Tuesday, November 17, 2015

As Caucaguita goes so will the election go (election YV-4)

Long time readers of this blog will remember that I have picked up Caucaguita as a bell-weather district in all election analysis that I have written along these many years. Sometimes even with regularly updated graphs as years added more data. As I have written a few months ago this time around I have neither the intention, nor the time to analyze in detail this most emotional of elections, amen of the worst treachery factor since 1999. But I did promise a few short posts in the last days to help interested people understand what is going on. So I went to my Caucaguita electoral figures and came up with this simplified version.

To make a long story short, Cuacaguita is a poor downtrodden area of Eastern Caracas in the Petare district. It has been used as an electoral propaganda ground, most notoriously in the  Luis Herrera election (1978). But things never improved much since. It should be a district where chavismo should get always 75% of the vote. And yet it does not.

Now there is a lot of data available for the behavior of Caucaguita voter and one observation is that abstention rates are at least 10% higher in "local" elections than in "national" elections. And more variable. But now I can use only "national" elections data, presidential, referenda and legislative in the graph above. And the results can be simplified to that subset of data, and become more telling.

Interestingly the abstention trend line is to decrease. Slowly but surely.  This shows that not only the "bring in the vote" machinery has perfected over the years, but even the opposition benefits from it in what is normally hostile territory. Never mind the possibility of a better educated elector, more aware of its role.

The second observation is that the advantage of chavismo is eroding, slowly but equally surely. The graph shows what percentage of the opposition vote would represent of the chavista vote. That is, 60% means that for every 100 chavista voters 60 opposition voters showed up.

I think that the graph above is quite clear in its meaning even though the total chavista votes varies a lot according on what is actually on the ballot. The opposition vote is increasing its share, and it has gone from a 1 to 2 deficit  advantage to barely a 4 to 5.

This is bad news for the regime as we cannot see how this one can stop that trend, the more so that the economic situation is near catastrophic. If the opposition were to manage a count of at least 85% of the chavista count in Caucaguita we can predict a general victory for the opposition country wide. Only rural districts can escape the electoral logic of the Cuacaguita urban nature.

I will note that in its latest attempt at gerrymandering Cuacaguita was taken away from Petare, considered lost for chavismo, to supplement the Guarenas-Guatire district now under heavy opposition pressure (Guatire is already lost). However if the opposition equates 85% of chavismo in Caucaguita I am afraid that it all will have been for naught for the regime.

Then again there is also naked electoral fraud, but that is another story.  The take home lesson here is that the lower the abstention the better the chances for the opposition. This graph, in this most difficult district, is explicit. In other words, for the assholes that still preach abstention, please, shut up, you are an embarrassment.


  1. kernel_panic1:56 PM

    Daniel, you say "amen of the worst treachery factor since 1999". Can you please elaborate? Back then I was only a kid, and all I know about those elections is that he won the constituyente with about >90% of the vote and not all folks went out and voted...

  2. He won the referendum on the constituyente because it was organized by the still existing electoral authorities that were in place in 1998 and recognized his electoral victory. That 90% voted yes is another matter. At least I voted NO and I wear this as my badge of honor.

  3. There may be other explanations for meaning of the data on "abstention". Quite possibly, those who were not voting are often simply not that "political" or politically opinionated. If these voters are forced or shamed into voting by the "get out the vote" movement, there is a good chance they will vote for the opposition. And they are the exact voter that will tend to switch allegiance due to poor economic and security conditions. Voters who are not that political will react to bad economic and security issues.

    At some point in time, the opposition voter becomes more engaged and likely to vote. As economic issues increase and the popularity of Maduro and the memory of Chavez decline, the Chavez voter becomes increasingly less and less enthused about voting, less political and more likely to abstain. Such voters when they switch sides are not likely to abstain in the near future until something changes.

    Over time, the identity of the likely voter to abstain can change.

    Therefore, a point in time will come when abstention hurts the Chavistas more than it will the opposition.

  4. Anonymous6:32 PM

    As a matter of interest - How much "leaning" on a voter by the Government goes on. Especially with Government Employees or people on Government Benefits ????


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