The few faithful readers left to this blog would certainly not have been surprised last week when chavismo decided to start "talks" on constitutional programming for the 2013-2019 program of government which must undoubtedly lead to a new attempt at modifying the constitution of 1999.
In a text published on October 21 I explained as clearly as I could that chavismo had to seek a constitutional modification in order to avoid an election were Chavez going to croak before January 2017. amen of seeking to make the presidency hereditary within the Chavez family so as to avoid unpleasant succession wars. I really do not need to add anything to that previous post, except to make limited comments as to the timing and methods chosen by chavismo.
Showing posts with label autocratic 2007 constitution. Show all posts
Showing posts with label autocratic 2007 constitution. Show all posts
Wednesday, November 14, 2012
Monday, December 29, 2008
2008: the year Hugo Chavez lost his democratic fig leaf
There are many ways to write a routine article to review a year. As far as this blogger is concerned 2008 will mark the year when the pseudo Bolivarian Revolution has been proved without a doubt to be only a vehicle for Chavez personal ambition to retain power forever. Or, in other words, 2008 will come down as the year where it became impossible to ignore the undemocratic nature of Chavez and his followers.
That is good in a perverse way, in that now we have a clearer panorama of the situation. Now it will be very difficult for any supporter of chavismo to dare support this masquerade.
A simple summary will be enough to refresh any one’s memory and to sustain my point.
In December 2007 Chavez lost his first vote when he tried to modify the constitution in order to accumulate more power for himself. A true democrat can always be appreciated in defeat. Chavez was a sore loser. If on the first night he grudgingly accepted defeat (after a considerable delay) a couple of days after he showed how bitter he was posing in the middle of his generals, just as the landscape of Caracas was being dotted with posters warning that he was not giving up.
The first sign of what was to come was when the Electoral Board, CNE, failed to release the final results of the referendum. To this date we still do not know the exact margin of victory for the NO. In what democratic country one can observe such a disregard in telling the people the result of a supposedly free and fair election? Thus the political umpire of Venezuela was the second in exposing its naked partiality.
Through 2008 a series of decree laws established many of the provisions that were rejected in 2007. The argument here is not whether these changes could have been applied through laws without a constitutional change. The point is that Chavez tried to get them through a constitutional change, the people said NO and Chavez went ahead anyway.
At the end of 2008 Chavez tried to transform what should have been regional elections into a plebiscite on himself. Never as for these elections the machine of state was used to the extent it was used to favor one side, the Chavez side. Never was a presidential language as foul as the one used by Chavez during this campaign where political adversaries where labeled traitors and worse. But again, the specifics of the election, as tasteless as they were, are not the real point, nor the final results: the riveting moment was when chavismo refused to relinquish the few places won by the opposition or when it pillaged and turned them into nothing before finally allowing the newly elected officials to take charge. The opposition officials were served notice that they would not be allowed the means to exert the position for which the people elected them.
To crown this already telling year, Chavez within hours started yet a new electoral campaign where he threw aside all pretense of the noble aims that he tried to make us believe guided him: a single amendment to the constitution to allow his reelection. Simply put, Chavez is blackmailing the country with the reactionary argument that if he is not allowed to run for office again, that if he must leave office one way or the other, the country will fall into chaos. The implication here is not that Chavez should be allowed to run again for election, the implication is that not only he should be allowed to do so but that he should be allowed to use any forcible mean to ensure that he is reelected. Make no mistake: this coming referendum is also a referendum on Chavez campaign style, on the material abuses he commits, on how he twists the law to remove any opponent that could become a threat to his hold on power. Those who will vote YES on the February 2009 referendum will also vote to allow a man to use such tactics that he will never be threatened at the ballot box. We saw those tactics in 2008, they include from incomplete electoral results release to restrictions of civil rights to whomever displeases him.
Those are the only things worth retaining from the 2008 year in Venezuela. All the rest are mere distracting details.
That is good in a perverse way, in that now we have a clearer panorama of the situation. Now it will be very difficult for any supporter of chavismo to dare support this masquerade.
A simple summary will be enough to refresh any one’s memory and to sustain my point.
In December 2007 Chavez lost his first vote when he tried to modify the constitution in order to accumulate more power for himself. A true democrat can always be appreciated in defeat. Chavez was a sore loser. If on the first night he grudgingly accepted defeat (after a considerable delay) a couple of days after he showed how bitter he was posing in the middle of his generals, just as the landscape of Caracas was being dotted with posters warning that he was not giving up.
The first sign of what was to come was when the Electoral Board, CNE, failed to release the final results of the referendum. To this date we still do not know the exact margin of victory for the NO. In what democratic country one can observe such a disregard in telling the people the result of a supposedly free and fair election? Thus the political umpire of Venezuela was the second in exposing its naked partiality.
Through 2008 a series of decree laws established many of the provisions that were rejected in 2007. The argument here is not whether these changes could have been applied through laws without a constitutional change. The point is that Chavez tried to get them through a constitutional change, the people said NO and Chavez went ahead anyway.
At the end of 2008 Chavez tried to transform what should have been regional elections into a plebiscite on himself. Never as for these elections the machine of state was used to the extent it was used to favor one side, the Chavez side. Never was a presidential language as foul as the one used by Chavez during this campaign where political adversaries where labeled traitors and worse. But again, the specifics of the election, as tasteless as they were, are not the real point, nor the final results: the riveting moment was when chavismo refused to relinquish the few places won by the opposition or when it pillaged and turned them into nothing before finally allowing the newly elected officials to take charge. The opposition officials were served notice that they would not be allowed the means to exert the position for which the people elected them.
To crown this already telling year, Chavez within hours started yet a new electoral campaign where he threw aside all pretense of the noble aims that he tried to make us believe guided him: a single amendment to the constitution to allow his reelection. Simply put, Chavez is blackmailing the country with the reactionary argument that if he is not allowed to run for office again, that if he must leave office one way or the other, the country will fall into chaos. The implication here is not that Chavez should be allowed to run again for election, the implication is that not only he should be allowed to do so but that he should be allowed to use any forcible mean to ensure that he is reelected. Make no mistake: this coming referendum is also a referendum on Chavez campaign style, on the material abuses he commits, on how he twists the law to remove any opponent that could become a threat to his hold on power. Those who will vote YES on the February 2009 referendum will also vote to allow a man to use such tactics that he will never be threatened at the ballot box. We saw those tactics in 2008, they include from incomplete electoral results release to restrictions of civil rights to whomever displeases him.
Those are the only things worth retaining from the 2008 year in Venezuela. All the rest are mere distracting details.
Thursday, August 21, 2008
Chavez deus ex machina
With the flurry of recent events one is in need of reviewing which Chavez’s real intentions are. Well, readers of this blog have known long ago what this is all about, to install Hugo I. But maybe it is time to evaluate the last couple of months, a check point of sorts, to see where we are going. First, we need a summary of what must be comprehended if you want to make sense of current events.
Principles of chavista grammar
I know, I know, this is going to be repetitive for many of you but I think on occasion it is worth listing again what are the moving forces behind what we see unfolding.
Chavez wants to remain in office for ever. This is clear, and it is the main driving force of all that happens, from the people that think they will benefit from Chavez hold on office from the mistakes of many in the opposition who amazingly seem not to have quite gotten that, not forgetting those who have already accepted that as a fact of life and pretend that all is fine as they dodge bullets daily, you know, like a Panglossian silence.
Chavismo cannot leave office peacefully. After ten years of larceny and corruption and outright looting, too many within chavismo know that without Chavez in power they will not be able to enjoy the loot they have accumulated. At least not inside Venezuela. Since many of them are “resentidos sociales” they do want to enjoy their new wealth inside Venezuela, not in Miami. Otherwise many of them would have already left, having by now ensured their financial future. No, most chavista want to be rich IN Venezuela to rub it off the faces of the many folks they hate.
The people that rule are thugs. I do not mean this in a pejorative sense, believe it or not. No, I mean this in a psychological sense. Chavez and his entourage are ruling Venezuela exactly as if this one were the gang in charge of some bad neighborhood. They also feel their turf under constant threat from other street gangs. What this means is that they are unable to see people that disagree with them as just that, a disagreement that needs to be discussed in public so that people can decide which is the way they want to do things. They are unable to see anyone that disagrees with them as anything else but a personal threat. In a way, so far, this has been our salvation from totalitarianism: these people are not ideological enough to have such a driving goal, what they want is control and loot. As long as you are not perceived as threatening them, or do not provoke their envy, you are fine. Por ahora.
Chavistas are competently incompetent. Forgive the purposeful oxymoron. The general lack of education or experience in things of the world for most if not all chavista officials are for all to see. After 10 years they are still learning on the job. Unfortunately learning is difficult for them because, well, they do not have the proper education tools, the ones that taught you how to learn and how to evaluate ideas. However they do have the cunning, and they have raised cunning to value status, erasing most other values such as honesty, hard work, openness and transparency. The mystery here is how come a government was able to survive mostly on cunning: no real creativity, no follow up, no nothing, only cunning and day to day improvisation, with the only long term goal being retaining Chavez on top. Look for example at the misiones, the only semi creative thing chavismo ever did. These days Chavez is satisfying himself with renaming them. Chavismo has survived because the political opposition goes from mistake to mistake and because of generous oil prices. Chavistas have proven themselves exceedingly competent on their cunning maneuvers, in order to bend and twist all that stands in their way. For the rest? Forget it!
Chavez’s problem
As far as he is concerned, Chavez has a single problem in life: he lost the 2007 referendum and according to the constitution he must go February 2013. Any constitutional change to remove that expiration date can only be done through further constitutional violation. Of course, that does not bother him a bit, but you know, you still need to make that change believable enough to force people to accept it. Thus all his measures aim at:
Now that we have reviewed how chavismo is motivated and how it perceives its challenges let’s look at some examples on how he tries to solve intractable problems, the chavista deus ex machina.
Inhabilitaciones. Barring popular leaders form running for office is the latest trend. And yet chavismo is not creative there as it is a method already in wide use among some of Chavez friends. But in this case the peculiar competence of chavismo is clearly in example: they do not even need to jail or put their opponents on trial. A simple administrative decision by what is nothing more than a bureaucrat is enough to stop the run of, say, Leopoldo Lopez for Caracas Mayor. Now, his 20 to 30 points lead is of no use for the opposition as Leopoldo is more worried about benefiting of his victim status rather than solve the candidature problem he left in his wake. We could even say that chavismo made Leopoldo act more like a self serving thug than a responsible long term politician, validating their outlook on life.
Nationalization of the cement industry (and others to come along that line). No sane government has any need to nationalize the cement industry of the country. There are many ways to control prices, and supply, and priorities. For example the government could decree that for its own needs it gets in priority so many tons of concrete a year. Thus the private producers will need on their own to increase their production to satisfy their own customers which can only be served after the state has been served. And they can charge them more if needed as the government can negotiate a “special” price. So, why take over cement industry?
Well, here we have at play the incompetence in chavismo in building housing and major public works. The need to blame another is in part solved by pretending that the government is nationalizing the cement industry because we are led to think Cemex, Lafarge and Holcim where not following this well established capitalist principle of selling the rope to the guy about to hang you.
But we also have the fear of losing power. See, in 4 years Chavez will have to support a successor election, in case he has not found a way to change the constitution and run again himself. As such the nationalization of the cement industry is an admission that the coming local November election will mark a defeat for chavismo, and give 4 years exposure to an eventual successor at some state house. The new crop of local authorities will have four years to prove their worth, for example building the housing that the central government is unable to do (see, by the way, the case of Acosta Carles who is the only chavista governor with a significant public housing track record and who is now able to challenge chavismo in Carabobo!). The solution is thus simple: from now on chavismo will control who will get what cement and at what price. I bet you anything that the new governors will get near nothing, and at high price. You want bridges, houses, hospitals and schools? Vote Chavez! The ultimate blackmail.
This scenario is applied to the nationalization of the steel industry, on the nationalization of the main refrigeration complex in Venezuela, on other food concern nationalization to come who will send their production to PDVAL and MERCAL in priority, and thus to chavista mayors and governors and officials. You are hungry? You want a Mercal near you with full shelves? Vote Chavez! The ultimate populism!
Last minute enabling law decrees. No, the government was not that incompetent to issue on the last day of its 18 months period the 26 decrees it emitted a couple of weeks ago. No, the government was not deliberately violating constitutional principles as a provocation: the constitution has lost its virginity as early as late December 1999 and for thugs repeated rape does not count. No, the real reason for the late publication is that the government needed to tailor them as useful as possible considering polls. It was good to also void any discussion that could have forced a withdrawal of some of the decrees, an event that could have taken place easily if there was a public uproar before the enabling law expired. Now, only painfully long process can change these laws and thus chavismo can apply them for a while at least, long enough to give a few blows.
The enabling law decrees. It is very simple: passing many of the social and economic controls that Chavez wished for in December 2007. He did not get them, people rejected them, so he did the thug way: I am the strong guy here, my way of the highway. That is how Chavez solves the problem he got on December 2: a distinct possibility of weakening about to become much worse November 23. Now, the result of the elections in November 2008 will not mean that much as chavismo will retain the main power tools in all states and cities no matter who is elected there, opposition or chavista as many of them seem to desert Chavez after 4 years.
These laws carry a whole lot of goodies for chavismo, the kind of goodies that populist of the past had wet dreams about. Just to give an example: now Chavez can expropriate whomever he wants. It is not in the constitution but it is in the law. Chavistas come, take your business away with the lamest of excuses BUT you will be paid something, someday. Promised!
Chavez now can decide to lower your prices because “the people” need your goods. He can lower that well below costs if needed if he can prove you were hoarding. Since it is chavistas bureaucrats who decide, not even judges, who is hoarding, well, you are screwed. And if you stop production because you cannot afford it, then you are expropriated.
If by any chance you considered starting a protest or something then you will have the militia getting in your place of work, because see, now Chavez is again a military by law and as such he has the right to go above any general or any officer to force any militia or troop to enter and loot your store, or protect chavista looters. Until then he could only declare wars or guarantee public order. Now he can loot. Be happy that you are not sent to jail because you could end there easily, for more years than if you had killed your spouse.
And I let you imagine what will happen to your business if you are caught financing some opposition politician. May the good Lord take you in his mercy!
--- --- --- ---
I can keep going on with more examples from the decrees, or how some of these things are used as decoys to distract people from taking about the very real problems of the country such as the murder rate and the murderous inflation rate. But I trust that the reader got the point.
-The end-
Principles of chavista grammar
I know, I know, this is going to be repetitive for many of you but I think on occasion it is worth listing again what are the moving forces behind what we see unfolding.
Chavez wants to remain in office for ever. This is clear, and it is the main driving force of all that happens, from the people that think they will benefit from Chavez hold on office from the mistakes of many in the opposition who amazingly seem not to have quite gotten that, not forgetting those who have already accepted that as a fact of life and pretend that all is fine as they dodge bullets daily, you know, like a Panglossian silence.
Chavismo cannot leave office peacefully. After ten years of larceny and corruption and outright looting, too many within chavismo know that without Chavez in power they will not be able to enjoy the loot they have accumulated. At least not inside Venezuela. Since many of them are “resentidos sociales” they do want to enjoy their new wealth inside Venezuela, not in Miami. Otherwise many of them would have already left, having by now ensured their financial future. No, most chavista want to be rich IN Venezuela to rub it off the faces of the many folks they hate.
The people that rule are thugs. I do not mean this in a pejorative sense, believe it or not. No, I mean this in a psychological sense. Chavez and his entourage are ruling Venezuela exactly as if this one were the gang in charge of some bad neighborhood. They also feel their turf under constant threat from other street gangs. What this means is that they are unable to see people that disagree with them as just that, a disagreement that needs to be discussed in public so that people can decide which is the way they want to do things. They are unable to see anyone that disagrees with them as anything else but a personal threat. In a way, so far, this has been our salvation from totalitarianism: these people are not ideological enough to have such a driving goal, what they want is control and loot. As long as you are not perceived as threatening them, or do not provoke their envy, you are fine. Por ahora.
Chavistas are competently incompetent. Forgive the purposeful oxymoron. The general lack of education or experience in things of the world for most if not all chavista officials are for all to see. After 10 years they are still learning on the job. Unfortunately learning is difficult for them because, well, they do not have the proper education tools, the ones that taught you how to learn and how to evaluate ideas. However they do have the cunning, and they have raised cunning to value status, erasing most other values such as honesty, hard work, openness and transparency. The mystery here is how come a government was able to survive mostly on cunning: no real creativity, no follow up, no nothing, only cunning and day to day improvisation, with the only long term goal being retaining Chavez on top. Look for example at the misiones, the only semi creative thing chavismo ever did. These days Chavez is satisfying himself with renaming them. Chavismo has survived because the political opposition goes from mistake to mistake and because of generous oil prices. Chavistas have proven themselves exceedingly competent on their cunning maneuvers, in order to bend and twist all that stands in their way. For the rest? Forget it!
Chavez’s problem
As far as he is concerned, Chavez has a single problem in life: he lost the 2007 referendum and according to the constitution he must go February 2013. Any constitutional change to remove that expiration date can only be done through further constitutional violation. Of course, that does not bother him a bit, but you know, you still need to make that change believable enough to force people to accept it. Thus all his measures aim at:
Psychological war to make folks believe he will not go, that he is indispensable.Application of the chavista grammar rules
Controlling everything in society in such a way that if he violates the constitution there will be no way for a political challenge to rise and block his takeover. This has a side benefit: if he manages to control society but for any reason he fails to retain power in 2013 he would at least be able to put someone in place to rule by proxy, à la Putin.
Now that we have reviewed how chavismo is motivated and how it perceives its challenges let’s look at some examples on how he tries to solve intractable problems, the chavista deus ex machina.
Inhabilitaciones. Barring popular leaders form running for office is the latest trend. And yet chavismo is not creative there as it is a method already in wide use among some of Chavez friends. But in this case the peculiar competence of chavismo is clearly in example: they do not even need to jail or put their opponents on trial. A simple administrative decision by what is nothing more than a bureaucrat is enough to stop the run of, say, Leopoldo Lopez for Caracas Mayor. Now, his 20 to 30 points lead is of no use for the opposition as Leopoldo is more worried about benefiting of his victim status rather than solve the candidature problem he left in his wake. We could even say that chavismo made Leopoldo act more like a self serving thug than a responsible long term politician, validating their outlook on life.
Nationalization of the cement industry (and others to come along that line). No sane government has any need to nationalize the cement industry of the country. There are many ways to control prices, and supply, and priorities. For example the government could decree that for its own needs it gets in priority so many tons of concrete a year. Thus the private producers will need on their own to increase their production to satisfy their own customers which can only be served after the state has been served. And they can charge them more if needed as the government can negotiate a “special” price. So, why take over cement industry?
Well, here we have at play the incompetence in chavismo in building housing and major public works. The need to blame another is in part solved by pretending that the government is nationalizing the cement industry because we are led to think Cemex, Lafarge and Holcim where not following this well established capitalist principle of selling the rope to the guy about to hang you.
But we also have the fear of losing power. See, in 4 years Chavez will have to support a successor election, in case he has not found a way to change the constitution and run again himself. As such the nationalization of the cement industry is an admission that the coming local November election will mark a defeat for chavismo, and give 4 years exposure to an eventual successor at some state house. The new crop of local authorities will have four years to prove their worth, for example building the housing that the central government is unable to do (see, by the way, the case of Acosta Carles who is the only chavista governor with a significant public housing track record and who is now able to challenge chavismo in Carabobo!). The solution is thus simple: from now on chavismo will control who will get what cement and at what price. I bet you anything that the new governors will get near nothing, and at high price. You want bridges, houses, hospitals and schools? Vote Chavez! The ultimate blackmail.
This scenario is applied to the nationalization of the steel industry, on the nationalization of the main refrigeration complex in Venezuela, on other food concern nationalization to come who will send their production to PDVAL and MERCAL in priority, and thus to chavista mayors and governors and officials. You are hungry? You want a Mercal near you with full shelves? Vote Chavez! The ultimate populism!
Last minute enabling law decrees. No, the government was not that incompetent to issue on the last day of its 18 months period the 26 decrees it emitted a couple of weeks ago. No, the government was not deliberately violating constitutional principles as a provocation: the constitution has lost its virginity as early as late December 1999 and for thugs repeated rape does not count. No, the real reason for the late publication is that the government needed to tailor them as useful as possible considering polls. It was good to also void any discussion that could have forced a withdrawal of some of the decrees, an event that could have taken place easily if there was a public uproar before the enabling law expired. Now, only painfully long process can change these laws and thus chavismo can apply them for a while at least, long enough to give a few blows.
The enabling law decrees. It is very simple: passing many of the social and economic controls that Chavez wished for in December 2007. He did not get them, people rejected them, so he did the thug way: I am the strong guy here, my way of the highway. That is how Chavez solves the problem he got on December 2: a distinct possibility of weakening about to become much worse November 23. Now, the result of the elections in November 2008 will not mean that much as chavismo will retain the main power tools in all states and cities no matter who is elected there, opposition or chavista as many of them seem to desert Chavez after 4 years.
These laws carry a whole lot of goodies for chavismo, the kind of goodies that populist of the past had wet dreams about. Just to give an example: now Chavez can expropriate whomever he wants. It is not in the constitution but it is in the law. Chavistas come, take your business away with the lamest of excuses BUT you will be paid something, someday. Promised!
Chavez now can decide to lower your prices because “the people” need your goods. He can lower that well below costs if needed if he can prove you were hoarding. Since it is chavistas bureaucrats who decide, not even judges, who is hoarding, well, you are screwed. And if you stop production because you cannot afford it, then you are expropriated.
If by any chance you considered starting a protest or something then you will have the militia getting in your place of work, because see, now Chavez is again a military by law and as such he has the right to go above any general or any officer to force any militia or troop to enter and loot your store, or protect chavista looters. Until then he could only declare wars or guarantee public order. Now he can loot. Be happy that you are not sent to jail because you could end there easily, for more years than if you had killed your spouse.
And I let you imagine what will happen to your business if you are caught financing some opposition politician. May the good Lord take you in his mercy!
--- --- --- ---
I can keep going on with more examples from the decrees, or how some of these things are used as decoys to distract people from taking about the very real problems of the country such as the murder rate and the murderous inflation rate. But I trust that the reader got the point.
-The end-
Tuesday, August 12, 2008
Why Chavez killed justice
Last December we told Chavez NO to his personal ambitions. But Chavez will not take NO for an answer and courtesy of an accomplice Constitutional Court he has found a way to get a lot of the stuff that we, as a people, rejected last December in a referendum. By the way, we are still waiting for the final count of that referendum and this accomplice silence of the CNE also explains a lot on why Chavez dares to violate the Constitution.
This cartoon of Weil is almost sublime and makes me want to cry.
-The end-
This cartoon of Weil is almost sublime and makes me want to cry.
-The end-
Friday, August 01, 2008
26 new laws by fiat in Venezuela
Just as the enabling law was about to expire, Chavez signed 26 new law-decrees that are applicable as of today. And he had the nerve to publish only their title in the Official Journal so even though the laws are already under application we might be unknowingly breaking many a law.
A quick survey of the titles already announce us very delicate times:; the army law for example is modified, something that should be modified only with adequate consultation. Others such as housing, tourism and social security were also affected. Not to mention that in Venezuela behind a name anything can go. Expect trouble ahead.
26 laws! Without consultation, without anyone expecting decisions on many of these topics! And coming on a week end without knowing at all what is inside these fiats!
But I tell you what, a lot of these laws are to push the Constitutional Reforma that was rejected last December. Their undemocratic nature, from the start, is a sure sign of conflicts ahead. Just as it happened in 2001, leading us straight to he 2002 coup. The situation is different now and in fact the result might be different for Chavez: a major defeat in November which would almost certainly imply a recall election on the National Assembly.
And this would be the best and most pacific outcome for the country. I let you imagine other outcomes, just as Chavez nationalized the third biggest bank in the country yesterday.
-The end-
A quick survey of the titles already announce us very delicate times:; the army law for example is modified, something that should be modified only with adequate consultation. Others such as housing, tourism and social security were also affected. Not to mention that in Venezuela behind a name anything can go. Expect trouble ahead.
26 laws! Without consultation, without anyone expecting decisions on many of these topics! And coming on a week end without knowing at all what is inside these fiats!
But I tell you what, a lot of these laws are to push the Constitutional Reforma that was rejected last December. Their undemocratic nature, from the start, is a sure sign of conflicts ahead. Just as it happened in 2001, leading us straight to he 2002 coup. The situation is different now and in fact the result might be different for Chavez: a major defeat in November which would almost certainly imply a recall election on the National Assembly.
And this would be the best and most pacific outcome for the country. I let you imagine other outcomes, just as Chavez nationalized the third biggest bank in the country yesterday.
-The end-
Monday, May 26, 2008
The 2008 election gambles: part 1, Chavez’s angst
May first brought once again to the forefront the divided country that Venezuela has become. There were two “workers” marches convoked. One to praise Chavez, with dozens and dozens of buses coming from all around at tax payer expense, all passengers adequately uniformed in red, brandishing whatever slogan du jour. The other one was a more heteroclite affair made of actual workers, mostly from Caracas. But there was a difference this time: the opposition workers march was barred from its final outcome by an extraordinary display of police and soldiers that betrayed only one thing: chavismo is running scared.
It is clear to all that the December 2 referendum has changed the political course of the country. With Chavez aura of invincibility gone, not only his followers are less likely to put up with all of his antics, but a new type of opposition, now emboldened by its success believes that the end of the regime is not a farfetched hypothesis anymore. What the opposition is doing these days is the subject of a following post.
The pressing events of the past few months, from the pro FARC debacle, through the new wave of nationalization and to the difficulty in locking up the PSUV configuration give a clear picture of what Chavez problems are and how he would try to win the regional elections next November. But before getting into this once again the reader must be reminded what are the real objectives of Chavez and what does he disposes to reach them.
What Chavez wants
It is very simple: Chavez wants to remain in office for life. For the time being his aim is thwarted by the December 2 2007 defeat but he still has more than 4 years to find a way around this obstacle. This need is exacerbated with the debacle of the Anderson Case where, after the financial corruption, the moral corruption of the regime is for all to see: once Chavez is not anymore in office, once the judicial power is freed of his control, a boatload of chavistas, including Chavez, are going to find their sorry asses in court, on the accused benches for a welcome change. In other words, the only way that a few hundred of folks can keep enjoying their loot is for Chavez to remain in office ad perpetuum, including the Chavez family who have carved a nice little fiefdom in Barinas. Not understanding this makes it impossible to understand anything else that is going on in Venezuela these days.
What Chavez has
He has two things: the oil check book and the people that are still with him. The oil check book is something nice and handy and with a lot of reach, in particular these days where a decreased Venezuelan oil production is nicely compensated with an oil barrel flirting with 130 USD. In fact some economist think that the misiones and his foreign actions are financed directly by oil, bypassing normal budgetary procedures (and staling funds that should go to the individual states). Day to day state functions are financed by a large portion of the oil income and by the SENIAT who every day is taxing more and more as the state expenses increase more and more. The taxation burden in Venezuela is reaching unbearable proportions, not from the amount of money taxed but because the tax payers are getting less and less in return. More than ever taxing is robbing the rich to give to the crooks, and, accessorily, the poor. In democracy the rich (read, anyone paying taxes in Venezuela) do not mind that much that their taxes are used to buy social peace, but they also want pothole free roads and to be able to sleep tight at night.
But there is also another problem that chavismo is starting to feel: the stipends that they used to give to the huddled masses are not enough. When someone is used to get a certain amount of freebees after a while this amount does not seem so great anymore, the more so when the annual inflation is somewhere high above the 20% mark. That is, if instead of teaching to fish you give free food, well, people get fat and hungrier. In short, if Chavez does not hurry up to secure his permanent hold on the country, soon there will be not enough money to buy such control, no matter how high oil prices are. Social programs can reach only so far.
Of course that Chavez is surrounded by crooks able now to steal quickly millions of dollars through semi legal ways does not help him much. Corruption under Chavez has rotten the state faster and deeper than the corruption during the full 40 pre Chavez years. And yet Chavez has to work with such people: he is the one that turned a blind eye to corruption in the hope to secure a devoted base, if anything to blackmail this new caste if needed- Unfortunately, even if devoted to Chavez (often through necessity and inner chavismo scare tactics), such a base is incompetent.
The drama of Chavez is that he cannot attract good managers, or charitably put, not enough good managers. Competent people, people with good administrative skills have enough self worth that they do not need to work for Chavez, and are certainly not willing to put up with his lengthy cadenas where they must spend hours nodding so as not to fall asleep, where they cannot even get a glass of water nor a bathroom break, while hoping that they will not publicly be insulted by Chavez. To subject yourself to such public humiliation you are either a nobody that has no choice in life or you are a crook. A few years ago one could still give the benefit of the doubt to the Chavez entourage: today such benefit is not allowed anymore.
Thus Chavez is paying the price for surrounding himself with mediocrities, whose only value for him is an alleged blind loyalty. All the problems that are now associated with the regime, from potholes in the streets to crumbling hospitals, from food shortages to extraordinary import levels are due to the people in charge who are all, without exception after the departure of Vielma Mora, crooks or incompetents, or usually both.
Clearly, with that motley crew Chavez will not solve the problems of the country and yet he must rely on them to spread the oil manna. And win elections.
The problems at hand
Moral corruption. After the Isaias Rodriguez fiasco with the Anderson case, as the cover up cannot be hidden anymore, you have to be a really hard core chavista to pretend that everything is fine. True, there are plenty of those around left, but not enough to win a large election without cheating.
Financial corruption. That one cannot be hidden anymore. Paradoxically it is not too much of a problem for chavismo since too many people just want to plug in and see what they can get. Besides, the primitive political culture of too many Venezuelans lead them to think such silly things as “well, it is our side who is stealing, so what is the problem?”. Yet, the problem is slowly but surely eroding chavismo more moderate base. That Chavez is not really hanging anyone for corruption will eventually accelerate the demise of the regime, just as it sped up the demise of the pre Chavez years. There is only so much that people can put up with and that these days Venezuelans are particularly lax in morals do not mean that they have no moral.
Food and other shortages. The coupling of increased purchasing power of the masses with the failure of production to increase from the late 90ies levels have resulted in a catastrophic chronic food shortage in Venezuela that can only be palliated through massive, and increasingly expensive, imports. That is, the oil money is spent on food and eventually find its way to the sewers, instead of, say, new roads or new jobs. Regrettably for Chavez with the incompetents that surround him, it does not matter how much he will increase imports, he will not be able to solve the problem on even a medium term prospect. Once upon a time the solution would have simply been to allow the private sector to work without much harassment, but now even that would not enough. For ten years there has been a major neglect in the upkeep of the Venezuelan infrastructure and this now is reaching dramatic proportions. The increased volume of cars and trucks, and motor traffic, courtesy of oil at 100 USD is just overwhelming the road system. Now any truck carrying food spends twice as much time as it used to do 3 years ago to reach its destination. The railroad system is years form been completed and collapsing roads are ensuring that the problem of efficient food distribution is going to get worse before it gets better. Amen of any increase in food production which depends in large part on the circulation of crops and their needed supplies.
Insecurity. The crime wave is not abating no matter how much the government twists statistics. The back pages of the newspapers tell a tale: Iraq risks being favorably compared to Venezuela. The only solution to this problem is short term repression and long term plans and prosperity and real job creation. The government has demonstrated that it can only repress opposition and is devoid of any long term plans. These anyway probably would be useless since the ministry revolving doors make any new appointee come up with his own plan superseding any previous effort. Expect an upward trend in the murder rate. Besides, high crime is a way for the government to control the opposition. After all the big wigs of chavismo have several body guards paid at tax payer expense. Why should they worry about their own security? How can the relate with the masses? Why should they care? The more crime there is, the more scared the populace is and the less it will think about protesting Chavez policies.
Real jobs are not coming. Real jobs are only created when there is a real economic growth in production ventures. Imports, distribution and banking redistribution of populist supplies do not ensure a permanent growth in economic output. In other words as long as Chavez economic policies do not allow the private sector to grow, there will be no creation of real jobs and only the public sector and some services will be the ones creating a few jobs, with the fragility that this implies. Yet the problem is dramatic for the state. The first promotions of the new chavista universities (UBV, for example) are coming to graduation and the work training plans are churning out “graduates” by the thousands. They all have pretty much useless skills and too much political baggage for the private sector to hire any of them, assuming it were hiring. Legions of chronic jobless are starting to hit the streets of Venezuela, and they have been promised jobs. How will Chavez deliver?
The enemy within. The newly formed PSUV is already having all sorts of problems. The delay in its formation was apparently due to the near impossibility to put up a veneer of democratic hues over the need for Chavez to have a transmission vehicle totally reliable, military style. Starting for the claimed 5 million plus sing up in 2006 we ended up one year later to about 20% of the original claimed number voting in the PSUV internal “elections”. Of course, that was in part a consequence of an indirect tiered voting procedure which was designed to have Chavez favorites to win. Still, many did not, delaying further the final installation of the PSUV. As the candidates are been selected for November, the PSUV is showing considerable strain due to this deficient birthing.
And there are many more problems that could be listed, something normal for any regime that has already run for ten years and who is now devoid of ideas and who never was very creative to begin with. The question is what Chavez will make of this and how will he run a campaign which is crucial for his future. Any result where the opposition carries 8 or more states will be considered as a major defeat and cannot be spun as a democratic face-lift for the regime. Any result where the opposition gets 10 or more states will even question the chances for Chavez to reach the end of his term. Such a defeat will almost automatically trigger a recall election on the National Assembly and the loss of the chavista majority there. There is one thing I can vouch for: Chavez knows this very, very well.
-The end-
It is clear to all that the December 2 referendum has changed the political course of the country. With Chavez aura of invincibility gone, not only his followers are less likely to put up with all of his antics, but a new type of opposition, now emboldened by its success believes that the end of the regime is not a farfetched hypothesis anymore. What the opposition is doing these days is the subject of a following post.
The pressing events of the past few months, from the pro FARC debacle, through the new wave of nationalization and to the difficulty in locking up the PSUV configuration give a clear picture of what Chavez problems are and how he would try to win the regional elections next November. But before getting into this once again the reader must be reminded what are the real objectives of Chavez and what does he disposes to reach them.
What Chavez wants
It is very simple: Chavez wants to remain in office for life. For the time being his aim is thwarted by the December 2 2007 defeat but he still has more than 4 years to find a way around this obstacle. This need is exacerbated with the debacle of the Anderson Case where, after the financial corruption, the moral corruption of the regime is for all to see: once Chavez is not anymore in office, once the judicial power is freed of his control, a boatload of chavistas, including Chavez, are going to find their sorry asses in court, on the accused benches for a welcome change. In other words, the only way that a few hundred of folks can keep enjoying their loot is for Chavez to remain in office ad perpetuum, including the Chavez family who have carved a nice little fiefdom in Barinas. Not understanding this makes it impossible to understand anything else that is going on in Venezuela these days.
What Chavez has
He has two things: the oil check book and the people that are still with him. The oil check book is something nice and handy and with a lot of reach, in particular these days where a decreased Venezuelan oil production is nicely compensated with an oil barrel flirting with 130 USD. In fact some economist think that the misiones and his foreign actions are financed directly by oil, bypassing normal budgetary procedures (and staling funds that should go to the individual states). Day to day state functions are financed by a large portion of the oil income and by the SENIAT who every day is taxing more and more as the state expenses increase more and more. The taxation burden in Venezuela is reaching unbearable proportions, not from the amount of money taxed but because the tax payers are getting less and less in return. More than ever taxing is robbing the rich to give to the crooks, and, accessorily, the poor. In democracy the rich (read, anyone paying taxes in Venezuela) do not mind that much that their taxes are used to buy social peace, but they also want pothole free roads and to be able to sleep tight at night.
But there is also another problem that chavismo is starting to feel: the stipends that they used to give to the huddled masses are not enough. When someone is used to get a certain amount of freebees after a while this amount does not seem so great anymore, the more so when the annual inflation is somewhere high above the 20% mark. That is, if instead of teaching to fish you give free food, well, people get fat and hungrier. In short, if Chavez does not hurry up to secure his permanent hold on the country, soon there will be not enough money to buy such control, no matter how high oil prices are. Social programs can reach only so far.
Of course that Chavez is surrounded by crooks able now to steal quickly millions of dollars through semi legal ways does not help him much. Corruption under Chavez has rotten the state faster and deeper than the corruption during the full 40 pre Chavez years. And yet Chavez has to work with such people: he is the one that turned a blind eye to corruption in the hope to secure a devoted base, if anything to blackmail this new caste if needed- Unfortunately, even if devoted to Chavez (often through necessity and inner chavismo scare tactics), such a base is incompetent.
The drama of Chavez is that he cannot attract good managers, or charitably put, not enough good managers. Competent people, people with good administrative skills have enough self worth that they do not need to work for Chavez, and are certainly not willing to put up with his lengthy cadenas where they must spend hours nodding so as not to fall asleep, where they cannot even get a glass of water nor a bathroom break, while hoping that they will not publicly be insulted by Chavez. To subject yourself to such public humiliation you are either a nobody that has no choice in life or you are a crook. A few years ago one could still give the benefit of the doubt to the Chavez entourage: today such benefit is not allowed anymore.
Thus Chavez is paying the price for surrounding himself with mediocrities, whose only value for him is an alleged blind loyalty. All the problems that are now associated with the regime, from potholes in the streets to crumbling hospitals, from food shortages to extraordinary import levels are due to the people in charge who are all, without exception after the departure of Vielma Mora, crooks or incompetents, or usually both.
Clearly, with that motley crew Chavez will not solve the problems of the country and yet he must rely on them to spread the oil manna. And win elections.
The problems at hand
Moral corruption. After the Isaias Rodriguez fiasco with the Anderson case, as the cover up cannot be hidden anymore, you have to be a really hard core chavista to pretend that everything is fine. True, there are plenty of those around left, but not enough to win a large election without cheating.
Financial corruption. That one cannot be hidden anymore. Paradoxically it is not too much of a problem for chavismo since too many people just want to plug in and see what they can get. Besides, the primitive political culture of too many Venezuelans lead them to think such silly things as “well, it is our side who is stealing, so what is the problem?”. Yet, the problem is slowly but surely eroding chavismo more moderate base. That Chavez is not really hanging anyone for corruption will eventually accelerate the demise of the regime, just as it sped up the demise of the pre Chavez years. There is only so much that people can put up with and that these days Venezuelans are particularly lax in morals do not mean that they have no moral.
Food and other shortages. The coupling of increased purchasing power of the masses with the failure of production to increase from the late 90ies levels have resulted in a catastrophic chronic food shortage in Venezuela that can only be palliated through massive, and increasingly expensive, imports. That is, the oil money is spent on food and eventually find its way to the sewers, instead of, say, new roads or new jobs. Regrettably for Chavez with the incompetents that surround him, it does not matter how much he will increase imports, he will not be able to solve the problem on even a medium term prospect. Once upon a time the solution would have simply been to allow the private sector to work without much harassment, but now even that would not enough. For ten years there has been a major neglect in the upkeep of the Venezuelan infrastructure and this now is reaching dramatic proportions. The increased volume of cars and trucks, and motor traffic, courtesy of oil at 100 USD is just overwhelming the road system. Now any truck carrying food spends twice as much time as it used to do 3 years ago to reach its destination. The railroad system is years form been completed and collapsing roads are ensuring that the problem of efficient food distribution is going to get worse before it gets better. Amen of any increase in food production which depends in large part on the circulation of crops and their needed supplies.
Insecurity. The crime wave is not abating no matter how much the government twists statistics. The back pages of the newspapers tell a tale: Iraq risks being favorably compared to Venezuela. The only solution to this problem is short term repression and long term plans and prosperity and real job creation. The government has demonstrated that it can only repress opposition and is devoid of any long term plans. These anyway probably would be useless since the ministry revolving doors make any new appointee come up with his own plan superseding any previous effort. Expect an upward trend in the murder rate. Besides, high crime is a way for the government to control the opposition. After all the big wigs of chavismo have several body guards paid at tax payer expense. Why should they worry about their own security? How can the relate with the masses? Why should they care? The more crime there is, the more scared the populace is and the less it will think about protesting Chavez policies.
Real jobs are not coming. Real jobs are only created when there is a real economic growth in production ventures. Imports, distribution and banking redistribution of populist supplies do not ensure a permanent growth in economic output. In other words as long as Chavez economic policies do not allow the private sector to grow, there will be no creation of real jobs and only the public sector and some services will be the ones creating a few jobs, with the fragility that this implies. Yet the problem is dramatic for the state. The first promotions of the new chavista universities (UBV, for example) are coming to graduation and the work training plans are churning out “graduates” by the thousands. They all have pretty much useless skills and too much political baggage for the private sector to hire any of them, assuming it were hiring. Legions of chronic jobless are starting to hit the streets of Venezuela, and they have been promised jobs. How will Chavez deliver?
The enemy within. The newly formed PSUV is already having all sorts of problems. The delay in its formation was apparently due to the near impossibility to put up a veneer of democratic hues over the need for Chavez to have a transmission vehicle totally reliable, military style. Starting for the claimed 5 million plus sing up in 2006 we ended up one year later to about 20% of the original claimed number voting in the PSUV internal “elections”. Of course, that was in part a consequence of an indirect tiered voting procedure which was designed to have Chavez favorites to win. Still, many did not, delaying further the final installation of the PSUV. As the candidates are been selected for November, the PSUV is showing considerable strain due to this deficient birthing.
And there are many more problems that could be listed, something normal for any regime that has already run for ten years and who is now devoid of ideas and who never was very creative to begin with. The question is what Chavez will make of this and how will he run a campaign which is crucial for his future. Any result where the opposition carries 8 or more states will be considered as a major defeat and cannot be spun as a democratic face-lift for the regime. Any result where the opposition gets 10 or more states will even question the chances for Chavez to reach the end of his term. Such a defeat will almost automatically trigger a recall election on the National Assembly and the loss of the chavista majority there. There is one thing I can vouch for: Chavez knows this very, very well.
-The end-
Sunday, May 18, 2008
When it rains, it pours: now the Washington Post makes a Reyes lap top editorial
Not a good Sunday for Chavez. There was this piece from Romero about his desperate need to control everything; the one by Carroll feeling sorry for the guy; and now the blast from the Washington Post. Here is the title and even more telling subtitle:
Hard-Drive Diplomacy
Evidence of Venezuela's support for terrorism could carry Hugo Chávez to the pariah status he deserves.
Oh dear.....
I am reporting this late because for some reason the mail daily digest of the WaPo came in late today. But talk about cosmic karma, the icing on the cake after the two previous articles.
Note that if the WaPo is direct, and strong, and convinced of Chavez complicity with the FARC, it also understands very well the rather cowardly Latin American mood. Thus its very constructive solution, one advocated in this blog already: punish the culprits, do not punish Venezuela. The WaPo wisely notices that the referendum was voted down in December and thus a majority of Venezuelans clearly do not agree with the FARC ties. Punishing all of us can only serve Chavez interests.
All in all AN EXCELLENT assessment of the present situation. Let's hope that all the people concerned, from the silly lefty Democrats (Delahunt) to the right wing nutty Republicans (Connie Mack) will sit down together and realize the gravity of the situation, that the time of permissiveness and grand standing is over.
-The end-
Hard-Drive Diplomacy
Evidence of Venezuela's support for terrorism could carry Hugo Chávez to the pariah status he deserves.
Oh dear.....
I am reporting this late because for some reason the mail daily digest of the WaPo came in late today. But talk about cosmic karma, the icing on the cake after the two previous articles.
Note that if the WaPo is direct, and strong, and convinced of Chavez complicity with the FARC, it also understands very well the rather cowardly Latin American mood. Thus its very constructive solution, one advocated in this blog already: punish the culprits, do not punish Venezuela. The WaPo wisely notices that the referendum was voted down in December and thus a majority of Venezuelans clearly do not agree with the FARC ties. Punishing all of us can only serve Chavez interests.
All in all AN EXCELLENT assessment of the present situation. Let's hope that all the people concerned, from the silly lefty Democrats (Delahunt) to the right wing nutty Republicans (Connie Mack) will sit down together and realize the gravity of the situation, that the time of permissiveness and grand standing is over.
-The end-
Monday, April 28, 2008
The communal councils failure
Tal Cual in its editorial by Alejandro Botia looks at the failure of one of the essential programs of chavismo: the communal councils.
As the editorial explains, these councils which have been tried under different forms and functions and whose origins could be indirectly traced to the in-famous Bolivarian Circles had a noble theoretical concept: the small communities would be empowered to design themselves their own plans to solve their very local needs. Of course, the idea is good as long as it is limited to small local needs and does not require complex, multi community planning for larger projects such as mass transit or hospital construction. But the aims of the government were different and came clear during the constitutional reform project mercifully defeated on December 2.
Long time reader Virginia did write a critical review of that particular constitutional proposal where the real intentions of the government are exposed. In short, what the government of Chavez wants/wanted was to atomize local forms of government to make them completely subject to the central state and avoid the constitution of any federal association that could contradict in any way or form or shape the central control from Caracas chavismo. A new meaning for "divide and conquer". That many of the votes of these councils would be taken with raised hands would have also helped a lot in the total political control of the country as opponents of central decisions would have been easily spotted and counted, or reduced to silence. This is perhaps the real final aim of chavismo, circle and silence opponents, as former minister Isturiz, now one of the PUSV vice president so eloquently stated a few days ago when he asked the PUSV battalions to make lists of "enemies" of the PUSV. Not political opponents, "enemies" (El Nacional, last Saturday, by subscription, includes the numerous times that Isturiz, former education minister, used vulgar expressions not fit for this family oriented blog).
Anyway, below is the translation of the editorial whose original in Spanish can be read here.
FRACASO DESCOMUNAL (pun that cannot be easily translated, the closest would be uncommon failure, for uncommon-communal)
From whichever angle you look at the misnamed "revolution" of Hugo Chávez there is a monument to inefficiency, brimming with petty corruption, mismanagement, fraud and abuse of authority.
Where is the Park of La Carlota, or the University of Miraflores? What happened to the Socialists 200 factories, the 20 plants of the Iranian industrial project, or the city of steel? Where did end up the “engine Moral and Enlightenment” [Moral y Luces]? What happened with the presidential commissions for food, mass employment, Public Safety or the Economic Constituent Assembly? Well, nothing. Everything was in pledges, hot air nonsense at Alo Presidente, while looting the public purse increases every day with a shameful record track with such cases as the Central Sugar Ezequiel Zamora (Caeez), Fondafa, Fondur, Mercal and a long and endless list of Etcetera.
The Government keeps pretending to see the people as nincompoop and still uses the same pretexts to justify its buffoon incompetence: that the shortages are the fault of a conspiracy of the stateless oligarchy. That insecurity is the caused by the Colombian paramilitaries. That the social protests are part of a nefarious plan by the FBI and the CIA to overthrow Chavez.
There is one area, however, where the failure of Chavez is well known and extremely regrettable: the so-called People's Power. Nobody remembers the Law on Local Councils Planning adopted in 2002 to incorporate citizens in the design, implementation and monitoring of municipal budgets.
The initiative was abandoned early and never really applied. The Technical Support groups previewed to advise communities in project design were never created and when the period of the first delegates expired there was no election to replace them.
For all practical purposes today they are dissolved.
The final blow came in 2006 with the Law on Communal Councils (CC), which broke the link between municipalities and communities to make them depend directly from the central power. Since its inception, Miraflores had set as a goal to create 50 thousand CC and last year announced with fanfare funds of 3.7 trillion old bolivares to finance them.
At the closing of 2007 there had been formed the not insignificant number of 33,549 CC, but only 9,736 (or, less than 30%) received funding, according to official figures. Of the funds approved, barely Bs. 761 billion, equivalent to 20% of the total, were assigned and the rest (Bs. 2.8 billion) was transferred to a trust in the Bank Treasury.
This year the government has announced two new payment of resources in Bs.F.
842 million (old billions) to fund 4,348 projects. But what about the 19 thousand CC who have not yet received any funds? As part of the mission on April 13, Chavez now seeks to choose 74 municipalities and 381 parishes "in particular state of crisis" to direct state aid.
In conclusion, universal coverage without political conditions for social programs is over. Far from solving the needs in communities, the Government has created a sort of forced begging for townships and a new delusion in the popular sectors, with the aggravating factor of seeking to politicize social assistance.
-The end-
As the editorial explains, these councils which have been tried under different forms and functions and whose origins could be indirectly traced to the in-famous Bolivarian Circles had a noble theoretical concept: the small communities would be empowered to design themselves their own plans to solve their very local needs. Of course, the idea is good as long as it is limited to small local needs and does not require complex, multi community planning for larger projects such as mass transit or hospital construction. But the aims of the government were different and came clear during the constitutional reform project mercifully defeated on December 2.
Long time reader Virginia did write a critical review of that particular constitutional proposal where the real intentions of the government are exposed. In short, what the government of Chavez wants/wanted was to atomize local forms of government to make them completely subject to the central state and avoid the constitution of any federal association that could contradict in any way or form or shape the central control from Caracas chavismo. A new meaning for "divide and conquer". That many of the votes of these councils would be taken with raised hands would have also helped a lot in the total political control of the country as opponents of central decisions would have been easily spotted and counted, or reduced to silence. This is perhaps the real final aim of chavismo, circle and silence opponents, as former minister Isturiz, now one of the PUSV vice president so eloquently stated a few days ago when he asked the PUSV battalions to make lists of "enemies" of the PUSV. Not political opponents, "enemies" (El Nacional, last Saturday, by subscription, includes the numerous times that Isturiz, former education minister, used vulgar expressions not fit for this family oriented blog).
Anyway, below is the translation of the editorial whose original in Spanish can be read here.
FRACASO DESCOMUNAL (pun that cannot be easily translated, the closest would be uncommon failure, for uncommon-communal)
From whichever angle you look at the misnamed "revolution" of Hugo Chávez there is a monument to inefficiency, brimming with petty corruption, mismanagement, fraud and abuse of authority.
Where is the Park of La Carlota, or the University of Miraflores? What happened to the Socialists 200 factories, the 20 plants of the Iranian industrial project, or the city of steel? Where did end up the “engine Moral and Enlightenment” [Moral y Luces]? What happened with the presidential commissions for food, mass employment, Public Safety or the Economic Constituent Assembly? Well, nothing. Everything was in pledges, hot air nonsense at Alo Presidente, while looting the public purse increases every day with a shameful record track with such cases as the Central Sugar Ezequiel Zamora (Caeez), Fondafa, Fondur, Mercal and a long and endless list of Etcetera.
The Government keeps pretending to see the people as nincompoop and still uses the same pretexts to justify its buffoon incompetence: that the shortages are the fault of a conspiracy of the stateless oligarchy. That insecurity is the caused by the Colombian paramilitaries. That the social protests are part of a nefarious plan by the FBI and the CIA to overthrow Chavez.
There is one area, however, where the failure of Chavez is well known and extremely regrettable: the so-called People's Power. Nobody remembers the Law on Local Councils Planning adopted in 2002 to incorporate citizens in the design, implementation and monitoring of municipal budgets.
The initiative was abandoned early and never really applied. The Technical Support groups previewed to advise communities in project design were never created and when the period of the first delegates expired there was no election to replace them.
For all practical purposes today they are dissolved.
The final blow came in 2006 with the Law on Communal Councils (CC), which broke the link between municipalities and communities to make them depend directly from the central power. Since its inception, Miraflores had set as a goal to create 50 thousand CC and last year announced with fanfare funds of 3.7 trillion old bolivares to finance them.
At the closing of 2007 there had been formed the not insignificant number of 33,549 CC, but only 9,736 (or, less than 30%) received funding, according to official figures. Of the funds approved, barely Bs. 761 billion, equivalent to 20% of the total, were assigned and the rest (Bs. 2.8 billion) was transferred to a trust in the Bank Treasury.
This year the government has announced two new payment of resources in Bs.F.
842 million (old billions) to fund 4,348 projects. But what about the 19 thousand CC who have not yet received any funds? As part of the mission on April 13, Chavez now seeks to choose 74 municipalities and 381 parishes "in particular state of crisis" to direct state aid.
In conclusion, universal coverage without political conditions for social programs is over. Far from solving the needs in communities, the Government has created a sort of forced begging for townships and a new delusion in the popular sectors, with the aggravating factor of seeking to politicize social assistance.
-The end-
Sunday, December 02, 2007
The WSJ editorial today
The Wall street journal chimes in (hat tip AM). The title leaves nothing to the imagination. The whole article below since it is subscribers only.
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Chávez's Electoral Coup
December 1, 2007
Political coups don't always wear khaki. Sometimes they take the form of populist politicians who use "democracy" to consolidate their power. That's the case in Venezuela, where President Hugo Chávez is promoting a national referendum this Sunday that would give him vast new authority. If he gets away with it, we hope his many American enablers will acknowledge their contribution.
Voters are being asked to approve 69 "reforms" that amount to an overhaul of the country's constitution. Mr. Chávez has promoted the vote, despite the view of many constitutional scholars -- some of whom are his former allies -- that these amendments require the election of a constitutional assembly. No matter. The president announced the referendum and had his rubber-stamp Congress approve it.
This is ironic, since Mr. Chávez all but wrote the 1999 constitution himself. But he has tired of its checks and balances, especially its decentralized power. He now wants to restore more authority to his central government. Communal councils will rule locally, but their members will no longer be elected; they will be appointed by the Chávez government. His name for this is "participatory democracy," which he prefers over the "representative" kind.
A "yes" vote will give the executive control over central bank reserves. To promote his "productive economic model," Mr. Chávez is also modifying private property rights. The new standard of ownership will be "mixed properties held between the State, the private sector and the communal power, so as to create the best conditions for the collective and cooperative construction of a Socialist Economy."
The state will have the right to occupy any private property that it plans to expropriate in advance of any judicial review. Any property deemed by the state to be nonproductive could be transferred to "public corporations, cooperatives, communities or social organizations." Perhaps you thought this sort of thing went out of style about 1989. But Mr. Chávez believes socialism didn't fail; it just wasn't tried with enough gusto.
Moving right along, the reforms would give Mr. Chávez the right to be re-elected indefinitely, and he will be able to name multiple vice-presidents to govern with the communal councils. The President will gain new powers to suspend due process during emergencies, and the legislature will lose its role in determining how long those emergencies last. To make all this go down with voters, Mr. Chávez has included in the referendum a 36-hour work week, a reduction in the voting age to 16, and more generous welfare benefits.
Mr. Chávez wouldn't be close to pulling this off if he hadn't already used his nine years in power to neuter Venezuela's independent political institutions. To gain control of the Supreme Court, Mr. Chávez increased the number of justices to 32 from 20. Then he fired the National Electoral Council (CNE) and named his own version, which presided over a crooked and non-transparent August 2004 recall referendum.
Former President Jimmy Carter nonetheless blessed that fraud, and the Bush State Department went along too. For their part, Venezuelans have so little faith in an honest vote that they boycotted the 2005 legislative elections; chavista candidates won 100% of the seats.
In 2002 Mr. Chávez also purged the military after it refused to fire on protestors and briefly removed him from power. In that event, Connecticut Senator Chris Dodd rushed to support Mr. Chávez while ignoring the pleas of labor unions, human rights activists and religious leaders that he was abusing his power. Another enthusiastic supporter is Joseph P. Kennedy II, who in exchange for discounts on Venezuelan oil has been promoting the president as a benefactor to America's poor.
Despite this help from abroad, Mr. Chávez's popularity at home has been dropping sharply as Venezuelans rebel against this electoral putsch. Students have been pushing back hard against limits on free speech, and even former ally General Raul Baduel has called the referendum a "coup against democracy" and joined the opposition.
Polls show most Venezuelans are also opposed, but a genuinely fair vote may be impossible. The President's electoral council controls the voter rolls, the voting machines and the ultimate count. Yet whatever Sunday's outcome, the real story of this referendum is that Mr. Chávez's days as a Venezuelan hero are over. His grab for power is so blatant that it has aroused a passive public, as shown by the huge and peaceful "no" rally in Caracas on Thursday. Maybe his American friends will even figure it out.
-The end-
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Chávez's Electoral Coup
December 1, 2007
Political coups don't always wear khaki. Sometimes they take the form of populist politicians who use "democracy" to consolidate their power. That's the case in Venezuela, where President Hugo Chávez is promoting a national referendum this Sunday that would give him vast new authority. If he gets away with it, we hope his many American enablers will acknowledge their contribution.
Voters are being asked to approve 69 "reforms" that amount to an overhaul of the country's constitution. Mr. Chávez has promoted the vote, despite the view of many constitutional scholars -- some of whom are his former allies -- that these amendments require the election of a constitutional assembly. No matter. The president announced the referendum and had his rubber-stamp Congress approve it.
This is ironic, since Mr. Chávez all but wrote the 1999 constitution himself. But he has tired of its checks and balances, especially its decentralized power. He now wants to restore more authority to his central government. Communal councils will rule locally, but their members will no longer be elected; they will be appointed by the Chávez government. His name for this is "participatory democracy," which he prefers over the "representative" kind.
A "yes" vote will give the executive control over central bank reserves. To promote his "productive economic model," Mr. Chávez is also modifying private property rights. The new standard of ownership will be "mixed properties held between the State, the private sector and the communal power, so as to create the best conditions for the collective and cooperative construction of a Socialist Economy."
The state will have the right to occupy any private property that it plans to expropriate in advance of any judicial review. Any property deemed by the state to be nonproductive could be transferred to "public corporations, cooperatives, communities or social organizations." Perhaps you thought this sort of thing went out of style about 1989. But Mr. Chávez believes socialism didn't fail; it just wasn't tried with enough gusto.
Moving right along, the reforms would give Mr. Chávez the right to be re-elected indefinitely, and he will be able to name multiple vice-presidents to govern with the communal councils. The President will gain new powers to suspend due process during emergencies, and the legislature will lose its role in determining how long those emergencies last. To make all this go down with voters, Mr. Chávez has included in the referendum a 36-hour work week, a reduction in the voting age to 16, and more generous welfare benefits.
Mr. Chávez wouldn't be close to pulling this off if he hadn't already used his nine years in power to neuter Venezuela's independent political institutions. To gain control of the Supreme Court, Mr. Chávez increased the number of justices to 32 from 20. Then he fired the National Electoral Council (CNE) and named his own version, which presided over a crooked and non-transparent August 2004 recall referendum.
Former President Jimmy Carter nonetheless blessed that fraud, and the Bush State Department went along too. For their part, Venezuelans have so little faith in an honest vote that they boycotted the 2005 legislative elections; chavista candidates won 100% of the seats.
In 2002 Mr. Chávez also purged the military after it refused to fire on protestors and briefly removed him from power. In that event, Connecticut Senator Chris Dodd rushed to support Mr. Chávez while ignoring the pleas of labor unions, human rights activists and religious leaders that he was abusing his power. Another enthusiastic supporter is Joseph P. Kennedy II, who in exchange for discounts on Venezuelan oil has been promoting the president as a benefactor to America's poor.
Despite this help from abroad, Mr. Chávez's popularity at home has been dropping sharply as Venezuelans rebel against this electoral putsch. Students have been pushing back hard against limits on free speech, and even former ally General Raul Baduel has called the referendum a "coup against democracy" and joined the opposition.
Polls show most Venezuelans are also opposed, but a genuinely fair vote may be impossible. The President's electoral council controls the voter rolls, the voting machines and the ultimate count. Yet whatever Sunday's outcome, the real story of this referendum is that Mr. Chávez's days as a Venezuelan hero are over. His grab for power is so blatant that it has aroused a passive public, as shown by the huge and peaceful "no" rally in Caracas on Thursday. Maybe his American friends will even figure it out.
-The end-
Monday, November 26, 2007
Chavez escalates against Uribe: fishing for votes in a dangerous game
(Updated)
The numbers must be bad for Chavez headquarters, and as rogue politicians do when their poll numbers go south is to look for a foreign adversary to try to shore up support.
This week, having failed to dress down the Spaniards - and get covered in international ridicule -, having failed to turn the OPEC in his international political tool, having made Sarkozy waste his time with him, and hint at it, Chavez aimed at Colombia, a true and tested method to win a few electoral points here and there. The only problem is that Chavez has not measured his words and he got a stinging rebuke tonight from Uribe. In fact, it is not an overstatement to say that tonight relations between Colombia and Venezuela are at their lowest point since Chavez came to office, and most of the blame can be put squarely on Chavez who know openly confuses Venezuelan foreign policy with his very own foreign policy.
Background
A few months ago Uribe decided in a surprising gamble to ask Chavez to intermediate between Colombia and the guerrilla groups, also known as narco-guerilla, to obtain an humanitarian exchange. Namely, for the FARC to free some of its hostages in exchange for Colombia to free some of the jailed FARC. The problem here is that after 5 years Uribe does not seem to be able to erase the FARC from the map although he has diminished the FARC enough that they are pushed to a few jungle reduct where their only negotiating tokens left are the very hostages that the FARC has. Ingrid Betancourt is of course the glamor hostage of the FARC, the one they most need to stay on the international news scree as the French desperately want the freedom of Ingrid.
Unfortunately what was supposed to happen, happened. Chavez, never a subtle diplomat, slowly but surely made this mediation a self promoting road circus. Among the gems there was the invitation to Miraflores palace in Caracas of Ivan Marquez, one of the least palatable FARC guerrillas, thus giving the FARC a recognition that had eluded them until that day. Note: Chavez had tried first to go to Colombia and meet straight with Marulanda. The Colombian government promptly refused to grant permission and one would have thought that Chavez got the hint. But no.....
Recent events
The last drop was a direct phone call to the big brass of the Colombian army. Piedad Cordoba, the go between of Colombia, a leftist senator with the blessing of Uribe, as a senator of Colombia might still have an excuse to call a top brass in her country but cannot be excused to pass the call to Chavez who started to ask delicate questions. Apparently Uribe had warned in Santiago Chavez that he could not talk directly with certain Colombian security personnel. We do not know what the General replied but the next thing he did was to tell Uribe about this direct interference of Chavez and Uribe, probably looking for a while for any excuse to get rid of Chavez mediation role, took the opportunity. Soon the Uribe government suspended Cordoba and Chavez in their mediator roles. There is a clear 18 point communique.
Chavez did not reply right away, but this morning he could not resit anymore and attacked Uribe, calling him a liar among other choice words. And froze relations with Colombia. For good measure he also said that relations with Spain would be frozen until the King of Spain apologizes. A classic campaign speech of Chavez, stirring the masses on cheap, really cheap, chauvinism.
Unfortunately for Chavez, it seems that since the King of Spain told him to shut up, foreign leaders are beginning to consider saying their own version of "¿Por que no te callas?"
AFP so far is the only one carrying some of the Uribe words this afternoon in English but Globovision has already a more complete account. Or Reuters if you prefer something more neutral. The complete speech has been published by the Colombian government. Some choice excerpts:
Calamar, Bolívar Province, 25 nov (SP).
Observe several things in this speech besides the extraordinary strong wording from a head of state to another one: the king Hugo is naked, his obvious expansionist project (ALBA, confederation with Cuba made possible as of December 2) and his authoritarian changes in Venezuela are publicly stated. Clearly, Uribe has decided that if Chavez wins in December 2, Venezuela will become a basket case, a source of trouble and Uribe has deiced to get ready agasitn the new Venezuela coming up.
It is impossible to underestimate the speech of Uribe today. Even if he made a mistake, even if he lost it under the heat of Calamar (he was sweaty on the video), his words reflect a crude reality that all knew and few dared articulate (well, this blogger did frequently anyway). Now it is out in the open and who knows where the pieces are going to fall. We are talking major diplomatic crisis today of unforeseen repercussions, starting with the vote next Sunday (more on that later).
Needless to remind the reader that for every dollar Colombia buys in Venezuelan goods, Venezuela buys almost 5 back. This time if Chavez were to close the border, we might starve at home.
--- --- --- --- ---
It fascinating to read the words of chavez. I have written long ago that there was no more a Venezuelan foreign policy, just a Chavez one. That is, if we are generous enough to call that a foreign policy.
"AS long as the King of Spain does not apologize, I am freezing relations with Spain"
"I declare that the relations with Colombia I am putting them in the freezer because I lost all trusty in any one in the Colombian government"
-The end-
The numbers must be bad for Chavez headquarters, and as rogue politicians do when their poll numbers go south is to look for a foreign adversary to try to shore up support.
This week, having failed to dress down the Spaniards - and get covered in international ridicule -, having failed to turn the OPEC in his international political tool, having made Sarkozy waste his time with him, and hint at it, Chavez aimed at Colombia, a true and tested method to win a few electoral points here and there. The only problem is that Chavez has not measured his words and he got a stinging rebuke tonight from Uribe. In fact, it is not an overstatement to say that tonight relations between Colombia and Venezuela are at their lowest point since Chavez came to office, and most of the blame can be put squarely on Chavez who know openly confuses Venezuelan foreign policy with his very own foreign policy.
Background
A few months ago Uribe decided in a surprising gamble to ask Chavez to intermediate between Colombia and the guerrilla groups, also known as narco-guerilla, to obtain an humanitarian exchange. Namely, for the FARC to free some of its hostages in exchange for Colombia to free some of the jailed FARC. The problem here is that after 5 years Uribe does not seem to be able to erase the FARC from the map although he has diminished the FARC enough that they are pushed to a few jungle reduct where their only negotiating tokens left are the very hostages that the FARC has. Ingrid Betancourt is of course the glamor hostage of the FARC, the one they most need to stay on the international news scree as the French desperately want the freedom of Ingrid.
Unfortunately what was supposed to happen, happened. Chavez, never a subtle diplomat, slowly but surely made this mediation a self promoting road circus. Among the gems there was the invitation to Miraflores palace in Caracas of Ivan Marquez, one of the least palatable FARC guerrillas, thus giving the FARC a recognition that had eluded them until that day. Note: Chavez had tried first to go to Colombia and meet straight with Marulanda. The Colombian government promptly refused to grant permission and one would have thought that Chavez got the hint. But no.....
Recent events
The last drop was a direct phone call to the big brass of the Colombian army. Piedad Cordoba, the go between of Colombia, a leftist senator with the blessing of Uribe, as a senator of Colombia might still have an excuse to call a top brass in her country but cannot be excused to pass the call to Chavez who started to ask delicate questions. Apparently Uribe had warned in Santiago Chavez that he could not talk directly with certain Colombian security personnel. We do not know what the General replied but the next thing he did was to tell Uribe about this direct interference of Chavez and Uribe, probably looking for a while for any excuse to get rid of Chavez mediation role, took the opportunity. Soon the Uribe government suspended Cordoba and Chavez in their mediator roles. There is a clear 18 point communique.
Chavez did not reply right away, but this morning he could not resit anymore and attacked Uribe, calling him a liar among other choice words. And froze relations with Colombia. For good measure he also said that relations with Spain would be frozen until the King of Spain apologizes. A classic campaign speech of Chavez, stirring the masses on cheap, really cheap, chauvinism.
Unfortunately for Chavez, it seems that since the King of Spain told him to shut up, foreign leaders are beginning to consider saying their own version of "¿Por que no te callas?"
AFP so far is the only one carrying some of the Uribe words this afternoon in English but Globovision has already a more complete account. Or Reuters if you prefer something more neutral. The complete speech has been published by the Colombian government. Some choice excerpts:
Calamar, Bolívar Province, 25 nov (SP).
...the truth, with witnesses...
...when there are no arguments and one resorts to insults, as you do, not only international relations are affected, but in this case, you with your insults and your lack of arguments hurt the dignity of the Venezuelan people that you represent.
Your words, your actions, give the impression that you are not interested in Colombian peace, but Colombia becomes the victim of a terrorist government of the FARC.
The truth, president Chavez, is that if you are promoting an expansionist project in the continent, in Colombia this project has no life.
The truth, president Chavez, the truth with witnesses, is that one cannot light up the Continent [South America] as you do, talking one day against Spain, the next one on the US; mistreating one day Mexico, next day Peru, and following morning Bolivia. You cannot mistreat the Continent, light it up, as you do, talking about imperialism, when you, grounded on your budget, want to build up an empire.
The truth, president Chavez, the truth with witnesses, is that you cannot confuse the people misinterpreting the legacy of Bolivar the Libertador. The Libertador was an integrationist, but not an expansionist..... The Libertador was not trying to free American territory form the domination of Europe, to impose, as you would like to do, your own domination, based on the might of your budget, on the people of Venezuelan and the people of Colombia.
I am very worried that you, in a hurry for your electoral ambitions, now is trying to the old trick of stirring in Venezuela the hatred against Colombia and the government of Colombia, to seek your electoral good fortunes.
The truth, president Chavez, is that at each moment surge new elements. Our consul in the US, who accompanied senator Cordoba to the meeting with one of the FARC prisoners there for drug trafficking, our consul has informed us that ..... the senator talked also of the necessity of a government of transition in Colombia. [Uribe was reelected last year with more than 60% of the vote in an election considerably cleaner than any Venezuelan recent election]
... that mediation was more interested in facilitating a government in Colombia under terrorist influence that to help us overcome the tragedy of the hostages.
We do not allow that you take advantage of our tragedy to come and include Colombia in an expansionist project that little by little is denying the freedoms that with so much difficulty this Continent has managed to gain.
Observe several things in this speech besides the extraordinary strong wording from a head of state to another one: the king Hugo is naked, his obvious expansionist project (ALBA, confederation with Cuba made possible as of December 2) and his authoritarian changes in Venezuela are publicly stated. Clearly, Uribe has decided that if Chavez wins in December 2, Venezuela will become a basket case, a source of trouble and Uribe has deiced to get ready agasitn the new Venezuela coming up.
It is impossible to underestimate the speech of Uribe today. Even if he made a mistake, even if he lost it under the heat of Calamar (he was sweaty on the video), his words reflect a crude reality that all knew and few dared articulate (well, this blogger did frequently anyway). Now it is out in the open and who knows where the pieces are going to fall. We are talking major diplomatic crisis today of unforeseen repercussions, starting with the vote next Sunday (more on that later).
Needless to remind the reader that for every dollar Colombia buys in Venezuelan goods, Venezuela buys almost 5 back. This time if Chavez were to close the border, we might starve at home.
--- --- --- --- ---
It fascinating to read the words of chavez. I have written long ago that there was no more a Venezuelan foreign policy, just a Chavez one. That is, if we are generous enough to call that a foreign policy.
"AS long as the King of Spain does not apologize, I am freezing relations with Spain"
"I declare that the relations with Colombia I am putting them in the freezer because I lost all trusty in any one in the Colombian government"
-The end-
Thursday, November 22, 2007
Chavez new constitution: Article 98
Patents and the decline of science and technology in Venezuela
In May I posted information published by the National Science Foundation (NSF) that discussed science and engineering in Latin America. In it they reported that Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico have been trending upwards in technology development to become "high-tech exporters". Not surprisingly Venezuela ranked the lowest of the countries scored, mainly because: "[it] suffered because it was considered the riskiest or least attractive site for foreign investment". Instead of stimulating foreign and domestic investment and encourage technology development, the Chavez government has made decisions that adversely affect Venezuelans competitiveness and economy while currently they are taking steps to further discourage innovation. Specifically within the constitutional reform, to be voted on December 2nd, a modification to article 98 is planned. The original article states:
Modified article 98 - text changes are underlined
The most concerning aspect of this reform is that it limits protection to cultural diversity, to the exclusion of any protection that may be strictly intellectual or economic. In addition, the term "cultural diversity" is non-specific, how should one define it or interpret it? More than likely the interpretation will be left to the court system which is controlled by Chavez.
A simple interpretation of the new article suggests that most science and technology would not be protected since most do not contribute to cultural diversity. There are countless examples of how this will affect Venezuela, from books to merchants with the sole goal of bringing everything under state. State control has proven to be inefficient and a hindrance on scientific and technological progress, the participation of the private sector and intellectual property protection is essential for it to flourish.
It is clear that the Chavez government is reforming and will interpret the new article in a way that will significantly decrease intellectual property rights and severely limit patent protection. In the words of National Assembly member Carlos Escarra these are economic (i.e. capitalist) rights not cultural rights. Cultural rights constitute art, poetry, and literature whereas "inventions" have economic benefits. Apparently, Escarra fails to realize that art, music, and literature do have economic benefits to the inventor, through the sale of their work.
It is unfortunate that the new reform is designed to decrease patent protection since it is well established that patent protection, along with property rights and decreasing state bureaucracy play key roles in spurring innovation and economic development, ultimately leading to decreased poverty. This is not a new concept, but Chavez seems intent on creating a society based on a barter system and where some of the most important technological advances, such asOrimulsion is being phased out while giving the Chinese the technological knowhow for production while collecting little to no royalties.
The proposed reform to article 98 is simply putting on paper what the Chavez has been doing for years, either directly or indirectly though his actions. To see how Venezuela has declined in technological innovation we can look at the number of U.S. patents awarded to individuals in Venezuela (see graph below).
In the graph we see that Venezuela averaged about 32 patents a year from 1993 to 2002. From 2002 to 2006 the number patents dropped sharply to 15 after hitting a 13 year low of 10 in 2005. The most probably explanation for this sharp drop in patents is Chavez's decision to purge PDVSA of political opponents, particularly those such as the PhD investigators at PDVSA research institute (INTEVEP), where 66% (108 out of 164) were fired. The loss of highly skilled/educated individuals comes at a huge loss to the State, making it less competitive, reducing innovation and investment, resulting in a less diverse economy and loss of potential revenue. The loss of these investigators is particularly damaging to PDVSA since it accounts for the bulk of the economy and requires technological innovation to stay competitive among the other oil companies. Sadly this loss is long term since the time and investment required to create a highly skilled worker with a PhD is high, approximately 5 years of education and $300,000 not counting the experience needed post PhD. Making the Venezuelan situation worse is that most of these skilled workers have left, and/or have been prevented from working in Venezuela, thus they have emigrated and sought jobs with other petroleum companies taking their knowledge and skills with them. So who loses? Venezuela.
Over the years we have seen how Chavez has made decisions that adversely affect innovation in Venezuela, now the Chavez government is poised to modify article 98 which will further discourage investment and innovation that will not only affect the oil industry but the wider economy. The Venezuelan chamber of franchises has already stated that modification to article 98 will negatively affect that business sector, which has seen significant growth recently and now accounts for 2.2% of the GDP.
The modification of article 98 is an obvious decision by the Chavez government that will only lead to decreased technological innovation in Venezuela. However, this is only one decision, although a significant one, among many that Chavez has made during the past 10 years that will adversely affect Venezuela for many years.
--- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Kensey writes his own blog, Venezuela US topics, and he can be reached there also for further questions.
-The end-
In May I posted information published by the National Science Foundation (NSF) that discussed science and engineering in Latin America. In it they reported that Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico have been trending upwards in technology development to become "high-tech exporters". Not surprisingly Venezuela ranked the lowest of the countries scored, mainly because: "[it] suffered because it was considered the riskiest or least attractive site for foreign investment". Instead of stimulating foreign and domestic investment and encourage technology development, the Chavez government has made decisions that adversely affect Venezuelans competitiveness and economy while currently they are taking steps to further discourage innovation. Specifically within the constitutional reform, to be voted on December 2nd, a modification to article 98 is planned. The original article states:
Cultural creation is free. This freedom includes the right to invest in, produce and disseminate the creative, scientific, technical and humanistic work, as well as legal protection of the authors rights in his works. The State recognizes and protects intellectual property rights in scientific, literary and artistic works, inventions, innovations, trade names, patents, trademarks and slogans, in accordance with the conditions and exceptions established by law and the international treaties executed and ratified by the Republic in this field.
Modified article 98 - text changes are underlined
Cultural creation is free. This freedom includes the right to cultural diversity pertaining to invention, production and dissemination for creative works, scientific, technological, and humanistic, including the legal protection and rights to the author for their work. The state recognizes the rights of all to participate in the cultural community, enjoy the arts, and participate in scientific technological progress, and enjoy their benefits.
The most concerning aspect of this reform is that it limits protection to cultural diversity, to the exclusion of any protection that may be strictly intellectual or economic. In addition, the term "cultural diversity" is non-specific, how should one define it or interpret it? More than likely the interpretation will be left to the court system which is controlled by Chavez.
A simple interpretation of the new article suggests that most science and technology would not be protected since most do not contribute to cultural diversity. There are countless examples of how this will affect Venezuela, from books to merchants with the sole goal of bringing everything under state. State control has proven to be inefficient and a hindrance on scientific and technological progress, the participation of the private sector and intellectual property protection is essential for it to flourish.
It is clear that the Chavez government is reforming and will interpret the new article in a way that will significantly decrease intellectual property rights and severely limit patent protection. In the words of National Assembly member Carlos Escarra these are economic (i.e. capitalist) rights not cultural rights. Cultural rights constitute art, poetry, and literature whereas "inventions" have economic benefits. Apparently, Escarra fails to realize that art, music, and literature do have economic benefits to the inventor, through the sale of their work.
It is unfortunate that the new reform is designed to decrease patent protection since it is well established that patent protection, along with property rights and decreasing state bureaucracy play key roles in spurring innovation and economic development, ultimately leading to decreased poverty. This is not a new concept, but Chavez seems intent on creating a society based on a barter system and where some of the most important technological advances, such asOrimulsion is being phased out while giving the Chinese the technological knowhow for production while collecting little to no royalties.
The proposed reform to article 98 is simply putting on paper what the Chavez has been doing for years, either directly or indirectly though his actions. To see how Venezuela has declined in technological innovation we can look at the number of U.S. patents awarded to individuals in Venezuela (see graph below).
In the graph we see that Venezuela averaged about 32 patents a year from 1993 to 2002. From 2002 to 2006 the number patents dropped sharply to 15 after hitting a 13 year low of 10 in 2005. The most probably explanation for this sharp drop in patents is Chavez's decision to purge PDVSA of political opponents, particularly those such as the PhD investigators at PDVSA research institute (INTEVEP), where 66% (108 out of 164) were fired. The loss of highly skilled/educated individuals comes at a huge loss to the State, making it less competitive, reducing innovation and investment, resulting in a less diverse economy and loss of potential revenue. The loss of these investigators is particularly damaging to PDVSA since it accounts for the bulk of the economy and requires technological innovation to stay competitive among the other oil companies. Sadly this loss is long term since the time and investment required to create a highly skilled worker with a PhD is high, approximately 5 years of education and $300,000 not counting the experience needed post PhD. Making the Venezuelan situation worse is that most of these skilled workers have left, and/or have been prevented from working in Venezuela, thus they have emigrated and sought jobs with other petroleum companies taking their knowledge and skills with them. So who loses? Venezuela.
Over the years we have seen how Chavez has made decisions that adversely affect innovation in Venezuela, now the Chavez government is poised to modify article 98 which will further discourage investment and innovation that will not only affect the oil industry but the wider economy. The Venezuelan chamber of franchises has already stated that modification to article 98 will negatively affect that business sector, which has seen significant growth recently and now accounts for 2.2% of the GDP.
The modification of article 98 is an obvious decision by the Chavez government that will only lead to decreased technological innovation in Venezuela. However, this is only one decision, although a significant one, among many that Chavez has made during the past 10 years that will adversely affect Venezuela for many years.
--- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Kensey writes his own blog, Venezuela US topics, and he can be reached there also for further questions.
-The end-
Saturday, November 17, 2007
For your reading pleasure: what Chavez wants to do and what will really happen
For your reading pleasure I have two things today.
Simon Romero writes a major article, major as in big here, on what the referendum to be held in two is about. Yet I am not quite satisfied with this New York Times piece. I understand that Romero cannot be outright against Chavez constitutional changes where he is publishing. I sense that he certainly feels the danger behind Chavez move and he has the smarts to quote Barrera Tyszka who coins the "tyranny of popularity" to describe Chavez regime. The reader will come out of that article definitely worrying about the future of Venezuela (at least the democratic reader which I do hope are the NYT majority readers). But there is still something missing. Could it be that Romero includes academics in Chavez power base when all the evidence is to the contrary as chavismo is unable to win a faculty election in all serious and independent university, when not a single high flying Venezuelan academic is supporting the regime, where the only luminaries are imported mediocrities such as Spain's Monedero?
Perhaps that is what is missing in Venezuela coverage today: that there are few noteworthies that are willing to support the regime and that all support comes from a love relationship between Chavez and a large section of the masses. Romero gets it right when he senses that fervent chavistas will vote SI even if they do not agree with the changes because they trust Chavez no matter what. But perhaps Romero should have been more careful about judging the support to Chavez elsewhere. Also, he could have underlined that after all these chavismo excesses are only made possible through US diplomacy mistakes and its refusal to grow less dependent on Venezuelan oil.
At any rate, Romero at least offers a clear glimpse at what is awaiting Venezuela, a legally elected autocracy without hope of return to democracy except through violent means. But he only hints at the implications (well, the article can only be so long, the NYT is not a blog). If you want to look at the consequences you could start very well on the story of Citgo as researched and told by the Wall Street Journal (hat tip AC). There you will read how Chavez policies have been slowly but surely gutting Citgo, making miss its chance to become one of the leading oil companies in the world, leaving it now to face a slow extinction.
Of course, at 100 USD a barrel Citgo with Venezuela support will not go bankrupt, but that is not the point. The point is that Citgo under a good management and the insured Venezuelan oil supply could have become a leading US company, one of these whose words shape US policies. Instead it is slowly but surely becoming an average business at the sufferance of the US public who is more and more staying away of Citgo. Not that it matters much anyway as Citgo has become unable to supply its clients and gave up hundreds and hundreds of its affiliates.
The reason behind the dismantlement of Citgo is the need for fast cash by Chavez. Not for him long term business plans: it is now or never. Thus, the purchase of Citgo which cost a considerable effort to the old PDVSA. Now, by just signing some contract sale, oil terminals and refineries in the US are sold and the revenue is spent happily by Chavez in unproductive social programs, gifts to other countries, corruption and what not. That is right, assets go up in intangible smoke of no benefit for Venezuela except for a temporary political benefit for Chavez. The assets that PDVSA acquired at difficult times with rather sharp acumen are squandered. It is difficult to see how the new PDVSA would recover them someday if it needed them again. The opportunities of the 90ies are gone for good in the oil industry.
The WSJ paper also tells us two very interesting items about the future of Venezuela, even if only Citgo is studied. First, the secrecy that now surrounds Citgo. Citgo has sold any stocks or bonds it might have and is now out of SEC control. That is not too important in a way, through worrying. What is more important is that now Citgo is managed through a board of directors that are not US (it is not clear if there is at least one US guy on it), and a board which acts in total secrecy. Secrecy! That is a word that characterizes well the new look of the Chavez movement and one of the goal of the new constitution where the people will have definitively no access to the government accounts. In other words there is no way for an independent inquiry to see how well Citgo (or any state controlled business in Venezuela ) is doing. At least for Citgo we can have some day tax returns at the IRS which will give us profits over revenues. But for the rest of Venezuela we will only know how much the revolution of Chavez has cost us once he is out of office. A reason by the way powerful enough for him to cling to power for ever and ever.
The other item expanded in the WSJ ties up with what I wrote above, that none of the Venezuelan best and brightest are in bed with chavismo. The board of Citgo includes two foreigners, Bernard Mommner described as a French Marxist mathematician (and a very discrete power player within chavismo with a reported lavish European life style) and the Mexican Juan Carlos Boué (who, by his name, might also be of French origin). These two characters had espoused in the past the theory that PDVSA was not bringing home enough of its profits by investing too much overseas. In such way they demonstrated clearly that they did not know how a capitalist business must work, through constant investment to keeps its competitive edge, its market share and its future prospect. After all, whatever PDVSA bought overseas was still owned by Venezuela and could eventually ensure a comfortable income once the investment was absorbed.
The strategy of PDVSA was based at a time where Venezuelan oil was not well quoted and where oil in general was thought as a long term cheap commodity. But PDVSA had planted the seeds to become a major world player once oil woudl go up again. Instead by listening to advisers such as Mommer and Boué Venezuela is reverting to a colonial exploitative system where it will sell its oil to the highest bidder, becoming thus economically dependent on the highest bidder, being that one the US, China, India or Europe. Because the higher bidder will also pose its conditions and the unquenchable thirst of Chavez will make him eventually accept the conditions imposed.
And thus we see the future of Venezuela where Chavez will repulse the Venezuelan intellectual elites and thus will have to rely more and more on international mercenaries. Meanwhile in the streets even people that know better are deciding to vote SI because they just love Chavez.
-The end-
Simon Romero writes a major article, major as in big here, on what the referendum to be held in two is about. Yet I am not quite satisfied with this New York Times piece. I understand that Romero cannot be outright against Chavez constitutional changes where he is publishing. I sense that he certainly feels the danger behind Chavez move and he has the smarts to quote Barrera Tyszka who coins the "tyranny of popularity" to describe Chavez regime. The reader will come out of that article definitely worrying about the future of Venezuela (at least the democratic reader which I do hope are the NYT majority readers). But there is still something missing. Could it be that Romero includes academics in Chavez power base when all the evidence is to the contrary as chavismo is unable to win a faculty election in all serious and independent university, when not a single high flying Venezuelan academic is supporting the regime, where the only luminaries are imported mediocrities such as Spain's Monedero?
Perhaps that is what is missing in Venezuela coverage today: that there are few noteworthies that are willing to support the regime and that all support comes from a love relationship between Chavez and a large section of the masses. Romero gets it right when he senses that fervent chavistas will vote SI even if they do not agree with the changes because they trust Chavez no matter what. But perhaps Romero should have been more careful about judging the support to Chavez elsewhere. Also, he could have underlined that after all these chavismo excesses are only made possible through US diplomacy mistakes and its refusal to grow less dependent on Venezuelan oil.
At any rate, Romero at least offers a clear glimpse at what is awaiting Venezuela, a legally elected autocracy without hope of return to democracy except through violent means. But he only hints at the implications (well, the article can only be so long, the NYT is not a blog). If you want to look at the consequences you could start very well on the story of Citgo as researched and told by the Wall Street Journal (hat tip AC). There you will read how Chavez policies have been slowly but surely gutting Citgo, making miss its chance to become one of the leading oil companies in the world, leaving it now to face a slow extinction.
Of course, at 100 USD a barrel Citgo with Venezuela support will not go bankrupt, but that is not the point. The point is that Citgo under a good management and the insured Venezuelan oil supply could have become a leading US company, one of these whose words shape US policies. Instead it is slowly but surely becoming an average business at the sufferance of the US public who is more and more staying away of Citgo. Not that it matters much anyway as Citgo has become unable to supply its clients and gave up hundreds and hundreds of its affiliates.
The reason behind the dismantlement of Citgo is the need for fast cash by Chavez. Not for him long term business plans: it is now or never. Thus, the purchase of Citgo which cost a considerable effort to the old PDVSA. Now, by just signing some contract sale, oil terminals and refineries in the US are sold and the revenue is spent happily by Chavez in unproductive social programs, gifts to other countries, corruption and what not. That is right, assets go up in intangible smoke of no benefit for Venezuela except for a temporary political benefit for Chavez. The assets that PDVSA acquired at difficult times with rather sharp acumen are squandered. It is difficult to see how the new PDVSA would recover them someday if it needed them again. The opportunities of the 90ies are gone for good in the oil industry.
The WSJ paper also tells us two very interesting items about the future of Venezuela, even if only Citgo is studied. First, the secrecy that now surrounds Citgo. Citgo has sold any stocks or bonds it might have and is now out of SEC control. That is not too important in a way, through worrying. What is more important is that now Citgo is managed through a board of directors that are not US (it is not clear if there is at least one US guy on it), and a board which acts in total secrecy. Secrecy! That is a word that characterizes well the new look of the Chavez movement and one of the goal of the new constitution where the people will have definitively no access to the government accounts. In other words there is no way for an independent inquiry to see how well Citgo (or any state controlled business in Venezuela ) is doing. At least for Citgo we can have some day tax returns at the IRS which will give us profits over revenues. But for the rest of Venezuela we will only know how much the revolution of Chavez has cost us once he is out of office. A reason by the way powerful enough for him to cling to power for ever and ever.
The other item expanded in the WSJ ties up with what I wrote above, that none of the Venezuelan best and brightest are in bed with chavismo. The board of Citgo includes two foreigners, Bernard Mommner described as a French Marxist mathematician (and a very discrete power player within chavismo with a reported lavish European life style) and the Mexican Juan Carlos Boué (who, by his name, might also be of French origin). These two characters had espoused in the past the theory that PDVSA was not bringing home enough of its profits by investing too much overseas. In such way they demonstrated clearly that they did not know how a capitalist business must work, through constant investment to keeps its competitive edge, its market share and its future prospect. After all, whatever PDVSA bought overseas was still owned by Venezuela and could eventually ensure a comfortable income once the investment was absorbed.
The strategy of PDVSA was based at a time where Venezuelan oil was not well quoted and where oil in general was thought as a long term cheap commodity. But PDVSA had planted the seeds to become a major world player once oil woudl go up again. Instead by listening to advisers such as Mommer and Boué Venezuela is reverting to a colonial exploitative system where it will sell its oil to the highest bidder, becoming thus economically dependent on the highest bidder, being that one the US, China, India or Europe. Because the higher bidder will also pose its conditions and the unquenchable thirst of Chavez will make him eventually accept the conditions imposed.
And thus we see the future of Venezuela where Chavez will repulse the Venezuelan intellectual elites and thus will have to rely more and more on international mercenaries. Meanwhile in the streets even people that know better are deciding to vote SI because they just love Chavez.
-The end-
Friday, November 09, 2007
Chavez New Constitution: Transitional Statutory Provisions
Introduction: Katy of Caracas Chronicles is another writer that does not need an introduction. Instead I am using this opportunity to announce that the constitutional project shifts gear as it needs to include at least some of the “sobrevenidos” (articles added at a few midnights reunions of the National Assembly). The 33 articles of Chavez might not be all covered but many others will be includes while necessary modifications to previous comments will be done if necessary as the new draft is finally published.
However there is a fascinating part, perhaps even more important than many of the 69 articles, and that is the “transitional provisions” of the text, those rules that will define how Venezuela shifts from democracy to authoritarian socialism (and who knows where else). To inaugurate this second phase of the Constitutional Blog I could not think of anyone better than Katy to deal with these “transitions” that are so revealing of what hides behind the Chavez naked power grab. I hope that you will be as impressed as I was.
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
The transition to the Socialist Constitution
By Katy (who can be contacted at Caracas Chronicles)
If Venezuelan voters approve the proposed Constitution, the Reform project has included a number of “Transitional Statutory Provisions” to be implemented right after the vote. Reading them gives us a hint of what the Constitutional reality will be on December 3rd if the “Sí” option wins.
1. Legislative priorities – “We prioritise all and everything”
Assuming the Constitution is approved, the National Assembly will proceed to modify the laws necessary to establish a socialist economy. Its first priority will be to pass Organic laws in matters such as the promotion of the socialist economy (or is that the destruction of the private economy?), the regulation (or is it pillage?) of the Central Bank, the creation of the National Fund of Popular Power, the downgrading of municipal power, regulation of oil and gas, regulation of social security, regulation of pensions for informal workers, anti-monopoly legislation and annuity payments for workers on payroll.
What this hints at is that the National Assembly will go to work quickly to begin implementing the laws that back economic reforms on practically everything. Communal councils will begin receiving loads of cash, and state and local government will see their resources dwindle. Chávez will be in complete control of the Central Bank and its reserves. Informal workers will supposedly begin getting a pension fund and the oil and gas laws will be changed. The curious thing is that many of these laws are already part of Chavez’s enabling package, which makes the emphasis on how they will get to work quickly rather odd.
The last bit on the list of laws to be changed is the Organic Education Law. The immediate discussion and passage of this new law will be a chance for the government to steamroll a demoralized opposition and impose its control over private education once and for all.
Other laws that will be prioritised include Organic laws for the territorial (dis?)organization of the country, for the Foreign Service (to make them what, more chavista? Is that even possible?), a reform of the penal code to include sanctions against torture (don’t we have that already?) and an organic law for the justice system (see comment on Foreign Service law).
What this amounts to is that the National Assembly will “prioritise” absolutely everything in its grasp. In other words, they will leave no stone unturned, and there’s no way of telling which stones they will overturn first.
2. Perks – “Fellas, come back to Congress whenever you want”
One of the Transitional articles includes a provision that any National Assembly representative elected December of 2005 can reclaim their seat after having served in any position in the Executive Power. In other words, if Chávez fires you, you still have a job to go back to, unlike now, where you have to settle for any old Embassy he might throw your way.
3. Indigenous representatives and annuity charges – “Oh, let’s do our job”
Eight years after approving the current Constitution, there are still many provisions in it that have not been regulated. The Assembly, in a curious act of devilishness, has included a number of provisions that regulate articles in the established Constitution but are not part of the group of articles being considered for reform.
An example of this is Article 92, which says all workers have a right to their annuity payments, or “prestaciones sociales.” The Assembly has decided to include in their Transitional Provisions an article explaining exactly how workers will get their annuities. It says workers will earn annuities according to their last salary, and that this right will last for ten years (the writing is very vague on this one, pardon but I don’t yet have my Ph.D. in Chavistology to make ends or tails of it). The purpose of this seems to be to ensure workers’ annuities do not suffer because of the change in the workweek.
Another example is Article 125 of the current Constitution, which is not up for discussion and simply says that indigenous people will have their own representatives. Transitional Provisions explain exactly how indigenous representatives will be elected, bypassing the need for a special law in that regard. They also say that the demarcation of indigenous lands, something that according to the existing Constitution should have been done a long time ago, will have to be done… in the next two years!
The indigenous lobby must be thrilled with all this attention they’re getting. Too bad it amounts to not much.
4. Deferring to other people – “The following things will be handled by the people who are supposed to handle them according to existing legislation.”
Somehow the National Assembly saw the need to specify that things that specific people are in charge of handling specific things under existing laws, and that these things will continue to be handled by those people under existing laws, unless they (the Assembly) change their minds. If this sounds to you, as it does to me, as complete mumbo-jumbo and a total waste of paper, then maybe we didn’t go to enough law classes to understand the “intricacies” of the judicial “sciences.”
For example, the Provisions delegate to the CNE any authority to decide the details of how elections are to be carried out while new electoral laws are passed. In other words, it includes a paragraph saying that the CNE is in charge of elections until we change the laws, which is totally and completely obvious to me.
Furthermore, it specifies that, until new legislation is brought forth regarding empty lots of land, the administration of said lands will continue in the hands of Chávez under the guise of whatever the hell he decides is his will on a particular day, ermm, sorry, “existing legislation.”
The provisions also specify that the matters of “professional titles,” and “professional associations” will continue to be guided by existing legislation. Again, oddly enough, this is referring to an Article (105) that surprisingly! exists in our actual Constitution, which says something completely banal about how the law will regulate the requisites people need to earn a professional degree and associate with colleagues and, doubly surprising! is not even one of the articles being considered for the reform.
Finally, the Comptroller’s office and the regulations that govern its functioning are supposed to continue working under existing legislation. In other words, the Comptroller and his cronies can continue keeping their heads in the sand just fine.
5. The economy again – “Oh, in case it wasn’t clear by now, Chávez will run everything for as long as he wants”
There are separate provisions specifying that Chávez will have immediate power to modify key things about our economy. It would seem like the fact that Chávez has an Enabling Law with an actual expiration date is not enough, since the Transitional Provisions effectively hand over power to Chavez “until laws are passed” which could perfectly be never.
Insofar as laws are not approved, Chávez will be able to begin the transition to a socialist economy by decree. Chavez will also be able to fund Communal Councils immediately, until an Organic Law for the Popular Power is approved.
6. Decentralization – “Bye-bye suckas!!”
As was expected, a number of the transitory provisions deal with the immediate dismantling of decentralization.
The changes to the Constitutional Entitlements (Situado Constitucional), by which state and local governments are entitled to a certain percentage of the national budget, will come into effect with the Budget Law of 2009. In other words, decentralization has exactly one year before it ceases to exist.
Furthermore, it hands over to Chavez the power to create the Federal District of Caracas, remove current Major Mayor (no pun intended) Barreto and pass all administrative and bureaucratic tasks to the new Federal District authorities. Oh, I forgot, “as long as a new law isn’t passed”, which could be never. In other words, Chávez becomes the king and sole decider of the Federal District as well.
Finally, it says the State has one year to transfer all the power stipulated in the reform from the different local governments to Chavez.
The idea is clear: we have exactly one year before the decentralization experiment is part of history.
7. Presidential elections in 2012 – “Wait – Chavez resigns at the beginning of his fourth period?”
Curiously enough, the Provisions specify that the new, seven-year presidential term will only come into effect once the current one is done. In other words, there will be Presidential elections in 2012 and not 2013.
This is a surprise to me. If my calculator is correct, that means that elections following that will take place in 2019, for a term that would begin in early 2020. That means that if Chavez plans on staying until 2021, he’s planning to resign after the start of that term?
Wait, maybe they’re confused just like they were with the changes in the clock. Maybe Chavez wants to stay until 2030. But wait – elections would take place in 2026 and then in 2033. How would he only stay until 2030? Is he planning to die that year? Is he going to resign? Is he planning on changing the Constitution again in the future? Should we expect a change in 2010 saying the Presidential term is now TEN years instead of seven?
However, the article itself is written in quasi-grammatical fashion, as is usual with these shamefully uneducated lawmakers. It says, “Fourteenth: The presidential term established in article 230 of this Constitution will be applied once the current presidential term has expired.” Putting aside the issue that Presidential terms are not “applied”, it seems like there’s a wee-bit of a gray area there, but I find it unlikely that they will come up with nonsensical interpretations of this article. Then again, stranger things have happened.
8. State of exception – “Oh, I almost forgot, your rights will be taken from you whenever we say for as long as we want, starting now”
It’s been said before, but it begs repeating. The law passed in 2001 that regulated when, how and for how long the State can decree a “State of Exception” - see Musharraf (2007) – will cease to exist as soon as this Constitution is approved. In other words, if in the days after the Constitution is approved the government decides to enact an unlimited State of Exception, we will be in true legal limbo since there will be no law to regulate it – meaning, no law that says what the State can or cannot do during those “exceptional” times.
In this scenario, the National Assembly makes clear that it would not be violating any laws by enacting a State of Exception since, well, States of Exception will be completely unregulated. When the government begins to censor newspapers at will, it will have the law on its side.
Furthermore, the State of Exception will be for as long as the government wants it to be. Say, did you know that people in Egypt have been living under a State of Exception since 1967? Did you know that Hitler enacted a State of Exception following the Reichstag fire in 1933, and the German Constitution was effectively suspended until the war was over? Did you know that Syria has been in a State of Exception since 1963? Just thought I’d throw that out there. It’s amazing the kind of stuff you can learn from Wikipedia.
-The end-
However there is a fascinating part, perhaps even more important than many of the 69 articles, and that is the “transitional provisions” of the text, those rules that will define how Venezuela shifts from democracy to authoritarian socialism (and who knows where else). To inaugurate this second phase of the Constitutional Blog I could not think of anyone better than Katy to deal with these “transitions” that are so revealing of what hides behind the Chavez naked power grab. I hope that you will be as impressed as I was.
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
The transition to the Socialist Constitution
By Katy (who can be contacted at Caracas Chronicles)
If Venezuelan voters approve the proposed Constitution, the Reform project has included a number of “Transitional Statutory Provisions” to be implemented right after the vote. Reading them gives us a hint of what the Constitutional reality will be on December 3rd if the “Sí” option wins.
1. Legislative priorities – “We prioritise all and everything”
Assuming the Constitution is approved, the National Assembly will proceed to modify the laws necessary to establish a socialist economy. Its first priority will be to pass Organic laws in matters such as the promotion of the socialist economy (or is that the destruction of the private economy?), the regulation (or is it pillage?) of the Central Bank, the creation of the National Fund of Popular Power, the downgrading of municipal power, regulation of oil and gas, regulation of social security, regulation of pensions for informal workers, anti-monopoly legislation and annuity payments for workers on payroll.
What this hints at is that the National Assembly will go to work quickly to begin implementing the laws that back economic reforms on practically everything. Communal councils will begin receiving loads of cash, and state and local government will see their resources dwindle. Chávez will be in complete control of the Central Bank and its reserves. Informal workers will supposedly begin getting a pension fund and the oil and gas laws will be changed. The curious thing is that many of these laws are already part of Chavez’s enabling package, which makes the emphasis on how they will get to work quickly rather odd.
The last bit on the list of laws to be changed is the Organic Education Law. The immediate discussion and passage of this new law will be a chance for the government to steamroll a demoralized opposition and impose its control over private education once and for all.
Other laws that will be prioritised include Organic laws for the territorial (dis?)organization of the country, for the Foreign Service (to make them what, more chavista? Is that even possible?), a reform of the penal code to include sanctions against torture (don’t we have that already?) and an organic law for the justice system (see comment on Foreign Service law).
What this amounts to is that the National Assembly will “prioritise” absolutely everything in its grasp. In other words, they will leave no stone unturned, and there’s no way of telling which stones they will overturn first.
2. Perks – “Fellas, come back to Congress whenever you want”
One of the Transitional articles includes a provision that any National Assembly representative elected December of 2005 can reclaim their seat after having served in any position in the Executive Power. In other words, if Chávez fires you, you still have a job to go back to, unlike now, where you have to settle for any old Embassy he might throw your way.
3. Indigenous representatives and annuity charges – “Oh, let’s do our job”
Eight years after approving the current Constitution, there are still many provisions in it that have not been regulated. The Assembly, in a curious act of devilishness, has included a number of provisions that regulate articles in the established Constitution but are not part of the group of articles being considered for reform.
An example of this is Article 92, which says all workers have a right to their annuity payments, or “prestaciones sociales.” The Assembly has decided to include in their Transitional Provisions an article explaining exactly how workers will get their annuities. It says workers will earn annuities according to their last salary, and that this right will last for ten years (the writing is very vague on this one, pardon but I don’t yet have my Ph.D. in Chavistology to make ends or tails of it). The purpose of this seems to be to ensure workers’ annuities do not suffer because of the change in the workweek.
Another example is Article 125 of the current Constitution, which is not up for discussion and simply says that indigenous people will have their own representatives. Transitional Provisions explain exactly how indigenous representatives will be elected, bypassing the need for a special law in that regard. They also say that the demarcation of indigenous lands, something that according to the existing Constitution should have been done a long time ago, will have to be done… in the next two years!
The indigenous lobby must be thrilled with all this attention they’re getting. Too bad it amounts to not much.
4. Deferring to other people – “The following things will be handled by the people who are supposed to handle them according to existing legislation.”
Somehow the National Assembly saw the need to specify that things that specific people are in charge of handling specific things under existing laws, and that these things will continue to be handled by those people under existing laws, unless they (the Assembly) change their minds. If this sounds to you, as it does to me, as complete mumbo-jumbo and a total waste of paper, then maybe we didn’t go to enough law classes to understand the “intricacies” of the judicial “sciences.”
For example, the Provisions delegate to the CNE any authority to decide the details of how elections are to be carried out while new electoral laws are passed. In other words, it includes a paragraph saying that the CNE is in charge of elections until we change the laws, which is totally and completely obvious to me.
Furthermore, it specifies that, until new legislation is brought forth regarding empty lots of land, the administration of said lands will continue in the hands of Chávez under the guise of whatever the hell he decides is his will on a particular day, ermm, sorry, “existing legislation.”
The provisions also specify that the matters of “professional titles,” and “professional associations” will continue to be guided by existing legislation. Again, oddly enough, this is referring to an Article (105) that surprisingly! exists in our actual Constitution, which says something completely banal about how the law will regulate the requisites people need to earn a professional degree and associate with colleagues and, doubly surprising! is not even one of the articles being considered for the reform.
Finally, the Comptroller’s office and the regulations that govern its functioning are supposed to continue working under existing legislation. In other words, the Comptroller and his cronies can continue keeping their heads in the sand just fine.
5. The economy again – “Oh, in case it wasn’t clear by now, Chávez will run everything for as long as he wants”
There are separate provisions specifying that Chávez will have immediate power to modify key things about our economy. It would seem like the fact that Chávez has an Enabling Law with an actual expiration date is not enough, since the Transitional Provisions effectively hand over power to Chavez “until laws are passed” which could perfectly be never.
Insofar as laws are not approved, Chávez will be able to begin the transition to a socialist economy by decree. Chavez will also be able to fund Communal Councils immediately, until an Organic Law for the Popular Power is approved.
6. Decentralization – “Bye-bye suckas!!”
As was expected, a number of the transitory provisions deal with the immediate dismantling of decentralization.
The changes to the Constitutional Entitlements (Situado Constitucional), by which state and local governments are entitled to a certain percentage of the national budget, will come into effect with the Budget Law of 2009. In other words, decentralization has exactly one year before it ceases to exist.
Furthermore, it hands over to Chavez the power to create the Federal District of Caracas, remove current Major Mayor (no pun intended) Barreto and pass all administrative and bureaucratic tasks to the new Federal District authorities. Oh, I forgot, “as long as a new law isn’t passed”, which could be never. In other words, Chávez becomes the king and sole decider of the Federal District as well.
Finally, it says the State has one year to transfer all the power stipulated in the reform from the different local governments to Chavez.
The idea is clear: we have exactly one year before the decentralization experiment is part of history.
7. Presidential elections in 2012 – “Wait – Chavez resigns at the beginning of his fourth period?”
Curiously enough, the Provisions specify that the new, seven-year presidential term will only come into effect once the current one is done. In other words, there will be Presidential elections in 2012 and not 2013.
This is a surprise to me. If my calculator is correct, that means that elections following that will take place in 2019, for a term that would begin in early 2020. That means that if Chavez plans on staying until 2021, he’s planning to resign after the start of that term?
Wait, maybe they’re confused just like they were with the changes in the clock. Maybe Chavez wants to stay until 2030. But wait – elections would take place in 2026 and then in 2033. How would he only stay until 2030? Is he planning to die that year? Is he going to resign? Is he planning on changing the Constitution again in the future? Should we expect a change in 2010 saying the Presidential term is now TEN years instead of seven?
However, the article itself is written in quasi-grammatical fashion, as is usual with these shamefully uneducated lawmakers. It says, “Fourteenth: The presidential term established in article 230 of this Constitution will be applied once the current presidential term has expired.” Putting aside the issue that Presidential terms are not “applied”, it seems like there’s a wee-bit of a gray area there, but I find it unlikely that they will come up with nonsensical interpretations of this article. Then again, stranger things have happened.
8. State of exception – “Oh, I almost forgot, your rights will be taken from you whenever we say for as long as we want, starting now”
It’s been said before, but it begs repeating. The law passed in 2001 that regulated when, how and for how long the State can decree a “State of Exception” - see Musharraf (2007) – will cease to exist as soon as this Constitution is approved. In other words, if in the days after the Constitution is approved the government decides to enact an unlimited State of Exception, we will be in true legal limbo since there will be no law to regulate it – meaning, no law that says what the State can or cannot do during those “exceptional” times.
In this scenario, the National Assembly makes clear that it would not be violating any laws by enacting a State of Exception since, well, States of Exception will be completely unregulated. When the government begins to censor newspapers at will, it will have the law on its side.
Furthermore, the State of Exception will be for as long as the government wants it to be. Say, did you know that people in Egypt have been living under a State of Exception since 1967? Did you know that Hitler enacted a State of Exception following the Reichstag fire in 1933, and the German Constitution was effectively suspended until the war was over? Did you know that Syria has been in a State of Exception since 1963? Just thought I’d throw that out there. It’s amazing the kind of stuff you can learn from Wikipedia.
-The end-
Tuesday, November 06, 2007
Baduel throws a big stone in the Venezuelan pond
And the ripples are just starting. (Updated)
I know, I know, some readers probably want me to start by explaining how Baduel will rid us of Chavez. Before I address that I will, as it is my bad habit, write some background so people can measure the importance of the moment. It is a good opportunity because I have not done a political update in a few weeks and less than one month from the supposed voting day, it might be my last opportunity.
Opposition problems
I start there because it is the easiest part of this post.
Since June the opposition has the upper hand in the battles of ideas. Even the launching of the constitutional proposal reform in August 15 was unable to stir any social debate because 1) it was obvious that it was about giving Chavez more power and a presidency for life and 2) the way the discussion was directed was not conducive for chavismo to become a source of ideas: it was asked to shut up and approve the proposal.
But it was neither for the political parties nor the mass media to benefit from this chavismo mental blanking: the dissident students found with the closing of RCTV the voice to say what was at stake in Venezuela: freedom of information loss is the first step before the loss of other freedoms. Students, who thrive on information, understand that very well.
Thus was the first error of chavismo: by closing RCTV it created the first genuine popular movement against it (regardless of its size) and it broke its international image to levels it did not imagine.
Chavismo problems
Chavismo had a hard time to deal with the student ill called “dissidence” (because chavismo assumes that all in Venezuela should be behind Chavez). They even tried a shameful entrapment at the National Assembly. It blew in the face of Cilia Flores, the chair, and its acolytes and from then on chavismo could only hope for summer vacation to get rid of the students.
Unfortunately for chavismo new problems were in stock: white sugar which had been missing for six month was rejoined by brown sugar, and milk, and wheat floor, and cooking oil, etc… Oh, Venezuela did not starve but the fact of the matter is that now for your weekly shopping you have to schedule several stops. If this is understandable in time of natural catastrophe, it is not in time of peace when you are subjected to incessant propaganda from the sate that all is rosy and bright.
Soon, in the heat of summer a carry-on bag was caught in Buenos Aires with 800 000 dollars in cash. Owning such a large stash of cash in Venezuela is not legal (unless you declare them to the sate and justify its origin as from a certain date) and taking it out of the country even less legal (unless CADIVI allows you to do so). Chavez decided to silence all by throwing in the game his constitutional proposal at the very last date he could do it to get a vote before the end of the year.
If the initial proposal audacity and callousness sort of stunned us for a few days, soon enough it was clear that things were not alright for chavismo. The first evidence for that was the refusal of chavismo to discuss the proposal except in staged ceremonies that the opposition tried to crash as often as possible. This created a sense of “hiding the truth” that PODEMOS took up with craftiness to reconstruct its battered image without breaking up with some sector of the chavismo base.
By the time September rolled in the student movement started to wake up again. All the way through the end of September and early October unrest became the norm, from chavistas protesting the lack of housing or milk, to students starting again street activities. There was effervescence though no one would have expected the result of October X. That day, under the rain, the students showed that they were back in the streets in large numbers, and that the opposition electorate was starting to follow them. Almost in the same breath the main cultural and think tanks of the country opposed the new constitution, the Church went squarely against it and repression started to be felt in the street. By last November 1 march to the CNE suddenly it was clear chavismo was not holding the street anymore because, simply put, there was no popular support of Chavez in the streets as the serious opinion polls showed that less than 40% of the country might be willing to vote for the garbage that was printed by the National Assembly last Friday.
We can say today that we should have seen it coming, but we were still taken aback by the speed of it all. Chavez rally of this Sunday was a surprise to all, including to Chavez. The low attendance, the unwillingness of his people to show up or to crack down as much as they should on the opposition made Chavez go bonkers in his speech. In front of an emptying Bolivar Avenue Chavez threatened the students, forbade them to take to the streets again, demanded the security apparatus to keep order in the streets while 40 more Venezuelans were murdered by petty crime this week alone in Caracas. He also threatened Globovision, CNN and what not. In other words Chavez ordered the administration to take car of HIS interests before those of the country.
But Chavez was only seeing in front him the results of his second political error: not to extend unlimited reelection to his followers. In his mad ambition to stay in office for ever and protecting himself from any challenge, external or internal, he removed the only incentive that was left to his followers to support him. Why would Pedro Perez, two term mayor of Tucusiapón, who is out of a job next October, spend his last monies (that he could “distract “ for other uses) in bringing people to Caracas, in campaigning for Chavez? What is in it for him when his boss so grossly extend his presidential term, ensures eternal renewal while he sends him back into oblivion?
Chavez third mistake?
The third mistake of Chavez was yesterday, with his intemperate attacks on all, showing were the shots were coming from: a totalitarian past, clear for all to see and hear. Clear even for his supporters, and we can be sure that a few of them wondered what could protect them the day he turns against them.
That is in part what explains today events. First, the students undaunted have protested pretty much everywhere. More clashes, injuries reported. For all to see, for all to worry about.
But there was the Baduel bomb. That bomb was well prepared even if it had a certain sense of “sudden” to it. To begin with I have already received through two mails the link to a Baduel blog! There, besides his career you can read the whole text he read today. So there you have it, Baduel is not acting alone, even if he seemed in a rush today.
But see, for all the faults that Baduel has, and this blog has been a consistent reporter of them, there is one thing that Baduel has: he is a serious and methodical man and the chaos where chavismo is slowly sinking can only affect him. After yesterday intemperate threats of Chavez he had no choice but come out today against Chavez in the strongest terms one can imagine.
I am certainly not going to be a pro Baduel guy now, I am allergic to any military and to begin with if we are in the dire situation we are in today it is in large part due to Baduel. It is too easy to come and try to make up like that. But Baduel is onto something and he certainly senses when the wind turns, just as he sensed perfectly all events through April 11-13 2002, showing impeccable timing then. I do not know who his allies are. PODEMOS? Some within the army? Some within chavismo? But he certainly can lead and anti-SI front because probably nobody within chavismo has the credentials to do so. You just needed to see the funeral faces of the crowd around the Vice president Rodriguez press round this afternoon. Rodriguez, the cynic clown ever could not manage to bring a single smile from any of those around them except for the sutured plastic smile of Cilia Flores, and a poor quality one today.
And tonight as I type this I watched on VTV Chavez called Baduel a traitor, making Vanessa Davis, the host, wince at how easily Chavez goes from calling you a friend to able you a traitor just because you expressed your opinion. I am sure that Vanessa must have wondered when her turn will come.
Oh yes, they brought even Maniglia and Carneiro, two former defense ministers, to the front. Maniglia seemed fatter than ever, with all the signs of a major, major hangover. Carneiro was his stupid self. They even managed to contradict themselves and seemed totally pitiful in their threats. But no matter how they try to smear Baduel, the usual chavista threat against anyone they dislike from modest bloggers to 3 star generals, with Baduel it will not work. He is the one to which Chavez owes his throne and the whole country knows that. And if they push too hard against Baduel I am sure he will have some dirt to throw at them.
The new panorama
Well, I am sorry to say that my crystal ball is not working yet.
The students cannot alone unseat Chavez. As Katy explained very well we cannot ask them for the impossible. Unless we hit the street with them and march to Miraflores like in April 11 2002, nothing is going to happen. They are an important factor, an essential factor, but alone they cannot do it. Even less when the standards of Alo Ciudadano tonight were still full of people calling not to vote in an hysterical way without proposing for an instant what we should do in exchange.
The political parties? Has anyone heard of them lately? Besides some peep squeaks from Primero Justicia, that is all.
Comando de la Resistencia? Chavez has called for their head yesterday. The students were out today, we will see what the Comando will be doing in turn. It is their turn to show us that they are willing to risk their lives for us. I suspect that Hernan Escarra will do. I wonder if is infamous brother Carlos Escarra will shoot him.
Chavismo lost big today. They will waste precious campaign days countering Baduel speech. In fact, today they might have lost the vote. Why? Because Baduel was not talking to the opposition: Baduel was talking to the chavistas that do not agree with the constitutional fraud. He spoke clearly to them, implying that it was OK to vote NO, that they would not be alone and that Baduel will be their lightning road. That includes many soldiers in barracks where the strange sado-masochism of military culture makes many soldiers vote for whom their fat and corrupt generals tell them to vote for. Baduel has infinitely more ascendancy than people like Maniglia who got even fatter while his wife is in high positions within Miraflores.
Or why do you think that Chavez himself went tonight on TV, even though through a never ending phone call to Vanessa show? To lower himself in a way that a head of state should NEVER lower himself, to call a citizen a traitor without any proof, without any arrest warrant. Baduel knew how to hit deep and precise.
Baduel today has made it acceptable for many chavistas to start speaking out in a wave that might become a tsunami. Or not. Observe that in his speech he never mentioned Chavez, he never asked for his ousting. He told chavistas indirectly but very understandably that they could vote NO and yet Chavez could still enjoy five more years in office.
Now, what the opposition will do does not seem to be of any concern for Baduel. Their only option is to follow his lead, stop their stupid internecine quarrels as to vote or not to vote and go massively stop the coup d’état announced by Baduel. Some think itis a tap, that Bduel is acting with Chaevz in tandem so as to convicne peopel togo and vote and fall in thetap of the CNE. I am not so sure. This is too risky of a gamble for chavismo, and Baduel for all his fault has always been an independent spirit which is why Chavez had so much hesitation and delays before giving him his third star, way longer after mediocrities such as Carneiro got theirs.
To end this story I will just say that Baduel says in his declaration that we should all go and vote, that the constitutional change proposal is nothing less than a coup d'etat in which all branches of government are accomplices, and that will have to pay for it someday. The only thing he does not say is that he will not recognize the result of an eventual vote, but that is material for a later post. I need to discuss in more detail this recurring idea, that even if the country votes yes we have the right to refuse a document that restricts our rights without a Constitutional Assembly. Baduel hints at that, though.
--- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Rayma gives us a stunning cartoon. It is a pun which is much better in Spanish than in English but here it is: we have now our reasoning/rationing cards. Observe the red padlocks, the red ties. That is what chavismo wants to do to all of its followers, lock in a unique way to see the world. Impressively scary cartoon of the thugs that want to lord over us forever.
-The end-
I know, I know, some readers probably want me to start by explaining how Baduel will rid us of Chavez. Before I address that I will, as it is my bad habit, write some background so people can measure the importance of the moment. It is a good opportunity because I have not done a political update in a few weeks and less than one month from the supposed voting day, it might be my last opportunity.
Opposition problems
I start there because it is the easiest part of this post.
Since June the opposition has the upper hand in the battles of ideas. Even the launching of the constitutional proposal reform in August 15 was unable to stir any social debate because 1) it was obvious that it was about giving Chavez more power and a presidency for life and 2) the way the discussion was directed was not conducive for chavismo to become a source of ideas: it was asked to shut up and approve the proposal.
But it was neither for the political parties nor the mass media to benefit from this chavismo mental blanking: the dissident students found with the closing of RCTV the voice to say what was at stake in Venezuela: freedom of information loss is the first step before the loss of other freedoms. Students, who thrive on information, understand that very well.
Thus was the first error of chavismo: by closing RCTV it created the first genuine popular movement against it (regardless of its size) and it broke its international image to levels it did not imagine.
Chavismo problems
Chavismo had a hard time to deal with the student ill called “dissidence” (because chavismo assumes that all in Venezuela should be behind Chavez). They even tried a shameful entrapment at the National Assembly. It blew in the face of Cilia Flores, the chair, and its acolytes and from then on chavismo could only hope for summer vacation to get rid of the students.
Unfortunately for chavismo new problems were in stock: white sugar which had been missing for six month was rejoined by brown sugar, and milk, and wheat floor, and cooking oil, etc… Oh, Venezuela did not starve but the fact of the matter is that now for your weekly shopping you have to schedule several stops. If this is understandable in time of natural catastrophe, it is not in time of peace when you are subjected to incessant propaganda from the sate that all is rosy and bright.
Soon, in the heat of summer a carry-on bag was caught in Buenos Aires with 800 000 dollars in cash. Owning such a large stash of cash in Venezuela is not legal (unless you declare them to the sate and justify its origin as from a certain date) and taking it out of the country even less legal (unless CADIVI allows you to do so). Chavez decided to silence all by throwing in the game his constitutional proposal at the very last date he could do it to get a vote before the end of the year.
If the initial proposal audacity and callousness sort of stunned us for a few days, soon enough it was clear that things were not alright for chavismo. The first evidence for that was the refusal of chavismo to discuss the proposal except in staged ceremonies that the opposition tried to crash as often as possible. This created a sense of “hiding the truth” that PODEMOS took up with craftiness to reconstruct its battered image without breaking up with some sector of the chavismo base.
By the time September rolled in the student movement started to wake up again. All the way through the end of September and early October unrest became the norm, from chavistas protesting the lack of housing or milk, to students starting again street activities. There was effervescence though no one would have expected the result of October X. That day, under the rain, the students showed that they were back in the streets in large numbers, and that the opposition electorate was starting to follow them. Almost in the same breath the main cultural and think tanks of the country opposed the new constitution, the Church went squarely against it and repression started to be felt in the street. By last November 1 march to the CNE suddenly it was clear chavismo was not holding the street anymore because, simply put, there was no popular support of Chavez in the streets as the serious opinion polls showed that less than 40% of the country might be willing to vote for the garbage that was printed by the National Assembly last Friday.
We can say today that we should have seen it coming, but we were still taken aback by the speed of it all. Chavez rally of this Sunday was a surprise to all, including to Chavez. The low attendance, the unwillingness of his people to show up or to crack down as much as they should on the opposition made Chavez go bonkers in his speech. In front of an emptying Bolivar Avenue Chavez threatened the students, forbade them to take to the streets again, demanded the security apparatus to keep order in the streets while 40 more Venezuelans were murdered by petty crime this week alone in Caracas. He also threatened Globovision, CNN and what not. In other words Chavez ordered the administration to take car of HIS interests before those of the country.
But Chavez was only seeing in front him the results of his second political error: not to extend unlimited reelection to his followers. In his mad ambition to stay in office for ever and protecting himself from any challenge, external or internal, he removed the only incentive that was left to his followers to support him. Why would Pedro Perez, two term mayor of Tucusiapón, who is out of a job next October, spend his last monies (that he could “distract “ for other uses) in bringing people to Caracas, in campaigning for Chavez? What is in it for him when his boss so grossly extend his presidential term, ensures eternal renewal while he sends him back into oblivion?
Chavez third mistake?
The third mistake of Chavez was yesterday, with his intemperate attacks on all, showing were the shots were coming from: a totalitarian past, clear for all to see and hear. Clear even for his supporters, and we can be sure that a few of them wondered what could protect them the day he turns against them.
That is in part what explains today events. First, the students undaunted have protested pretty much everywhere. More clashes, injuries reported. For all to see, for all to worry about.
But there was the Baduel bomb. That bomb was well prepared even if it had a certain sense of “sudden” to it. To begin with I have already received through two mails the link to a Baduel blog! There, besides his career you can read the whole text he read today. So there you have it, Baduel is not acting alone, even if he seemed in a rush today.
But see, for all the faults that Baduel has, and this blog has been a consistent reporter of them, there is one thing that Baduel has: he is a serious and methodical man and the chaos where chavismo is slowly sinking can only affect him. After yesterday intemperate threats of Chavez he had no choice but come out today against Chavez in the strongest terms one can imagine.
I am certainly not going to be a pro Baduel guy now, I am allergic to any military and to begin with if we are in the dire situation we are in today it is in large part due to Baduel. It is too easy to come and try to make up like that. But Baduel is onto something and he certainly senses when the wind turns, just as he sensed perfectly all events through April 11-13 2002, showing impeccable timing then. I do not know who his allies are. PODEMOS? Some within the army? Some within chavismo? But he certainly can lead and anti-SI front because probably nobody within chavismo has the credentials to do so. You just needed to see the funeral faces of the crowd around the Vice president Rodriguez press round this afternoon. Rodriguez, the cynic clown ever could not manage to bring a single smile from any of those around them except for the sutured plastic smile of Cilia Flores, and a poor quality one today.
And tonight as I type this I watched on VTV Chavez called Baduel a traitor, making Vanessa Davis, the host, wince at how easily Chavez goes from calling you a friend to able you a traitor just because you expressed your opinion. I am sure that Vanessa must have wondered when her turn will come.
Oh yes, they brought even Maniglia and Carneiro, two former defense ministers, to the front. Maniglia seemed fatter than ever, with all the signs of a major, major hangover. Carneiro was his stupid self. They even managed to contradict themselves and seemed totally pitiful in their threats. But no matter how they try to smear Baduel, the usual chavista threat against anyone they dislike from modest bloggers to 3 star generals, with Baduel it will not work. He is the one to which Chavez owes his throne and the whole country knows that. And if they push too hard against Baduel I am sure he will have some dirt to throw at them.
The new panorama
Well, I am sorry to say that my crystal ball is not working yet.
The students cannot alone unseat Chavez. As Katy explained very well we cannot ask them for the impossible. Unless we hit the street with them and march to Miraflores like in April 11 2002, nothing is going to happen. They are an important factor, an essential factor, but alone they cannot do it. Even less when the standards of Alo Ciudadano tonight were still full of people calling not to vote in an hysterical way without proposing for an instant what we should do in exchange.
The political parties? Has anyone heard of them lately? Besides some peep squeaks from Primero Justicia, that is all.
Comando de la Resistencia? Chavez has called for their head yesterday. The students were out today, we will see what the Comando will be doing in turn. It is their turn to show us that they are willing to risk their lives for us. I suspect that Hernan Escarra will do. I wonder if is infamous brother Carlos Escarra will shoot him.
Chavismo lost big today. They will waste precious campaign days countering Baduel speech. In fact, today they might have lost the vote. Why? Because Baduel was not talking to the opposition: Baduel was talking to the chavistas that do not agree with the constitutional fraud. He spoke clearly to them, implying that it was OK to vote NO, that they would not be alone and that Baduel will be their lightning road. That includes many soldiers in barracks where the strange sado-masochism of military culture makes many soldiers vote for whom their fat and corrupt generals tell them to vote for. Baduel has infinitely more ascendancy than people like Maniglia who got even fatter while his wife is in high positions within Miraflores.
Or why do you think that Chavez himself went tonight on TV, even though through a never ending phone call to Vanessa show? To lower himself in a way that a head of state should NEVER lower himself, to call a citizen a traitor without any proof, without any arrest warrant. Baduel knew how to hit deep and precise.
Baduel today has made it acceptable for many chavistas to start speaking out in a wave that might become a tsunami. Or not. Observe that in his speech he never mentioned Chavez, he never asked for his ousting. He told chavistas indirectly but very understandably that they could vote NO and yet Chavez could still enjoy five more years in office.
Now, what the opposition will do does not seem to be of any concern for Baduel. Their only option is to follow his lead, stop their stupid internecine quarrels as to vote or not to vote and go massively stop the coup d’état announced by Baduel. Some think itis a tap, that Bduel is acting with Chaevz in tandem so as to convicne peopel togo and vote and fall in thetap of the CNE. I am not so sure. This is too risky of a gamble for chavismo, and Baduel for all his fault has always been an independent spirit which is why Chavez had so much hesitation and delays before giving him his third star, way longer after mediocrities such as Carneiro got theirs.
To end this story I will just say that Baduel says in his declaration that we should all go and vote, that the constitutional change proposal is nothing less than a coup d'etat in which all branches of government are accomplices, and that will have to pay for it someday. The only thing he does not say is that he will not recognize the result of an eventual vote, but that is material for a later post. I need to discuss in more detail this recurring idea, that even if the country votes yes we have the right to refuse a document that restricts our rights without a Constitutional Assembly. Baduel hints at that, though.
--- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Rayma gives us a stunning cartoon. It is a pun which is much better in Spanish than in English but here it is: we have now our reasoning/rationing cards. Observe the red padlocks, the red ties. That is what chavismo wants to do to all of its followers, lock in a unique way to see the world. Impressively scary cartoon of the thugs that want to lord over us forever.
-The end-
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