports of all the violations of the electoral code that Chavez is already doing. Start counting also the very few minutes that the state media will grant to Rosales as opposed to the hours and hours that Chavez will literally steal through cadenas and legal and forced governmental advertisements. You will need to document all of that to the international observers when in October the situation becomes unbearable and you might want to start street protests and withdrawal threats. Trust me on that one, chavismo is barely starting its abuses.

I really have not that much to say about Rosales. He is the typical provincial politician that made good. That is, he started on the lowest echelons of AD in the then remote “Sur del Lago” area, the humid and swampy southern side of Zulia. But he climbed steadily until he reached the Maracaibo mayor office, the second one in the country. When the chavismo tidewave came he was smart enough to leave AD and form his own political party, UNT, Un Nuevo Tiempo (a new time). He must have been a rather successful mayor as he was easily elected governor of Zulia when Chavez old buddy Arias Cardenas preferred to run for president and lost. Still, this unassuming provincial politician was not given much credit even if his 2000 victory was stronger than anyone had expected at the height of Chavez REAL popularity. In fact, the conjunction of Arias and Rosales was enough for Chavez to lose Zulia when he was taking every other state. At the time one would have thought that it was the Arias factor but now it seems that the star of Rosales was already rising.

Rosales went on to become a constructive opposition leader. At first he tried to build bridges with Caracas which, if anything, reflects well on his desire to fulfill his pledge to Zulia voters before promoting his own personal ambition. Some people even considered the UNT as a junior party of the Chavez majority. But by 2002 he was in the leading edge of the opposition, being awkwardly filmed, rather embarrassed, signing the infamous Carmona decree (I personally remember as I watched TV that April 12 whether he was going to sign so awkward was his demeanor). Since then Chavez has marked him. But it did not help because in spite of the biggest attack machine that Chavez designed he could not unseat Rosales in 2004.

Because this is a fact: for all its threats against the Carmona decree signatories, the legality is on such shaky grounds that we are still waiting for the massive trial promised. The reason is simple, if such trial is ever held chavismo will also have to take a stand in the trial and chavismo has as much to fear from a close investigation of April 2002 than the opposition. How else can we explain that 4 years have passed and nothing has been done except a few indictments and citations? Rosales being recently one of the targets by the way: we will see if the sold out judiciary dares to jail him during the campaign.

I would not dismiss Rosales easily if I were chavismo (I do not think they do considering what I already saw today, Carmona decree pictures included)). He might be an old fashioned populist politician but he holds several big cards from the start.

1) His reelection in Zulia shows that he has achieved something there, that people like him, that he reached them. No matter what dirt Chavez tries to throw at him (VTV is ripe of cheap adds about dissatisfied Zulianos), Rosales has at least as much to show for than Chavez in Venezuela, all proportions guarded.

2) Rosales cannot be tied to Caracas old politics. Rosales has never held a Caracas office. All his career is in Zulia state and all the huge rallies he has called were in Zulia, not in Caracas. In addition he bailed out of AD early enough and has been careful to surrender himself with local pols (then again he might be provincial enough to be wary of anyone not from Zulia). These days Chavez looks everyday more like just another Caracas distant pol for us in the provinces.

3) He has a rather plain speaking tone. A nice respite from the Chavez exhausting speech. After 8 years of permanent confrontation a candidate that promises good management, to bring back the bucks sent away, in a more measured tone, might have a surprising effect.

4) His face his poke marked, he is short, he looks almost as mestizo as Chavez and certainly not white, not Caracas type at all. Think province lawyer. Playing race and elite with him will not go far. Frijolito 3 will not work well with Rosales.

But Rosales has some big problems too. He will need to find fast the right confrontational tone with the CNE. He will need to solidify the opposition unity as an electoral alliance with a minimal but concrete government plan. He will need to steady himself against the Chavez formidable vulgarity onslaught. He will need to watch out for betrayal maneuvers from people such as AD or some hard right folks that might be the ones behind some other disturbing candidacies. He will need to find money. He will have barely three months to set up a support group to make sure that elections are not stolen from him. As I had written months ago: Rosales should have been a unity candidate late May, at the latest. Two full months have been wasted in intrigues.

Thus is Rosales, an accidental candidate, the one that nobody expected, the one that probably never thought he would even leave the “Sur del Lago”. Yet today he carries on his shoulders all the weight to save Venezuelan democracy. I have seen him once. A couple of years ago I was at the Eurobuilding of Caracas on a business diner. This was in the sad post recall election days. Rosales was then trying to organize the regional campaign for the elections which saw the loss of all but 2 states to Chavez. Rosales was with a small group of 2-3 people, standing up at the bar area but not drinking, waiting for someone. Nobody was stopping to say hi. Nobody was staring. He had a certain “had been look” as all the opposition leaders had these days. The conversation was serious, no one was smiling. As a blogger I was tempted to go and introduce myself but I was on business and I could not drop my party. I had a rather favorable impression of the guy: non assuming, quiet, serious, slightly undaunted to be in such a public place without any escort, not even an obvious assistant, taking himself his cell phone calls (he was the governor of the main Venezuelan state, an assistant would have been expected!). Today the sycophantic tide is turning his way. I hope, I even think that his provincial nature will protect him from them. All that he has he owes it apparently to himself alone: he owes nothing politically. He seems of the no nonsense type. He might be the man after all. We will see.

Ministros sin menester

Creo que los gringos inventaron esa tradición de la "luna de miel" política, ese tiempo que se le da a un político recién electo para que tome sus primeros pasos sin ser juzgado con severidad. Obviamente, políticos reelectos no tienen tal beneficio aunque por lo menos se les permite unos días para saborear su nuevo triunfo. Ni siquiera esto está pasando hoy en Venezuela y no es culpa de la oposición: con sus primeros nombramientos al gabinete no solamente Chávez nos reta, pero da al traste con cualquiera buena intención que habría de parte de la oposición no para un dialogo pero, digamos, para un chat, aunque sea por Facebook.

The FARC business inside Venezuela increasingly revealed

Chavez must start regretting a little bit his praise words toward the FARC. This is only resulting in an increased scrutiny of the FARC activities inside Venezuela by the press. And the Chavez administration is not looking good at all. In fact, in his latest article Juan Forero barely stops himself from accusing chavismo to be collaborating deliberately with the FARC business inside Venezuela. It must have been difficult for him to stop as we even have a "smoking gun" of sorts through the confessions of FARC deserters. This is in fact the most complete and researched article that I have seen so far from the foreign press about the specific activities of the FARC, even more remarkable that Juan Forero used to be a chavez supporter and that by writing such an article he endangers his position inside Colombia where he is based. Either that or inside Colombia the FARC is in such trouble that people are starting again to write and report about the FARC terror.

So, which are these activities inside Venezuela? Kidnapping for money (Forero does not mention drug trafficking, but that is OK, his article is damning enough as it is).

Which are the modalities? Direct kidnapping or kidnapping threats by FARC or ELN groups, and also the local mob kidnapping people that are thought to be at least worth half a million bucks to "resell" them to the FARC.

Which are the practical aspects? Kidnapping of course, with people held often for years. Even when they die in captivity, kidnappers still try to collect a ransom pretending they are alive. But there is also a very extended system of "vacuna" vaccine, where you are obliged to pay a certain sum every year if you do not want you or your relatives to be kidnapped at some point.

What does the chavista government do to prevent? Nothing. In fact it is busy diminishing the statistics, minimizing the numbers, trying to make links with the mob only, going as far as to pretend that the FARC has nothing to do when it is public and notorious that the FARC has been at it for years. And if it is not the FARC that is directly involved, the leaders seem all to be graduates from the FARC or ELN universities.

Does the government of Chavez participates? All seems to indicate that yes, it does so and actively. We have the kind words of Interior Minister Rodriguez Chacin to the FARC guerrilla that released Hernandez and Rojas early January. But we also have many testimonies form ex FARC. The Venezuelan Nazional Guard and other "security" offices such as the DISIP are deeply infiltrated and some of its components collaborate extensively with the kidnappers to facilitate information on the potential victims. This is even seen these days in non FARC related crimes such as the regular ransom activities observed in Caracas where quite often police from the Metropolitana are involved.

Which are the results? Staggering. Kidnapping went up from 44 the year Chavez reached power to 232 in 2006 and 382 last year, government numbers! Private numbers are much higher as many victims are very aware that the authorities are not only of no help but usually make things worse. In addition this has disrupted the agricultural production of one of the most productive areas of the country, Tachira and Sur del Lago since of course it is much easier to monitor the "wealth" of agricultural producers and to kidnap them while the travel through the country side to check on their fields. The food shortages that we are suffering are due in part to that situation.

Is there anything new in Forero's article? No, nothing. All has been said beofre, Forero just had to put it all together. But he has the merit of research, of talking to the victims and of exposing himself as a target for which he deserves praise. We must thank him for this because inside Venezuela it is becoming more difficult to speak abotu those things. Journalists now know that talking about such issues will result in an automatic tax income audit at the very least, to real threat of body harm, to even exile. Yesterday again, the legislative body chamber of the Carabobo state was wrecked by disgruntled supporters of the Governor Acosta Carles with journalists trying to film the event crudely aggressed. So you can imagine what happens when these journalists try to cover matters such as drugs or kidnapping....

Any political repercussions? Forero duly notes that the FARC link is not helping at all the popularity of Chavez. As the kidnapping industry expands, the bitterness of the victims and of the people who know about them increases. To which I can add that it is becoming clear to all that if the state security does not fight such abominable crime, it will fight even less petty crime that is the scourge of all of us. The recent pictures of the hordes of people trying to get food in Tachira are also contributing to slowly but surely illustrate to people how the government blind eye approach to the problem is affecting even their access to food. No wonder Chavez went straight to the confrontation with Exxon, even if through that unnecessary fight he wrecks the economy once and for all. After all, Chavez has made a career to hide a scandal with a new one, bigger if possible. But that is how thugs operate, no?

-The end-

After a legislative coup, a sort of economy coup: massive devaluation in Venezuela

And yet you would not believe that there was such a massive devaluation if you read only the headlines of Google news.  Words like "unification" pop up to hide the fact that about half of the imports of Venezuela will now cost 65% more in USD than they did today.

Second cadena of the day

The university Romulo Gallegos is graduating some medical personnel, surgeons we are told.  The kind of personnel that I do not want near me if I am sick or injured, now that we know the kind of education they are getting.  But the excuse is good enough for a cadena to silence Globovision, to silence the speech of Zulia governor that was passing as the cadena started.

But Chavez can do as many cadenas as he wants, the Sur del Lago is a battle that he is far from having won.


PS: I will spare you the new bolivarian socialist version of the Hippocratic oath according to Chavez....

The "Chucho Melean" saga

I do not know how the invasion and organized land robbery of the Sur del Lago farms by the regime will end up, but one thing we are going to get is a fabulous saga by Milagros Socorro.  In Codigo Venezuela, the e-zine she is now editing, she has started to tell the tale in a series of installments.  The first one is up, in Spanish unfortunately but do not miss it and try the Google translation tool if you must.  It is more, much more than just the narrative of the last couple weeks: it is a slice of Venezuelan social history and mores!

From Calabozo to El Vigia: is the real Venezuela speaking up?

This blogger specialty, to give it a name, is to try to take the pulse of what goes on outside of Caracas. Not that living in San Felipe gives me particular clout on this, but since I am the only English language blogger that lives in the provinces if anything I get the title by default (1). I was particularly impressed by the latest set of campaign pictures published by Alek, in particular the pictures from two rallies: one in Calabozo and the other one in El Vigia. From what I see, what I hear, what I sense, it seems that the Rosales campaign is hitting chavismo really hard in the country side.

The Calabozo rally and its implications

Before I put the picture of the rally from Calabozo, I went to my Google Earth and took a picture of the Venezuelan Llanos (roughly the are circled in phosphorescent green). It is important to point out that Calabozo is smack down in the Llanos, one of the main points of agriculture, where most of the Venezuelan rice comes from (click to enlarge). It is also in the middle of all the land redistribution schemes. Within a 100-150 miles radius you have major invasion and take over schemes such as Hato Piñero, or all the controversies of Guarico governor, Manuitt, a particularly despicable thug.

Thus we could have expected Guarico and Calabozo as being one of the areas where Chavez should be able to run easy, no significant opposition since all his burnt earth policies were made in the name of the people, to give them land, to give them a way of life, to retain them on the ground. But the picture of the rally in Calabozo surprised me: I would have never expected Rosales to be able to fill up more than 3 blocks, tightly filled up at that (look in the distance, you cannot tell where it really ends). Calabozo is after all a small town, and far from any source of people that could be brought in by bus to pack the streets. These are really the people from the area who came on their own as Rosales meetings do not give enough advance notice to ferry all the folks in, not to mention he does nto have the means of Chavez who can commandeer all the public transportation he wants, whenever he wants.

Apparently we must conclude that the agrarian policies of Chavez have not been, by far, the rousing success that he pretends them to be. The only thing that Chavez has managed to do is to ruin commerce and investments in the area, while bringing the sulfurous smell of corruption such as the Barinas sugar mill. I will have to review my predictions as to the Llanos where I was giving a huge lead to Chavez: after the success of Rosales in Apure and Calabozo things are not a given anymore for Chavez.


El Vigia confirms Merida for Rosales

El Vigia I chose among Alek pictures because it is a predictable results. That is, even though El Vigia is in the state of Merida, its hinterland is Sur del Lago, the political birthplace of Rosales. If you compare the El Vigia rally with the one of Calabozo you can measure even further the importance of that Calabozo turn out. If I were just to base myself on these two pictures I should call both Guarico and Merida for Rosales (right now I am giving Merida to Rosales but still Guarico to Chavez as after all Chavez seems still strong in San Juan de los Morros. But he is definitely weakening in Guarico and upset should brought back in the Venezuelan dictionary.

Anyway, I hope these pictures are food for thought for the pollsters of the world that are swarming around trying to get Bolivarian cash to publish half assed polls. I am not too sure how you can be a successful pollster in Guarico where you probably cannot even run cel phone polls. But what Alek is seeing is real: something is going on, and as far as I know Chavez is not planning any rousing rally in Calabozo…

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1) Alek already asked me to do an evaluation of Lara a few days ago.

What would a Rosales presidency look like?

After having scrutinized some of Rosales' program presented last Wednesday, and after seeing that the polls keep inching up even though Rosales is still not ahead, one can start speculating some as to how would a Rosales presidency be. It would be simplistic to imagine through time what would be the steps taken: after all Rosales will inherit the daunting prospect of the whole state machinery geared to serve the new leader of the opposition, Chavez. However it is possible to consider the “feel” that his presidency would have. We have seen already enough to suspect that Rosales will be a very different president from those we have had in the past.

The first “maracucho” president

One thing that external observers might not be realizing is that Rosales would be the first Zuliano (maracucho) president. If memory serves me well, since independence times no maracucho has reached high office in Venezuela, this a preserve of the Andes region mostly, with a few significant figures from the Central part and an occasional Easterner or Llanero. That might seem silly to observe but it is not, because maracuchos are a breed of their own and they are mad that Venezuela development has been based on what is found under their feet and which has failed to produce wellbeing for their state while Caracas politicos have split the pie as they wished.

Now Zulia has the largest chunk at the National Assembly, and probably the most vibrant state economy in spite of Colombian guerilla setting shop as your corner mafia organization. A people who has managed to strive against all handicaps imposed from Caracas will definitely imprint a new administration with quite a different way to do business.

A true province president

The second hallmark of a Rosales administration is that it owes nothing to Caracas establishment. That is, Rosales career has been a Zulia only career and if Rosales is indebted to anyone is to Zulia folks and Zulia campaign money givers. The Caracas funding machinery has geared only once Rosales got the presidency and they are motivated much more by getting Chavez out of the picture than by electing Rosales. Once in office, well, he will be able to stick his tongue out at the Caracas establishment. I think that this would be a tremendous change in the way of doing politics. Even Chavez failed to set free form Caracas, for two reasons. His main political advisors at first where products of Caracas politics (Miquilena, Rangel to name two). Then, when he turned more and more to the army, it was often to soldiers who made career holding command or office posts in Caracas defense ministry of Fuerte Tiuna or Maracay which is after all now only a distant suburb of Caracas. And if Chavez is free of electoral debt it is only because he dips into the public treasury as needed and he forces folks getting huge contracts with the state to chip in. That could backfire once these people reach the polling station.

A hands on approach

Rosales has started his career in possibly the most difficult area of Venezuela. Sur del Lago is a hot, humid, sticky, gang land area. You cannot become a successful political leader there is you do not know how to squeeze the flesh, how to respect deals made, how to communicate constantly with the people, your constituency. Failure to do so can mean that you are promptly ejected of power, or that a “machetazo” late at night in an obscure alley would end your career. This has made Rosales a hands-on mayor and governor, one that is always worried that his policies are implemented and monitored. Granted, in Venezuelan political culture implementation and follow up are relative terms compared to what we see elsewhere, but at least it is fair to say that of all past presidents, the only one that comes close to worry about follow up were Leoni and Perez Jimenez.

The interesting contrast here is that Chavez has perhaps bragged to be the most hands on president of our history but the record of mismanagement of his administration indicates that in fact he has been the most distant and disinterested president in our recent history, with the possible exception of CAP, the president to which Chavez resembles the most, even though he hates him best.

Thus with Rosales we would have a new kind of management style never before experienced in Venezuela. For the first time ever we will have a president that will have extensive management experience (Zulia and Maracaibo are our most populous state and second biggest city respectively). For the first time we will have a president that is out fo reach from Caracas control, that will come with his own gang to avoid falling into the net of Caracas diverse mafias.

Because make no mistake: a Rosales presidency is not a return to the past. Rosales has no need of politicos of the past, owes nothing to them, does not think like them. All of those who support Rosales and hope that they will just have to ring at Miraflores door to get a job once Rosales moves in are in for a rude awakening. Rosales is his own man and he will not take crap from anyone, be it chavista or old style opposition.

A black kiss and a piece of paper: chavismo on the fritz

I have tended to stop bothering about tiny details of daily electoral life in Venezuela: long ago I have noticed that chavismo has been using, when not creating, new scandals to hide inconvenient ones. Chavismo also loves to wallow in details so they can later pick one to make a point, no matter how insignificant that detail might be. Thus after last Saturday Avalancha I have been surprised that since last Monday chavismo has been trying to whip up outrage about two things: 1) Rosales does use notes to direct his speeches and 2) Rosales wiped his mouth after kissing the Lady that is current poster boy of the campaign, she who illustrates the Mi Negra offer.

My first reaction was to dismiss it, but something bothered me in the whole insistence. And sure enough today it all came together: as usual with chavismo these types of incidents reveal much more about themselves than what they might reveal about Rosales (or any other targeted victim).

Let’s start with the easiest one to discard: Rosales as racist. The whole issue, as shown on the video below, is that Rosales did wipe his mouth after kissing the lady shown in one of the different dark skinned people promoting “Mi Negra” one of the main offers of Rosales (she is the one with a white T-shirt). Why did Rosales wipe his mouth? The brow of “Mi Negra” was two sweaty? Is Rosales racist as VTV implies?

Let’s go back to Rosales himself. The picture on the left is taken from today’s march in Aragua. You can go to Vcrisis pages and see many pictures of the sort. Let’s start by the obvious first: how “white” is Rosales? I would like to start with all the people who are tearing today their shirts in horror as to Rosales racism and to go all the way to the end of their reasoning and tell me how “white” Rosales” is. Rosales is criollo, that is, there is at least one African American ancestor in his gene pool.

Let’s continue with the political life of Rosales: he has been elected, reelected through every position that Venezuela allows, except President (so far). And he started in one of the possible worst place to start a political career in Venezuela: Sur del Lago, hot, humid, sticky swamp area. Rosales has kissed so many hot, sweaty, sticky people to reach the position where he is that I doubt very much that at this point in his career he needs to wipe his mouth after any elector he kisses. I mean, he would spend his whole wake up time doing so.



No, what is seen here is the “inner” racism of chavismo. Chavez speeches are full of racial allusions. In fact he is using an artificial race card to achieve his personal political ambition.

Before I go on to the next point, I would like also to point out that this video, courtesy of Aporrea at YouTube, is from La Hojilla late night show which has to be one of the vilest creations of Venezuelan TV ever. As for the credibility of the anchor you should consider that among other props he has Che Guevara prominently displayed, which already speaks volume on any objectivity that might be harbored by this guy, who gets a tax payer paid paycheck.

The second point that chavismo used as an issue today is that Rosales uses notes when he makes a speech. I was really dumbfounded by that one. I, for one, personally, feel much better when an important figure uses notes in his or her speech. In the US, even Bill Clinton used teleprompter. When you are in certain positions, you owe it to your audience to make sure that all important points are addressed. The video below shows two things, the moment when VTV, the state official propaganda channel, “exposed” Rosales using Cliff notes, and the use that the communication ministry made us of this moment through its infamous goebbelian holder William Lara (1).



Well, according to Lara Rosales using notes is a weakness that should be duly pointed out. He even pointed out that the Venezuelan parliament used to forbid reading from notes during debates. He probably is ignorant enough to forget that such rules were initially made to stop filibustering efforts, such as the famous US cases when Senators went on the podium and started reading from the Bible for hours.

To begin with, this is all in bad faith. Chavez himself, no matter how loquacious he is, uses notes when needed: he had them at the UN, he is often pretending to write things during his marathon Alo Presidente when in fact he is probably reading stuff he needs to remember. Heck, he even uses hearing radio devices through which his staff undoubtedly feed him with things he needs to discuss, as shown on the picture on the left, where he is clearly "connected", indoor and outdoor. And there is no problem with that. So, why make it such an issue. Because Rosales did not apologize for using notes? Because that makes Rosales less intelligent than Chavez? Because it is better for Venezuela to have a jack ass that speaks with verbal diarrhea for 2, 3, 4, 5 6, or more hours “without” notes than some guy that needs to keep track of things? Guess who has been the best manager, Chavez in Venezuela or Rosales in Zulia? Rosales has been reelected governor of Zulia in spite of all the heavy artillery that Chavez pointed at him in 2004. Enough said.

But why not hear the words of Rosales on this matter? In this third YouTube (2) you can see the almost aggressive tone of the VTV journalist (doing his commandeered hack job) and the reply that Rosales gave, including how come at chavista events oppo media was not allowed whereas he had so much access that he could even film Rosales note book.



As usual this rather pathetic discussion reveals more the inner demons of chavismo than any flaw on Rosales. It says a lot on the mind frame of certain chavistas, such as Lara, that a leader for them must be able to hold the tribune for hours, with no paper in hand, uttering anything. There is a Messianic wish built into the psyche of so many chavistas that it is, well, a subject of worry. They do not want a president manager, they want a president preacher.

Addendum: ever so vigilant readers have sent me yet another video which leaves the chavista racial implication unsustainable. Watch here how Rosales keeps his hand around "Mi Negra"'s neck and has even his daughter partaking in the hugging and patting (see comment section for more details and the reader's name).

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1) In this Video you can also hear Liliana Hernandez asking VTV how come it managed to show Rosales notebook but never showed the view from the grand stand as Rosales addressed the huge crowd attending his speech.

2) This is my first YouTube incursion. Even Venezuela News and Views must update. And for a start, well, three videos!

PS: Thanks to Feathers and YB for the last video and Chavez hearing aid picture.

The building up of a FARC/drug corridor in Venezuela

Miguel's text on Rodriguez Chacin candidacy for Guarico state forces me to finish this post I was pondering for a while. Miguel certainly describes well the character but he seems to have missed the bigger picture that is emerging.  For this I have drawn this very amateur map of what will Venezuela drug routes look like soon, and where the FARC will take temporarily refuge once the Havana talks between the Colombian government and the FARC conclude (1).

How chavismo plans to offer refuge to FARC.
In light mauve the zones in Colombia where FARC and ELN concentrate before crossing over to Venezuela.

The first electoral campaign of Chavez

Yesterday was a holiday in Venezuela. Since it has been gutted of all its meaning as Chavez decided to make it the “day of indigenous resistance”, everyone will give it the meaning it wants, which becomes quickly a free day to go shopping or the beach. In my case I stayed home and rested from some dental work and thought about Chavez electoral problems. Now, they are not that bad, the guy after all has an unlimited supply of money (to campaign or buy votes), controls the media and the electoral system. But he does have some problems recently: money cannot buy happiness even if it can buy the presidency. A few weeks ago it seemed like Chavez would waltz in with 70% of the vote. Now it might even become a squeaker, seriously compromising his road to XXI socialism and his image in LatAm.

I decided that one of the reasons why this time Chavez is not setting the electoral agenda is, well, believe it or not, this is the first real campaign he has to run and he has no one to help him along. But to understand this one needs to make brief historical recap of Venezuelan electoral history.

The 1998 Campaign

Then Chavez arrived as a novelty. He did not even want to run for office but was convinced to do so before starting a civil resistance movement. The implication were quite simple: he run as an anti system candidate, with only a late political set up, the improvised MVR. But he had a campaign to run anyway: after all there is the need for constant press releases, for touring the country, for drafting meetings, rallies, marches, to bring at voting stations witnesses for your own side, etc…

I remember. That was my first year in San Felipe, fresh from many years in the US. When Chavez started climbing in polls he came through San Felipe. Well, guess what? It was the MAS who organized his campaign in Yaracuy. By 1998 there had been a certain regionalization of politics as COPEI and AD had to relinquish the control of some states. Thus the MAS was an important party in Yaracuy, as it was in Portuguesa, Aragua and Sucre. Or the Salas in Carabobo, or Causa R in Bolivar or the PPT elsewhere. Depending on where Chavez went, one of his political allies run the show. And thus Yaracuy was covered with the orange colored flags of the MAS to welcome Chavez.

But this was not all, for the national campaign Chavez counted on wizened guys that if they never managed to win an election had still run many campaigns and new how the job was done. These were folks like Miquilena, Rangel, to name the most important. They only needed a good candidate, a nice loudspeaker, and with Chavez they got it. Thus Chavez, as Woody Allen could have said, had just to show up at meetings to be a success.

The 1999 Campaigns

These had all a common factor: they were single issues event.

The first one was the 1999 constitutional referendum. The opposition, showing how incompetent it would become, decided that the referendum was illegal and thus they would not vote in it. Only 10% brave souls, included yours truly, did go anyway to vote NO to the calling of a new constitutional assembly.

By not voting in the referendum the opposition lost any reason to campaign for the Constitutional Assembly, and screwed by an undemocratic electoral system saw Chavez gain 97% of the seats with barely 60% of the vote (and a rising abstention).

The constitutional ratification was a little bit more fought but the opposition had surrendered initiative in April and by December it was too late to try to get it back. Still, there was “some” campaign but Chavez seemed too strong, was too strong of a leader and on his own he could manage the campaign and get a 70% of the votes, his highest percentage ever, by the way, in a campaign where he invested himself deeply.

That is, in 1999 there was no need for any massive electoral apparatus and the advice of people like Miquilena and the political machinery of 1998 was enough to roll through 1999 with Chavez limiting himself again to be the loud speaker.

The 2000 campaigns

The first one was for the re-legitimization of the elected bodies. Again, using what was left from the 1998-1999 runs, it was easy to propel ahead. With Arias making it a personal run it became an Arias versus Chavez personal battle where issues were never discussed. The result was predictable; Chavez got his first reelection. Yet the National Assembly managed to elect almost a third of opposition candidates. This was due to the fact that the old party machinery still existed and could put a fight at the local level: AD remained the main opposition party.

But there was a problem: the December 2000 referendum became also the first time Chavez lost an election while winning it. In an effort to boost participation for local elections and control townhalls from the opposition by bringing in chavista councilmen, Chavez called for an unnecessary and complex referendum on forcing a new electoral system for Venezuelan trade unions. This time he thought that just by giving the order people would vote for him anyway. That was a mistake. A weak campaign could of course not explain the reasons why to vote whereas the opposition made the referendum a symbol of resistance to the now increasing authoritarian regime. The abstention was massive and the result was gutted of all meaning. Chavez shut up and never brought the issue back. Soon enough the CTV held elections anyway and chavismo candidates were properly routed, not having an adequate machinery to run very complex trade union elections.

For the first time, although one can only see it today, Chavez showed that he was vulnerable if an election required a complex electoral machinery. The curse of messianic leaders.

The 2004 campaigns

By 2004 the political situation had considerably changed. The regime had shown its true colors, and the control of the electoral system had become the new weapon of chavismo. The opposition underestimated considerably the role of the sold out CNE and paid a dear price for it. In addition the opposition did not organize itself well for that election, did not run a proper campaign, falling into the trap that it was uniquely a popular contest on Chavez. Thus the campaign was a popular contest where the opposition was more worried discussing who would be the next president instead of working actively at unseating Chavez. The result is well known: Chavez won with 60%, be it legally or illegally, it does not matter, he won the political battle anyway.

The October 2004 regional elections were of course predictable: the opposition collapse allowed Chavez to take control of all but two states. However the observing eye could have detected a curious phenomenon: in Zulia Chavez would barely make a 53% and in the Metropolitan area of Caracas he would even lose. And in October in spite of a brutal campaign Zulia would remain in the opposition hands with 54% of the vote and a majority in the legislative council. The reason: Rosales, the governor of Zulia did manage a real campaign.

The 2005 campaigns

With the opposition entangled in the abstention inner fight, Chavez did not need to campaign much. The abstention reached historical heights and Chavez cashed up to 100% elected seats.

The 2006 campaign

For the first time Chavez is faced with a real campaign on the other side, and it shows! Rosales has been campaigning all of his life, hard campaigns at that. Let the reader remember that starting political life in Sur del Lago, an area rife with political patrons, caciques and drug overlords where political conflict are often settled with machete fights is the perhaps the toughest electoral school of Venezuela. Starting from there Rosales made it the top position in the biggest Venezuelan state. Nobody gave Rosales that position: he earned it the hard way. On the other hand a case could be made that the historical situation of Venezuela almost resulted in the country giving Chavez the presidential seat.

Thus for the first time ever Chavez has to face a real candidate. And apparently Chavez seems ill equipped for it. One reason is that all the people that were with him are mostly gone, or are all tired. The political wiz of Miquilena and the like have long been booted out of chavismo. Rangel is too busy running the country while his boss campaigns in Venezuela or abroad for a UN silly seat. And the small time political operators have been getting fat with governmental jobs or juicy contracts: they are not in the mood anymore to go and sweat in the streets to round up voters. See, this time it will be harder to rouse enthusiasm for Chavez: after 8 years in office people might still be willing to vote for him but there is really no reason to go and sweat it at political rallies and marches. The hunger for change now is inside the opposition.

Thus we are left with a Chavez that is bereft of an adequate campaign staff (can anyone seriously think that Ameliach is a politically savvy electoral operator?). In fact, more than ever Chavez electoral staff is the board of the CNE who is EXTREMELY lazy and complacent with all the electoral abuses now widely reported in the media. Chavez is alone to run his campaign and it shows: the time when being a good loudspeaker was enough is gone. Today Chavez must also defend his record and defending a rather lousy record without the appropriate staff, well, in any political system it is a hard job.

This is what happens when you create a system where the only way to rise to the top is to show devotional inclinations for the great leader. Few creatives can handle a system where they are not allowed to question the presidential agenda or his decisions. For the first time we see Chavez running in a real election on his own and it is not pretty so far.

We will see how it plays from here to December.