2019 in review part 4: a suicidal opposition?

The opposition to the regime started on solid footing in January when Guaido was elected chair of the National Assembly as this one declared null the "election" of Maduro a few months before.  Unfortunately the high hopes of early 2019 have been dashed and many are trying to put all the blame on Guaido. This is unfair for many reasons.

2019 in review part 3: the dollar bubble

The economy of Venezuela keeps tanking. And yet some papers are talking "improvement". This is bullshit and only reflects on the superficiality of Venezuelan coverage, still, after all of these years.  Then again if you limit yourself to Caracas you could be fooled, the more so that traveling inside the country is becoming more and more difficult.

Why? Two reasons. Caracas is the showcase of the regime, and this one has relented and allowed public use of the US dollar (other currencies come to nought in spite of the regime attempts at favoring Euros).

The Pompeo storm

Today we had yet another example on how the failures of the opposition outmatch its successes.

Secretary of state Mike Pompeo had a private conversation on Venezuela that was leaked (I personally wonder whether he wanted that to be leaked). In that conversation he said two important things: that the Venezuelan opposition was very hard to organize into some form or real unity and that it was because there were at least 40 folks that wanted the US to annoint them as the next president of Venezuela. (1)

“Our conundrum, which is to keep the opposition united, has proven devilishly difficult”

“The moment Maduro leaves, everybody’s going to raise their hands and [say], ‘Take me, I’m the next president of Venezuela.’ It would be forty-plus people who believe they’re the rightful heir to Maduro.”

Fiascoes

Following Venezuela from afar is a painful exercise. All that I see are missed opportunities and grand thuggery in action. Not surprising of course when you know the actors. What is most offensive though is the reaction of these actors; as if they expected the outcome to be different than what was predictable.

I am speaking for all, not only the opposition post April 30 debacle, but also the regime failure to come up with a solution to its power holding problems, only insuring that everything will happen again. And let's not forget the international community either desperately clueless or desperately weak (or both).

From afar, to Cucuta

Trying to speak about what goes on from afar is reckless.

Local information is not good, does not understand what has been going on in Venezuela, let's its own bias take over.

Following tweets does not help much. Opposition tweets are transfigured. Chavista tweets are beyond denial.

Even were I to be in Venezuela it would not have been too easy: massive shut down of any media that shows the Cucuta concert , including Nat geo (or that may discuss the massacre of natives at the hand of the Nazional Guard at the Brazilian border).

Thus I have to resort to go to bed with some comfort pill and hope for a nicer wake up tomorrow morning.

One thing is certain though: the only way out for Maduro is a blood bath. Or a yellow uniform.

Tug of war

I was distracted with other issues, so let's have a quick catch up, in what seems to be now the usual mode, item by item.

What is the legal status of Juan Guaido?

The eight day challenge: myths of snap elections

Yesterday the European Union, clearly in trouble in finding a single voice on how to deal with the current situation on Venezuela, emitted through some countries what was termed an "ultimatum" to Maduro. What I saw myself as a great tool form the EU generated a tweet storm of rejection that surprised me. Well, maybe not, the Venezuelan tweetosphere has become quite deleterious.  Perhaps that hysterical opposition expects the foreign legion to land tomorrow to free us?
So as a new public service I am going explain a few electoral details to understand the whys of the ultimatum details.

How does operate the European Union foreign policy

Servicio publico / Public service / Service public: RE:23/01/2019

RE. Juan Guaidó 23/01/2019

Servicio publico/Public service/Service public

Español: Escribo esta ayuda explicativa en tres idiomas para que usted pueda argumentar con cualquier ignorante que pretenda ser conocedor de Venezuela.

English: I am writing this so you can argue with any ignorant that pretends to know about Venezuela.

Français : J’écris ceci pour que vous puissiez expliquer aux ignorants qui croient tout savoir sur le Venezuela. 

Explication technique simple du 23 janvier en français

 - L'élection de Maduro en mai 2018 n'a aucune légalité ni légitimité. L'élection a été convoquée en dehors du système judiciaire (élection en mai pour être assermenté en janvier, convoquée par une assemblée constituante illégale, conditions extrêmement défavorables pour tout candidat contre Maduro, etc.).

Simple technical explanation of January 23 crisis in English

My excuses for a bad typo: for some reason Blogger repeated the first two paragraphs, something that did not happen in the French and Spanish versions.  When I proof read it it was a cache copy and thus I did not detect it.  Sorry for those who already had read this post entry. But the arguments still remain equally valid.
-------------------------------------
- The election of Maduro in May 2018 has no legality or legitimacy. The election was convened outside the legal system (election in May to be sworn in in January, convened by an illegal constituent assembly, extremely unfavorable conditions for any candidate against Maduro, etc.)

Explicación técnica simple del 23 de enero en español

- La elección de Maduro en mayo 2018 no posee ni legalidad ni legitimidad. La elección fue convocada fuera del ordenamiento legal (elección en mayo para juramentarse en enero, convocada por una asamblea constituyente ilegal, condiciones extremadamente desfavorables para cualquier candidato contra Maduro, etc)